

Environmental Politics in the United States

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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to present an analytical framework for environmental politics in the United States with an emphasis on the structure of public opinion using two relatively well-documented case studies.

The first of these cases is the presidency of Richard Nixon in the early 1970s. This case is particularly useful in illustrating the link between environmental politics and environmental policy output. The early seventies were especially notable from a political standpoint, because the environment suddenly emerged as one of the most important problems in public opinion polls. The early seventies were also significant in terms of public policy, since the basic groundwork for contemporary pollution control and wildlife preservation policies were laid down in this period. The case of the Nixon administration helps us link the structure of public opinion with the influence of politics on policy output and vice versa.

The second case study is the special U.S. Senate election held in Oregon in January 1996 after the resignation of Senator Packwood due to

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a sexual harassment scandal. The environment was a major issue in this election. The election was of national significance in terms of environmental politics, since the Republican majority in the 104th Congress was encountering a major public opinion backlash as a result of attempts to relax environmental regulations. This case study is useful in analyzing the role of environmental issues in the television-driven media politics of the contemporary United States.

The Nixon case study thus deals with the policy-election relationship between election seasons, while the Oregon case covers an actual election period. The two cases complement each other.

Much has been written on the environment by historians and political scientists. In analyzing policy histories, historians have often elaborated on the political aspect as well; however it is not their job to present a theory-oriented analytical framework for environmental politics.¹ Political scientists interested in public policy have come up with useful analytical frameworks such as the issue network, the advocacy coalition and entrepreneurial politics;² nevertheless they have not gone far enough in linking policy with the voting behavior of the electorate through relevant case studies. On the other hand, those political scientists interested in voting behavior have not yet ventured into substantive public policy. Thus, the attempt made in this paper to link the public opinion structure, voting behavior, substantive policy output, and policy history through related case studies is a new direction.

The paper consists of three parts. The first section is an overview of the dynamics of environmental politics in general. The second section deals with the Nixon administration case study. Finally, the third section analyzes the role of environmental issues in the media politics of the special U.S. Senate election in Oregon.

II. DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS

The essence of environmental politics consists of three elements related to the structure of public opinion.

- It is a permissive consensus issue.
- Environmental concerns correlate with educational attainment.
- It is subject to an issue attention cycle.

A. The environment as a permissive consensus issue

When we analyze the structure of public opinion on environmental

protection, we should look at two factors: the broadness of support and the intensity of support. As for the broadness of support, a great majority of people tend to agree to a general statement that environmental protection is important. Such an issue is called a valence issue.³ For example, in Gallup polls over the past five years, those who call themselves environmentalists have outnumbered those who do not by roughly three to one, although in a poll taken in April 1995 the margin narrowed to less than two to one.⁴ However, regarding intensity, concern for the environment is not nearly as strong as that on such issues as jobs, inflation and race. A consultant for a Democratic polling firm recently wrote in a journal for campaign professionals that, in terms of voter priority, environmental protection does not come close to such gut issues as the economy, crime and welfare reform.⁵ Issues such as this where there is widespread but not very intense public support are termed permissive consensus issues; the environment is clearly such an issue as analyzed by Dunlap.⁶

Permissive consensus issues allow significant discretion to policy makers, because people do not constantly monitor them.⁷ Such a public opinion structure helps explain the environmental policies of the Nixon administration discussed below. However, once the public finds the government to be obviously deviating from the widely-held consensus, there is risk of a public opinion backlash like the one the Reagan administration faced when it tried to roll back environmental programs.⁸ Similar attempts by certain industrialists during the Nixon administration encountered similar public opinion pressure when a relaxation of environmental regulations was suggested. Public backlash against polluters was also a factor behind the defeat of a Republican businessman in Oregon's special U.S. Senate election.

Because public concern on the environment tends to be broad and weak, the electoral impact of the environment tends to be significant but moderate in those elections where it becomes a major issue. To those voters without overriding concerns such as jobs or race, the environment can become a reason for voting. Relatively well-to-do suburban areas, for example, are probably more likely to be home to such pro-environment voters. In years of economic prosperity, the environment is more likely to be salient than during recession, when many people have more pressing things to worry about. The Oregon special election is just such an example of the environment becoming a major issue in a year of relative prosperity.

So how large is the electoral impact of environmental issues? In more than a few public opinion polls, including one for the Oregon election, more than 10% of respondents indicated that they either have voted or would vote for or against a candidate because of their record on environmental issues. For example, in a Gallup poll taken in March 1990, as many as 33% of the electorate responded that they have voted for a candidate for reasons of conservation and pollution. A Voter Research and Survey poll for the 1992 presidential election found that approximately one in ten respondents said they voted for environmental reasons, and about seven out of ten of those voted for Clinton. Although Dunlap questions the notion that the environment is a source of a significant swing vote on the ground that voters assign a rather low priority to the environment as compared to other issues, one could argue that a relatively well-off voter in a year of economic prosperity might base his or her choice on the environment because there are no other pressing issues to worry about.

As will be elaborated in Section II, the permissive consensus issue model, when coupled with the issue attention cycle model, provides a quite effective means of linking public opinion structure with electoral outcomes and policy output.


B. The environment-education link

The notion of widespread support for the environment needs one major caveat; the environment tends to receive less support when the statement is more specific. A good example of where public opinion tends to be split is the protection of life forms such as insects or fish that do not capture the public attention as cuddly or majestic. A cornerstone of contemporary environmental policy is the understanding that even a seemingly worthless, lowly creature is a part of the larger ecosystem and performs a valuable function. Policies founded on this basis, endangered species preservation policy for example, may not enjoy overwhelming public support. Survey data indicates that the general public tends to attach greater priority to building dams for drinking water or agriculture than saving a fish species from extinction.⁹ Although people tend to support environmental protection in general, support for specific programs is not a given. Often, support for more controversial environmental programs such as endangered species preservation correlates with the level of educational attainment.

