

America's Withdrawal from Siberia and Japan-US Relations

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INTRODUCTION

Japan-US relations after the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) were gradually strained over the Open Door in Manchuria, the naval arms race in the Pacific, and Japanese immigration into the United States. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan emerged as a regional power and proceeded to expand its interests in East Asia and the Pacific. The United States also emerged as an East Asian power in the late nineteenth century and turned its interest to having an Open Door in China and defending the Western Pacific. During World War I the relationship of the two countries deteriorated due to Japanese expansion into mainland China (Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China in 1915). As the Lansing-Ishii agreement (1917) indicated, their joint war effort against Germany did little to diminish friction between Japan and the United States. After World War I, however, the Wilson administration began to shift its policy toward

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Japan from maintaining the status-quo to warning against Japanese acts. Wilson hoped to curb Japanese expansion in East Asia and the Pacific without isolating it by cooperating in the establishment of a new Chinese consortium and a joint expedition to Siberia, as well as in founding the League of Nations. Nevertheless, following Wilson's failure to secure US participation in the League of Nations, his further cooperative policy with Japan lost out to the domestic mood of isolationism and unilateralism.

A typical example of this impasse was the decision to withdraw the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) from Siberia. This article focuses more fully on the primary factors in America's unilateral decision to pull out and analyzes how this decision affected Japan-US relations.

I. THE DECISION TO INTERVENE AND THE CONFUSION IN SIBERIA

After the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 1918 that ended hostilities between Germany and Russia along the Eastern Front, Germany was able to make a counter offensive on the Western Front. The Allied forces fell into crisis and hoped to reconstruct the Eastern Front. Wilson faced tremendous Allied pressure to launch an armed intervention against the Bolsheviks and restore the Eastern Front. He was also opposed to Bolshevism and hoped to welcome a liberal Russia into the new world order that he envisioned after the war.¹

Wilson, however, repeatedly refused the Allies' demands. He feared that any intervention would become an anti-Soviet movement and interfere with the right of the Russians to choose their own form of government.² He was firmly convinced that the Americans must not get involved in the Russians' internal factional disputes. Such interference would be a clear violation of Point Six of his Fourteen Points.³ Wilson wanted either the Bolsheviks or a representative Russian group to invite and approve armed intervention. He feared US armed intervention in Russia would be taken as a serious interference in Russia's internal affairs.

Despite Wilson's resolute opposition to uninvited intervention, the situation in Russia drastically changed, prompting the United States to send troops to the Russian Far East. In August 1918, Japan and the United States, as members of the Allied Powers, sent a joint expedition to Siberia. There were three main reasons why President Wilson finally decided to intervene in Siberia.

First, he was concerned that Japan might act independently in Siberia to expand its sphere of influence. The Sino-Japanese military agreements

of May 1918 laid the basis for a unilateral expedition. With strong support from Britain and France, Japan almost decided on immediate intervention in the Russian Far East. The question of Japanese penetration into Siberia had to be faced eventually. Wilson believed that with a joint expedition Americans could act as a restraining influence on Japanese expansionism in the Russian Far East.

Second, Wilson thought it was imperative to prevent the Germans from obtaining Allied war supplies. Those supplies were stored not only in Archangelsk in northern Russia but also in Vladivostok in Siberia. Should the Bolsheviks hand them over to the Germans, the chance of Allied victory on the Western Front would be slim.

Third, the United States was asked by the British and the French to assist in the evacuation of the Czech Legion from Vladivostok. The Czech Legion was to move eastward via Japan and the United States, then finally fight the Central Powers on the Western Front. They had been recognized as an Allied belligerent under the auspices of the French. On May 26, 1918, hostilities between the Czechs and the Austro-German prisoners of war at Chelyabinsk in Western Siberia escalated into an all-out armed conflict between the Czechs and the Bolsheviks. In fact, the Czechs were strong enough to seize most of the Trans-Siberian Railway in a few days. However, about seventy thousand members of the Czech Legion, who were heading west for their home country, were allegedly attacked by Austro-German prisoners of war in Siberia. The Czechs sought independence from Austria-Hungary. They sought self-determination through the delegate of the Czech Legion, Tomas Masaryk. Impressed by their earnest desire for self-determination, on July 6, Wilson finally decided to send a limited number of troops to Siberia to rescue them. Repatriation of the Czech Legion was the direct cause of America's Siberian expedition.

