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## Improving US–Japanese Relations through the News Media: Roy W. Howard, Dentsu, and the *Osaka Mainichi*

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### INTRODUCTION

After the First World War, the importance of public opinion increased within the field of diplomacy.<sup>1</sup> Even in the Far East, China and Japan competed to improve their status in global public opinion, especially how they were viewed by the United States and the United Kingdom. Chinese diplomats who were educated in the West, such as Wellington Koo, worked actively at the Paris Peace Conference to gain assistance from the powers with regard to the Shandong problem related to returning former German holdings in China from Japan.<sup>2</sup> By the late 1930s, Chinese propaganda, or public diplomacy, was influencing US policy toward Japan,<sup>3</sup> whereas Japanese propaganda was less effective and did not engage the American public successfully.<sup>4</sup>

What was wrong with Japanese information policy? The Japanese political elite understood the importance of propaganda. Masayoshi Matsumura described Japan's public diplomacy efforts during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5).<sup>5</sup> Although this operation was temporary, Japan diligently pursued a strategy of disseminating information after the Paris Peace Conference.<sup>6</sup> Fumimaro Konoe, who became prime minister in 1937,

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advocated consistently from the early years of his career for using intellectuals to deliver effective public diplomacy or propaganda.<sup>7</sup> Peter O'Connor in his 2010 book *The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918–1945* described the efforts of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to take control of its own news dissemination and manage its own image beginning in the 1920s. The Japanese Foreign Ministry established its Information Division, which dealt with overseas news propaganda, in 1921. Further, with the creation of the Rengo News Agency in 1926, the Foreign Ministry enlarged its share of the news market. The ministry's network consisted of Rengo, the *Japan Times*, the *Far East*, and the *Herald of Asia*. As can be seen, the Japanese Foreign Ministry had already introduced news propaganda in the early 1920s.<sup>8</sup>

The quantity of propaganda was, moreover, substantial. In the mid-1930s, the Japanese Foreign Ministry intensified its activity in both news propaganda and cultural diplomacy by reorganizing its foreign ministry's structure. The Domei News Agency was established at the end of 1935 by the merger of Rengo and the news agency Dentsu, which had been in competition with Rengo since the late 1920s, and the Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai (International Culture Promotion Association) was set up in 1934.<sup>9</sup> The direction of Japanese information policy, however, does not seem to have been very sophisticated. Especially after the mid-1930s, the foreign ministry's activities became inflexible and could not adapt to changing situations.

The problem was not the quantity of propaganda but its quality. According to historian Atsushi Shibazaki, by the time the Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai was established, Japanese cultural policy was based mostly on explanation, or *rikaiseshimuru*, which unyieldingly backed the Japanese cause.<sup>10</sup> As I will show, the same pattern prevailed in news propaganda.

One of the primary causes of the poor quality of Japanese propaganda was related to the centralization of news transmission resulting from the merger of Dentsu and Rengo. This centralization had both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, it enabled the Domei News Agency to play a significant role in domestic thought control after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, Domei's monopoly position was not so effective in foreign propaganda.

To analyze the adverse effect of Domei on foreign propaganda, I will focus on Dentsu and its network. Most historians have not focused on Dentsu, even though it was a strong competitor of Rengo in the early 1930s, whereas Domei has received more attention since the late 1990s.<sup>12</sup> Before its

1935 consolidation with Rengo, Dentsu had a valuable resource for Japanese public diplomacy toward the United States: Roy W. Howard.

Howard was an influential American journalist and publisher who controlled many newspapers and a news agency in the United States. Born in 1883 in Ohio, he became president of the United Press (UP) news agency in 1912. In 1933, he headed the Scripps-Howard syndicate, which comprised about twenty newspapers, including the *San Francisco News* and the *World Telegram*.<sup>13</sup> In August 1930, the *New York Times* described him as one of the “59 leaders . . . ‘who rule America’.” Howard convinced Herbert Hoover to enter the Ohio presidential primaries and supported Hoover’s 1928 presidential campaign, although he transferred his backing to Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932.<sup>14</sup>

The UP, headed by Howard, had a contract with Dentsu and the *Osaka Mainichi* in Japan and was also a competitor of the Associated Press (AP) news agency, which was a partner of Rengo. This partnership with the UP, competing with the Rengo-Domei network, offered great potential for Japanese public diplomacy. Howard was a prominent American who genuinely wanted to ease tensions between the United States and Japan. He tried to deliver a pro-Japan message to the US public through his publications and also sought to influence President Roosevelt through personal connections. If the experts in the Japanese Foreign Ministry had pursued an adequate information policy, this collaboration with Howard might have resulted in successful public diplomacy in the United States.

In this article, I describe how Howard and Japanese news media such as Dentsu and the *Osaka Mainichi* attempted to cooperate with the goal of improving US–Japan relations during the 1930s. This will provide insight into why Japan’s public diplomacy failed during these years.

There exist few academic studies of Howard’s involvement in Japanese public diplomacy. Historian, David Lu has examined Japanese foreign minister Yosuke Matsuoka’s visit to the United States, which occurred at Howard’s invitation, but his focus was mainly on Matsuoka, not Howard.<sup>15</sup> Izumi Hirobe described Howard’s support of the pro-quota movement in 1933 in his book about the Japanese immigrant problem. However, he did not pay attention to Howard’s political activities other than those related to the immigration issue.<sup>16</sup> In 2016, Patricia Beard published a biography of Howard that includes valuable citations from Howard’s diary (not available to most researchers), but she did not focus on his role in US–Japanese relations.<sup>17</sup>

The most insightful research on Howard’s involvement in Japanese public

diplomacy has been conducted by Teruo Ariyama and Shigeki Mori. Ariyama analyzed Howard's interview with the Japanese emperor and the invitation extended to American journalists to visit Japan. I agree with Ariyama that this was an instance of effective Japanese public diplomacy, carried out with Howard's active cooperation. However, Ariyama did not fully examine Howard's intentions, because he consulted only Japanese documents and thus focused mainly on the intentions on the Japanese side.<sup>18</sup> Mori, meanwhile, analyzed Howard's maneuvering to invite Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the United States in spring 1941. He pointed out that Howard hoped for an improvement in US-Japanese relations based on Matsuoka's realism but that Matsuoka tried to force US acceptance of the Japanese cause, backed by the Tripartite Alliance concluded among Germany, Italy, and Japan in September 1940.<sup>19</sup> Clearly, there was not much common ground between Howard and Matsuoka at that time.