Support for environmental interest groups also seems to be correlat-

Chart 1

Correlation between education
and environmental group
membership among the 50 states



ed to educational attainment. One study has found that members of major environmental groups are predominantly graduate school and college educated. For example 53% of Sierra Club members attended graduate school and another 41% went to college.¹⁰ There is a high statistical correlation between the state-by-state membership of environmental groups and education; the correlation between membership of two major environmental groups among the population of each state and the proportion of those with a bachelor's degree or higher in each state has a correlation of 0.81.¹¹ (Chart 1)

As for the public opinion structure, an in-depth survey of American attitudes toward animals has identified a significant link between educational attainment and nature preservation values.¹² A review of various public opinion research on the environment found a "moderately strong relationship between environmental concern and education".¹³ Some general public opinion surveys indicate a correlation between environmental concerns and education; however, others do not, suggesting that responses may be quite sensitive to survey wording. Although not all data point in the same direction, there seems to be enough evidence to conclude that environmental values and educational attainment are correlated. In the subsequent analysis, this education-environ-

ment link will help explain the victory of the Democratic candidate in the Oregon case study.

C. Issue attention cycle

The up and down swings in public attention to environmental issues were publicized by Anthony Downs in a *Public Interest* article more than twenty years ago.¹⁴ The first surge of environmental concern began to be recorded by public opinion polls around 1970. In a 1970 Gallup poll, 53% of the people ranked air and water pollution of as one of the three most important problems (MIPs), the second highest figure next to crime (56%). This high ranking, however, was short-lived, lasting less than a year. In another Gallup poll in March 1971, 7% of the respondents specified "pollution, ecology" as the one most important problem; this percentage was much smaller than for economic problems (24%) and the Vietnam War (28%). By autumn, however, the corresponding figure was down to just 2%. Although these three polls are not directly comparable, one can discern another downward trend in the status of the environment as an MIP in the early seventies. Such a swing in public concerns in the early seventies could explain the handling of environmental issues by the Nixon administration over this period.

One can discern another, though smaller, surge of public concern over the environment between the late 1980s and 1992, when the Earth Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro.

Research on the agenda-setting function of the mass media indicates that public perception of MIPs is a function of the public's exposure to mass media reporting.¹⁵ Caulfield and Costaine have identified a surge in the reporting by the *New York Times* of environmental issues in the early seventies and to a smaller extent in late 1980s, which is consistent with public opinion trends.¹⁶ The author has found a similar trend in media coverage using four general interest magazines (*Business Week*, *Newsweek*, *Reader's Digest* and *Time*) as indicated by Charts 2 and 3.

Dunlap argues that MIPs are so ephemeral that a better indicator is needed.¹⁷ This author thinks otherwise, because MIPs appears to be related to Congressional activities; from the late sixties to the early seventies, constituent mail to Congress and Congressional Record entries related to the environment are reported to have approached or surpassed those on the Vietnam War.¹⁸

In the sections to come, we shall see that the environmental policies

Chart 2





Chart 3



Note:

Article counts in the two charts are for *Business Week*, *Reader's Digest*, *Newsweek* and *Time*.

—Book version of the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* was used for Chart 2. The key words included environment, pollution, parks, wildlife, wilderness and related words (e.g. air pollution, environmental policy).

—Chart 3 was compiled using the CD-ROM version of the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Key words were environment, pollution, wilderness, wildlife and parks.

—The figures for the two charts are not directly comparable because their keywords and cross references do not overlap exactly.

of the Nixon administration and the outcome of Oregon's special election for the U.S. Senate can be explained by the analytical framework above centering on the structure of public opinion regarding the environment. The activities of interest groups and politicians are essentially governed by the public opinion structure, at least as far as their electoral aspects are concerned.

III. ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY DURING THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

The environmental policy of the Nixon administration is highly significant both in terms of politics and policy. It was noteworthy in terms of environmental politics, because the early part of the administration overlapped with the crest of the issue attention cycle. The Nixon administration occupies a special place in environmental policy history, because the foundations for contemporary pollution control were laid down at this time. Not all, but a significant part of the progress was due to the initiatives from the administration. Especially important was the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970. The framework for setting pollution control standards was a joint product of the administration and Congress. The newly formed EPA drafted and implemented all details of pollution control, such as the state implementation plans.

In this section we will analyze how this policy output was influenced by political factors, and how policy achievements affected politics, especially the reelection prospects of President Nixon. We shall start with how Nixon perceived the dramatic surge in environmental concerns in the early seventies. Then we shall analyze to what extent public opinion affected the policy priority that the administration assigned to environmental protection.

A. Nixon's perception of public opinion on the environment

Nixon collected private poll data to assess American public opinion on the environment. Between 1969 and 1972, the administration conducted 233 private polls, which was a significant increase in the use of polls over the Johnson and Kennedy administrations (130 and 93).¹⁹ Regarding the administration's interest in public opinion on the environment, a poll taken by Opinion Research Corporation in 1971 and annotated by President Nixon is available among the documents of the President's Office Files.²⁰ This annotation by the president helps us understand how public opinion on the environment was related to electoral politics in Nixon's mind.

In the poll, inflation/cost of living/taxes(44%), pollution/ecology(25%), unemployment(24%), drugs/alcohol(23%) were deemed most important by survey respondents. Nixon marked these four items

and jotted down the phrase "Big 4 issues".

A cover letter accompanying this poll indicates that it was commissioned to determine whether those with high concern for the environment were basically opponents of the Nixon administration. The poll figures suggested the answer was no; the poll showed environmental concern was broad, cutting across demographic, socio-economic, regional and ideological divisions. Nixon specifically noted that the demographic groups crucial to his election shared environmental concerns. In the section giving a demographic breakdown of those who chose pollution/ecology, Nixon circled the number for "South", and "Liberal", "Conservative" and "In between". He wrote a dash next to some percentage figures including those for middle income, high school, and Catholic. Thus, the annotated poll data indicates that Nixon was aware of the popularity of environmental protection among the public in general, including the demographic groups which were supportive of the administration, including Southern Democrats. As we saw in the previous section, environmental protection is a valence issue.

