

The Road to San Francisco: The Shaping of American Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty

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IN JULY 1947 the United States government took the initiative in proposing a preliminary peace conference to the other member nations of the Far Eastern Commission. The American initiative failed to yield any results, and the United States tabled the proposal. Two years passed with no progress toward a peace settlement with Japan.

The primary reason for the long delay in peacemaking was, of course, the rapid change in U.S.-Soviet relations from wartime cooperation to postwar confrontation. Because the mutual antagonism of the two superpowers became a predominant factor in defining postwar international relations, the question of a peace with Japan could not remain simply a matter of "postwar settlement." It developed into an issue in the U.S.-Soviet global rivalry.

After the First World War, too, rivalries developed among victorious allies. But the U.S.-Soviet rivalry which followed the Second World War was far more intense and far-reaching than the imperialist rivalries among the victors of the previous war. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry tended to influence even decisively the nature of the social and economic systems of other nations. Such friction made negotiations and compromises far more difficult for both sides.

If a peace settlement had been concerned mainly with such issues as disposition of territories, exaction and allocation of reparations, and preventive measures against the resurgence of "militarism," it would

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have been much easier for the victorious powers to reach agreement through deals and compromises.

For a while after the end of the Second World War, the question of a Japanese peace treaty was seen mainly as a matter of "postwar settlement." The allies might then have achieved the peace settlement by prompt action. In that case, however, the peace settlement would have been a very severe one for Japan.

In the case of the First World War, the Paris Peace Conference opened a little more than two months after the end of the war. President Woodrow Wilson, backed by the great power of the United States, exerted strong leadership in the international political process from the armistice to the opening of the peace conference. There was also a set of principles for peace in the form of Wilson's Fourteen Points.

At the end of the Second World War, the allies did not lack guiding principles on important issues in a peace settlement with Japan. The Potsdam Declaration enunciated a number of guiding principles, and the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta Agreement were other sources for such principles. There was, however, no strong leader comparable to Wilson, who could lead the allies toward an early peace settlement. There was a more important cause that prevented an early peace based on the principles agreed on before the end of the war. It was the Western leaders' fear of the "menace of the Soviet Union" which was aroused by Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe and other peripheral areas around her border in the last phase of the war and in the early postwar years. Their fear of Soviet power was further deepened by growing Communist strength in war-devastated Western countries. Western leaders were led by their fear of Soviet expansionism to reconsider their peace policy toward Japan and Germany.

Both Japan and Germany retained the potential to become again strong military powers because of their industrial and technological capabilities and diligent, sophisticated labor forces. When the basic tone of U.S.-Soviet relations changed from cooperation to confrontation, the two adversaries inevitably perceived the strategic value of those vanquished nations for their contest for power.

As the "postwar settlement" viewpoint began to recede, and as the "Cold War" viewpoint in turn began to permeate deeply into the question of a peace settlement with Japan, compromise over the question between the United States and the Soviet Union became increasingly difficult. Difficulty in compromise first became apparent when

U.S.-Soviet negotiations resulted in a deadlock over the form and procedures of a preliminary peace conference in 1947. Whereas the United States proposed a preliminary peace conference composed of all the members of the Far Eastern Commission and insisted on the "veto-free" formula for the voting procedure of such a conference, the Soviet Union wanted a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Big Four to discuss the peace question and persisted in her demand for a veto power.

The conflict of opinion over procedural questions between the United States and Great Britain on one side and the Soviet Union on the other was the primary international factor that prevented progress toward a peace conference. But the conflict over procedural matters was only superficial. In fact, it represented a phase of the increasingly intensified "Cold War." Under these circumstances, no easy compromise was possible.

Intertwined with the development of the Cold War situation, intra-governmental politics within the United States also cast a shadow over the path to peace. The State Department and the Defense Department developed conflicting opinions about the question of a Japanese peace treaty. The two departments differed as to the degree of importance to be given to military considerations. They differed especially about the importance of military bases in Japan. General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo entertained his own views, which were different both from State's views and from Defense's. Delay in forming a consensus within the United States government was a serious obstacle on the road to a peace settlement with Japan.

Relying mainly on documents compiled in the *Foreign Relations* series and partly on sources available at the MacArthur Memorial Library, the Truman Library and the British Public Record Office, this article attempts to analyze the process of intra-governmental politics through which the Truman administration adjusted internal differences and reached agreement on a peace policy. Its analysis is limited to the sixteen month period which began with the Acheson-Bevin meeting in September 1949 and ended with the revision of NSC 60/1 in January 1951.

I

On September 13, 1949, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson conferred with British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin who was on a visit to Washington. In the meeting, Acheson confirmed his determination to

accomplish an early peace settlement with Japan and expressed his desire to have a prior agreement with Britain and the Commonwealth countries on the principal provisions of the peace treaty. Bevin told Acheson that the next Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' Conference would be a good opportunity for Bevin to enlist the support of the Commonwealth countries for the basic treaty provisions desired by the United States. They agreed that January 1950 might be a good time for the conference and Acheson promised that he would meanwhile "line up the military and other elements" of the United States government and inform Bevin of Washington's idea on a Japanese peace treaty before the Commonwealth conference.¹

Since Acheson had assumed the post of Secretary of State in January 1949, he had been preoccupied with European affairs. First, he had had to cope with the year-long Berlin blockade by the Soviet Union. A potential danger of direct American-Soviet military clash, the blockade had continued until May 12. Secondly, he had conducted delicate negotiations leading to the conclusion of the NATO treaty on April 4. Thirdly, he had busied himself with the tasks of unifying the American, British, and French occupation zones in Germany, of terminating the direct military government of the three powers, and of establishing the West German government. Those tasks were accomplished by September 21. Thus, Acheson's diplomacy had evolved around West European, especially German, issues from the spring through the summer of 1949.

Acheson could take great satisfaction in his achievements. After his return from the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris in June, he spoke with optimism at a press conference on June 23, that "the position of the Soviet Union in regard to the struggle for the soul of Europe has changed from the offensive to the defensive."² President Harry S. Truman shared the same optimism as his Secretary of State. On June 1, the President told a reporter that he believed the world was closer to peace than at any time in the last three years.³

While the European situation was moving towards stabilization, the Far Eastern situation was in confusion. The Chinese Communists were winning the civil war. In April, their armies had crossed the Yangtze River and prepared to surround Shanghai. The fate of the Chinese

¹ Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1949* [hereafter cited as *FRUS, 1949*], Vol. 7, Part 2, pp. 858-59.

² Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson* (New York, 1972), p. 103.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

Nationalist government was about to be sealed on the mainland. Having dealt with a crisis in Western Europe and established the collective defense system of NATO, Dean Acheson now turned to Far Eastern problems which had been awaiting his attention and energetic handling.

There was discord between Washington and London in regard to China policy. While London was thinking of according diplomatic recognition to the new Chinese government the Communists would soon establish, Washington intended to maintain its diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government. Adjustment of this discord was on the agenda of the Acheson-Bevin talks in September. More important for Acheson, however, was the problem of peace with Japan. Since it was expected that a joint Soviet-Chinese diplomatic offensive toward Japan might be intensified after the establishment of a Communist government in China, it became urgent for his diplomacy to take the initiative on the issue of an early peace with Japan and to secure Anglo-American cooperation for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. Since a Commonwealth conference was scheduled to meet to discuss the problem of peace with Japan that coming January, Acheson must have felt that he should move immediately.

