
Copyright © 2019 Fumiaki Kubo. All rights reserved. This work may be used, with this notice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed, electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission from the author.

Japan-US Alliance in the Face of Populism: The Vulnerability of an Alliance Based on Asymmetric Rights and Obligations

*Fumiaki KUBO**

INTRODUCTION

The asymmetry referred to in this article does not refer to asymmetry in military strength or, more broadly, national strength. Rather, it refers to the rights gained and the responsibilities borne under a treaty. It would seem that it is typical of the countless bilateral alliances throughout world history—ancient and modern, Eastern and Western—for both partners to promise nearly the same types of rights and responsibilities to each other. For instance, if Country A and Country B are in an alliance, B will defend A if it is attacked, and A, correspondingly, will support B if it is attacked. By the definition used in this article, partners' rights and responsibilities are symmetric when, in this typical form of an alliance, countries A and B have established between themselves, substantively, the same rights and obligations.

In this article I basically limit the discussion to the Japan-US Security Treaty (henceforth “the Security Treaty”) as it has existed since its amendment in 1960. Because US military strength is far superior, the Japan-US alliance is clearly asymmetric in terms of the parties' military power. In that sense, all alliances that the United States has formed have

*Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo

been asymmetric. Using the unique asymmetrical Japan-US alliance, which is unequal in the allocation of rights and duties, I consider the strengths and weaknesses of such atypical alliances in the context of rising populism.

Though it can mean many things, populism in general is an attitude, a political orientation, a movement, or a thinking of nonelite people who oppose the elite or the establishment members of a polity. In domestic politics, it often supports generous government expenditures for ordinary people or more restrictions on immigration, while in foreign affairs it pushes nationalistic goals or inward-looking policies. How it emerges differs from country to country. In the context of this article, it is notable that the public of the United States, since the end of the Cold War, seems to be weary of an interventionist, internationalist, globalist foreign policy, while ordinary Japanese citizens, especially residents in Okinawa, actively support a pacifist foreign policy, in particular regarding US bases in Okinawa, paying less attention to the international security environment that has become more strained in the past two decades. In some cases, there emerges a division among establishment politicians, some of whom come to embrace positions that nonelite people support.

In the Security Treaty, the United States gained the right to use bases in Japan and, in return, took on the duty of defending Japan. Japan's duty was to allow the United States to use bases located in Japan, and it won the right to be defended by the United States. Of note here is that Japan has no duty to defend the United States except in the event of an attack on a US government facility in an area under Japan's administration. Because an attack on a US government facility located in Japan would, in effect, be the same as an attack on Japan, and because it would be virtually impossible to attack US government facilities in Japan without attacking Japan itself, it seems safe to assume that Japan has a *de facto* exemption from any duty to defend the United States.

There has been a legion of books and articles on not just alliances and alliance theory but also the US-Japan alliance. Virtually no study, however, has been conducted on the asymmetric nature of the US-Japan alliance in terms of the partners' rights and obligations and, in particular, no exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of this alliance structure.¹

There is, however, an article on populism and alliance, "Partnership in Peril: Populist Assault on the Transatlantic Community" by Vikram Singh, Dalibor Rohac, and Danielle Pletka; although it is written out of a concern for the effect of rising populism on the alliance, that article's focus is clearly on the North Atlantic alliance.²

I. US INTERESTS

The question that is sometimes asked in the United States is why the nation—by agreeing to the Security Treaty—has accepted the duty of defending Japan without acquiring a commitment from Japan to defend the United States if it is attacked, even to the extent of risking the lives of its own people. The answer to the question lies in the right the United States gained from the Security Treaty. Under Article 6 of the Security Treaty, the United States obtained the right to use bases in Japan for the purpose of providing “peace and security in the Far East.” In other words, in exchange for the responsibility of defending Japan, the United States gained the right to use bases in Japan for purposes other than the defense of Japan. This, indeed, is the core national interest that the United States has secured through the Security Treaty.

This article is too brief to describe in detail why such an alliance, asymmetric in terms of its rights and duties, came into being. I would merely like to note the following points.