B. Public opinion and policy output in the Nixon administration

How did such perception affect policy output? The Nixon administration as a whole devoted significant efforts to environmental programs. The amount of time devoted to an issue in State of the Union addresses is a good indicator of policy priority. One can recognize significant environmental components in Nixon's State of the Union addresses. After 1969, the administration submitted over 40 bills concerning natural resources, the environment and energy.²¹

In spite of the popularity of environmental issues in 1970 and in early 1971, and the significant action his administration took on this issue, Nixon showed little personal interest in the environment. Its priority in Nixon's mind did not seem high. Among domestic issues, Nixon was more interested in such things as cancer research, labor legislation, drugs, crime, taxes and desegregation, that he perceived as politically potent, than in economic issues, including the environment, according to an interview with Ehrlichman by a historian.²² Other evidence of the low priority of environmental issues is the fact that the environment is rarely mentioned in the *Haldeman Diaries*.²³ Except for those issues Nixon was personally interested in, he delegated authority to Ehrlichman and his staff.²⁴ A staff document found among Nixon's

Presidential files corroborates this; Whitaker, an Ehrlichman staffer in charge of the environment, writes in a confidential memo to Ehrlichman in 1971 that among hundreds of individual decisions and a score or so key decisions only three issues (toxic materials, the SO₂ tax and land use) required the president's attention; most decisions were made below Whitaker's level and only four meetings involved Ehrlichman.²⁵

No other president has faced more pressure from public opinion to do something about the environment than Nixon in the early seventies. Yet Nixon delegated authority on this popular valence issue to his staff. How should we explain this? The answer lies in the public opinion structure. As has been explained earlier, the environment is a permissive consensus issue; there is much room for discretion because support is widespread but not intense. Under this atmosphere of discretion, many initiatives were taken to protect the environment. Those to whom Nixon delegated authority on the environment were qualified people. Ehrlichman was an expert in land use laws, which were key elements in both natural resources management and pollution. William Ruckelshaus, the first Administrator of the EPA, and Russell Train, the first Chairman of the White House's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), came to earn much respect in the environmental community. Under the permissive issue context, Nixon pursued environmental policies of a generally progressive nature mainly through delegating authority to competent people.²⁶

The relatively low priority typically assigned to environmental issues by recent U.S. Presidents corroborates the validity of the permissive consensus issue model. In the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, it was Stuart Udall—the Interior Secretary and not the president—who took the initiative in most environmental affairs. Ford and Reagan, and especially the latter, had weak environmental records. Although Bush took some positive steps in the early part of his presidency, he was much criticized later on by the environmental community as well as mass media for failing to take steps to curb global warming. Clinton is generally perceived by the environmental community as not making enough commitment to environmental affairs, even though he has done much to appoint environmentalists to key positions, including the post of his vice-president. The only exception is Carter; his administration not only appointed environmentalists to key positions, but sided with them in such controversial issues as water development and preserva-

tion of the Alaskan environment. This exception can probably be attributed to ideology and personal interest.

The exceptional case of Carter and his personal interest in environmental issues leads us to the question of Nixon's personal beliefs on the environment. Where the structure of public opinion allows much leeway for policy discretion, personal ideology as well as interest group influence may count in shaping policy. An annotated document among the President's Office Files gives us a clue as to Nixon's own beliefs on the environment. This is an article by Peter Drucker, which accompanies a cover letter by Ehrlichman dated August 24, 1971. On the cover letter, Nixon jotted down "This makes more sense on the environment than anything I've seen recently."²⁷ Drucker contended that environmental risk should be balanced with economic cost. He urged that priorities should be set, and that one priority should be creating jobs for the growing number of baby boomers who were entering the job market. This statement was underlined by Nixon. Nixon believed that jobs had priority over the environment.

In policy decisions which were thought to involve a conflict between environment and economy/jobs, Nixon generally sided with the latter. In the July 23 budget meeting in 1971, Nixon ordered Ehrlichman and his staff to reexamine all pollution bills in terms of their economic effect and put brakes on them where feasible.²⁸ In August a memo by Paul McCracken, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, on the economic cost of pollution control was distributed to those involved in the environmental program; on this memo Nixon jotted down that the administration had gone overboard on the environment.²⁹ As for automobile exhaust regulations, the administration had little discretion, due to Congressional mandate, but Nixon was sympathetic to the auto industry; he granted a meeting to Henry Ford III in April 1971 to hear the industry's complaints on pollution and safety regulations, and in September 1971 at the Detroit Economic Club essentially stated publicly that jobs received priority over the environment.³⁰

In spite of this pro-business public statement by the president, there was no significant cutback in pollution control regulations.³¹ Public opinion, Congressional oversight and the EPA provided a counterbalance to pro-business forces in the White House. Shortly after the Detroit statement by Nixon, an influential Republican attempted to block the EPA's effort to force an Armco Steel plant in Houston, a major polluter, to install pollution control devices by shutting it down.

William Verity, Armco's president and an influential leader of the Ohio Republican party, sent Nixon a letter dated September 28, 1971 protesting against the EPA action. Peter Flanigan, a powerful Nixon assistant, tried to force the EPA into abandoning its efforts to pressure Armco. The Washington *Star* reported on this White House intervention, and Henry Reuss, chairman of a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, began to investigate the affair; in the end Armco had no choice but to capitulate. This incident, along with zealous oversight by liberal members of Congress such as Reuss and Thomas Eagleton deterred polluters from using political influence to shirk pollution control regulations.³² In spite of the pro-business preference of the President, the Nixon administration was thus forced by a combination of public opinion, mass media, Congress and the bureaucracy (EPA) into making serious efforts to control pollution. This pattern is consistent with the permissive consensus issue model.

The state of the national economy was one reason why the Nixon administration turned more conservative about environmental issues in mid-1971. In November 1971 the CEQ chairman Train stated in a letter to Ehrlichman that erosion of the administration's position on the environment had begun six months previously due to economic slowdown and other reasons.³³ Earlier in 1971, Nixon was more receptive to pollution control. In February 1971, Nixon had allowed the inclusion in his environmental message of a proposal to impose an SO₂ tax—which would have meant a significant cost burden on certain industries—despite the opposition of his commerce secretary. As Train observed, the economic downturn and a subsequent shift in public opinion must have had a major role in modifying the administration's pollution control policy. This is consistent with the previous analysis that environment is not such a powerful issue as the economy.