Howard's involvement in Japanese public diplomacy began much earlier, however, and the possibilities for success were greater in the early 1930s, as Ariyama has argued. My examination of Howard's efforts during the 1930s draws from the Roy W. Howard Papers at the Library of Congress and the Joseph C. Grew Papers at the Houghton Library of Harvard University. The Howard Papers include many letters between Howard and representatives of Japanese media, such as Dentsu and the *Osaka Mainichi*, and Japanese Foreign Ministry officials. By analyzing these letters, I will elucidate the attempts to ease tensions between the United States and Japan in which Howard participated.

## I. MATSUOKA'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

What caused Howard to become interested in Japan? The UP began to enlarge its business in the Far East in the early 1920s. Dentsu, competing with Rengo, which was reorganized out of the Kokusai news agency in 1926, and the *Osaka Mainichi* concluded a contract with the UP in Japan.<sup>20</sup> Howard's first trip to the Far East occurred in the mid-1920s. He focused on Far Eastern political affairs and visited the Philippines, China, and Japan to collect hot news there.<sup>21</sup>

Beginning in the mid-1920s, close personal connections gradually developed between the UP correspondents in Japan and staff at Dentsu and the *Osaka Mainichi*. Shingoro Takaishi of the *Osaka Mainichi*, who had been responsible for concluding the contract in 1923,<sup>22</sup> and Dentsu personnel such as Hoshiro Mitsunaga and Sekizo Ueda helped the UP's staff become

acclimated to Japan and became close friends with Howard.<sup>23</sup>

However, the Manchurian Incident, in which the Japanese military invaded China on the pretext of an explosion outside Mukden, occurred in September 1931. Supporting the peace-keeping machinery of international law was important to Howard because he opposed the US naval buildup.<sup>24</sup> The Scripps-Howard papers' condemnation of Japan was quite overt. Although American newspaper editors were generally critical of Japan's behavior in the Manchurian Incident, they were divided concerning the actual extent of Japanese actions.<sup>25</sup>

Until early 1933, the Far Eastern situation remained deadlocked. Clearly, the Stimson doctrine, in which the United States refused to recognize changes made in China that would interfere with American treaty rights, was not sufficient to expel the Japanese Army from Manchuria. Therefore, Howard turned his attention to Matsuoka's active approach to the foreign press in Geneva.<sup>26</sup> This involvement led Howard to his first contact with Japanese public diplomacy, which occurred when he invited Matsuoka to visit the United States on the Japanese official's return from the general assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva. On February 24, 1933, the Japanese delegation, headed by Matsuoka, walked out of the general assembly after voting for a resolution based on the Lytton Report that rejected Japan's argument of Manchukuo as an "independent" state. The Lytton Commission was appointed by the League of Nations to investigate the state of affairs in China, Manchuria, and Japan. Howard asked Matsuoka to visit the United States to explain Japan's position to the American public.<sup>27</sup>

Matsuoka initially had no desire to visit the United States because he viewed the Japanese withdrawal from the League as a total failure of his diplomatic efforts. Seijiro Yoshizawa and Hiroshi Saito, however, persuaded him to accept the invitation.<sup>28</sup> Yoshizawa, born in 1893, was a diplomat who had returned from Italy just before the Manchurian Incident and worked on the report that the Japanese government submitted to the Lytton Commission. He then accompanied Matsuoka to Geneva. Saito, born in 1886, was deeply involved in the Japanese Foreign Ministry's information policy. He attended the Paris Peace Conference with Matsuoka, where they worked as press attachés (*shinbun keihatsu gakari*).<sup>29</sup> He was one of the "reformist" group called Kakushin-ha and assumed the position of director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Information Division in 1929. Under his tenure, the so-called Carnegie Mission visited Japan to promote US–Japanese understanding, and this interaction had a positive effect on

American intellectuals. The decision to call this project the Carnegie Mission, even though it was a Japanese propaganda initiative funded by Japan, was significant; using the Carnegie name could help to conceal the project's actual purpose.<sup>30</sup> When Matsuoka was sent to Geneva, Saito was the Japanese ambassador to the Netherlands and assisted the Japanese delegation, including Matsuoka.

Moved by Yoshizawa and Saito's persuasion, Matsuoka changed his mind about taking a detour to the United States and arrived in New York on March 24. He visited various cities, including Boston and Chicago, and spoke to the American public about the Japanese position on the Manchurian Incident. Howard also arranged for Matsuoka to meet with President Roosevelt.<sup>31</sup> According to Yoshizawa, Howard's arrangements were quite adequate, and the American public paid considerable attention to Matsuoka's remarks.<sup>32</sup>

What was Howard's purpose in assisting this campaign? Certainly, he wanted publicity to help him sell newspapers, but this was not his only motivation. Howard believed that Americans paid far less attention to Far Eastern politics than to the maintenance of world peace-keeping machinery. Moreover, he believed that a "new deal" involving a united renunciation of the Nine-Power and Four-Power treaties in the Pacific might be better than the current instability. Under the Four-Power Treaty, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan agreed to maintain the status quo in the Pacific by respecting the Pacific holdings of their fellow signatories, not seeking further territorial expansion, and consulting with one another in the event of a dispute over territorial possessions. Howard's reference to doubts about the Four-Power Treaty indicated his adoption of a positive attitude toward the US naval buildup, which he had initially opposed.<sup>33</sup>

Howard did not always agree with Matsuoka's cause, but he appreciated the Japanese envoy's frankness. Matsuoka displayed this frankness intentionally, believing like Howard that the public wanted to hear open, straightforward expression of views rather than sophisticated, boring statements couched in diplomatic terms. Howard and Matsuoka found common ground in that both sought to speak directly to the American public.<sup>34</sup> This experience also influenced Saito's future career, as he became Japan's ambassador to the United States in December 1933. He initiated an energetic press campaign even before arriving in the United States and became a popular figure during his tenure through his frankness with the press and the public alike.<sup>35</sup>

## II. HOWARD'S INTERVIEW WITH THE JAPANESE EMPEROR

Pleased with the results of Matsuoka's visit to the United States, Howard next planned to visit Japan for an interview with the Japanese emperor as the second major initiative in his focus on US–Japanese relations.<sup>36</sup>