No sooner had the joint expedition started than problems arose in Siberia. The first American troops arrived in Vladivostok on August 15, 1918. However, Maj. Gen. William Graves, commander of the AEF in Siberia, and his staff didn't land until September 2. The absence of an American commander or orders resulted in confusion. Furthermore, Graves was not informed by the War Department that Gen. Ōtani Kikuzō, commander of the Japanese Army in Vladivostok, had been appointed supreme commander of Allied expeditionary forces in the Russian territory in the Far East. Graves refused to accept a subordinate position under a Japanese commander and maintained a separate command following the instructions of Wilson's aide-mémoire.⁴

Meanwhile, the Japanese finally made a drastic change in their policy regarding intervention. On August 5, the Japanese government decided to move some troops (a part of the 7th Division from Asahikawa) from South Manchuria to Manchouri in order to protect the Manchurian border from the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the Japanese government informed the United States on August 23 that it was sending troops (part of the 3rd Division from Nagoya) to the Trans-Baikal region to support the Czechs. Japan continued to send troops into Siberia; at its peak, the total number of troops reached 72,400.⁵ Indeed, following orders from the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army, Japanese expeditionary forces in Siberia took a wartime formation rather than a peacetime formation. As a result of this military formation, the Japanese force was far larger than expected.⁶

President Wilson believed strongly that the expedition should be limited to Vladivostok and that the number of troops should not be more than 9,000 or 12,000. Indeed, Secretary of State Robert Lansing complained to the Japanese ambassador to the United States Ishii Kikujirō that the British and Canadian troops embarked on their Siberian expedition without prior consultation with the United States.⁷ Lansing claimed the Siberian expedition had to be considered a cordial US-Japan joint enterprise. As almost 25,000 Allied troops were deployed there, he confided to Ishii, the force was already large enough to deal with Siberia's existing problems.⁸ Considering America's reluctance to intervene, Japan's action clearly contradicted Wilson's purpose in Siberia to assist the Czechs.

Wilson was deeply disturbed by the Japanese conduct. He sent the Japanese government strong protests in both September and November 1918.⁹ He objected to Japanese unilateral military operations infringing on the US-Japan agreement to conduct a joint expedition in Siberia. To temper America's criticism, the newly inaugurated Japanese government of Prime Minister Hara Takashi decided to reduce drastically the number of Japanese troops in Siberia. The first reduction plan, which called for cutting 14,000 men, took effect in mid-October.¹⁰ The second reduction plan was implemented in mid-December, and the total number decreased to 26,000.¹¹ Moreover, Japan relinquished its exclusive military control of the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railways. In March 1919 the Inter-Allied Railway Committee was established to provide general supervision of the railway in those regions where Allied troops were operating. The IARC was chaired by a Russian and included one representative each from the United States, Japan, China, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. The Japanese recognized this committee and promised

to participate in restoring and protecting the railway system. Furthermore, Japan promised to cooperate with the AEF in Siberia under General Graves and to modify its previous policy of supporting local Cossack leaders such as Ataman (the Cossack title for a military leader) Gregorii Semenov and Ivan Kalmikov. However, the Japanese troops in Siberia eventually ignored the direction from Tokyo not to encourage them. Personnel of the Special Service Agency (Tokumu Kikan) of the Japanese Army in Siberia not only deliberately overlooked their evil deeds but even continued to financially support them in order to strengthen Japan's preponderant influence in the Russian Far East.¹²

As mutual objectives began to fade, each country's individual objectives became decisive. Japan was determined to gain control of the Eastern Siberian provinces. The United States was determined to block Japanese control of Siberia and hoped that democratic Czech and anti-Bolshevik Russian forces would be helped in every way possible by the US support. Britain and France were bent on reestablishing the Eastern Front and eliminating the Bolsheviks. The Czechs, rather than moving eastward to Vladivostok, remained in Russia to hold open the Trans-Siberian Railway as a preliminary step toward reestablishing the Eastern Front. Inter-Allied friction gradually intensified.