In addition to the state of the economy, Nixon's frustration over the lack of credit received for his domestic policy achievements should be underscored as a factor behind the shift in his position on pollution. In February 1971, Nixon and Haldeman had considerable discussions regarding PR efforts on domestic affairs, which Nixon thought were not working.³⁴ Then in May Nixon said he was going to quit meeting people who were against him and playing to audiences such as consumer advocates, environmentalists, intellectuals and so on.³⁵ In July, Nixon told Haldeman he wanted to shift his priority in domestic issues from welfare, the environment and consumerism to areas where he could act

with conviction; this followed the reading aloud of a *Look* article by Haldeman which was critical of Nixon's record on environmental and consumer affairs in particular.³⁶ A lack of favorable feedback on the administration's efforts to protect the environment helped discourage Nixon from taking further steps to protect the environment.

Favorable coverage by the mass media was lacking because of the administration's relations with the media. Although a vast majority of daily papers and periodicals supported Nixon, four influential newspapers, two magazines and many TV anchormen did not.³⁷

The 1972 presidential election was anticlimactic as far as environmental politics were concerned. Among the major potential Democratic candidates, George McGovern, Edmund Muskie, Edward Kennedy and George Wallace, only Edmund Muskie had strong ties with the environmental movement. He stumbled early in the primaries, and had dropped out of the race by the spring of 1972.

The case of the Nixon administration, which governed during a crest of the environmental issue attention cycle, demonstrates that electoral concerns and policy output are interconnected. The Nixon administration launched initiatives on the environment in response to public opinion. Nixon himself lacked personal interest in and ideological commitment to the environment, but mainly through the initiative of the White House Domestic Council and the newly created federal environmental agencies, the EPA and CEQ, to whom Nixon delegated authority, significant legislative proposals were made to protect the environment, especially in the early years of the administration. In 1971 Nixon decided to slow down on pollution control because of an economic downturn, and also because policy output had failed to affect public opinion in a way that would help him politically. Nevertheless, public opinion, mass media, Congress and the EPA did not let the White House ease pollution control efforts significantly. The fact that Nixon allowed much discretion to his staff, the relative political weakness of the environment compared to jobs and inflation, and the backlash against efforts to roll back pollution control are all consistent with the permissive consensus issue model.

IV. ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN MEDIA POLITICS—THE CASE OF A SPECIAL SENATE ELECTION IN OREGON

Contemporary media politics in the United States is driven by televi-

sion advertisements, and environmental issues have a role to play in these media politics. This was amply demonstrated in a special U.S. Senate election held in Oregon in January 1996 to elect a successor to Robert Packwood, who was forced to resign due to a sexual harassment scandal. This election elected a Democrat for the first time since 1962.

In order to fully assess the impact of a particular issue on an election, one must evaluate the whole context in which the election takes place, including other major issues and the political environment of that particular locality as well as the nation. It is not appropriate to study just the environmental aspects.

A. Outline of the candidates and local context of the election

In this election, the liberal Democrat Ron Wyden was pitted against Gordon Smith, a conservative Republican. Wyden, a former executive director of the Gray Panthers, was a 15-year House veteran representing the eastern half of Portland, a very liberal city tending to vote Democratic with solid margins. He had a liberal voting record; his average ADA score for 1990–1994 was 89%.³⁸ He was a skilled legislator, and was a major player in putting together President Clinton's health care reform package. He was popular in his district. He was well-connected to liberal interest groups and had a secure fund-raising base.³⁹ In spite of these advantages, however, his Senatorial campaign was damaged at the outset by a competitive primary against Peter A. DeFazio, another Congressman.

Gordon Smith, the owner of one of the largest frozen food companies in the U.S. was from rural eastern Oregon. Rural Oregon is dependent on agriculture, including lumbering on public lands. Protection of the spotted owl in national forests in compliance with the Endangered Species Act had been a thorny issue in recent years. Smith was a pro-life fiscal conservative. He was a newcomer, having entered politics in 1992, but was wealthy and telegenic. He quickly rose to be president of the state Senate. He had a deeply conservative voting record.⁴⁰ In the primary he had easily won with 64% of the vote.⁴¹

Although Wyden was a solid liberal and Smith a solid conservative, both sent centrist messages on such issues as the budget, the environment and Medicare in their campaigns.⁴² Each also tried to label the other as an extremist. Such attempts to sound moderate had to do with the political landscape of Oregon. Oregon traditionally elects moderate

Republicans such as Mark Hatfield and Robert Packwood to the U.S. Senate. At the national level, suburbs tend to provide the swing vote that decides election outcomes. In Oregon, many independents and Republicans prefer moderate Republicans.⁴³ Five counties around Portland and two other counties with similar demographic characteristics accounted for 50% of the total votes cast in this election.⁴⁴ Since voters preferring moderate politics are so numerous, it is hard to take a decidedly conservative or liberal position in a general election in Oregon.

A unique aspect of this special Senatorial election was the use of a mail ballot. Ballots were mailed to voters on January 10 and they were to return the ballots by January 30.⁴⁵ A total of 65.8% of eligible voters voted.⁴⁶ This rate was significantly higher than in past special elections; however, none of these earlier ballots were Congressional elections. Whether this high voter participation rate of 65.8% favored one of the candidates or not will be discussed later.

Finally, in the West Coast states, including Oregon, environmentalism enjoys wide support, mainly in urban areas. Many people have moved to Oregon attracted by its pleasant natural environment. Membership of environmental organizations is above the national average. Oregon ranked 6th in terms of the membership per capita of two major environmental groups among the 50 states and Washington D.C..⁴⁷ However, the rural parts of Oregon are dependent on forestry in public lands. The spotted owl controversy has in recent years pitted rural forestry interests against urban environmentalists. The Republican Senators, Hatfield and Packwood, while having a strong voting record on environmental issues overall compared to their Republican colleagues in Congress, nevertheless tended to side with forestry interests in the spotted owl debate. The environment, especially when the natural resources component is added, was a potential wedge issue that could result in internal division among the supporters of both the Democratic and the Republican parties.

B The environment and other issues in the electoral campaign

There are several resources that a candidate can employ to influence voters. Media campaigns, based mainly on TV advertisements, are perceived to play a central role in contemporary American politics. Although TV ads are very costly, because they give a blanket coverage of a very large audience, per voter cost tends to come cheaper than mail and other means. On the West Coast, where the political parties tend to

be weak, TV ads are especially important. Other campaign tools are targeted mail, phone banks and neighborhood canvassing by volunteers.