When the first Japan-US Security Treaty was signed in 1951, Japan’s constitution, including Article 9, which outlaws war as a means of settling international disputes, had already come into force. Japan was entirely disarmed, without even the Japan Self-Defense Forces that would be established in 1954. In 1951, Japan had no military with which to defend the United States. At the same time, the United States possessed overwhelming military strength and, thus, had no need to rely on Japan to defend its territory. In this backdrop, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 showed many Japanese the existence of a direct threat to Japan and confirmed the United States’ contention that it was necessary to continue to use bases in Japan to resist the military threat posed by the Communist bloc. In addition, it seemed that there was no hope of the United Nations guaranteeing the security of Japan given that its Security Council was paralyzed by the growing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Many commentators have used the word “unilateral” to describe the Security Treaty that has existed from 1960 to the present. Strictly speaking, however, this description is not accurate. Because the United States has the duty to defend Japan and Japan has the duty to allow the United States to use its military bases for purposes other than the defense of Japan, both Japan and the United States are subject to obligations, and in that sense, the treaty is reciprocal. To reiterate the explanation already provided in this article, because the substance of the rights and responsibilities differs, the

treaty is asymmetric.

As an aside, in the original 1952 Japan-US Security Treaty, the United States obtained the right to use bases in Japan without accepting concomitant duties, including the defense of Japan. Therefore, the first treaty of 1952 was truly unilateral. It is, thus, only natural that the first treaty was subject to strong criticism in Japan.

Further, there are differences between the Japan-US Security Treaty and other alliances to which the United States is party. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (ROK), signed in 1953, was symmetric and reciprocal in terms of the defense obligations it imposed. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established in 1949, is similarly based on a mutual sharing of defense responsibilities among its members. Under the US-ROK alliance and NATO, in addition to these mutual rights and duties, the US military is stationed in South Korea and in some European NATO member states.³

In this article, I consider the strengths and weaknesses of the Security Treaty, which has a rare legal structure. Particularly, I discuss these matters by emphasizing comparisons with alliances in which the rights and responsibilities are structured symmetrically.

II. WEAKNESSES OF THE US-JAPAN ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCE

First, it is extremely difficult for people other than specialists in national security to understand this type of alliance. The complicated legal structure is itself a source of political weakness. Within each nation, its perceived national burden alone tends to be emphasized; further, this burden captures the attention of the public and the mass media. As a result, the understanding of the alliance never increases, and criticism—particularly criticism that is wide of the mark—tends to circulate.

The Japan-US alliance tends to invite discontent from US citizens who understand it only superficially. In the United States, the alliance has been frequently understood as a one-sided and unfair alliance in which the United States has the duty to protect Japan while the latter has no responsibilities. Some Americans even add that Japan sells many cars to steal jobs in the United States, even as the alliance makes the United States defend Japan. Such arguments were made quite frequently during the 1980s and 1990s when trade friction between Japan and the United States were at its worst. The argument was something along the lines of “Why should Americans have to spill their blood defending such a strong—or even threatening—

country like Japan?” In 2016, Donald Trump—the front-runner in the Republican Party contest for winning the nomination to the 2016 presidential election—demonstrated precisely this sort of understanding, or lack thereof.

In Japan, the burden of military bases that is borne by local residents tends to be an issue. This is a particularly serious political problem in Okinawa. Some Japanese, while demanding the withdrawal of US troops from Okinawa and even from mainland Japan, still think that the United States would be obliged to defend Japan; this is also a reflection of naive understanding of the alliance-obligation framework. Among those who thought that way was former prime minister Yukio Hatoyama.

Hatoyama’s idea was that there could be a security treaty without the presence of US military in Japan. The notion was that the US military would not station troops in Japan during peacetime but would come to Japan’s aid and defend it during a crisis. While in office, Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that this plan had been shelved; however, he did not retract it as a mistaken idea. It is understood that acceptance of this proposal would not bring any benefits to the United States in terms of its national interest. Hatoyama had envisioned it, however, before he became prime minister, calling his plan “an alliance without US troops being stationed in Japan.” Some even called it “a baseless security treaty.”⁴

Herein lies the vulnerability of this complicated alliance with its asymmetric legal structure of rights and obligations when it faces populism. Political leaders are expected to enlighten ordinary citizens about the true meaning of an alliance treaty, including the Japan-US Security Treaty. But what if they are misinformed, misguided, or have a partial understanding of the treaty, or even exploit or instigate misunderstandings by their fellow citizens?