The inspiration for this interview came from a hint that Matsuoka dropped unintentionally while he and Howard were drinking together. Howard picked up on the idea immediately and sailed for Japan on April 30, 1933, only two weeks after Matsuoka left San Francisco.<sup>37</sup>

On his arrival on May 17, Howard requested Matsuoka's assistance in getting to see the emperor.<sup>38</sup> Howard left on May 25 for a trip to Manchuria and China proper and returned to Japan on June 18. Yasuya Uchida, the foreign minister, requested that Manchukuo and the South Manchurian Railway Company welcome him, and the Kwantung Army even provided him with an airplane.<sup>39</sup>

While Howard was in China, Matsuoka asked Yoshizawa to arrange a meeting with the emperor. Yoshizawa consulted the lord keeper of the privy seal, Nobuaki Makino, who coordinated the meeting on June 22.<sup>40</sup> Actually, from Japan's perspective, this was not an interview but a formal meeting (*ekken*) with a particular purpose. The Japanese Foreign Ministry persuaded Howard not to cite the emperor's remarks directly.<sup>41</sup> Howard cooperated with this scheme by agreeing to the *ekken* procedure.<sup>42</sup>

The US ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, believed that this meeting was carefully arranged to promote Japan's prestige in international society. He considered the emperor's reference to easing tensions between the United States and Japan quite intentional and part of the Japanese government's public diplomacy.<sup>43</sup>

On June 23, many American newspapers, including the *World Telegram* and the *San Francisco News*, which published a front-page article on Howard's interview with the emperor (fig. 1).<sup>44</sup> This article highlighted the Japanese emperor's desire for cordial US–Japanese relations and for world peace, along with his belief that Manchukuo would not be a menace to the Open Door Policy in the Far East. Kensuke Horinouchi, the Japanese consulate general in New York, reported to the Foreign Ministry positively that the article emphasized the Open Door Policy on Manchukuo. Actually, Howard had had a conversation on May 27 with Kuniaki Koiso, chief of staff of the Kwantung Army at Changchun, who told him that if Americans were hesitant to invest in Manchukuo because of their government's nonrecognition policy, the Japanese Empire would serve as guarantor.<sup>45</sup> The

SAN FRANCISCO NEWS  
JUNE 23, 1933

**His Imperial Majesty, Hirohito, Emperor of Japan**



who has granted an audience to an American newspaperman for the first time in the history of the Japanese empire.

The United Press presents the story as cabled by Roy W. Howard, chairman of the board of Scripps-Howard newspapers, who was received by the Emperor.

By imperial rules the conversation between the Emperor and Mr. Howard cannot be presented as an interview, because the Emperor is never allowed to be quoted directly.

The audience with the Emperor and a later interview with the foreign minister, however, combine to reveal that Japan feels confident that good relations between the Japanese empire and the United States will be maintained and that the two countries are closely bound together by mutual trade relations that cannot be broken without injury to both.—The Editor.

**HIROHITO EXPRESSES KEEN INTEREST, UNDERSTANDING IN 2 NATIONS' FRIENDSHIP**

Bearing of Nipponese Ruler Cordial and Simple, Shakes Hands Warmly in True Western Fashion

**FOREIGN MINISTER ECHOES SENTIMENTS**

Declares Americans Have Excellent Opportunity to Increase Trade in Manchukuo; No Designs on China

**BY ROY W. HOWARD**  
(Copyright, 1933, by United Press in All Countries)

TOKIO, June 23.—Japanese-American friendship, understanding and co-operation are of the utmost importance to peace, not only in the Far East, but in the world, in the opinion of his imperial majesty, Hirohito, Emperor of Japan.

This fact was impressed forcefully on me today when I was granted the first audience extended to an American newspaperman by any Japanese ruler.

There exists today no question capable of disturbing the good relations existing between Japan and the United States, in the opinion of Foreign Minister Count Yasuya Uchida, to whom I was referred for an outline of the government's attitude toward the present world situation.

Figure 1. The *San Francisco News*, June 23, 1933

Open Door Policy on Manchukuo was one of the most important ideas that the Japanese government wanted to disseminate.

On June 25, the *Tokyo Nichinichi*, which had a close connection with the *Osaka Mainichi*, contained an article on Howard's *ekken* under the title "Cooperation between the United States and Japan: Japanese Emperor's Hope Published in 1,200 American Newspapers."<sup>46</sup>

Howard had clearly changed his policy toward Japan, but he did not become a Japanese publicist. Although he cooperated with the Japanese government's public diplomacy, he felt some discomfort with Japan's understanding of US policy. He insisted for years that the United States preferred disarmament, and his newspapers proclaimed the US government's intention to delay building its navy to the upper limit permitted by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Howard realized, however, that this policy had been misunderstood by the Japanese when he visited Manchukuo and China. He found that the US reluctance to strengthen its naval presence in the region had been interpreted as indifference to Japanese violations of international law such as the Manchurian Incident.<sup>47</sup> Howard wrote Yakichiro Suma, a Japanese diplomat

in Shanghai:

I am not in the least disposed to set myself up in criticism of Japan's course of action, for the reason that while I firmly believe that it was an ill-advised course that in the long run will prove to Japan's disadvantage, I have, nevertheless, been privileged to see enough of the Japanese point of view to realize the high sense of patriotism which motivated those of her leaders who effected the conquest of Manchuria.<sup>48</sup>

Howard wrote in a letter to the president of the UP, Karl Bickel:

[Koiso] confirmed in a most positive fashion, my growing impression of the menace of Japanese militarism. . . . Without saying so in so many words, Koiso made it manifest that Japan intends to write the program for the shaping of Orient history from this time forward and that any nation displeased with that program as written, will have to accept it or fight.<sup>49</sup>

On July 7, the day of Howard's return to San Francisco, a second article referring to the interview with the Japanese emperor was published in newspapers of the Scripps-Howard syndicate, urging improvement of US–Japanese relations. The article also advocated a continued US naval buildup and, at the same time, a revision of the anti-Japanese Immigration Act of 1924 to improve Japanese feelings toward the United States.<sup>50</sup> The *Japan Advertiser*, an English-language newspaper in Japan, reprinted this article (fig. 2).<sup>51</sup>