There was another important reason why the State Department gave serious attention to the matter and began to work earnestly for an early peace treaty with Japan. It was the consensus within the Department that the occupation of Japan, having accomplished its original purposes, the demilitarization and democratization of Japan, had now reached a phase of "diminishing returns." Dean Rusk, the then Deputy Under Secretary of State, would describe at a seminar at Princeton several years later what haunted the officials of the State Department in 1949. They felt, according to him, that occupation forces ran into a process of progressive "deterioration" or "corruption" not only in terms of physical luxury but also in terms of their arrogance toward the Japanese. For example, young officers occupied residences of former upper class Japanese while forcing them to live in their garages. How long could such a practice continue without invoking strong Japanese resentment? The prolonged occupation, they feared, would surely sour pro-American feelings, which the United States had succeeded in cultivating in Japan.⁴

⁴ Dean Rusk's statement at the Princeton Seminar, March 14, 1954, Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library (Independence, Mo.)

A series of ominous incidents that occurred in 1949, such as the "Matsukawa" incident, the "Shimoyama" incident, and the "Mitaka" incident, may have appeared to them to confirm their apprehension of the evils of the prolonged occupation.

In carrying out his peace program, however, Acheson had to cope with opposition from four groups: "the Communists, the Pentagon, our allies, and the former enemy." Of those, he recalled in his memoirs, "the communists gave the least trouble. . . . The most stubborn and protracted opposition to a peace treaty came from the Pentagon."⁵ He gave many pages of his memoirs to the story of his struggle with the Pentagon.

As the experiences of 1947 and 1948 had made clear, the most difficult problem confronting a peace settlement with Japan was that of security. Both NSC 13/2 and 13/3 had consciously evaded a clear answer to this problem. Another difficult task for Acheson was to devise a circuitous way to reach a peace settlement, avoiding the convening of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the major Allies which the Soviet Union would strongly demand as the organ for peace making.

Acheson launched his attack on the bastion of the Pentagon by a letter he let Under Secretary of State James Webb write to Defense Secretary Louis Johnson on October 3. In the letter, Webb requested Johnson to inform the State Department of "the essential security requirements" which in the view of the Defense Department should be secured in a peace settlement with Japan. He solicited a speedy response from the military, emphasizing the necessity for the two departments to agree on that matter by mid-November, so that an American draft treaty could be presented to the British government before the Commonwealth conference.⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), on the other hand, were in no mood to respond positively, for it was their opinion that the time had not arrived to seek peace with Japan. The JCS had made in June a reevaluation of U.S. strategic needs in East Asia, in view of an impending Communist victory in China. They reaffirmed the value of the offshore island chain for U.S. military strategy to contain Soviet expansion. They paid special attention to the strategic importance of Japan. In NSC 49, a document

⁵ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969), p. 428.

⁶ *FRUS, 1949*, Vol. 7, p. 860; Frederick S. Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton, 1963), p. 83.

dated June 15, which emphasized Japan's strategic value, the JCS maintained that military bases in Japan were so important for American security interests that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan was still premature.⁷

Emphasizing the prematurity of a Japanese peace treaty, the JCS maintained that the continuing Soviet policy of aggressive communist expansion made it essential that Japan's democracy and western orientation must first be established beyond question. In rebuttal, the State Department argued in a document of September 30 that "the only hope for the preservation and advancement of such democracy and western orientation as now exist in Japan lies in the early conclusion of a peace settlement with that country."⁸

These exchanges indicate that the Pentagon did not share with the State Department the apprehension that the prolonged occupation would bring forth adverse effects.

The State Department went on with its own studies of the problem of a Japanese peace treaty and drew up on October 13 a draft treaty which was based on the draft of January 1948.⁹ Strangely, the text of this important document, twenty-four pages long and accompanied by nine annexes, is not printed in *Foreign Relations*. But the outline of the document can be known from Frederick S. Dunn's book. According to Dunn, that draft treaty was "very similar" to the treaty finally negotiated by John Foster Dulles and signed at San Francisco, and was a generous and "thoroughly realistic" plan.¹⁰ There were no provisions regarding the security problems. The reason, of course, was that no agreement had been reached with the Defense Department.

The revised version of the October draft treaty was adopted by the Department on November 2,¹¹ and it was sent to General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Tokyo, for comment.¹² About the same time, the State Department announced that the first draft peace treaty would soon be completed. This announcement was certainly a device to put pressure upon the slow-moving Pentagon. The announcement stimulated the mass media's

⁷ *FRUS, 1949*, Vol. 7, pp. 774-77.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 871-73.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 877-78.

¹⁰ Dunn, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-86.

¹¹ This draft is not printed in *Foreign Relations*. But it is in the MacArthur papers. MacArthur Archives, MacArthur Memorial Library (Norfolk, Va.)

¹² *FRUS, 1949*, Vol. 7, pp. 898-900.

interests in a peace treaty and journalists often speculated that a peace conference might be held in the middle of the following year.

As the date for opening the Commonwealth Conference drew near, the State Department, increasingly annoyed by the Pentagon's obstruction, came to look to General MacArthur in Tokyo for a helping hand in breaking the impasse. This does not mean, of course, that there was a high degree of agreement between the State Department and General MacArthur on the nature of the peace settlement or of the security arrangement for Japan. However, they both shared the same opinion that the occupation had accomplished its purposes, that the delay of a peace settlement would bring forth adverse effects, that the occupation should be terminated by a peace treaty at the earliest possible time, and that the treaty should not be a severe, punitive one. It was natural therefore that the State Department regarded SCAP as an ally in intra-governmental politics vis-à-vis the Pentagon.

General MacArthur, who had been an advocate of an early peace settlement with Japan since 1947, entertained in 1949 unique views with regard to the question of Japan's security. His views were conveyed to Washington in a dispatch of his political advisor William Sebald and by the oral report which Colonel Stanton Babcock, a member of his staff, delivered at a meeting at the State Department.¹³ They may be summarized as follows.

(1) Unarmed neutrality, guaranteed by the great powers, is from every point of view Japan's most desirable course; even though it was impossible for Japan to pursue this course immediately, it would be the optimum long-run solution of the security question. The possibility of the Soviet Union joining in the international guarantee should not be excluded. (In the State Department, his preference for an unarmed neutral Japan was shared by George Kennan.¹⁴ But it cannot be denied that there was some ambiguity in MacArthur's vision. At one point he spoke of a joint guarantee by great powers; at another he spoke of the United Nations as the guarantor.)

(2) Until the system of international guarantee became feasible, the United States should keep its naval and air bases in Japan to make it unmistakably clear to the Soviet Union that aggression against Japan would mean an all-out war with the United States. The size of United

¹³ See footnote 15.

¹⁴ Acheson, *op. cit.*, p. 429; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston, 1967), p. 396.

States forces could be kept to the minimum, since they were a “symbol” of American commitment to Japan’s security.

(3) Arrangements for U.S. bases in Japan after the treaty should be incorporated in a bilateral agreement separate from the peace treaty itself.

(4) The Ryukyu islands must be retained by the United States as they were an essential link in the offshore island chain.