The second, and related, weakness is that the Security Treaty tends to raise opposition within areas of Japan that bear the major burden of the bases. It is safe to assume that the reason for this opposition—besides the mere fact that these bases exist—is that these bases house foreign military personnel, particularly US military personnel. Friction with Okinawans is often reported, caused by, for example, serious crimes committed by American soldiers.

It is certain that even without a security treaty, Okinawa—a strategic hub in the realm of security, especially for defending Japan’s territory in the southwest—would have a concentration of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces bases. There is a clear difference, however, between the level of military

presence required purely for the defense of Japan and that required when military force beyond what is needed for the defense of Japan is involved. The difference between the level required exclusively for self-defense and that required for ensuring “the peace and security” of the entire Far East is particularly striking. It is obvious that the level of force required when the defense of Japan is not the only concern is higher. This is the reason the US government has deployed troops and divisions in Okinawa in order to have a rapid response to situations outside Okinawa. In that sense, the significant local burden in terms of bases is still, arguably, a weakness of the asymmetrical alliance.

Moreover, in Okinawa, where US military bases are highly concentrated, crimes committed by US troops are sometimes a significant issue. Some of the crimes are serious. According to the US military, however, the crime rate among US soldiers is lower than the average crime rate of Okinawans.⁵ This is an issue that requires more thorough investigation and consideration.

The third issue is that, for some Japanese, the stationing of US military troops appears to be a continuation of the postwar US occupation from 1945 to 1952. Some Japanese, who have a nationalistic bent, see the stationing of foreign military forces on their national territory as an infringement of sovereignty and consider it demeaning.

The fourth weakness in the alliance that I would like to note is that the Japanese public’s willingness to protect the security of its nation may have diminished. Even in the current tense international security environment, Japan spends less than 1 percent of its GNP on defense. Based on the poll by the Cabinet Office in 2014, to the question what you would do if your country is attacked by a foreign country, only 6.8 percent of the respondents answered that they would resist the invasion by joining the SDF, while 56.8 percent replied that they would resist by all means, though they would not join the SDF.⁶

Because of the continuous presence of the US military in Japan, and its overwhelming power, it has been easy for many Japanese to pay less and less attention to the need to defend their own country, while at the same time feeling more and more dependent on the United States. Because of this dependency psychology of the Japanese, the “in this fight together” aspect of the Japan-US alliance has been weak; this was the case even during the peak of the Cold War. In contrast, the US-ROK alliance that was established in 1953 after the end of hostilities in the Korean War was truly an alliance forged as the result of fighting side by side against Communist forces.

Fifth, there are other problems arising from the stationing of the US

military in Japan besides the burden of the bases. Japan and the United States have also signed a status of forces agreement establishing rights and privileges for the US troops. This has frequently been a source of discontent or the cause of conflict over the rights of the stationed forces, environmental pollution and degradation, responsibilities to be borne by Japan, and the so-called sympathy budget, which is called *omoiyari-yosan* (Japanese-provided host-nation support) in Japanese.

III. STRENGTHS OF THE US-JAPAN ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCE

There are advantages for Japan as well as disadvantages in the asymmetric alliance between the United States and Japan. The first advantage of having the US military stationed in Japan is that deterrence of foreign aggression is strong in terms of both force and credibility. Having the US military stationed on one's soil clearly provides a stronger deterrent than having US forces merely able to rush in from far away—the US mainland, Guam, or Hawaii—after an incident has occurred. It is clear to Japan that, in most cases, there is no room for doubt that the US military would come in to lend support. Attacking Japan is practically the same as attacking the United States. It also appears that US military presence functions as a deterrent against the threat of or attack by nuclear weapons.

Second, the US military's disaster-response capabilities should be noted. The people of the Tohoku region witnessed these capabilities during the March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and the resulting tsunami and nuclear accidents. The US military's Operation Tomodachi was conducted on a massive scale and was effective, saving many lives. The cost incurred by the US government in the operation was more than \$80 million and involved 24,000 US troops. The benefit of having military forces nearby was truly demonstrated. There is considerable value in having permanently stationed units in Japan that are responsive, well-trained, well-equipped (including with aircraft carriers), and, above all, possessing good will.