After his interview with the emperor, Howard started a campaign to promote cordial US–Japanese relations, insisting that the emperor was seeking America's friendship. He decided to set aside concerns over Manchukuo, even though he did not agree with the Japanese attitude toward international law concerning Manchuria. Thus, he adopted two different approaches simultaneously. While backing an increased US naval presence to counter Japanese military activities in China, he also advocated for revision of the Immigration Act to improve US relations with Japan.<sup>52</sup> Howard was conscious of the need to contain Japanese military power, so he was surprised that the editorial reaction of the Japanese press to his statement of July 7 was extremely favorable. From this response, he concluded that the Japanese did not object to a further US naval buildup and,




Figure 2. The Japan Advertiser, July 8, 1933

therefore, that they did not intend further aggression in China.<sup>53</sup>

What moved Howard to change his policy toward Japan? According to Hirobe, one influence was Wallace M. Alexander, the Hawaiian-born president of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, who was working diligently in support of the pro-quota movement rather than exclusion for Japanese immigrants.<sup>54</sup> That assessment is accurate, but Howard viewed the Japanese immigrant issue in conjunction with another political issue, namely, strengthening the US naval presence to restrain Japan.

Howard's Japanese connections, such as Shingoro Takaishi of the *Osaka Mainichi*, also had an impact. Takaishi, born in 1878 and a graduate of Keio

University, joined the *Osaka Mainichi* in 1901. After further study in the United Kingdom, he became director of the foreign news department and then of the political department.<sup>55</sup> Howard told Takaishi that he was returning to the United States with a new conception of the situation in the Far East, which he would attempt to describe in such a way as to bring Japan and the United States closer together. Howard urged Takaishi to work with him in an intentional collaboration.<sup>56</sup>

Takaishi expected Howard to help in solving the Japanese immigrant problem as part of this cooperation.<sup>57</sup> Howard had this purpose in mind when he met with President Roosevelt in September 1933 and encouraged him to apply a quota to Japanese immigrants beginning in December. Howard wrote to Grew on July 26 that the article of July 7 seemed to have been fairly well received and that he planned to visit Washington relatively soon.<sup>58</sup> His approach to the president was based on a Japanese agreement not to engage in further aggression in China. Howard and the president talked from 7:45 p.m. to 12:15 a.m. because Roosevelt wanted a full report on the Far East. Whereas Roosevelt wanted to get the United States out of the Philippines, Howard told him that an American withdrawal would lead to Japanese domination of the Pacific. During Roosevelt's first term, Howard was one of his most enthusiastic supporters, and the president invited him to the White House again in 1934 and 1935.<sup>59</sup> Although sharp disagreement arose between them after Howard opposed Roosevelt's proposed reform of the Supreme Court in 1937, Roosevelt could not ignore Howard during his tenure.<sup>60</sup>

Around the same time, Takaishi established a new administrative organization at his paper. The *Osaka Mainichi*, with a circulation of more than one million, was Japan's second-largest newspaper in the 1930s, behind only the *Osaka Asahi*. Until the Manchurian Incident, the *Osaka Asahi* opposed the army, whereas the *Osaka Mainichi* supported the army with Soho Tokutomi, an ultraconservative figure, serving as a senior adviser to the newspaper. Hikoichi Motoyama, president of the *Osaka Mainichi*, released to twenty-eight American newspapers a statement describing the Manchurian Incident as a legitimate exercise of Japanese self-defense.<sup>61</sup> Takaishi, who disliked Soho, established his dominant position at the *Osaka Mainichi* by expelling Motosuke Kido, the successor to Motoyama, in October 1933.<sup>62</sup> Howard celebrated this change at the *Osaka Mainichi* and told Takaishi that he was satisfied with it, believing that it could foster improved US–Japanese relations.<sup>63</sup>

Howard, though by no means simply a Japanese tool, aimed to help in

stabilizing US–Japanese relations by cooperating with his Japanese friends. His shift in attitude was influenced by his judgment of the Far Eastern situation. Howard initially supported the Stimson doctrine, but by early 1933, many American intellectuals, including Howard, began to doubt whether the Stimson doctrine could bring a practical solution to the Manchurian problem.<sup>64</sup> He defined American interests in the Far East as including the stabilization of US–Japanese relations and decided to put the Manchukuo problem on hold for a while. The Japanese government’s use of the opportunity to promote its international prestige by welcoming Howard was a wise decision on the part of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, although Howard’s interview with the emperor was not initially a Japanese project.

### III. THE INVITATION TO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS TO VISIT JAPAN

Around late 1933, Howard changed his policy toward Japan and began to promote US–Japanese understanding through his news reporting and his personal connection with the president. Meanwhile, he was also aware of the creeping danger presented by the planned merger of Rengo and Dentsu, which he considered undesirable for two reasons. First, with Japanese news reports emanating largely from a single source, the media’s tendency to come under government control would be intensified. Second, the consolidated Japanese news organization might keep its contract with the AP and cut off the UP. Howard was thus concerned for both his own business interests and freedom of the press. He also believed that this move would damage US–Japanese relations because if UP lost its contract with Japan the UP would lose interest in Japan.<sup>65</sup>

The merger of these two news agencies was initiated by Yukichi Iwanaga of Rengo and supported by Japanese government officials who were dissatisfied with the difference between the two entities’ reporting. Regarding the Manchurian Incident, Rengo and Dentsu often reported differently. For example, Rengo projected that the Japanese Army would not bomb Chinchow (Jinzhou) in October 1931, whereas Dentsu indicated that the army could attack if necessary. Concerning the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations, Rengo argued that Japan should not withdraw; Dentsu insisted that it must withdraw. In both cases, Dentsu’s perspective proved to be correct. It was argued that this situation had resulted from the two agencies’ dependence on different sources—Rengo on the Foreign Ministry and Dentsu on the army. Hoshiro Mitsunaga, president of Dentsu, was very dissatisfied with the proposed merger because Dentsu was healthy

and profitable whereas Rengo was heavily subsidized by the Foreign Ministry.<sup>66</sup>

Howard shared Mitsunaga's view on this issue. In 1934, Howard cooperated with his Japanese connections in two media events aligned with his desire to promote favorable US–Japanese relations: a visit to Japan by American journalists and a roundtable press conference on the occasion of Fumimaro Konoe's visit to the United States.<sup>67</sup> The former was associated with Mitsunaga's efforts to avoid an undesirable merger and strengthen his position with respect to the Japanese government.