II. TROUBLE IN SIBERIA AND AMERICA'S WITHDRAWAL NOTE

The operation of the American Expeditionary Forces on the Western Front after 1917 reversed the situation in the European theater. The Central Powers were defeated and an armistice was signed in November 1918. With the war in Europe over, the differing motives and severe tension among the interventionists in Siberia were now exposed. After the armistice, the Czechs stopped guarding the Trans-Siberian Railway and wished to return home to build a democratic country under Masaryk. The Alexander Kolchak government, the core of the White Army and autocratic Russia, was defeated by the Bolshevik Army and forced to leave its capital, Omsk. US policymakers encountered a critical situation in Siberia. The State Department discussed a plan for withdrawal with British ambassador Sir Edward Grey in mid-October 1919. The War Department also promised General Graves it would send transport ships to Vladivostok in case of an emergency.¹³

Graves continued to send telegrams to Washington about the changing conditions in Siberia. While Japan claimed to have stopped supporting

Semenov, Graves was skeptical about such an estrangement between the Imperial Japanese Army and Cossack leaders.¹⁴ Moreover, he indicated, “in view of the number of armed anti-Kolchak troops in the vicinity of the railroad, the safety of American troops demands a concentration which results in abandoning parts of our sector.” He sought concrete guidance from Washington regarding future policy in Siberia.¹⁵

Meanwhile, in Washington, Secretary of State Lansing and Third Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long drew up a US plan for withdrawal from Siberia on December 23, 1919. They submitted it to President Wilson and got his approval on December 27.¹⁶ However, the withdrawal, planned for December 29, was postponed until December 31 after Undersecretary of State Frank Polk’s return to Washington. They wanted to wait until he returned because he was one of the chief policymakers in charge of this case.¹⁷ On December 30, Long spoke with Masaryk regarding the safe transportation of Czechs to their home country.¹⁸

At the same time, the War Department was separately preparing its withdrawal plan from a strategic standpoint. In a December 29 message (received by Graves on December 31), Chief of Staff of the US Army Payton C. March reported to Graves, “It is expected that within a few days you will receive orders for the withdrawal of your entire command.” March ordered Graves: “Keep the matter very secret until after the orders are received by you.” “But in the meantime,” March suggested to Graves that he “make plans for the prompt concentration of all your forces and supplies in Vladivostok with a view to their immediate transportation to Manila.”¹⁹ In a note dated January 5, 1920 (received by Graves on January 7), March informed Graves that “the State Department would make a formal announcement of withdrawal on January 7” and ordered Graves to “keep the movement secret until the last minute if you are determined to embark any troops before January 7.”²⁰

The official notice of the AEF withdrawal from Siberia, however, was delayed due to the lack of communication among the president, the State Department, and the War Department. Regardless of such confusion, on January 8, Graves informed Gen. Ōi Shigemoto, commander of Japanese expeditionary forces in Siberia, of America’s intention to withdraw from Siberia. Graves did not notify Japan of the US decision through a formal diplomatic channel because he believed his government had made a formal announcement on January 7. He also believed that the order from the War Department on January 5 had authorized him “to inform those vitally

interested such as Japanese and others guarding the railway.”²¹

Why did the Wilson administration commit such a diplomatic blunder vis-à-vis Japan? Only a few primary sources shed light on this case. However, the diary of Breckinridge Long and the reminiscences of Dewitt C. Poole help reveal the conditions then facing the Wilson administration.

According to Long's diary, the main reason for this trouble was the lack of communication among policymakers in Washington. Long had advocated the withdrawal of US troops from Siberia for some time. In his diary, he confided, “If the Japanese had been notified when the President directed it and when I recommended it there would have been no trouble [i.e., the political situation in Siberia had not deteriorated when Long recommended evacuation in August]. Polk and the Secretary [Lansing] delayed it, Baker acted too hastily, March presumed too much and Graves was just plain stupid. However, the effect on Japan is bad. It is discourteous.”²²

Another source, the reminiscences of Poole, sheds light on different aspects of the policy of the Wilson administration. Poole was chief of the Division of Russian Affairs in the State Department. He was vehemently anti-Bolshevik and supported continuing the US intervention in Siberia. Furthermore, Poole also states that there were some problems regarding personnel and civil-military relations within the US government. According to him, there was “a lack of really good relations between [Secretary of War] Newton D. Baker and [Secretary of State] Robert Lansing, and perennial restlessness of the military against political control.” Poole also confided, “The military fell back on the excuse that purely tactical orders had been misinterpreted into what amounted to a strategic decision to take these troops out at a given time, which was a specious explanation.”²³

Thus, various explanations can be found regarding the US decision-making process involved in withdrawing troops from Siberia. Meanwhile, Japan was actually engaged in the joint operations in Siberia. However, no information was given to Japan concerning the possibility of US withdrawal. This inevitably complicated Japan's future Siberian policy.