Third, contributions to local communities by bases, particularly economic benefits, is widely noted. The economic contribution of bases to larger regional economies is likely to be considerable. The US Department of Defense, for example, has long been trying to close redundant bases in the United States with little success. This is because the members of Congress who represent local communities work diligently to prevent closures. Naturally, these members represent the desires of their local constituencies. Bases can be a means of helping strengthen and revitalize sparsely

populated areas. Japan Self-Defense Forces bases in rural areas or on remote islands appear to be appreciated for this effect. It is possible, however, that the existence of a base can be an impediment to economic growth and/or tourism, as is pointed out by the Okinawa prefectural government and local Okinawan newspapers;⁷ thus, it is necessary to carefully analyze the effects of having bases on a case-by-case basis.

Fourth, US bases serve as points of contact for cultural exchange. People from Japan can encounter US culture, while being stationed in Japan provides opportunities for US military and related personnel to become familiar with Japanese culture. Furthermore, there is even a chance that some of these people will become friends of Japan. If enough thought is put into it, truly substantive cultural exchanges are possible. Additionally, it is highly likely that people working on the bases, as a result of a deeper understanding of a Japanese culture, will develop a favorable view of their host country and remain admirers and supporters of Japan after returning to the United States.

Fifth, the alliance contributes to regional security among Japan's neighbors. This is a direct consequence of the asymmetric allocation of rights and obligations under the Security Treaty. The US military can use this alliance, by right, for the defense of countries beyond Japan. Because of the support it gains from having military bases in Japan, the United States has been able to project its military influence in the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, in the Philippines, and in the South China Sea, and even as far as the Middle East. Needless to say, the US bases in Okinawa played a crucial role during the Vietnam War.

Sixth, one can argue for economic benefits in a broader sense. Specifically, because Japan has been supported by the robust deterrence that the US military stationed on its soil provides, the country has been able to spend a relatively small amount on defense. Notably, as mentioned before, defense costs have long been less than 1 percent of its GDP, except for a few years in the 1980s, and despite the national security threats that the nation has faced from North Korea and China. Japan was able to devote itself to economic development to a considerable degree while being essentially lightly armed. This lack of militarization had the added effect of Japan being unlikely to appear as a threat to other countries.

I have already mentioned Hatoyama's idea of "a baseless security treaty." There are many examples of remarks of this kind by leading politicians. Ichiro Ozawa, the former chairperson of the Democratic Party of Japan, said that the US Seventh Fleet alone would be adequate for Japan's protection;⁸

however, this statement only considers the defense of Japan under Article 5 of the Security Treaty and ignores the rights to which the United States is entitled to under Article 6. The necessity of the presence of US Marines on Japanese soil as a force to defend Okinawa or Japan has been repeatedly questioned, but this seems a one-sided and not thoroughly considered point of view. The Marines appear to aid Japan's defense in various ways, but even if that were not the case, they could still be stationed anywhere the United States deems appropriate; this is because under Article 6 of the Security Treaty, it has the right to do so.

These remarks cover just a small number of the many cases of leading politicians not fully understanding the meaning of the alliance that I could provide; however, they demonstrate how many people in Japan—including a former prime minister and leading politicians—do not fundamentally understand or purposely disregard the legal basics of the Security Treaty. In this sense, the populist perspective is shared by some of the leading politicians, who are in most cases in the center-left or leftist political parties. Thus, there is a serious cleavage in the elite politicians on national defense, amplifying the voice of the populists.

IV. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE?

The purpose of this article is not to propose the elimination of the described asymmetry in the Japan-US alliance, nor do I even intend to suggest such a thing. In the preceding sections, I have focused on the asymmetry of rights and responsibilities in the Japan-US Security Treaty and considered the strengths and weaknesses of the treaty's structure. The discussion up to this point has confirmed that despite the serious weaknesses in alliances that are asymmetrical in their allocation of rights and duties, they also have strengths as an alliance. Thus, we should next consider how to retain, to the greatest possible extent, the strengths of the alliance as noted—or bolster them further—while simultaneously decreasing, and compensating for, the weaknesses.

Needless to say, if we live in a world without any threat to Japan's national security, Japan may not need an alliance. Given the military power, military posture, and the behaviors of some countries in Japan's vicinity, however, we have to assume that there is a threat that cannot easily be dealt with by Japan alone.