(5) Japanese rearmament is not advisable not only because of the Constitutional provision but also because of the fact that Japan would for the time being be unable to afford the cost.¹⁵

Pressed by the State Department to clarify its position on “essential security requirements” in a peace treaty, the Defense Department answered that it was sending to Japan a mission to survey the Far Eastern situation and particularly to ascertain MacArthur’s opinion. The Pentagon could clarify its position only after the return of the mission. The fact-finding mission headed by Under Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Voorhees visited Japan in early December. The mission was obviously a part of the Pentagon’s tactics of delay. But it was also a purpose of the mission to persuade the General to change his mind and agree with the Pentagon.

When the Voorhees mission had returned from Tokyo, the Pentagon held a meeting of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on December 14. In that meeting, Voorhees argued that it would be better for the Pentagon to insist on the two conditions for a peace treaty rather than to reject the State Department’s proposal simply as premature. In his opinion, the Pentagon should insist that the peace treaty must be signed by all the former belligerents including the Soviet Union and also stipulate the retention of military bases in Japan by the United States.¹⁶

No doubt Voorhees’ argument for an “all-inclusive peace” took its cue from MacArthur’s idea. This argument, however, was taken up by the Pentagon as a means to put a damper on the positive attitude of the State Department for an early peace settlement. On December 23, the JCS at last prepared an answer to the State Department’s request. In view of political and military instability in the Far East, the JCS deemed

¹⁵ Sebald’s Memorandum, September 21, 1949, *FRUS, 1949*, Vol. 7, pp. 862–64; Colonel Babcock’s oral report at a joint State-Army conference of November 2, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 890–95. See also Voorhees’ statement at the meeting of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, MacArthur Archives.

¹⁶ The same JSSC meeting, MacArthur Archives.

it a part of the “minimum military requirements” to keep U.S. forces of nearly the existing size and use generally the same bases as at present. The JCS also held that, from the military point of view, “a treaty to be acceptable must include both the USSR and the *de facto* Government of China as party signators to the document.” Since the minimum military requirements and the requirement that the USSR be a party to the treaty are probably mutually exclusive, the JCS concluded, they had to reaffirm their previous view that negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan was still premature.¹⁷

Pentagon officials, preoccupied with the desire to perpetuate the free, unrestricted use of Japanese military bases, the privilege the U.S. military enjoyed in occupied Japan, tended to persist in their opposition to an early termination of the occupation. They were unable to be flexible enough to appreciate the argument of the State Department that bases could not be used effectively without a voluntarily cooperative spirit on the part of the Japanese. Acheson was severely disappointed by Johnson’s letter of December 23, with which the memorandum of the JCS was enclosed.¹⁸ In the December 24 meeting with General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, Acheson sarcastically characterized the memorandum as a “masterpiece of understatement.”¹⁹

It was now clear that Acheson could not carry out his promise to have the American draft of a Japanese peace treaty delivered to Bevin before the Commonwealth conference. On the same day, Acheson invited British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks to his office and informed him with regret that the U.S. government had failed to present an American draft treaty because of the lack of agreement within the government on security requirements.²⁰ Having fully explained the situation in the government, however, Acheson emphasized the importance of not giving the world, especially the Japanese, the impression that the United States was holding back in proceeding with a peace settlement. He asked Franks to convey to Bevin his earnest desire to get Bevin’s kind cooperation in shaping the public impression that the real root of difficulty in peacemaking was “the predatory and uncooperative attitude of Soviet Russia.”²¹

¹⁷ This answer by the JCS, given the document number NSC-60, was distributed to the NSC members on December 27. *FRUS, 1949*, Vol. 7, pp. 922-23.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 922.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 924-26.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 927-29.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 929-30.

II

The JCS's delaying tactics put Acheson in an embarrassing position. Their intransigence displeased President Truman. At the meeting of the National Security Council held on December 29, Truman rejected the JCS's proposal to provide the Nationalist regime in Taiwan with military aid. As for the question of a peace settlement with Japan, he remarked that "the United States and the United Kingdom could negotiate a peace treaty with Japan whether the USSR participated or not." Thus he made clear his endorsement of Acheson's position.

About the same time as Truman and Acheson successively made important announcements in regard to America's Asian policy in Washington, Philip C. Jessup had a revealing conversation with MacArthur in Tokyo in early January 1950. He was on a three month fact-finding trip in Asia as a roving ambassador. On January 8, Jessup called on MacArthur. When Jessup told the General that one of the ways to counter the communist menace in Asia was to conclude a Japanese peace treaty which would satisfy the legitimate desires of the Japanese, the latter concurred emphatically. The United States, said the General, had promised in the surrender instrument and the Potsdam Declaration to give them their freedom when they had accomplished the essential purposes laid down in those documents, and they had fulfilled their part of the promise to the letter. MacArthur was of the opinion that a neutral Japan could be "to the advantage to the United States and to the Soviet Union as well." "We should be able to convince the Russians that here at least their interests and ours were parallel." He favored proceeding "actively to negotiate the treaty if necessary ending up with a treaty to which the Soviet Union and China would not be parties."

When Jessup mentioned the JCS's memorandum on the question of a Japanese treaty, MacArthur replied that they "did not at all understand the problem here." He went on to make a comment on each of the Joint Chiefs. General Bradley "had never been in Asia and had all his experiences and made his reputation in the European theatre"; General Hoyt S. Vandenberg "lacked any general, broad knowledge of problems outside of his particular jurisdiction"; Admiral Forrest Sherman was "a man of the very first quality in all fields," but "the decision of the JCS did not reflect his view," and General J. Lawton Collins "did not know

²² Rusk's memorandum. January 24, 1950. *FRUS, 1950*, Vol. 6, p. 1131.

Asian problems thoroughly.” MacArthur was of the opinion that Bradley was expressing Secretary Johnson’s view.

MacArthur was very critical of the JCS argument that, as under the circumstances the Soviet Union and China could not be expected to join in peacemaking, the negotiation of a peace treaty was premature. This was not a decision, he said, which should be left to the JCS. Since the JCS were overruled on the question of aid to Taiwan, there was no reason why they could not be overruled on the question of a Japanese peace treaty. He advised that Secretary Acheson “should take the matter up with the President and ask for definite authority to proceed with the negotiation of the treaty, the terms and procedures to be left to his discretion.” This conversation convinced Jessup that MacArthur viewed matters in much the same way as Acheson did and that the difficulty existed between SCAP and the Department of Defense.²⁴ Thus he wondered “whether on a matter so important as the negotiation of the Japanese peace treaty it would not be possible for the President to take the matter into his own hands and request General MacArthur to report directly to him his views on this question.”²⁵

In the meantime, Dean Acheson’s famous address, delivered at the National Press Club on January 12, incurred the anger of right-wing Republicans and of the China lobby. They bitterly criticized him for leaving Taiwan outside his “defensive perimeter” in the Pacific and blamed his passive Asian policy for the “loss of China.” In February, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy started his Red-hunting campaign and the whole State Department came under McCarthyist attack. With the public mood leaning toward the right, the right-wing Republicans intensified their attack on the government.

General MacArthur, a hero of the Pacific War and the successful administrator of occupied Japan, stood as a kind of “sanctuary” which rightist critics of the Truman administration dared not attack. Because MacArthur’s view and the Pentagon’s ran parallel in regard to the Taiwan question, the rightists showed no mercy in criticizing the State Department’s China policy. In the advocacy of an early peace settlement with Japan, however, MacArthur was aligned with Acheson, and this made rightist critics hesitate to attack Acheson on this issue. Because of MacArthur’s advocacy of an early peace treaty, the Pentagon was

²³ Jessup’s Memorandum, January 1, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1109–14.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1114–16.

deprived of the advantage of having that clamorous group on its side over the issue of a Japanese treaty.