III. US DECISION TO WITHDRAW AND ITS IMPACT ON THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

A. Change of Japanese Policy by the Hara Cabinet

After the fall of Omsk in mid-November 1919, the Bolshevik Army

began to approach Eastern Siberia. The Bolshevik troops and the Allied Powers were almost in a state of war in Siberia. The Japanese troops guarding the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railways were the largest in number among all Allied forces except the Czechs. They faced an extremely dangerous situation in Siberia. The war minister, Gen. Tanaka Giichi, therefore proposed that the government dispatch some additional troops to northern Manchuria in order to defend the buffer zone near the Russian-Chinese border. However, Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo opposed this idea. Since it was impossible for Japan to stabilize Siberia on its own, he suggested, Japanese troops should immediately withdraw from Siberia. Finally, Prime Minister Hara stated that it was essential to obtain US consent to withdraw and to maintain the spirit of cooperation with the United States. On November 21, 1919, all the members of the cabinet agreed with this course of action and awaited the US response.²⁴

However, the Japanese government did not receive a formal reply regarding Siberian policy from the US government. Conditions in Siberia were deteriorating from day to day. The impatient Hara Cabinet sought American views either through US ambassador Roland Morris in Tokyo or Lansing in Washington. However, both gave only vague answers.²⁵

While the Japanese were waiting for the US reply, Bolshevik forces advanced on the Western Siberian town of Irkutsk. Ambassador Katō Tsunetada in Irkutsk requested an additional reinforcement of one thousand to two thousand troops for defense.²⁶ However, Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai merely directed Ambassador Shidehara Kijūrō in Washington to seek a US reply again and rejected Katō's request unless there was US approval.²⁷ On December 24, the Japanese War Ministry issued the Comprehensive Plan of Policy in Siberia.²⁸ It declared not only the abandonment of economic "exclusionism" but also emphasized cooperation with the United States and China in Siberia. Furthermore, the commander of Japanese troops, General Ōi, even stated that he could not send troops without orders from Tokyo and refused Katō's request.²⁹ General Ōi regarded the Siberian expedition not so much as an "operation" as a "policy." At this moment, both the Japanese government and the Japanese troops in Siberia were moving toward harmonization with US policy.

Under these circumstances, America's unintended unilateral decision to withdraw from Siberia shattered the hopes of the Hara Cabinet. It had a tremendous impact on the future of Japanese policy in Siberia. First, the Japanese government had no choice but to either withdraw immediately

or stay independently. If Prime Minister Hara had been informed of the US withdrawal beforehand, he could have chosen joint withdrawal after consultation with the United States.³⁰ Confronting a difficult situation, Hara decided to remain independently to prevent Bolshevism from penetrating into Manchuria and Korea.³¹ He stated in a cabinet meeting that an orderly withdrawal could not be completed without increasing troop numbers.³² Because Hara was also planning an evacuation in the event that conditions in Siberia worsened, America's sudden withdrawal severely limited Japan's policy choices in the Siberian expedition. Second, the US decision meant that Japanese troops had to guard the railways by themselves. Foreign Minister Uchida protested to Ambassador Morris that if one party suddenly decided to withdraw without prior arrangements with the other, it would inevitably cause difficulties in guarding the railway.³³

B. The US Decision and Its Impact on the Imperial Japanese Army

By the end of December 1919, members of the Japanese Diet, as well as public opinion, were beginning to support an immediate withdrawal of troops from Siberia. Despite the domestic mood, the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army and Japanese expeditionary forces considered the conditions in Siberia to be a serious threat to Japanese interests in the region. The General Staff envisioned building a buffer zone against Bolshevism in Eastern Siberia. As Chief of the General Staff Uehara Yūsaku revealed in his memoirs, the General Staff dispatched forces to Siberia in order to “rebuild stability in Siberia, preserve or indeed enhance Japan's pre-eminent position.”³⁴ On the other hand, the Japanese expeditionary forces, confronting a critical situation in Siberia and lacking appropriate orders from Tokyo, overreacted. General Ōi, the commander of Japanese troops in Siberia, believed that without US assistance, they had to attack Bolshevik forces and improve a difficult situation in Siberia.³⁵

Interestingly, the War Ministry did not share this kind of opportunism. They did not support the view that it was a good idea to attack the Bolsheviks. War Minister Tanaka backed Hara's plan to cooperate with the United States. He was convinced that the Siberian expedition should be conducted not by the “operational command of the General Staff” but by the “military administration of the War Ministry.”³⁶ This friction within the Imperial Japanese Army became irrelevant when local conditions worsened as a result of the conflict among the parties and the Bolsheviks got stronger. Consequently, the Japanese troops became unable to

withdraw from Siberia.³⁷

Thus, the policy of the Imperial Japanese Army in Siberia was by no means monolithic. While the General Staff vehemently opposed the evacuation, Japanese troops in Siberia were asking Tokyo to give orders suitable for local conditions. In addition, the War Ministry supported the gradual withdrawal advanced by Prime Minister Hara. Even within the Imperial Japanese Army there was disagreement about stationing the troops independently in Siberia.