Although Mitsunaga formally asked Howard on February 24, 1934, to help with the arrangements to bring American journalists to Japan, the plan had been discussed during Howard's time in Japan the previous year. Howard had already begun preparations, such as creating a list of prospective journalists, before the formal request arrived.<sup>68</sup>

Shortly after Mitsunaga's request, Eiji Amou made an important declaration. On April 17, Amou, the director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Information Division, stated in a press conference that Japan had a special responsibility for maintaining peace in Asia and opposed the extending of any foreign aid to China. This declaration, which has been analyzed by many historians,<sup>69</sup> deeply influenced public opinion all over the world, especially in the United States. On May 21, Howard asked Mitsunaga to postpone the proposed visit because of the unfavorable mood in the United States following the Amou declaration.<sup>70</sup> Howard forwarded a copy of this letter to Ambassador Grew on June 23.<sup>71</sup>

Mitsunaga, however, insisted on proceeding with the project. He believed that the Amou declaration's negative effect on US–Japanese relations made the proposed visit to Japan by American journalists even more urgently needed.<sup>72</sup> He had already collected the funds,<sup>73</sup> and that may have been one reason why he wanted to continue with the project; but in addition, the Japanese, including Mitsunaga, were generally not sensitive to the impact of the Amou declaration. The content of the declaration had already been released by Rengo nine months earlier, on July 25, 1933: "The Japanese Government must needs express their opposition to the Powers' policy assisting China in this manner. Should they maintain such attitude towards China, the Japanese Government would be compelled to take suitable measures to prevent it."<sup>74</sup> This message and the lack of immediate reaction to it indicate two important facts. First, the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Rengo believed that their position on foreign assistance to China would be readily accepted by foreign governments and the general global public

without serious objections. Second, Rengo's earlier statement did not provoke an adverse response as the Amou declaration would. That is another sign that the Japanese Foreign Ministry network described in O'Connor's work was not sufficiently robust to influence global public opinion in the mid-1930s.

Even after the Amou declaration grabbed the world's attention, the Japanese media sources helping to carry out Japanese public diplomacy continued to pursue their project. Konoe visited the United States from May to July 1934 as originally planned, and Mitsunaga's project with American journalists continued as well. On June 28, the *Osaka Mainichi* with Konoe held a press conference in New York, titled "Listening to American Public Opinion," with several journalists from UP and the Scripps-Howard syndicate participating.<sup>75</sup>

Konoe's visit complemented Ambassador Saito's proposal for a US-Japan joint resolution. Saito was in the second phase of his endeavors as ambassador to the United States. His ultimate goal was to secure US recognition of Manchukuo, but he took a gradual approach. Although he had already succeeded in his first stage, which resulted in an exchange of cordial messages between the US secretary of state Cordell Hull and the Japanese foreign minister Koki Hirota, promoting the official proposal for the recognition of Manchukuo was not easy. That was Konoe's task as a private envoy. However, most Americans who spoke with Konoe did not respond favorably to the idea of recognizing Manchukuo, not even in private exchanges.<sup>76</sup>

Mitsunaga pursued his project during Konoe's visit to the United States. On June 8, he and Sekizo Ueda of Dentsu sent a letter to Howard containing a list of the twenty newspapers whose correspondents they intended to invite (table 1). They wanted to have all parts of the United States represented, including journalists from Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Atlanta or New Orleans. They were planning a stay of about three weeks for the group, of which seven to ten days would be devoted to an inspection trip to Manchukuo. The Japanese press association, Nihon Shinbun Kyokai, intended to cover all the trip's expenses.<sup>77</sup>

Howard believed that it might be difficult to organize the precise contingent that the Japanese wanted to attract because of the relatively limited interest in the Far Eastern situation within the United States. He believed that the objectives Mitsunaga and Ueda sought to achieve would be better advanced if the group were invited during cherry blossom season in 1935, rather than during chrysanthemum season in 1934, despite the

disarmament conference planned for 1935.<sup>78</sup>

Howard, nevertheless, actively cooperated with the project. He made his own list of about thirty American journalists in response to Dentsu's initial list. Mitsunaga and Ueda could not have realized their plan without Howard's help. The Japanese wish list contained only the names of newspapers, not specific journalists to be invited. The Japanese principals apparently lacked sufficient knowledge and personal connections to determine exactly whom to invite. In contrast, Howard identified specific people who had influence over editorial boards or were interested in Japan. Even when he was unable to recommend a particular name, he could offer guidance on how to approach the paper. For example, he wrote the following about the *Los Angeles Times*:

The *Los Angeles Times* is the outstanding conservative newspaper of the western United States, and its editorial expressions carry considerable weight with conservative people all over the United States. Mr. Norman Chandler, a young man in his early thirties, is the son and potential successor of the present owner of the paper, Mr. Harry Chandler. I am not certain that young Mr. Chandler would be able to make the trip, but anyone he would nominate from his staff would be a creditable representative.<sup>79</sup>

The final list of August 14 named fifteen members of the press, including Edmund Gilligan of the *New York Sun*. Many candidates declined the invitation, but Howard did the best he could in this challenging effort. The group of American journalists sailed on the *Chichibu Maru* on September 4. Howard accompanied the contingent to Honolulu, providing onboard lectures on Japanese affairs, to give them a better picture of the Japanese state of mind and the Japanese journalists' sincere desire to learn from American newspapers' point of view. He desired earnestly to make this project more than a mere Japanese propaganda outreach to American journalists.<sup>80</sup>

Despite these efforts, the Americans had rather gloomy hopes for the project. Howard wrote to Mitsunaga that he was not fully satisfied with the group of participating journalists.<sup>81</sup> Ambassador Grew did not expect much from the exchange either. On September 19, the day after the American journalists arrived at Yokohama, the US Embassy held a reception for them, as the Grews were planning a private trip to China that was to begin that evening. Grew wrote in his diary:

**Table 1.**

		6/8 Japanese list	7/5 Howard's proposal
New York	New York	American Herald Tribune Sun Times World-Telegram Evening Post	Unable to determine name (American) Ogden Reid (Herald Tribune) William T. Dewart, Jr. or Keats Speed (Sun) Arthur Sulzberger (Vice President, Times) Marlen E. Pew (Times) Reuben Maury or Fred D. Pasley (Daily News) Henry R. Luce (Time) Wm. Chenery (Collier's Weekly)
Washington, D.C.		Post Star	Felix Morley (Post) Oliver Owen Kuhn (Star) Lowell Mellett (News)
Chicago	Illinois	Daily News Tribune	Hal O'Flaherty or Paul Scott Mowrer (Daily News) Edward S. Beck (Tribune)
San Francisco	California	Chronicle	William N. Burkhardt (News)
Los Angeles	California	Times	Norman Chandler (Times)
Philadelphia	Pennsylvania	Bulletin Public Ledger	Robert MacLean (Bulletin)
Boston	Massachusetts	Christian Science Monitor Post	Very recently the Editor died (Christian Science Monitor)
Seattle	Washington	Post Intelligencer Times	Jamess G. Scripps (Star)
Baltimore	Maryland	Sun	John W. Owens or Hamilton Owen (Sun)
Atlanta	Georgia	Constitution	Major John S. Cohen (Journal)
Portland	Oregon		Phillip Jackson or Donald Sterling (Journal)
Rochester	New York		Frank E. Gannett (Times-Union)
St. Louis	Missouri		Elzey Roberts or Frank Taylor (Star)
New Orleans	Texas		L. K. Nicholson (Times-Picayune)
Kansas City	Kansas		Henry J. Haekell or Roy Roberts (Star)
Des Moines	Iowa		Gardner Cowles, Jr (Register-Tribune)
Newark	New Jersey		Arthur Sinnott (News)
Richmond	Virginia		John Stewart Bryan (News-Leader)
Detroit	Michigan		W. S. Gilmor (News)
Emporia	Kansas		
Memphis	Tennessee		
Honolulu	Hawaii		
	Washington		

final invitations	8/14 final acceptances
Grafton Wilcox (Herald Tribune) Edmund Gilligan (Sun) Arthur Sulzberger (Times)	Edmund Gilligan (Sun)
Colonel Patterson (Daily News) William Lydgate (Time) Jim Scripps	William Lydgate (Time)
Eugen Meyers (Post)	
Lowell Mollett (News)	Lowell Mollett (News)
Carroll Binder (Daily News) Edward S. Beck (Tribune)	Carroll Binder (Daily News)
George T. Cameron (Chronicle) William N. Burkhardt (News)	George T. Cameron (Chronicle) William N. Burkhardt (News)
B. Millard (Times)	B. Millard (Times)
Robert MacLean (Bulletin)	
J. Roscoe Drummond (Christian Science Monitor)	J. Roscoe Drummond (Christian Science Monitor)
Paul Patterson (Sun)	
Major John S. Cohen (Journal)	
Phillip L. Jackson (Portland Journal)	Phillip L. Jackson (Portland Journal)
Frank E. Tripp (Times-Union)	Frank E. Tripp (Times-Union)
Elzey Roberts (St. Louis Star)	Elzey Roberts (St. Louis Star)
L. K. Nicholson (Times-Picayune)	
Roy Roberts (Star)	
Gardner Cowles, Jr (Register-Tribune)	
Arthur J. Sinnott (Newark Evening News)	Arthur J. Sinnott (Newark Evening News)
John Stewart Bryan (News-Leader)	
W. S. Gilmor (News)	
W. A. White	
George T. Hammond (Commercial Appeal)	George T. Hammond (Commercial Appeal)
Lorrin P. Thurston (Honolulu Advertiser)	Lorrin P. Thurston (Honolulu Advertiser)
James T. Williams (Hearst)	James T. Williams (Hearst)

Their Japanese hosts, with singular tactlessness, will probably defeat their own object in bringing the delegation over here. . . . Where they make their big mistake lies in the fact that the whole two months schedule is an appalling and unbroken round of sightseeing, luncheons, receptions, banquets, and speeches, speeches, speeches, day in and day out.<sup>82</sup>

As we have already seen, the Japanese side appears to have made an inadequate effort to understand the American public, despite Howard's involvement. Before long, Howard became very critical of Amou, the director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Information Division. Howard visited Japan in fall 1935 and proposed an interview with Foreign Minister Hirota, which he thought would go a long way toward improving the American understanding of certain aspects of the Far Eastern situation. According to Howard, Hirota and the vice minister, Mamoru Shigemitsu, supported this proposal, but Amou's opposition helped to defeat it. Howard wrote to Kensuke Horinouchi, director of the American bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, that Amou appeared to have something closely approaching genius when it came to misinterpreting American psychology and the relationship between the American press and public.<sup>83</sup> On another occasion, Howard wrote directly to Amou that any lengthy discussion of the points Amou had raised would be futile, as it was obvious that Amou was unable to take Howard's understanding of American psychology seriously. With regard to what type of article would best promote warmer Japanese-American relations, Howard and Amou had a wide difference of opinion.<sup>84</sup>

Howard thought that both US leaders and the American public had a realistic sense of the international implications of the Manchurian situation. Their perspective was not pro-Chinese or anti-Japanese. It was difficult for Japanese leaders, however, to acknowledge that US interests were focused solely on possible international repercussions and on the peace-preserving efficacy of international instruments such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Four-Power and Nine-Power treaties proclaiming open door in China, and the Washington Naval Treaty limiting naval construction. Howard found that Japanese opinion had become a little more tolerant than in 1933. Amou had never listened to Howard's explanations about American public opinion, however, and simply requested him to disseminate what the Japanese government wanted said.<sup>85</sup>

After Amou left his post as director of the Information Division in April

1937, Howard attempted to participate in Sino–Japanese mediation in November 1937 through Takaishi; Wang Chengting, who was the Chinese ambassador to the United States and former foreign minister; Hu Shin, who was a famous Chinese philosopher and future ambassador to the United States in 1938; and W. H. Donald, who was an adviser to Chang Kai-shek. He also helped to arrange an interview between President Roosevelt and Yoshitaro Kusuyama, a journalist at the *Osaka Mainichi* in May 1939. In this interview, Roosevelt told Kusuyama that Japan had won on the battlefield but that it did not have enough power to continue the war. His opinion was that there was no need to intervene in the Sino–Japanese War because China would have an advantage in a long, drawn-out conflict.<sup>86</sup> At that time, it was extraordinarily difficult to obtain an interview with President Roosevelt, and Kusuyama could never have secured one without Howard's help.