Considering matters in this context, the 2015 change in the Japanese government's constitutional interpretation concerning the exercising of the

right of collective self-defense under new security legislation was arguably an epoch-making development in terms of the structure of this kind of asymmetrical alliance; it was called the Legislation for Peace and Security. Although Japan's defense policy is still subject to various constraints, the change in the Japanese government's interpretation of the right of collective self-defense greatly expanded the scope of Japan's contribution to the actions of the US military. Under the legal structure of the asymmetrical alliance, Japan changed the interpretation of Article 9 in 2015 to compensate, to a certain degree, for the weakest part of that structure; thus, Japan is not required to defend the United States—not as a duty placed on Japan by the treaty but, rather, Japan will do that as part of its own right to self-defense. Specifically, if certain conditions are met, Japan can now come to the aid of the US military and fight alongside it for Japan's own security.

The handling of alliances is not always easy, regardless of the rights and responsibilities that have been defined by treaties. When the rights and duties are asymmetrical, as they are in the case of the Japan-US alliance, the difficulty only increases. Thus, the peace and security legislation of 2015 in Japan is a step toward ameliorating that difficulty over the medium to long term, although it has proved to be a controversial political decision at home simply because the public still prefers a more pacifist approach to national security affairs.

V. US-JAPAN RELATIONS UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP

Donald Trump was an isolationist during his presidential campaign. But he changed his position dramatically after assuming the presidency in 2017. In a March 21, 2016, interview, Trump told an editorial board member of the *Washington Post* that the US-Japan alliance is unfair because Japan is not required to defend the United States. He demanded that Japan pay more, and even demanded it pay 100 percent of the cost of stationing US soldiers in Japan. He did not, however, respond to the question of what he would do about the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, which are claimed by both Japan and China.⁹

Therefore, it was not surprising that there was a tremendous amount of anxiety in the Japanese government on November 8, 2016, when it became clear that Trump was the presidential election winner. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe worked hard to persuade president-elect Trump to value the alliance, in an informal meeting with the president at the Trump Tower right after he was elected president in November 2016. Abe found a totally

different Trump at the first formal summit meeting in February 2017. President Trump agreed to a joint statement about the United States defending Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, and he even expressed his appreciation for Japan's hosting of American troops.

The most important and pressing issue was whether President Trump would continue the previous US official policy of applying Article 5 of the Security Treaty to the Senkaku Islands. President Barack Obama had stated in public in Tokyo in 2014 that Article 5 of the Security Treaty would be applied to the Senkaku Islands. That was the first official pledge by a US president to defend those islands. If President Trump had not accepted this treaty obligation, the provocative activities by China in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands might have escalated. This was a dramatic change from Trump's position on Japan in 2016. Due to this great turnaround, the US-Japan alliance did not face a crisis.

Still, there are lingering concerns—in the minds of the Japanese and many other people around the world who depend on the United States for national security—about the direction that Trump's foreign policy will take in the coming years. President Trump is unpredictable. Above all, we do not know whether he understands an alliance in the same way as most leading politicians and many experts in international relations do.

Generally, when two countries enter into an alliance, they go through a process of hard negotiation over the terms of the alliance, as Japan and the United States did in 1951 and 1960. However, once they strike a deal, they tend to work together to guarantee each other's national security. When one country faces a national security threat, the other country normally lends as much support as possible. In this context, President Trump might have a different understanding than presidents in the past of the alliance. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) is a case in point. When it faced a serious national security threat from the increasingly belligerent Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in 2017, President Trump was helpful in guaranteeing the national security of South Korea, while forcing it to accept the renegotiation of the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement. In a sense, he was ready to exploit an ally in trouble. The next question is whether he would do the same thing to Japan.

There is still serious concern about what President Trump will do regarding the US-Japan alliance. Obviously, the difficulty for the alliance remains, though the worst-case scenario—virtual breakdown of the alliance—has been avoided, at least for the time being.