IV. THE HARA CABINET AND THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION: A FAILURE OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

A. Hara's Perception of America

The Hara Cabinet had always endeavored to cooperate with the United States in Siberia. Hara opposed the unilateral evacuation of Japanese troops from Siberia on the ground that it might damage Japan-US relations.³⁸ He considered the joint expedition with the Americans a way to strengthen Japan-US relations.³⁹ In fact, on receiving a protest from the United States, Hara reduced the number of Japanese troops twice, from 72,400 to 26,000. He also accepted the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement and tried to restrain the Cossacks from engaging in murder and robbery. Moreover, he adopted an anti-Bolshevik policy after Wilson approved providing active support to Kolchak.

Nevertheless, Hara did not always accurately grasp US policy toward Russia. Japan came to a hasty conclusion regarding the recognition of the Kolchak government.⁴⁰ While the US State Department was willing to formally recognize the Kolchak government, Wilson did not support the plan. Hence, Hara's new Russian policy began to diverge from Wilson's policy.

Why did Hara misunderstand US policy toward Russia? The main reason was lack of information. The Japanese government had few diplomatic channels to the US government. Hara generally depended on information from the Foreign Ministry (Gaimushō) and merely dispatched pro-American Count Kaneko Kentarō to Ambassador Morris in Tokyo in order to explain Japanese policy. Therefore, the Hara Cabinet relied too heavily on information from Ambassador Morris and not enough on information from Washington.⁴¹

B. The Wilson Administration's Perception of Japan at the End of the Joint Intervention

US policy in Siberia after September 1919 was confused. The Wilson administration faced great difficulties in the Siberian intervention. From an international perspective, the Czech Legion firmly resolved to leave Russia, Japan expressed a conciliatory attitude toward the United States, and the collapse of the Kolchak government completely changed the political scene in Russia. Domestically, Congress questioned the effectiveness of the Siberian expedition (especially after the armistice of November 1918) and severely criticized the government's policy of aiding the Whites. Moreover, Wilson himself was preoccupied with the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, which included the foundation of the League of Nations. After suffering a severe stroke during his tour of the West in late September 1919, Wilson was clearly disabled, and it thus became impossible to establish new guidelines for the Siberian intervention.⁴² These factors contributed to Tokyo's misjudgment of US policy in Siberia.

US policymakers under Wilson had varying views regarding Japanese policy in Siberia. The first group supported the Open Door. Most of them were members of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and the Army and were cautious about the expansion of Japanese influence in northern Manchuria and Siberia.⁴³ The second group advocated the (anti-Bolshevik) status quo. They were composed of State Department personnel such as Lansing and Morris and were somewhat sympathetic to Japan defending itself against Bolshevism.⁴⁴

Furthermore, Wilson's negative image of Japan was confirmed by Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China in 1915 and was never reversed.⁴⁵ Wilson was suspicious of almost all Japanese actions after its Twenty-One Demands on China in 1915. Therefore, he proposed to Japan the joint intervention with a limited number of men. Furthermore, the president accepted the Siberian intervention reluctantly, at the repeated request of Britain and France and for the purpose of fighting Germany. Moreover, although Prime Minister Hara had emerged as Japan's most pro-American statesman, Wilson was not sympathetic to Hara's message.

CONCLUSION

The United States decided to withdraw from Siberia because of the

shifting international environment, domestic pressure, and the rapid military developments in Siberia. To begin with, the international environment had completely changed. The Czech Legion's repatriation operation had peaked and Japan demonstrated a more cooperative attitude toward the United States; both of these were original US objectives for the expedition. Moreover, domestic pressure was intense. Congress and public opinion demanded justification for stationing troops in Siberia and called for immediate evacuation. Finally, the rapid developments in Siberia with the defeat of the White forces determined the US attitude. The United States was not able to fight the Bolsheviks. Therefore, the swift approach of Bolshevik forces prompted the US evacuation.