Toward the end of January 1950, General Omar Bradley and the heads of the services paid a visit to Tokyo. They had talks with MacArthur for three days. But those talks proved to be inconclusive. To W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who visited Tokyo immediately after the MacArthur-Joint Chiefs parley, MacArthur said his talks with them had a "helpful and constructive result," and expressed his hope that they "would considerably modify their previous opinion."²⁶ After the return of the Joint Chiefs to Washington, however, General Bradley told Voorhees that the Chiefs were still "strongly of the opinion that it is premature to make a treaty at this time, and that they had so orally advised the President."²⁷

Having failed to receive a favorable oracle from MacArthur, Defense Secretary Johnson turned his displeasure upon the State Department. He regarded direct approach by the State Department to the General as an offside play and demanded that the Department stop discussing military matters directly with him.²⁸ Thus, intervention by the President became indispensable to curb the Pentagon's obstruction. On February 20, Truman ordered that a National Security Council paper be prepared for his consideration.²⁹ About the same time, discussions about the question of a peace treaty became more animated in Japan;³⁰ the British plan of a peace settlement submitted to the Colombo Commonwealth Conference became known;³¹ and the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance was concluded. Given such developments in international affairs, the United States government could not afford to allow the internal disagreement on the peace question to remain.

²⁶ Butterworth's Memorandum, February 5, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1133-35.

²⁷ Voorhees to MacArthur, February 27, 1950, MacArthur Archives.

²⁸ Acheson, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

³⁰ I shall discuss the Japanese side of the international process of peacemaking in a forthcoming book. For the best and most detailed description of the Japanese side of the story now available, see Kumao Nishimura, *Sanfuransisuko heiwa jōyaku* [The San Francisco Peace Treaty] (Volume 27 of the *Nihon Gaiko-shi Series* edited by Morinosuke Kajima, Tokyo, [Kajima Kenkyūjo Shuppan Kai, 1971]). My own short article, "Japan's Response to U.S. Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty: The Dulles-Yoshida Talks of January-February 1951," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics*, Vol. 10 (to be published in March 1982), mainly deals with the Dulles-Yoshida talks.

³¹ "United Kingdom's Paper on the Japanese Peace Treaty discussed at Colombo: January 1950," transmitted by the British Embassy to the State Department, January 18, 1950. MacArthur Archives.

Pressed to break the deadlock, the Defense Department presented its own treaty plan for the first time. It was the plan which its original author Under Secretary Voorhees characterized as a "possible new approach" to a Japanese treaty. He regarded it as "the best plan," for it was the only plan which, in his view, could reconcile the conditions deemed essential by the JCS with the objectives considered important by SCAP.³² The plan did not exactly envisage a peace treaty. It proposed to conclude "a treaty" or "a partial treaty" with Japan, which would terminate the state of war, liquidate the system of indirect military control under the occupation, restore Japan's sovereignty in diplomatic as well as domestic matters, and exempt Japan from the cost of the occupation. However, the Pentagon planned to maintain the "regime of control" (this meant SCAP) and occupation forces, which would be reactivated in an emergency (the standby SCAP system).³³ This proposal was dubbed the "half treaty" or "partial treaty" plan. According to Voorhees, one of the merits of this formula was that it could prevent the Soviet Union from occupying Japan, which the Kremlin might be tempted to try under the pretext of the continuation of the state of war in case a peace treaty was concluded without Soviet participation.

This "new approach," having been approved by the JCS, was presented to the State Department.³⁴ It was also communicated to SCAP. MacArthur did not like the new Pentagon proposal. He took it as an attempt to maintain the substance of the occupation by conceding a nominal treaty to Japan. He felt that the possibility of Soviet participation in a peace settlement should not be excluded. If the United States should recognize the Communist Chinese government, one of his subordinates reasoned, the Soviet Union would tend to be more willing to join in a peace settlement.³⁵

Acheson, too, received the Pentagon proposal without enthusiasm. He commented that it overstressed the importance of the legal problems involved and would arouse the suspicions of the allies that the United States intended to remain in Japan indefinitely in the guise of occupation. In the State Department, however, there emerged as a response

³² Voorhees' Memorandum submitted to Johnson, March 27, 1950. MacArthur Archives.

³³ The same Voorhees memorandum.

³⁴ *FRUS, 1950*, Vol. 6, pp. 1150-54.

³⁵ SCAP's memorandum, March 9, 1950. MacArthur Archives.

to the Pentagon plan an opinion which showed interest in trying a "new approach" different from that of the Pentagon. This new approach would conclude on the one hand a normal type of peace treaty dealing with economic and political problems and security problems in so far as they related to the possible resurgence of Japanese aggression, and on the other hand develop a multilateral security arrangement in relation to possible Soviet-Communist aggression. For the first time, the idea of a "Pacific pact" emerged in the State Department as a subject to be studied seriously. It may be surmised that the emergence of the "Pacific pact" idea had some connection with Jessup's return from his three-month trip in Asia.³⁶

On April 24, senior officials of the State and Defense Departments met in conference to discuss the question of a Japanese peace treaty in view of the coming meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain and France, which was scheduled in May. Acheson explained that, as discontent with the occupation was increasing in Japan, the real choice for the United States now was not either a peace or status quo but between a peace and a rapidly deteriorating situation. He also pointed out that if the Soviet Union proposed that a peace conference be held along the lines suggested by the United States in 1947, the United States would be put in a difficult position. He stressed the necessity of an early peace and proposed the idea of a multilateral security system which would involve the member nations of the Far Eastern Commission and Japan.³⁷

The military evaded a direct answer to the proposal of a multilateral security system, simply reiterating the importance of military bases in Japan. General Vandenberg and General Collins spoke of MacArthur's proposal for a peace conference as a mere propaganda move to embarrass the Soviets. Thereupon Johnson remarked that MacArthur's views had been reported variedly, and he suddenly broached his intention of going himself to Tokyo to talk with MacArthur together with Bradley in June. Requesting Acheson to leave the problem dormant until his return, Johnson again resorted to delaying tactics.³⁸

³⁶ *FRUS, 1950*, Vol. 6, pp. 1157-60.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1175-82.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

III

The entrance of a new actor was necessary for a new turn of the political scene. That new actor was John Foster Dulles. Appointed to a senior advisory post in the State Department, Dulles was assigned on May 18 the task of handling the question of a peace settlement with Japan. On the same day President Truman publicly stated that the question of a Japanese peace treaty belonged to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State, implying his support of Acheson in the State-Defense conflict over the question.³⁹

Dulles, an advocate of bipartisan foreign policy, who was close to both the Dewey and Taft factions of the Republican Party, could be expected to handle the issue of a Japanese peace settlement without making it a partisan issue. He was a veteran diplomat with a reputation as a tough, yet flexible, negotiator. In addition to his previous experience in the State Department, he had acquaintances in the Senate and among the military. Because of these qualifications, Dulles was entrusted by the President with the task of moving forward the stalled policy making process with regard to a Japanese peace settlement.⁴⁰ Soon he began to tackle his task energetically.