## CONCLUSION

The Manchurian Incident was an explicit violation of international laws, such as the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. However, the United States remained open to hearing Japan's position. Roy W. Howard tried to communicate the Japanese reasoning to the US public through his publications and to influence President Roosevelt through his private connections. Howard could have played a significant role in helping Japan to improve its relations with the United States had the Japanese Foreign Ministry more accurately understood his importance to Japanese public diplomacy.

In this article, I have examined three key incidents in US–Japanese relations concerning public diplomacy during the 1930s: Matsuoka's visit to the United States in 1933, Howard's interview with the Japanese emperor in 1933, and the invitation for American journalists to visit Japan in 1934. The first two interactions were initiated by Howard, whereas the last one was led by Mitsunaga and Ueda of Dentsu. Among these, the most effective Japanese public diplomacy took place surrounding Howard's interview with the Japanese emperor. In this case, even though the Japanese Foreign Ministry simply responded favorably to Howard's suggestion, the interaction delivered to the American public a significant message of Japanese hopes for improving US–Japanese relations. Howard's timing was also excellent because some Americans began to wonder whether the Stimson doctrine could provide a practical solution to the Manchurian problem.

When the Manchurian Incident happened, Howard supported the peace-keeping machinery of international law and opposed the US arms buildup. Thus, he was critical of Japanese violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, supporting the Stimson doctrine. Around late 1933, however, he changed his policy toward Japan and began to promote improved US–Japan understanding through Scripps-Howard news reporting and through his personal connection with Roosevelt. He arrived at this position through his efforts to understand Japan. Howard was searching for a means to stabilize the Far Eastern situation after he recognized that the Stimson doctrine could not be effective in forcing Japan out of Manchuria. Based on Matsuoka's speeches in the United States and Howard's own visit to Japan in 1933, he reached the conclusion that Japan was not satisfied with the status quo. He therefore sought to address this Japanese dissatisfaction by explaining it to the American public and at the same time tried to alleviate Japanese aggression. In the first article about his interview with the Japanese emperor, Howard disseminated the Japanese message of promoting cordial US–Japanese relations and the Japanese Open Door Policy regarding Manchukuo. Then, in his second article, he expressed his sympathy with revising the anti-Japanese Immigration Act while also insisting that the United States should build up its naval forces to counter potential Japanese armed aggression.

The inadequate information policy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry experts, however, obstructed effective cooperation with Howard after the mid-1930s. The period examined in this article was a time of transition during which the Japanese Foreign Ministry intensified its control of information policy by establishing the Domei News Agency through a merger between Rengo and Dentsu. Howard anticipated that this merger of Japanese news agencies would have a negative effect on world public opinion because the impression of tighter governmental control of information would cause the Japanese media to lose credibility. He told Takaishi that “a merger of the two press associations would prove a reactionary step fatal to the journalistic enterprise within Japan, and depreciating and casting doubt and suspicion on even honest news of Japanese enterprise and endeavor, when offered to the outside world.”<sup>87</sup>

Eiji Amou appears not to have been the best person to lead a public diplomacy effort. He was so inflexible that he could not stop assuming a unilateral stance. Thus, the relationship between Howard and Amou soon became strained. Nancy Snow, associate professor of public diplomacy at Syracuse University, has pointed out that public diplomacy before

September 11, 2001, “has been about governments talking to global publics in support of national objectives and foreign policies.”<sup>88</sup> As she suggested, the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s information policy as represented by Amou embodied a one-way exchange of information. Amou had not taken the time to understand his audience when Howard tried to advise him about the American public.

Howard’s Japanese connections were mostly with Dentsu, Rengo’s competitor, and it lost its influence with the formation of Domei at the end of 1935. The establishment of Domei as a national news agency representing Japan was a long-time goal of Yukichi Iwanaga, president of Rengo. Tomoko Akami has analyzed Iwanaga’s role in these extended efforts.<sup>89</sup> Iwanaga, who initially joined the Kokusai news agency in 1921 and who became president of Rengo in 1926 and then of the Domei News Agency in 1936, recognized that the credibility of a news source is significant for communicating effective propaganda. Therefore, he believed that news agencies should not be a government’s fully controlled mouthpieces.<sup>90</sup> Iwanaga’s success as president of Domei also entailed a loss of his former ideals regarding information policy. Influenced by the Foreign Ministry’s policy of one-way information dissemination and by military pressure, Domei soon became in effect a government mouthpiece.

Contrary to the general belief that Japan lacked a vigorous propaganda effort, Japan engaged extensively in propaganda during this period, but it was not effective because the consolidation of the news propaganda enterprise resulted in a one-way approach to imparting information.

#### NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939* (1939; repr., London: Papermac, 1991), 132–45.

<sup>2</sup> Ian Nish, *Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), 16–18.

<sup>3</sup> Akio Tsuchida, “China’s ‘Public Diplomacy’ toward the United States before Pearl Harbor,” *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 17, no. 1 (October 2010): 35–55. Key Japanese unofficial contributors to their country’s diplomatic efforts, such as Yukichi Iwanaga and Shigeharu Matsumoto, argued that Japan needed to counter Chinese propaganda. Shigeharu Matsumoto, *Shanghai Jidai* (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1977), 52–57.

<sup>4</sup> Peter O’Connor, *The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918–1945* (Leiden: Global Oriental, 2010), 72–73. Although the term “public diplomacy” was coined in

1965 by Edmund Gullion, a retired US foreign service officer, Nicholas J. Cull has revealed that Gullion used this as an alternative for the term “propaganda” because of the latter’s negative connotations. I use the terms “public diplomacy” and “propaganda” as synonyms in this article. Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion” *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Phillip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 19.

<sup>5</sup> Masayoshi Matsumura, *Nichiro Senso to Kaneko Kentaro* (Tokyo: Shinyusha, 1980) and *Portsmouth eno Michi* (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1987).

<sup>6</sup> Tomoko Akami, *Japan’s News Propaganda and Reuters News Empire in Northeast Asia, 1870–1934* (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2012). Parallel with these developments in Japanese information policy, the Japanese Foreign Ministry began to establish its cultural policy in the early 1920s. Young diplomats such as Kinichi Komura who were influenced by US cultural diplomacy toward China proposed introducing a similar policy within Japanese diplomacy. Fumio Kumamoto, *Taisenkankei no Chugoku Bunka Gaiko* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 2013), 44–58.