The candidates were more or less evenly matched in terms of overall deployable resources. On the one hand, Wyden had an advantage with volunteers. Labor, environmental, senior citizen and pro-choice groups provided volunteers. The Wyden camp was able to deploy as many as 4,000 campaign workers at one time in GOTV (Get out the vote) activities.⁴⁸ Pro-Republican grass-roots groups including the Religious Right, right-to-lifers and the gun lobby confined their activities mostly to mobilizing their own membership.⁴⁹ On the other hand, Smith was better financed than Wyden. Whereas Smith spent \$2 million of his own money and raised another \$4.3 million for a total of \$6.3 million, Wyden raised \$3.2 million, slightly less than half of what was available to Smith.⁵⁰

The media campaign was so negative by Oregon standards that the ads themselves became an issue. As in any typical Congressional election, Republican Smith portrayed Wyden as a tax-and-spend liberal. One ad contended that Wyden voted against a balanced budget five times.⁵¹ Smith also attacked Wyden for being an incumbent for too long. Another ad featured Wyden's dismal performance in a pop quiz given to the candidates by a local TV station.⁵² In the final stage of the campaign, an ad produced by DeFazio for the Democratic primary, which attacked Wyden's long incumbency, was included in one of Smith ads;⁵³ materials produced by a member of the opponent's own party are effective because they have a third-party credibility.

Wyden's ads included those attacking Smith's record on the environment, labor practices and abortion. Particularly devastating to Smith was an ad denouncing water pollution by a food processing plant owned by Smith, accompanied by footage of dead fish obtained from the state Department of Environmental Quality archive.⁵⁴ The Wyden camp also tried to link Smith with two conservatives who were unpopular in Oregon: the U.S. House speaker Newt Gingrich and Lon Mabon of the Oregon Citizen's Alliance.⁵⁵

At least three elements make the negative ad aspect of this election distinct. One was the role of independent advertising. Under the Federal Election Campaigns Act, independent ads can encourage voters to vote for or against a candidate, but should not be coordinated with the candidate's campaign. Among the pro-Wyden interest groups airing independent ads were the Sierra Club, the National Abortion and

Reproductive Rights Action and the Teamsters Union.⁵⁶ For the Sierra Club, this was the first attempt to launch an independent ad campaign. The frontal assault on the environment by the Republican majority in the 104th Congress has forced environmental groups to reconsider their previous strategy of focusing on insider lobbying. In addition to the Sierra Club, the Oregon Natural Resources Council, a local group, had a political action committee (PAC) and participated in independent advertising.⁵⁷

The second element was Wyden's decision to withdraw his negative ads about three weeks before the end of the campaign, in the face of much public resentment of the negative tone of the campaign.⁵⁸ According to a political science professor at the University of Portland, the decision appeared to be popular with voters.⁵⁹ However, independent ads remained on the air.

The third element was the availability of the fish kill footage to the Wyden camp. In media politics, pictures are more convincing than words. While verbal descriptions of voting records and so on are used when there are no appropriate graphics, attack ads with appropriate footage tend to be more effective.

C. Evaluating the role of environmental issues

Wyden won by a very small margin; Wyden and Smith got 47.6% and 46.1% of the vote, respectively. In this section, we turn to the central question: did the environmental issues help decide the outcome of the election? To answer this question we should first look at a poll conducted in the final days of the election campaign. This poll indicated that a portion of the electorate did vote for Wyden out of concern for the environment. The poll, conducted by the Voters News Service, a cooperative effort of four major TV networks and the Associated Press, indicates that the environment was indeed one of the factors behind Wyden's victory.⁶⁰ Education, abortion, taxes, the federal budget negotiations, the environment and the Republican performance in office were cited by the voters as most important in deciding how they voted. Of those who were certain to vote, 12% chose the environment; among these, 72% voted for Wyden. Nine in ten voters said they heard about the allegation of water pollution at Smith's food processing plant, and 26% of them stated it made them less likely to vote for Smith. Another 15% named education, and they voted for Wyden with a three to one ratio. A further 12% listed the performance of the

Republican Congress; support for Wyden among these voters was about three to two.⁶¹ Of the 28% of respondents who identified themselves as independents, 53% of them voted or were certain to vote for Wyden and 37% for Smith. Apparently Wyden did well among the independents. Using the same poll data, William Schneider, a prominent political analyst, attributed Wyden's victory to votes by women in a CNN program;⁶² he pointed out that Wyden led among women voters by 8 points, with Smith ahead by 10 points among men. Because women turned out in larger numbers, Wyden was able to win; according to the poll, 57% of those who voted were women. Together with education, the performance of the Republican Congress, and strong showing among women and independents, environmental concern was one of the factors that helped Wyden win the election, as this poll shows.

National-level politics influenced this Oregon election to some extent. About half of those surveyed responded that national politics was a factor. The well-publicized attempt by the Republican majority in Congress to roll back environmental regulations could have influenced to certain extent those 12% of Oregon voters in this election whose primary concern was the environment.

In addition, one should point out the contribution of suburban votes. Table 1 analyzes the election returns, dividing Oregon into the following four parts with different degrees of urbanization: Portland, Portland suburbs, other urban centers and small cities/rural areas.

Table 1⁶³
Special U.S. Senate Election Returns by Urbanization Category⁶⁴

	People /km ²	Population	Vote % Wyden (D)	Vote % Smith (R)
Portland	1342/km ²	243,961	66.1%	29.4%
Portland suburbs ⁶⁵	165	426,557	46.7%	47.9%
Other urban areas ⁶⁶	58	179,963	46.4%	45.1%
Small city/ rural areas	10	350,694	36.4%	56.0%

On the one hand, Smith defeated Wyden in small city /rural counties by a wide margin. Just as in the rest of the country, rural areas tend to be more conservative. Smith was from this part of Oregon. Furthermore, many of these counties, which depended on logging and lumbering in national forests, were hurt by the spotted owl controversy which led to bans on logging in national forests. On the other hand, Wyden trounced Smith in Portland by an even bigger margin. The votes in Portland suburbs and other urban centers were roughly split between the two candidates. What enabled Wyden to score his very narrow victory was not only the large margin in Portland, which he represented as a Congressman, but also the fact that he did not let Smith build margins in the Portland suburbs and other urban centers which formed the largest block of voters.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that, in three of the suburban counties, Republicans led the Democrats in voter registrations as shown in Table 2.