On June 17 Dulles, accompanied by his chief aid John M. Allison, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, arrived at Tokyo Airport a few hours ahead of the Pentagon duo, Johnson and Bradley. On his arrival, he gave an informal press conference, had a talk with Sebald, and then flew to Korea. Dulles returned to Tokyo on June 21. For a week, he carried on a very strenuous schedule, conferring with MacArthur and seeing leading Japanese figures of the various fields. It was during his visit to Tokyo, which coincided with the visit of the Pentagon group, that very substantial progress was achieved toward an understanding among the State Department, the Pentagon and SCAP. It was an important milestone on the road to the San Francisco peace settlement.

Sebald emphatically testified in his memoirs that the Dulles group and the Pentagon group had never met each other during their visits to Tokyo.⁴¹ James Reston of the *New York Times*, on the other hand, reported that MacArthur and the two groups had met together and

³⁹ Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁴¹ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan* (New York, 1965), p. 252.

reached an agreement.⁴² There is no documentary evidence to prove that the three parties met in a conference. It is highly probable, however, that the adjustment of differences of views among the three parties was made through several channels from June 21 through 23. It is most likely that MacArthur, Dulles and a member of the Pentagon group secretly met together at a certain stage of the negotiation for adjustment. It was MacArthur's memorandum, dated June 14, that provided a basis for his discussions with the two delegations. The memorandum represented, in Sebald's words, "a serious effort by MacArthur to bridge the gap between the State and Defense Departments."

With regard to the security question, his memorandum rejected the idea of a collective security system (the "Pacific pact" plan) espoused by the State Department and criticized the "half-treaty" plan favored by the Pentagon, as something "worse than maintaining the status quo." Although the document reiterated his cherished hope for an unarmed neutral Japan, its main point was the presentation of a third alternative security arrangement: "so long as 'irresponsible militarism' exists in the world as a threat to 'peace, security and justice' in Japan. . . points in Japanese territory [would] continue to be garrisoned by the Allied Powers. . . through United States forces."⁴³

It may be recalled in this connection that MacArthur had retreated from the idea of stationing small-scale forces in Japanese bases he had espoused the previous year and had leaned further toward the idealistic position of favoring "unarmed neutral" Japan in the last several months. He had maintained in the spring of 1950 that in view of the domestic situation in Japan the post-treaty maintenance by the United States of military bases would strengthen the anti-American groups in Japan.⁴⁴ He reversed his position, however, in his memorandum of June 14 and admitted the necessity of keeping U.S. forces in Japan. This must have pleased the Pentagon delegation.

But the memorandum did not entirely satisfy them. Therefore MacArthur and the Pentagon delegation continued discussions with Dulles most probably joining them in some way at the later stage of their

⁴² Dunn, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-04.

⁴³ The text of MacArthur's memorandum of June 14 is printed in *FRUS, 1950*, Vol. 6, pp. 1213-21. See also Sebald, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-55.

⁴⁴ For example, see Allison's memorandum of April 11, which discussed Sebald's report of his conversation with MacArthur held on April 6, *FRUS, 1950*, Vol. 6, pp. 1167-71.

talks.⁴⁵ The understanding they reached through compromises was embodied in the new MacArthur memorandum of June 23. This memorandum made two more concessions to the Pentagon's position. First, it advocated the formula that not only "points in Japanese territory" but "the entire area of Japan must be regarded as a potential base for defensive maneuver with unrestricted freedom reserved to the United States." Second, it expressed the opinion that despite Japan's constitutional renunciation of war its right to self-defense in case of predatory attack is implicit and inalienable."⁴⁶ By these concessions to the position of the Pentagon, the memorandum tried to dispel the anxiety of the military about the security of post-treaty Japan.

Admittedly, this second MacArthur memorandum still contained such a provision that "no major change in the disposition of the security forces shall be made without first consultation between the United States Military Commander and the Prime Minister of Japan." This provision would certainly make the freedom of action for U.S. forces more restrictive. But MacArthur's position in the memorandum, unlike his previous espousal of the "token presence" of U.S. forces, sought to reach a compromise with the Pentagon at a point that largely corresponded to its position on security requirements.

Having obtained such concessions in security matters, the Pentagon group conceded to MacArthur and the State Department in regard to the desirability of an early peace settlement. MacArthur acted on Dulles' advice to draw up his second memorandum.⁴⁷ The fact that MacArthur did it on the very day Johnson and his associates left for Washington suggests Dulles' active role as a mediator during his stay in Tokyo.

Another important concession the Pentagon group made in Tokyo was its approval of the formula of settling those security matters by a bilateral agreement which Japan would voluntarily conclude with the United States. The Pentagon came at last to accept the formula first proposed by the British government in 1948 and then favored by MacArthur and the State Department. In this respect, too, a series of talks held in Tokyo in June with MacArthur as the central figure had an important meaning.⁴⁸ The series of talks marked a decisive moment in

⁴⁵ In a letter of August 1 to Johnson, Acheson indicated his belief that Dulles had discussed treaty matters with Johnson in Tokyo. *Ibid.*, p. 1229.

⁴⁶ For the complete text, see *ibid.*, pp. 1227-28.

⁴⁷ Dulles to Acheson, June 30, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 1229-30.

⁴⁸ Acheson, *op. cit.*, pp. 432-33.

the process of consensus building within the United States government with regard to the basic outline of the San Francisco Peace system and the desirability of an early peace settlement.

The understanding reached at the Tokyo talks was illustrated by Jessup's memorandum of July 12, which recorded his conversation with Bradley. "Bradley said," wrote Jessup, "that General MacArthur's written memorandum cleared up a misunderstanding about his views and showed that there was no real difference of opinion on what was meant by the maintenance of 'bases.' He thought the views of State and Defense were not now very far apart. He noted that the maintenance of American forces in Japan by agreement with the Japanese would be very different from a continuation of the occupation on the present basis."⁴⁹

IV

At last the United States government appeared to have bridged the gap within itself with regard to the problem of a peace settlement with Japan. And the engine of the government was likely to start operating with full speed toward treaty drafting and negotiation with foreign governments. Exactly at that moment the Korean War broke out. The sudden development in the Far Eastern situation inevitably affected the problem of a peace settlement with Japan.

The war could not but direct the eye of the Pentagon toward the importance of the logistic functions of the Japanese bases. The importance of Japan's logistic functions, together with the intensified fear of Soviet aggression upon Japan, inevitably gave rise to the view in the Pentagon that all the negotiations for a peace with Japan should be postponed until the end of the war.