America's sudden withdrawal from Siberia had a tremendous impact on Japan-US relations. This impact had three dimensions. First, Japan was compelled to reexamine its policy toward Siberia. Japanese public opinion definitely supported an immediate withdrawal from the Russian Far East. However, America's sudden withdrawal forced the Japanese government single-handedly to undertake the defense of Siberia from Bolshevism and the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railways by sending reinforcements. Second, the withdrawal gave the Japanese General Staff the impression that the United States recognized Japan's free hand in Eastern Siberia. Because the United States did not inform Japan of its decision in advance, the Wilson administration could not criticize Japan for sending reinforcements that in fact helped defend the American sector and allowed for gradual evacuation. Third, the withdrawal damaged the Hara Cabinet's pro-American policy in Siberia. Lack of American deterrence induced the Japanese General Staff to establish a buffer zone in the Russian Far East against the Bolsheviks. It was not until the United States protested the Japanese occupation of the northern part of Sakhalin Island that the Hara Cabinet, fearing international opinion and US protest, completely recovered the initiative in foreign policy decision making from the Imperial Japanese Army.

Both Japan and the United States lacked consideration for each another. The Japanese blatantly violated the agreement with the United States on the number of troops. Additionally, Japanese troops in Siberia openly supported the Cossack leaders financially and materially, and the Japanese government ultimately failed to stop factional strife within the Cossacks in the Russian Far East. These facts prompted US suspicion of Japan. In this respect, Japanese cooperation with the United States was not perfect. Meanwhile, the American public was warned about the Japanese military

expansion in Siberia and northern Manchuria, and Americans continued to hold an unfavorable image of Japan. This made it difficult for Japanese liberals to maintain majority support for a policy of cooperation with the United States against an expansion in Asia proposed by army General Staff.

It can be argued that, as was the case with US withdrawal from Siberia, America's unilateral policies often confused the parties involved without considering its impact on them.⁴⁶ Wilson decided to withdraw the AEF for a number of reasons. It is commonly the case that domestic pressure from Congress and a change in the international environment occupies an important place in the US foreign policy decision-making process. However, with unilateral action, the Wilson administration finally brought unnecessary disorder to Japan-US relations.

NOTES

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¹ Scholars disagree over Wilson's response to the Russian Revolution. Gardner, Foglesong, and Richard argue that Wilson was consistently eager for intervention and that American intervention was intended to overthrow the Soviet government. Kennan, Link, Unterberger, McFadden, Schild, Melton, Takahara, and Kato emphasize that Wilson was consistently reluctant to intervene in Russia as it would be in violation of Point Six of the Fourteen Points. Davis and Trani argue that Wilson deserves mild criticism for his early indecision and inability to form a coherent policy toward Russia. Lloyd Gardner, *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913–1923* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 122–23, 197–98, 240–41; David Foglesong, *America's Secret War against Bolshevism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 186, 293–98; George Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 82–83, 128–29; Arthur Link, *Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace* (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1979), 95–97; Betty Miller Unterberger, *America's Siberian Expedition, 1918–1920* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1956), 230–34; David McFadden, *Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans, 1917–1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 53–54, 214–16; Georg Schild, *Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917–1921* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 127–31; Carol Melton, *Between War and Peace: Woodrow Wilson and the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918–1921* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2001), 207–12; Shūsuke Takahara, *Wilson Gaikō to Nippon: Risō to Genjitsu no aida 1913–1921* [Wilson Diplomacy and Japan: Ideal and Reality, 1913–1921] (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 2006), 104–5; Hiroaki Kato, “Gurēbusu shireikan no mita Shiberia shuppei”

[The Siberian expedition through the eyes of Commander Graves] (unpublished master's thesis, Sophia University, 2008), 1–3; Donald E. Davis and Eugene Trani, *The First Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson in US-Soviet Relations* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002), 202, 206; Carl J. Richard, *When the United States Invaded Russia: Woodrow Wilson's Siberian Disaster* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), ix–xi; 71–78.

² In August 1920, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby announced that the United States would not recognize the Bolshevik government. The Wilson administration cited the undemocratic character of the Bolshevik government and indicated that the Soviets' continued support of Communism in the United States was the primary reason for nonrecognition. McFadden, *Alternative Paths*, 330–33.

³ Lord Reading to David Lloyd George, July 12, 1918, William Wiseman Papers in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (hereafter cited as *PWW*), ed. Arthur S. Link, vol. 48 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 602–3.