Table 2⁶⁷
Oregon Voter Registration by Party in the Suburban Counties

	Democrats	Republicans	NAV*	Others
Clackamas	74,782	74,580	36,330	3,065
Columbia	12,336	7,027	4,080	N/A
Marion	51,516	56,915	25,671	1,723
Washington	73,739	84,847	43,472	3,361
Yamhill	14,477	16,656	8,055	709
Total	226,850	240,025	113,532	8,858

Source: The Oregon Secretary of State. *NAV=non-affiliated voters.

In three of the counties, accounting for about 65% of registered voters, the registered Republicans significantly outnumbered the Democrats. How was Wyden able to stop Smith from sweeping these suburban counties in spite of the voter registration advantage held by the Republicans? Specifically, to what extent did environmental concerns help Wyden do so well in the suburbs?

Practitioners in both the Democratic and the Republican camps

agree that environmental concerns are especially important among suburban voters. Glen Bolger, a Republican pollster who worked for the Smith camp, recently wrote that suburban voters in particular tend to believe that the country is making progress on the environment;⁶⁸ and they do not like to see such progress compromised. Earl Baker, a former state chairman of the Pennsylvania Republican Party, is reported to have acknowledged that suburbanites in his state were disillusioned by the Republican Congress; it was too conservative for these suburbanites, particularly from an environmental point of view.⁶⁹ Daniel J. Weiss, the political director of the Sierra Club, believes that the environment is a wedge issue that might appeal to suburban, fiscally conservative but socially moderate Republicans.⁷⁰ Mark S. Mellman, a Democratic pollster, states that President Clinton takes an interest in environmental issues because they attract suburban voters.⁷¹ Nationally there is significantly more public trust in Democrats than in the Republicans as regards protecting the environment.

This concern that suburban voters show for the environment could, to a certain extent, be attributed to their above-average educational attainment. In Oregon, of the five counties comprising the Portland suburbs and two other urban counties, four, accounting for about 2/3 of the combined population, are above state average in terms of the proportion of people with more than 16 years of education.⁷² As we have already discussed, environmental concerns and education are closely connected.

One can demonstrate quantitatively that educational attainment, together with political affiliation and degree of urbanization, was a key variable in explaining the voting behavior in this Oregon election. To do so, we perform a regression analysis setting as the dependent variable the percentage difference between the Wyden vote and the Smith vote in each county and taking three elements as independent variables: the percentage of people 25 years old and above with more than 16 years of education, the percentage of non-affiliated independent voters among those who voted, and the population density of each county. All three independent variables, including educational attainment, turn out to be statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The corrected R^2 value amounted to 0.43, which means that we can explain 43% of the variation in the dependent variable with these three independent variables.⁷³ This regression analysis clearly indicates that educational attainment, together with the proportion of independent voters

and the degree of urbanization, was a factor contributing to votes for Wyden. Of these, education is correlated with environmental concerns, as we have already discussed; in addition, urbanization is also related with environmental concerns in the sense that the recent dispute on the spotted owl in particular pitted rural communities dependent on logging against environmentalists.

In the context of the importance of educated, suburban, and independent voters as discussed above, we should note the significance of the Wyden strategy of adopting a centrist position on fiscal issues. Had Wyden not modified the liberal policy positions that he used to take as the representative from liberal Portland, he would have turned off the suburban voters who are generally fiscally conservative. Many suburbanites in the United States tend to believe that the suburban middle class is saddled with taxes to finance welfare programs for inner cities. In this context we should recall the 1984 presidential election. In this election Mondale was unable to take advantage of Reagan's poor record on the environment. One important reason was that Reagan succeeded in convincing the American voters that Mondale was too liberal. Among Democrats, only those that are fiscally conservative, the neo-liberals as they are sometimes called, are likely to be able to take advantage of environmental issues in American suburbs, because the suburban voters tend to reject those that they perceive to be tax-and-spend liberals.

Some contend that voter registration efforts, in which environmental interest groups participated, also counted.⁷⁴ In a National Public Radio interview, Wyden gave credit for his victory to voter registration in addition to the issues of education and environment.⁷⁵ In the end, though, higher turnout did not help either candidate in a significant way; as Schneider points out, among those who voted in this election but not in 1994, Smith won by only a slim margin. Given that Schneider is correct, one could still point out, however, that without the voter registration drive by the Democrats, Smith's advantage among these new voters might have been greater.

In view of the fact that the Voter News Service poll indicates a large gender gap in this election, it is worthwhile evaluating whether there is a link between gender and environmental concerns. Although inconclusive, some poll data suggest that, at the national level, women might be somewhat more pro-environment than men. In a Gallup poll in April 1995 which asked whether the environment or economy should be

given priority, 65% of women and 58% of men chose the environment (sample size: 1,007). In the same poll, 33% of men and 29% of women said that the proposals made by the Republicans in Congress gave adequate protection to the environment. Although the data from this survey alone is inconclusive statistically, and the results of other surveys on environmental views offer mixed conclusions regarding a gender gap, this is a topic worth further investigation in view of the importance of the gender gap in national elections since the 1980s.

Finally, the role of the environmental issue attention cycle in this election needs to be evaluated. Media coverage on the environment in the past several years has been significantly lower than early 1990s when it reached a peak (See Chart 3 for example). Gallup polls indicate there has been a moderate but significant decline in the public concern on the environment which corresponds to the decline in media coverage; those saying that protection of the environment should be given priority over economic growth declined by 9 points between April 1991 and April 1995, from 71% to 62%, which was roughly equal to the level in 1984.⁷⁶ The Oregon case indicates that the public backlash against perceived attempts to roll back environmental protection works regardless of the phase of the environmental issue attention cycle.

Overall, there were several factors that contributed to Wyden's victory. This Oregon election indicates that the environment may have a moderate but significant impact on election; in particular, the educated, suburban, independent voters, who in the recent decades have tended to vote Republican in other elections, may be swung by environmental concerns.