MacArthur's memorandum of June 23 was instrumental in restraining the opponents of a peace with Japan. Bradley, formerly a central figure of the "hawkish" group, maintained a forward-looking attitude toward the peace problem even after the outbreak of the war. On July 24, he told Jessup that "it ought to be possible to have an agreement in principle very shortly which would enable us to make some public announcement about plans for a peace conference."⁵⁰

Johnson still showed some reluctance to go ahead, but here again MacArthur's memorandum of June 23 proved to be helpful for Dulles in

⁴⁹ Jessup's Memorandum, July 24, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 1254-55.

persuading Johnson. In their telephone conversation of August 3, which followed the transmission of a draft security treaty to be mentioned in the next paragraph, Dulles pointed out that the draft of treaty articles sent to him from Acheson was intended to “carry out the position expressed by General MacArthur in the second memorandum.” Dulles reminded Johnson that the draft gave the United States “the right to maintain in Japan as much force as we wanted, anywhere we wanted, for as long as we wanted.” Johnson answered that if it was the intention of the State Department to give as broad military rights as Dulles had mentioned and as were referred to in MacArthur’s second memorandum, then he and Dulles could “get together and go places.”⁵¹

In July and August, a group, in which Dulles and Allison were leading members, were engaged in drafting the security provisions. They drew up on July 25 a draft of the four article treaty, a document with the title “International Peace and Security.” Dulles submitted it to Acheson,⁵² then it was forwarded to the Pentagon on August 1. The group in the State Department continued to examine the text of the draft for revision and elaboration. At this stage of treaty drafting, a single treaty which incorporated the security provisions with a general peace treaty was also prepared as a possible alternative.⁵³ The idea of concluding a security treaty separate from a general peace treaty was not confirmed as a definite policy yet.

On August 22, the JCS finally made a formal response to the draft of the articles, “International Peace and Security,” proposed by the State Department. In their response, the military clarified its position concerning the “security requirements” to be included in a peace settlement. For the first time, the Pentagon gave a straightforward answer to the question the State Department had posed in October 1949.

The JCS definitely withdrew their former opposition to a peace treaty that would not have the participation of the Soviet Union and China. Now they favored starting negotiations for an early peace settlement with certain conditions. They requested that the peace treaty be not ratified until after favorable resolution of the present U.S. military involvement in Korea. Then the JCS memorandum outlined the “security requirements” to be fulfilled in a peace settlement. The JCS regarded

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Dulles’ memorandum. August 3, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 1264–65.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 1259–61.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1267–70.

the State Department draft as unacceptable. In their view it did not adequately safeguard the minimum security requirements. They also emphasized the eventual necessity for the United States to have a Japan rearmed for effective self-defense and recommended that interim steps should be taken to build up a rearmed and friendly sovereign Japan.⁵⁴ The influence of MacArthur's memorandum of June 23 can clearly be seen in the JCS's decision in August. Although the State Department draft was not accepted by the JCS, the gap between them was no longer insurmountable. In subsequent negotiations, the State Department made some concessions. One important concession made by the Department was the agreement that "any peace treaty with Japan should not come into effect until after favorable resolution of the military situation in Korea." The State Department also confirmed its intention to conclude a separate agreement, simultaneously with the conclusion of the security treaty, which would contain the detailed provisions regarding the use of bases in Japan.⁵⁵

When the gap between the positions of the two Departments was almost bridged, adjustment of minor differences was worked out by Allison and Major General Carter B. Magruder, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army. They reached practically complete agreement on September 1. Thereupon Allison began to draft a joint memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of State and Defense. The memorandum was submitted to President Truman on September 7. It was approved first by the NSC members excluding the President and then by the President himself on September 8.⁵⁶ Thus the memorandum became a formal decision of the government.

The main features of the memorandum, known as NSC 60/1, may be summarized as follows.⁵⁷

(1) The United States should now proceed with preliminary negotiations for a Japanese Peace Treaty. The Department of State should undertake confidential preliminary discussion through diplomatic channels with friendly powers on the Far Eastern Commission. After the initial discussions with the friendly powers, a United States political representative will go to Japan to discuss confidentially with General

⁵⁴ JCS's memorandum, August 22, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 1278-82.

⁵⁵ State Department's memorandum, August 23, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 1284-88.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1288-93.

⁵⁷ Acheson-Johnson joint memorandum for Truman, August 7, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 1293-96.

MacArthur the proposed Treaty and by arrangements through and in cooperation with General MacArthur will discuss the proposed Treaty with the Japanese government.

(2) In conducting these negotiations the following security requirements should be regarded as vital and any treaty must take account of the following:

a. The treaty shall not become effective in any event until after favorable resolution of the military situation in Korea.

b. In so far as possible an access to the natural, industrial and manpower resources of Japan must be denied to the USSR.

c. It must provide that initially Japan will be garrisoned by forces acceptable to the United States under a United States military command.

d. It must provide that foreign forces unacceptable to the United States not be permitted in Japan.

e. The security arrangements, while protecting the United States from being forced out of Japan without its consent, should also make it possible for the United States to withdraw its forces whenever satisfactory alternative security arrangements are concluded.

f. It must not contain any prohibition of Japan's inalienable right to self-defense and to possess the means of exercise of that right.

g. The treaty must give the United States the right to maintain armed forces in Japan, wherever, for so long, and to such extent as it deems necessary. Questions regarding the extent to which Japan will be required to contribute to the cost of maintaining those forces, and similar questions regarding the detailed implementation of the security arrangements will be the subject of a supplementary bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan to come into effect simultaneously with the treaty.

h. It must not disturb the United States strategic trusteeship over the Marianas, Caroline and Marshall Islands.

i. Its terms must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north.

j. There should be nothing in the treaty which prohibits the United States garrison forces' acting at the request of the Japanese government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances.

(3) During the course of the discussions the treaty should be discussed informally with members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

(4) At an appropriate time a public announcement will be made to make clear the agreement of the United States government on the necessity of proceeding with preparations for a treaty and the fact that discussions through diplomatic channels are under way.

With the approval by the President of this joint memorandum (NSC-60/1), the peacemaking activities of the United States government entered a new stage. By a curious coincidence, it was exactly one year before the peace treaty was to be signed at the San Francisco Conference. It was also about one year after the Acheson-Bevin conference of September 1949. On September 14, 1950, President Truman announced in a press conference that his government would now start preliminary negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty.

V

In accordance with the procedures stipulated in NSC 60/1, Dulles began a round of preliminary talks with diplomats of the member countries of the Far Eastern Commission. In addition to the "Seven Principles," a memorandum which provided a basis for those talks, the State Department drafted a peace treaty composed of twenty-six articles on September 11. A working group in the Defense Department drafted a U.S. -Japanese agreement on security matters on October 27.⁵⁸ By the middle of November, Dulles felt he was ready to go to Tokyo.⁵⁹

Toward the end of that month, however, the war situation in Korea took a sudden adverse turn for the United States, as massive Chinese ground forces began to appear on the battlefields. Soon U.S. forces were in full retreat. On December 17, President Truman proclaimed a national emergency. The proclamation made Washington's mood gloomier and gave impetus to pessimism about Korea. The once prevailing optimistic forecast that the war would be over by Christmas was replaced by pessimistic talk about the possible loss of Korea. Even the military was infected by pessimism. In fact, the NSC discussed an "honorable withdrawal" from Korea as early as November 28.⁶⁰

In response to this critical situation, the State Department and the military again developed different views regarding the feasibility of an early peace settlement with Japan. It may be recalled that NSC 60/1

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 1297-1303, 1336-42.

⁵⁹ Dulles to MacArthur, November 15, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 1351.