⁴ Melton, *Between War and Peace*, 53–55.

⁵ Japanese ambassador to the United States Ishii Kikujiro to Foreign Minister Gotō Shinpei, August 23, 1918, in Gaimushō [Foreign Ministry], ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* (hereafter cited as *NGB*), *Taishō nana-nen, dai-issatsu* [Documents on Japanese foreign policy, 7th year of Taishō, vol. 1] (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1968), 964–65; Sanbō honbu [Army General Staff], ed., *Taishō 7-nen naishi 11-nen Shiberia shuppeishi, jo-kan* [History of the Siberian expedition, 1918–1922, vol. 1] (Tokyo: Sanbō honbu, 1924), 163; Hara Teruyuki, *Shiberia shuppei: Kakumei to Kanshō 1917–1922* [The Siberian expedition: Revolution and intervention, 1917–1922] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1989), 374–75.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 372–73.

⁷ As for Canada, recent scholarship reveals that anti-Bolshevism ran parallel with efforts to defuse activism and political opposition at home. Benjamin Isitt, *From Victoria to Vladivostok: Canada's Siberian Expedition, 1917–1919* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), chap. 4.

⁸ Ishii to Gotō, August 15, 1918, *NGB, Taishō nana-nen, dai-issatsu* [Documents on Japanese foreign policy, 7th year of Taishō, vol. 1], 954–55.

⁹ Ishii to Gotō, August 22, 1918, *ibid.*, 963–64; Lansing to Ambassador Rolland S. Morris in Tokyo, September 6, 1918, Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918 Russia*, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1932), 242–43 (hereafter cited as *FRUS*, with appropriate title, volume, publication year, and page numbers); Lansing to Morris, November 16, 1918, *FRUS, 1918 Russia*, vol. 2, 1932, 433–35; Ishii to Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya, November 19, 1918, *NGB, Taishō nana-nen, dai-issatsu*, [Documents on Japanese foreign policy, 7th year of Taishō, vol. 1], 1019–22.

¹⁰ Hosoya Chihiro, *Roshia kakumei to Nihon* [The Russian Revolution and Japan] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1972), 65.

¹¹ Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya to Ishii, December 25, 1918, *NGB, Taishō nana-nen, dai-issatsu* [Documents on Japanese foreign policy, 7th year of Taishō, vol. 1], 1024–26; Morris to Lansing, December 29, 1918, *FRUS, 1918 Russia*, vol. 2, 1932, 465–66.

¹² Morris to Polk, March 31, 1919, *FRUS, 1919 Russia*, 1937, 551–52.

¹³ Viscount Grey to Earl Curzon, October 10, 1919, Great Britain. Foreign Office, *Documents of British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, First Series, vol. 3, 1919* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), 589–90; March to Graves, October 15, 1919,

Records of US Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898–1942, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in Siberia, Historical Files (hereafter cited as AEF Records), box 111, Record Group (hereafter cited as RG) 395, National Archives (hereafter cited as NA).

¹⁴ Graves to March, December 20, 1919, AEF Records, box 110, RG 395, NA.

¹⁵ Graves to March, December 27, 1919, AEF Records, box 110, RG 395, NA.

¹⁶ Lansing to Wilson, December 23, 1919, *FRUS, Lansing Papers*, vol. 2, 1940, 392; Takahara, *Wilson Gaikō to Nippon*, 118–44.

¹⁷ Long Diary, December 27 and 29, 1919, Breckinridge Long Papers, box 2, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as LC).

¹⁸ Long Diary, December 30, 1919, Long Papers, box 2, LC.

¹⁹ March to Graves, December 29, 1919, AEF Records, box 111, RG 395, NA.

²⁰ March to Graves, January 5, 1920, AEF Records, box 111, RG 395, NA.

²¹ Graves to March, January 11, 1920, AEF Records, box 110, RG 395, NA.

²² Long Diary, January 12, 1920, Long Papers, box 2, LC.

²³ “The Reminiscences of Dewitt C. Poole,” Columbia University Oral History Collection (microfiche), 485–86.

²⁴ Entry in the diary of Hara Takashi, November 21, 1919, in Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Takashi nikki* [Diary of Hara Takashi], vol. 5 (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1965), 174.