IV CONCLUSION

The model presented in this paper linking policy output with the structure of public opinion in relation to election considerations provides a good explanation for the environmental policies of the Nixon administration and the special U.S. Senate election in Oregon.

The seeming contradiction between Nixon's lack of personal interest in the environment and the significant initiatives taken by his administration in this area at a time of considerable public concern over the environment in the 1970s can be explained as follows. Because the environment is a permissive consensus issue, policy makers enjoy a significant degree of discretion; the public does not follow permissive con-

sensus issues very closely. Nixon was able to delegate environmental protection matters to his staff and concentrate on other issues he was more interested in. Because people in general do not care about permissive consensus issues as much as jobs and inflation, Nixon put a brake on pollution control after mid-1971 when the economy showed signs of slowing down. This change in focus attitude was further reinforced by the fact that Nixon got little credit for his domestic policies among the media, especially the most influential newspapers, magazines and network stations. However, the shift in presidential priority did not prevent the Environmental Protection Agency from vigorously pursuing its regulatory programs. This was because public opinion, the mass media, and Congressional oversight offset the pro-business attitude of President Nixon himself. It is the nature of permissive consensus issue that voters will penalize policy makers once they perceive that their policies run counter to the commonly held consensus.

Concerns over the environment played a moderate but significant role in helping Wyden score a narrow victory against Smith in the Oregon election. Several factors led a majority of Oregonians to vote for Wyden, and environmental concerns was among them; 12% of the voters polled responded that the environment was the most important reason to vote for him. The fact that Wyden did well among suburban, educated, and independent voters was a factor which contributed significantly to his victory. A regression analysis indicates a statistically significant relationship between Wyden votes and three variables: education, percentage of independent voters, and degree of urbanization.

The lessons of this special election in Oregon are applicable to other U.S. elections, since there are numerous localities in the U.S., especially in the Northeast and on the West Coast, with a large concentration of educated, suburban, and independent voters. Furthermore, there is an increasing politicization of some environmental organizations with large memberships, especially the Sierra Club. These organizations, through their campaign activities, are likely to increase the salience of environmental issues in many elections to come.

The emergence of neo-liberal Democrats such as Clinton and Gore, who are fiscally conservative and socially liberal, in recent years is a factor to be taken account, because they seem to have considerable appeal to suburban voters as the 1992 presidential election indicated. The appeal of environmental issues to educated, suburban and independent voters has a significant meaning within the broad context of contem-

porary American politics, because increased support towards the Democrats among these constituents would enable the Democrats to offset the Republican gains among southern and Catholic whites in the past twenty years. The Republican strategy to erode the traditional Democratic advantage among southerners and blue collar Catholics by emphasizing conservatism on cultural and racial affairs was initiated by Nixon and successfully developed by Reagan and Bush in subsequent years. Such cultural conservatism was a winning strategy as long as the educated suburbanites, who are generally moderate to liberal on social issues, tended to vote Republicans because they saw the fiscal liberalism of the Democrats, which implied higher taxes, as worse than the cultural conservatism of the Republicans. With the emergence of fiscally conservative, neo-liberal Democrats in recent years, the environment, together with other social issues such as abortion, could be used to attack the cultural conservatism of the Republicans and win suburban votes.

Thus, environmental issues could come to make a moderate but significant contribution to electoral outcomes, especially when there are no other more powerful concerns such as the economy, taxes or race relations.

These two case studies support the basic analytical framework put together in the first section. However, it should be tested further by other well-documented case studies to verify the analytical approaches used.

NOTES

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¹ Among the works by historians with a significant political component, Samuel P. Hayes, *Beauty, Health and Permanence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) deserves particular mention.

² Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King ed. *New American Political System* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," *Policy Sciences* 21 (Fall 1988):129-168; James Q. Wilson, *American Government* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1992).

³ The analytical term "valence issue" was developed by Donald E. Stokes. See Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," *The American Political Science Review* 57(1963): 368-377.

⁴ *Gallup Poll Monthly*, April 1995, 18.

⁵ Frederick S. Yang, "Environmental Partnership; A Democratic Perspective." *Campaigns and Elections*, July, 1996, 57.

⁶ Riley E. Dunlap, "Public Opinion and Environmental Policy," in James P. Lester ed. *Environmental Politics and Policy* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1989), 131. As for permissive consensus issues in general, see John C. Pierce, Kathleen M. Beatty and Paul R. Hagner, *The Dynamics of American Public Opinion* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1982).

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Stephen R. Kellert, "Social and Perceptual Factors in Endangered Species Management," *Journal of Wildlife Management* 49, no.2(1985): 530.

¹⁰ From a Resources for the Future study in 1978 quoted in James Q. Wilson's *American Government*, 220.

¹¹ The environmental groups are the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society. The membership and state demographic figures are for 1990. Washington D.C. is included as a separate entity. There is no adjustment for overlapping membership.

¹² Stephen R. Kellert, "Perceptions of Animals in America," in R. G. Hoage ed. *Perceptions of Animals in American Culture* (Washington D. C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1989). Kellert has identified nine attitudes toward animals. Of these attitudes ecologicistic, naturalistic and scientistic attitudes, which are in line with the premises underlying contemporary nature preservation policy, were significantly related to educational attainment.

¹³ Van Liere and Riley Dunlap, "The Social Basis of Environmental Concern: A Review of Hypotheses, Explanations and Empirical Evidence," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 44(1980):181-197, 190.

¹⁴ Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology—the Issue-Attention Cycle," *Public Interest* 28(1972): 38-50.

¹⁵ For example, see Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, *News that Matter: Television & American Public Opinions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

¹⁶ James P. Lester and Douglas Costaine, "The Evolution of Environmentalism: From Elitism to Participatory Democracy?" in Bryan D. Jones ed. *The New American Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 248-249.

¹⁷ Dunlap, "Public Opinion and Environmental Policy," 103.

¹⁸ Laura L. Manning, Laura L. *The Dispute Processing Model of Public Policy Evolution; The Case of Endangered Species Policy Changes from 1973 to 1983* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990), 75; and "The Politicians Know an Issue," *Newsweek*, 26 January 1970, 33.