⁶⁰ *FRUS, 1950*, Vol. 7, pp. 1089-90.

stipulated that “the treaty shall become effective . . . in no event until after favorable resolution of the military situation in Korea.” The military therefore took the position that it was not an appropriate time to pursue an early peace settlement with Japan. The State Department, on the other hand, considered that it became even more urgent for the United States to make peace with Japan. The Department developed a new approach to Far Eastern and Pacific affairs. It was a call for a collective defense system for the Pacific island chain. The idea of a multinational Pacific agreement was not entirely new. It had existed in the Department since the spring of 1950. However, a Pacific agreement had formerly been conceived as a system of joint guarantee of Japan’s security. It was now conceived as a collective defense system which included Japan as a key member. Should the Communist camp succeed in capturing South Korea, its logical next aim would be Japan. Thus the State Department felt it very urgent to rebuild Japan’s armed forces and combine them with U.S. naval and air forces. An early peace settlement with Japan was a necessary incentive to Japanese rearmament and a Pacific defense pact would facilitate this by eliminating the opposition of other Pacific countries.

In a memorandum for Dulles dated December 2, Allison expressed his opinion that “we should endeavor to get the Japanese to agree, with respect to their own defense and the defense of the Japan area, to furnish ground forces . . . while the United States and such other of our allies as agreed with us and would come in on our terms would furnish air and naval forces.” In another memorandum written a few days later, Allison repeated his proposal to “create some sort of mutual assistance pact among the Pacific nations (Australia, New Zealand, Philippines and the U.S.) which Japan could join at a suitable time and which would have the dual purpose of defending Japan from Communist aggression and assuring our friends that Japan would be on their side and not a menace to them.”⁶¹

As revealed in those memorandums, the new approach envisaged the creation of a Pacific version of NATO, a collective defense system in which the United States and Japan would join together with such Pacific countries as the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. Since the United States could not keep a large army in the Pacific region, it was

⁶¹ Allison’s memorandums for Dulles, December 2 and 7, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, Vol. 6, pp. 1354–56, 1356–58.

hoped that Japan could take over from the United States the task of providing ground forces for the system.

It is possible to consider that Japanese rearmament had already begun in July 1950 with the creation of the National Police Reserve. Both the Soviet Union and China regarded it as a violation of the Far Eastern Commission's basic policy which had forbidden Japan to possess armed forces. However, the Police Reserve was equipped only with light weapons. It could be argued, therefore, that those weapons were no more than the "small firearms" permitted by the FEC directive of February 12, 1948. If the United States let Japan build full-fledged armed forces, it would certainly be a clear violation of the FEC policy. Allison argued, however, that the United States should not be restrained by the previous FEC decisions. In his opinion, "the present situation is so serious and present conditions so different from those contemplated at the time the FEC was set up." He therefore advised that the U.S. government should frankly tell the other FEC members that "we are no longer in a position to abide by the terms of reference of the FEC or its previous decisions."⁶²

The State Department also reasoned that the Japanese might be able to circumvent the constitutional restriction in rearmament if Japan was integrated into a collective defense system. As Dulles explained in his conversation with British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks on January 12, 1951: "If some device can be arranged whereby Japan can contribute armed forces to an international organization for the defense of peace and security in the Pacific area, it will be easier for the Japanese themselves, in view of their present constitutional limitations on a national defense force."⁶³

The State Department officials were worried about the impact upon the Japanese of America's disastrous retreat in Korea. They were worried about it especially because they felt that the control of mainland Asia, a traditional major market and supplier of materials for Japan, had given the Communist bloc an advantage in dealing with Japan.⁶⁴ When the Japanese lost confidence in American strength, the leftists might increase their influence in Japan and the country might drift toward the Communist bloc. That possibility was a nightmare haunting

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 1355.

⁶³ Memorandum of conversation, January 12, 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. 6, p. 793.

⁶⁴ See, for example, the record of Dulles's conversation with Sir Alvary Gascoigne, January 29, 1951, *ibid.*, p. 826.

the mind of State Department officials. In Dulles's opinion "Russia had two targets—Germany and Japan." If the Japanese leaned to the Communist bloc, the Western position in East Asia would be irretrievably lost. Thus "the accession of Japan to our side was an essential." Would the Japanese be willing to align their country with the United States if they were to witness America's defeat in Korea? Dulles expressed his anxiety to Hubert Graves, Counselor at the British Embassy on December 19. According to the British record of the conversation, "Dulles surmised that Japan's fears of aligning herself with the Western powers were likely to increase." Therefore, Japan would probably ask what price we would pay for her joining the Western bloc. "It was," said Dulles, "no longer a matter of drafting a treaty and inducing—or perhaps pressing—Japan to sign. We had to decide first of all how far we could go in paying the price she would almost certainly ask." Since Dulles's observation was exceedingly gloomy, Graves had the impression that Dulles was deliberately overpainting the picture.⁶⁵ However, Dulles and other State Department officials were genuinely worried about the impact of U.S. defeat in Korea upon the Japanese mind and the weakening of the American bargaining position in negotiating with Japan.

On December 8, Dulles recommended to Acheson that "a prompt effort [be made] to commit Japan, spiritually and politically, to the cause of the free world." "In this respect time is of the essence," he emphasized. He was afraid that the prestige of the United States would increasingly suffer in Japan as "the political and military implications of the Korean defeat" became more fully known. Thus he maintained that a mission should be sent to Japan as soon as possible. Sensing that the American bargaining position was weakened, Dulles and other State Department officials really felt that the United States might have to offer some concessions to induce Japan to commit herself to the cause of the free world. "Any such commitment by Japan," Dulles told Acheson, "would probably involve, in general, a basic decision by the United States to defend the island chain of Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines and a certain commitment to Japan in terms of sea and air power, certain economic assurances and a prompt restoration of Japanese sovereignty through a treaty of peace or a declaration of peace." Even the restoration of Japan's sovereignty over the Ryukyus and the

⁶⁵ Sir Oliver Franks to British Foreign Office, December 20, 1950. FO 371/83839, Public Record Office.

Bonins was considered.⁶⁶ On December 13, Acheson sent Defense Secretary George C. Marshall a four point proposal for partial revision of the NSC decisions of September 7. The United States should, he proposed, (1) seek “an early conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan without awaiting a favorable outcome of the situation in Korea”; (2) discuss “the peace settlement with assumption that the United States intends to commit substantial armed forces to defense of the island chain of which Japan forms part”; (3) leave “the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands under Japanese sovereignty, subject to the provisions of a contemplated military security agreement which would presumably take special account of the position in Okinawa”; and (4) explore “at this time a possible Pacific Pact” which “would have the dual purpose of assuring combined action as between the members to resist aggression from without and also to resist attack by one of the members, e.g. Japan if Japan should again become aggressive.”⁶⁷

On December 28, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee reported on the State Department’s proposal and drafted a memorandum for the Defense Secretary on behalf of the JCS. The military assessed the Korean situation as pessimistically as the State Department. They noted that the United States had suffered especially serious reverses in Asia. The success of future U.S. military operations in Korea was now “open to serious question.” The initiation of negotiations for a peace treaty would of necessity be conducted “under the circumstances of extreme weakness on the part of the United States in Japan.” The United States would be expected “to offer many military and other concessions to the Japanese which, under other circumstances, probably would not be necessary.” Thus they were strongly opposed to initiating negotiations with Japan for a peace settlement. The military also argued that under the present circumstances there was “a strong probability” that peace with Japan would “deprive U.S. forces of the use of Japan as a major base of operations in the Korean War.” Starting from the same gloomy view of the Korean War as that of the State Department, the military thus arrived at a conclusion quite opposite to that of State on the feasibility of an early peace with Japan.