CONCLUSION: US-JAPAN RELATIONS IN A COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The US-Japan alliance is very different from the US-UK alliance, which many people often regard as a natural alliance. It is certain that the US-Japan alliance is not so natural, given the difference in race, ethnicity, religion, and culture of the two nations, along with a modern past that includes a terrible war. It is these very differences and difficulties that make the US-Japan alliance even more remarkable and rare in world history. It has lasted for sixty-six years in spite of the serious weaknesses arising from the asymmetrical structure in terms of the rights and obligations of the alliance partners. The United States and Japan have overcome their negative past relationship and have achieved a lot. This achievement is symbolized by the mutual visits of President Obama to Hiroshima and Prime Minister Abe to Pearl Harbor in 2016.

This is a case of two democracies with very different backgrounds realizing a strong alliance based not only on national and strategic interests but also on shared values, mutual respect for each other's culture and tradition, and cultural understanding and exchanges. Therefore, in a very different way, US-Japan relations are as remarkable as those in any other alliance. Many of us can be optimistic about the future of our relations.

People, especially political leaders and public intellectuals who understand the alliance's value, nevertheless must keep working to maintain this unusual alliance, whose structure is not easily understood by some politicians and many ordinary people. The survival and stability of this alliance in the face of rising populism should never be taken for granted.

NOTES

This article is based on a paper prepared as the presidential address for the special symposium at the 52nd Annual Meeting of the Japanese Association for American Studies, June 2, 2018, held at the University of Kitakyushu, Fukuoka. This is also a part of the research result conducted when I was a Japan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2014.

¹ The following studies on the US-Japan alliance are worth mentioning: Kent Calder, "Securing Security through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective," *Pacific Review* 17, no. 1 (March 2004): 135–57; Victor Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia," *International Security*, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010):

158–96; Inh-Hwi Park, “Changing US Alliance Strategy and the Limits of Bilateral Alliance Structure in Northeast Asia,” *Journal of East Asian Affairs* 21, no. 1 (2007): 49–91; Evelyn Goh, “Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 8 (2008): 353–377; however, there is no in-depth exploration of the alliance’s asymmetrical structure in the sense used in this article.

² Vikram Singh, Dalibor Rohac, and Danielle Pletka, “Partnership in Peril: The Populist Assault on the Transatlantic Community,” Center for American Progress, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, July 2018, <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/SinghAuthoritarianPopulismAndTransatlanticAllianceReport.pdf>.

³ For a more detailed comparison, refer to Fumiaki Kubo, “Amerika Gaikō ni totte no Dōmei to Nichibei Dōmei: Hitotsu no Mitorizu” [Alliances and the Japan-US alliance in terms of US diplomacy: A sketch], Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2012; Fumiaki Kubo, ed., *Amerika ni totte Dōmei to wa Nani ka* [What is an alliance to the United States?] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2013), 3–30.

⁴ This expression was used by Strobe Talbott at the symposium held in Tokyo by *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (*Nikkei*) and the Brookings Institution on April 26, 2010; its summary can be found in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, April 27, 2010. The expression itself is recorded by Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki at <http://tameike.net/diary/apr10.htm>.

⁵ “Despite Low Crime Rate, US Military Faces No-Win Situation on Okinawa,” *Stars & Stripes*, May 24, 2016, <https://www.stripes.com/news/despite-low-crime-rate-us-military-faces-no-win-situation-on-okinawa-1.411132>.

⁶ An Opinion Poll on the Self Defense Force and Defense Issues, by the Cabinet Office, the Government of Japan, 2015, <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/2-5.html>. In the same question, 19.5% answered that they would resist through nonmilitary means, while 5.1% said they would not resist and 1.9% of them responded that they would resist through guerrilla-like ways.

⁷ “US Military Bases and Economy and Budget of Okinawa Prefecture,” <http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/tyosa/documents/p18.pdf>; “US Military Bases as a Hindrance to Economic Growth,” *Ryukyushimpo*, May 22, 2016, <https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-283959.html>.

⁸ *Sankei Shimbun*, February 25, 2009, <https://web.archive.org/web/20090227081405/http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090225/stt0902250151000-n1.htm>.

⁹ “A Transcript of Donald Trump’s Meeting with the *Washington Post* Editorial Board,” *Washington Post*, editorial page, March 21, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/03/21/a-transcript-of-donald-trumps-meeting-with-the-washington-post-editorial-board/?utm_term=.c91d9951d19c.