²⁵ Uchida to Japanese Ambassador to the United States Shidehara Kijūrō, November 28, 1919, *NGB, Taishō hachi-nen, dai-issatsu* [Documents on Japanese foreign policy, 8th year of Taishō, vol. 1] (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1970), 678; Shidehara to Uchida, December 9, 1919, *NGB, Taishō hachi-nen, dai-issatsu*, 686; Shidehara to Uchida, December 12, 1919, *NGB, Taishō hachi-nen, dai-issatsu*, 687–88.

²⁶ Katō Tsunetada, ambassador in Irkutsk, to Uchida, December 16, 1919, *NGB, Taishō hachi-nen, dai-issatsu*, 688–89.

²⁷ Uchida to Shidehara, December 19, 1919, *NGB, Taishō hachi-nen, dai-issatsu*, 689; Uchida to Katō, December 19, 1919, *NGB, Taishō hachi-nen, dai-issatsu*, 690; Rustin Bradley Gates, “Defending the Empire: Uchida Yasuya and Japanese Foreign Policy, 1865–1936” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2007), 123–29 and 148–49.

²⁸ Rikugun shō [Ministry of War], “Tai Shiberia seisaku” [Policy toward Siberia] (December 24, 1919), no. 414, Makino Nobuaki kankei monjo [Makino Nobuaki Papers], Kensei shiryō shitsu [Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room], National Diet Library of Japan, Tokyo.

²⁹ Matsudaira Tsunetada, chief of Political Department in Vladivostok, to Uchida, December 26, 1919, *NGB, Taishō hachi-nen, dai-issatsu* [Documents on Japanese foreign policy, 8th year of Taishō, vol. 1], 694–95.

³⁰ Momose Takashi, “Shiberia teppai seisaku no keisei katei,” [Japan’s policy-making process of withdrawal from Siberia] *Nihon rekishi*, no. 428 (January 1984): 98–99; Amamiya Shōichi, *Kindai Nihon no sensō shidō* [War leadership of modern Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1997), 143–44.

³¹ Nagata Akifumi, *Nippon no Chōsen tōchi to kokusai kankei* [The rule of Korea by Japan and international relations] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005), 190, 248–49; Hattori Ryuji, *Higashi Ajia kokusai kankyō no hendō to Nihon gaikō 1918–1931* [Japanese diplomacy and East Asian international politics, 1918–1931] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2001), 46–64.

³² Entry in the diary of Hara Takashi, January 6, 1920, in Hara Keiichirō, *Hara Takashi nikki*, 198.

³³ Gaimushō Ōbei kyoku Dai-ikka [First Division of European and American Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry of Japan], ed., “Shiberia shuppei mondai, Dai-ni hen, Rengōkoku kyōdo shuppei igo beikoku teppei ni itaru made no keika” [The problem of the Siberian expedition, part 2, Developments from the joint expedition by the Allied forces to the US withdrawal], November, 11th year of Taishō, Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryō-kan [Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan], 168.

³⁴ Gensui Uehara Yūsaku denki kankō-kai, ed., *Gensui Uehara Yūsaku Den* [Biography of Field Marshal Uehara Yūsaku] (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1937), 150; Shouyū Kurabu, ed., *Uehara Yūsaku Nikki* [The diary of Uehara Yūsaku] (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō Shuppan, 2011), 70, 75.

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⁴⁰ Yamamoto Shirō, *Hyōden Hara Takashi, ge-kan* [Biography of Hara Takashi, vol. 2] (Tokyo: Tokyo Sōgensha, 1997), 326; Kōketsu Atsushi, *Kindai Nihon seigun kankei no kenkyū* [A study of civil-military relations in modern Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), 217–22; Izao Tomio, *Shoki Shiberia shuppei no kenkyū* [Analysis of the early Siberian expedition] (Fukuoka: Kyūshū University Press, 2003), chap. 1.

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⁴² Thomas Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), chap. 4; John M. Cooper, Jr., *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chaps. 4 and 5; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (New York: Macmillan, 2002), 137–44; J. Michael Hogan, *Woodrow Wilson's Western Tour: Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and the League of Nations* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2006), 17–26; Takahara, *Wilson Gaikō to Nippon*, 157–75.

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⁴⁴ Morris to Lansing, October 13, 1919, *FRUS, 1919 Russia, 1937*, 531–32.

⁴⁵ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "Nijūikkajō yōkyū saikō" [The Twenty-One Demands reconsidered: Interactions in US-Japanese diplomacy] in *Nihon gaikō no kiki ninshiki* [Perceptions of crisis in Japanese diplomacy], ed. Kindai Nihon kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1985), 119–50; Takahara, *Wilson Gaikō to Nippon*, chap. 1.

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