The military’s response was equally negative to the other points proposed by the State Department. Regarding the second point, that is,

⁶⁶ Dulles’s memorandum to Acheson, December 8, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, Vol. 6, pp. 1359–60. See also Acheson to Marshall, December 12, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 1364.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1363–67.

the commitment of substantial armed force to the defense of the Pacific island chain, the military maintained that such a commitment was unrealistic because the United States was not capable of providing the island chain with adequate defense single-handedly in the case of a global war. As for the return of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the military could not perceive "any reason for such a gratuitous concession." They felt the concession "entirely unacceptable, in view of the strategic importance of those islands." The military took a lukewarm attitude on the idea of the Pacific pact because negotiations for such a pact were to be intertwined with those for a Japanese peace treaty.⁶⁸

The military maintained that a peace settlement with Japan would become practical only after Japan had revised the Constitution and begun to build up her self-defense capability. They suggested that an arrangement similar to the control of East Germany by the Soviet Control Commission might be devised as an interim measure in regard to Japan. They noted that East Germany under the Soviet Control Commission had been "granted a very large measure of ostensible autonomy and clothed with certain outward forms of independence."⁶⁹ Thus the military appeared to have returned to their earlier position favoring "a piecemeal peace" or "a half peace."

Again it seemed that State-Defense disagreement might deadlock American policy toward a peace settlement. Because of several factors, however, a stalemate did not develop this time. The international situation was so critical that the American government could not afford to allow obstructions by the military. Secondly, the post of the Secretary of Defense was now held by George C. Marshall, a retired five-star general and former Secretary of State. Marshall could communicate well with his successor at the State Department and control the military by his prestige. Thirdly, Dulles was there to apply his diplomatic skill in adjusting differences within the government.

In a conference with the Joint Chiefs on January 3, 1951, Dulles argued persuasively that a delay of his visit to Japan would be detrimental to the long-term interests of the United States. He emphasized two points in his attempt to persuade them. One was increasing uneasiness among the Japanese. "The Japanese people and their leaders," Dulles said, "are coming increasingly to feel the danger of throwing

⁶⁸ Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to JCS, December 28, 1950, and draft JCS memorandum for Marshall, the same date, *ibid.*, pp. 1385-92.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1390.

in their lot with us in view of the fact that Communist power seems to be closing in upon them, and also upon their normal process of food supply from French Indo-China, Siam and Burma. Our information points to increasing doubt on the part of the Japanese leaders as to the wisdom of any definite commitment to our cause. . . .” The absence of the American initiative in peace negotiations would increase their doubt and anxiety. The other point Dulles emphasized was the possibility of losing the initiative in peacemaking to the British Commonwealth. He pointed out that the British government was drafting a Japanese peace treaty. If the United States remained inactive, he warned, she would lose the initiative to Britain and the Commonwealth countries. To induce the military to agree to an early peace settlement, Dulles promised that the State Department would do its part in retaining U.S. control over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands if the Defense Department regarded control essential to U.S. interests. The military also expressed their fear that the visit of the Dulles mission might provoke a Soviet attack upon defenseless Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan, and argued for delay. But Dulles maintained that the Soviet Union had a long-term East Asian policy and would not make such an instantaneous response to the mere visit of an American mission to Japan.⁷⁰ Responding to a JCS inquiry, MacArthur flatly denied the possibility of such a Soviet action. MacArthur urged an early visit of the Dulles mission to clear up the uneasiness of the Japanese about American peace policy.⁷¹

On January 8, 1951, Acheson and Marshall agreed on the dispatch of the Dulles Mission. They also agreed on the contents of the Presidential letter to be given to Dulles. The JCS gave their consent to these documents the same day. President Truman put his signature on them on January 10. Thus the NSC decisions of September 8, 1950, were now supplemented and revised by the Acheson-Marshall joint memorandum and the letter of the President to Dulles. Truman’s letter stated that “the United States should proceed with further steps to bring about a peace settlement with Japan without awaiting a favorable resolution of the military situation in Korea.” The letter instructed Dulles that he should have in mind that “it is the policy of the United States Government that the United States will commit substantial armed force to the defense of

⁷⁰ Acheson to Sebald, January 3, 1951, and Dulles to Acheson, January 4, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, Vol. 6, pp. 778–79, 781–83.

⁷¹ Collins to MacArthur, January 3, 1951; MacArthur to JCS, January 4, 1951; and Sebald to Acheson, January 6, 1951, *ibid.*, pp. 780–81, 786.

the island chain of which Japan forms a part, that it desires that Japan should increasingly acquire the ability to defend itself; in order to further implement this policy, the United States Government is willing to make a mutual assistance arrangement among the Pacific island nations (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, the United States, perhaps Indochina)."⁷² The Truman Administration succeeded for the second time in reaching a consensus in regard to a peace settlement with Japan. Thus the Dulles mission could leave Washington for Tokyo on January 22.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida was quite willing to align Japan with the United States. But he strongly resisted Dulles's request for rearming Japan.⁷³ He argued that immediate rearmament would place an excessive economic burden upon the Japanese and play into the hands of the Communist bloc by bringing forth social unrest at home. He also mentioned such factors as the danger of militarist resurgence, the state of public opinion, and the feelings of neighboring nations.⁷⁴ MacArthur supported Yoshida's position.⁷⁵ Since the rearmament of Japan as an American ally was the major aim of his mission, however, Dulles could not leave Tokyo empty-handed on this matter. He sought to obtain from Yoshida some kind of commitment to rearm. After hard bargaining, Yoshida promised that Japan would prepare a National Defense Force of 50,000 army and navy personnel when peace became effective.⁷⁶ This promise barely met Dulles's condition for a peace settlement. Yoshida wanted to keep the promise secret and insisted that Japan would make no explicit commitment to rearmament in a treaty or an agreement to be signed simultaneously with a peace treaty. Dulles consented to this condition.⁷⁷ But he was determined to withhold clear

⁷² Truman to Dulles, (draft), January 10, 1951, *ibid.*, pp. 788–89.

⁷³ For a detailed discussion of Japan's response to the visit of the Dulles mission, see my article, "Japan's Response to American Peace Policy," which was mentioned in footnote 30.

⁷⁴ Nishimura, *op. cit.*, p. 88; Allison's Memorandum of Dulles-Yoshida conversation, January 29, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, pp. 827–30; a Japanese memorandum handed to the Dulles mission, January 31, 1951, *ibid.*, p. 834.

⁷⁵ Nishimura, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–89.

⁷⁶ A copy of the Foreign Ministry document, "The First Japan-U.S. Negotiations on the Peace Settlement," was obtained by the Tokyo Shimbun and an article based on the document was published in the newspaper on May 13, 1977. See also the *Foreign Relations's* editorial note on the Japanese memorandum dated February 3, 1951, titled "Initial Steps for Rearmament Planning" in *FRUS, 1951*, Vol. 6, p. 849.

⁷⁷ *Tokyo Shimbun*, May 13, 1977.

U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan until Japan revised the Constitution and became ready to develop military forces on a considerable scale.⁷⁸ Japan's passive attitude on rearmament, together with negative responses of Britain and several Pacific countries to the idea of a Pacific pact, discouraged the United States from pursuing a Pacific version of NATO. It may be said that the basic character of the San Francisco Peace was shaped by early 1951, when Dulles returned from his tour of the Pacific region.

⁷⁸Minutes of the staff meeting of the Dulles mission, February 5, 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, Vol. 6, pp. 857-58.