¹⁹ Lawrence R. Jacobs, and Robert Y. Shapiro, "The Rise of Presidential Polling; the Nixon White House in Historical Perspective," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59(1995): 163-195.

²⁰ The survey question was "Aside from the Vietnam War and Foreign Affairs, what are some of the most important problems facing people here in the United States?"

²¹ Paper dated September 5, 1974 prepared for the Cabinet meeting on September 7.

²² Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 20.

²³ Harry R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1994).

²⁴ Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, 20.

²⁵ Memo by Whitaker dated March 12, 1971 in *The John Ehrlichman Alphabetical Subject File 1969-1973* (Bethesda Md: UPA, 1989), microfiche.

²⁶ Walter Hickel, the Interior Secretary from Alaska, did not have much influence in shaping administration policies on the environment. In the Nixon administration, it was the White House and not the Cabinet which took policy initiatives.

²⁷ Memo by Ehrlichman dated August 24, 1971 in *President's Office Files Series A Documents Annotated by the President, 1969-1974* (Bethesda Md: UPA, 1990), Microfiche.

²⁸ Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries*, 328.

²⁹ Memo by Ehrlichman dated August 5, 1971 in *President's Office Files Series A Documents Annotated by the President, 1969-1974*.

³⁰ Richard M. Nixon, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1971), 967-968.

³¹ Although the decision to go slower on automobile exhaust control was a major exception, this was mainly due to an adverse court ruling and not to environmental politics.

³² John R. Quarles, *Cleaning Up America* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 58-93.

³³ Letter dated December 2, 1972 in *President's Office Files Series A Documents Annotated by the President, 1969-1974*.

³⁴ Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries*, 251.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 285.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 333.

³⁷ Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, 19.

³⁸ The ADA scores for this period are from Philip D. Duncan, and Christine C. Lawrence. *Politics in America 1996* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996), 1100.

³⁹ David Beiler, "It's in the Mail," *Campaigns and Elections*, April 1996, 34-69.

⁴⁰ Kim Murphy, "Oregon's New Senator Credits Environmental Vote for Victory," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 February 1996, PT. A, p12.

⁴¹ Beiler, "It's in the Mail," 35.

⁴² Robert Marshall Wells, "Wyden, Smith in Tight Race for Packwood Seat," *Congressional Quarterly*, 20 January 1996, 156.

⁴³ Robert Marshall Wells, "Wyden narrowly Scores Win in Bid for Packwood Seat" *Congressional Quarterly*, 3 February 1996, 310.

⁴⁴ These counties are Clackamas, Columbia, Marion, Washington and Yamhill around Portland and Polk and Lane.

⁴⁵ Oregon Secretary of State, "Voter's Pamphlet," [Cited January 31, 1997]; available from <http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/jan3096/pamphlet/vpcover.html>; INTERNET.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Per capita membership is for the combined total of the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society members in each state and Washington D.C for 1990. Overlapping membership is not accounted for.

⁴⁸ Beiler, "It's in the Mail," 37.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁵⁰ Kim Murphy, "Democrat Wyden Wins U.S. Senate Race in Oregon," *Los Angeles Times*, 31 January 1996, Pt. A, p1.

⁵¹ Beiler, "It's in the Mail," 36.

⁵² The quiz asked such common-sense questions as the price of gas and the location of Bosnia. Wyden was unable to answer any of them.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 37.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 36.

⁵⁶ Robert Marshall Wells, "Wyden, Smith in Tight Race for Packwood Seat," 155.

⁵⁷ Margaret Kritz, 1996. "Not-So-Silent-Spring," *National Journal*, 9 March 1996, 525.

⁵⁸ Murphy, "Democrat Wyden Wins U.S. Senate Race in Oregon," Pt. A., P1.

⁵⁹ Wells, "Wyden, Smith in Tight Race for Packwood Seat," 156.

⁶⁰ Mike Mokrzycki, "Oregon Voters Blame GOP More for Budget Crisis As They Elect a Democrat," Associated Press, 31 January 1996, in IQUEST[database online]; available from Compuserve. The poll was conducted by telephone between January 25 and January 29, right before the final day of the campaign. Sample size was 1,192.

⁶¹ Wells, "Wyden Narrowly Scores Win in Bid for Packwood Seat," 312.

⁶² "Inside Politics" CNN, aired on January 31, 1996. The transcript is available from *Broadcast News* [CD-ROM database] (Woodbridge Con.: Research Publications International, 1996).

⁶³ Elections returns are those of the Oregon Secretary of State; available from <http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/jan3096/other.info/result.htm>; INTERNET. Area grouping and tabulation is by the author.

⁶⁴ Population is for 1990. Population and area data is from County and City Data-book.

⁶⁵ Clackamas, Columbia, Marion, Washington and Yamhill.

⁶⁶ Polk and Lane.

⁶⁷ Voter registration data are those of the Oregon Secretary of State [Cited January 31, 1997]; available from <http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/jan3096/other.info/ptyvote.htm>; INTERNET.

⁶⁸ Glen Bolger, "Environmental Partnership: A Republican Perspective," *Campaigns and Elections*, July 1996, 57.

⁶⁹ Rhodes Cook, "Unpredictable Suburbs Will be Key in '96," *Congressional Quarterly*, 6 April 1996, 966.

⁷⁰ Margaret Kritz, "The Green Card," *National Journal*, 16 September 1995, 2265.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Clackamas, Lane, Polk and Washington.

⁷³
$$\%W-S = a + b_1 EDUC + b_2 NAV + b_3 POPDEN + e$$

$$-0.70 \quad 0.011^* \quad 2.4^* \quad 0.00033^{**}$$

%W-S=Wyden% minus Smith %; EDUC=people 25 years old or above with more than 16 years of education; NAV=% of non-affiliated, independent voters among those who voted; POPDEN=population density in square kilometers; *=statistically significant at 95% confidence level; **=statistically significant at 99% confidence level

⁷⁴ Beiler, "It's in the Mail," 69.

⁷⁵ "Wyden Credits Oregon Senate Victory to Voting by Mail," National Public Radio, 2 February 1996; available from *Broadcast News*.

⁷⁶ Gallup Poll Monthly, April 1995.