<sup>7</sup> Teiji Yabe, *Konoye Fumimaro*, Jou (Tokyo: Koubundo, 1952), 90–91.

<sup>8</sup> O’Connor, *English-Language Press*, 55–91. Teruo Ariyama has published three volumes about Japanese news history and its empire, *Joho Haken to Teikoku Nihon*, vols. 1 (*Kaitei Keburu to Tushinsha no Tanjo*), 2 (*Tsushingijutsu no Kakudai to Sendensen*), 3 (*Higashi Azia Denshinmou to Chousen Tsushin Shihai*) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 2013, 2013, 2016).

<sup>9</sup> Shu Satomi, *News Agency* (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 2000), 60–139. Ariyama, *Joho Haken to Teikoku Nihon*, vol. 2, 313–51. Tomoko Akami, *Soft Power of Japan’s Total War State: The Board of Information and Domei News Agency in Foreign Policy, 1934–45*, (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2014), 49–84. Atsushi Shibazaki, *Kindainihon to Kokusai Bunka Kouryu*, (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1999).

<sup>10</sup> Shibazaki, *Kindainihon*, 40–48.

<sup>11</sup> Therefore, most works concerning Domei focused on domestic control. Takesuke Nishiyama, “Tsusinsha ni taisuru seifu no josei kin,” *Media Shi Kenkyu* 6 (May 1997): 69–87. Shu Satomi, *Shinbun Togo* (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2011).

<sup>12</sup> Nishiyama, “Tsusinsha ni taisuru seifu no josei kin.” Junko Sato, “Manshukoku Tsushinsha no Setsuritsu to Joho Seisaku,” *Mediashikenkyu* 9 (March 2000): 24–43; “Domei Tsushinsha no Kaigai Johomou,” *Mediashikenkyu* 16 (April 2004): 74–91; and “Taigai Hasshin no Jiyuka to Tsushinsha,” *Mediashikenkyu* 23 (2007): 61–75. Akami, *News Propaganda*, 101–292. Akami, *Soft Power*. Ariyama, *Joho Haken to Teikoku Nihon*, vol.1, 319–86; vol. 2, 120–64, 352–95.

<sup>13</sup> Patricia Beard, *Newsmaker: Roy W. Howard, The Mastermind behind the Scripps-Howard News Empire from the Gilded Age to the Atomic Age* (Guilford, CT: Roman and Littlefield, 2016), 1–20, 89–96.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 149–57.

<sup>15</sup> David J. Lu, *Matsuoka Yosuke to Sono Jidai* (Tokyo: TBS-Britannica, 1981). David J. Lu, *Agony of Choice: Matsuoka Yosuke and the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1880–1946* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002).

<sup>16</sup> Izumi Hirobe, *Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 Immigration Act* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

<sup>17</sup> Beard, *Newsmaker*.

<sup>18</sup> Teruo Ariyama, “Manshujihenki Nihon no Taibei Senden Katsudo,” in *Nihon no Kokusai Johou Hasshin*, ed. Tokyo Keizai Daigaku Daigakuin Communication-gaku Kenkyuuka (Tokyo: Husou Syobou, 2004), 146–58.

<sup>19</sup> Shigeki Mori, “Taiheiyō Senso Zenya no Taibei Gaikou to Yoron Kousaku,” *Nihonshi Kenkyu* 559 (March 2009): 49–74.

<sup>20</sup> “Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi: Takaishi Shingoro,” *Bessatsu Shinbun Kenkyu* 1

(1975): 38.

<sup>21</sup> Beard, *Newsmaker*, 97.

<sup>22</sup> “Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi: Takaishi Shingoro,” 38.

<sup>23</sup> Howard to Takaishi; Howard to Uyeda; Howard to Mitsunaga, 1933/6/23, box 86, Roy Howard Papers, Library of Congress; hereafter, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>24</sup> Howard to Grew, 1933/7/26, box 86, Roy Howard Papers. Betty Houchin Winfield, *FDR and the News Media* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 85.

<sup>25</sup> Eleanor Tupper, *Japan in American Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), 295–97.

<sup>26</sup> Lu, *Matsuoka Yousuke*, 137–38.

<sup>27</sup> Lu, *Agony of Choice*, 91.

<sup>28</sup> Takashi Itoh, *Naiseishi Kenkyukai Sokkiroku: Yoshizawa Seijiro* (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryo Shuppan, 2008), 37. This is the record of an oral history project of the Naiseishi Kenkyukai research group, completed in 1973.

<sup>29</sup> Itoh, *Yoshizawa Seijiro*, 106–22. O’Connor, *English-Language Press*, 72–73. Matsumura, “Washington Kaigi to Nihon no Koho Gaiko,” *Gaimusho Chosa Gappou* (2002): 55–59.

<sup>30</sup> The Carnegie Mission visited Japan in May 1929 and stayed for twenty-six days, after which it continued on to Chosen for five days, Manchuria for twenty days, and China for twenty-five days. The project sought to present a favorable impression of Japan in comparison to China and to exhibit Japan’s “civilized” and stable colonial governance. Ariyama, “Manshujihenki Nihon,” 141–46. Somei Kobayashi, “Teikoku Nihon no Kouhou Bunka Gaikou to Higashi Asia,” *Intelligence* 13 (March 2013): 30–44. According to Ariyama, the planners of this project were Jotaro Yamamoto, president of the South Manchurian Railway Company, and Shigeru Yoshida, vice minister of the Foreign Ministry. Although Ariyama did not mention it, the main reason for this initiative was a media campaign to promote a conference planned by the Institute of Pacific Relations for fall 1929, with the Manchurian problem as the primary agenda item. The initiative was certainly effective, and George Blakeslee recognized that the American delegation attending the IPR conference that fall was critical of China. Blakeslee to Hornbeck, 1929/12/05, box 30, Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford University.

<sup>31</sup> Lu, *Matsuoka Yousuke*, 151–56.

<sup>32</sup> Matsuoka to Howard, 1933/4/13, box 86, Roy Howard Papers. Itoh, *Naiseishi Kenkyukai Sokkiroku: Yoshizawa Seijiro*, 139.

<sup>33</sup> Howard to Matsuoka, 1933/3/24, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Yoshie Takamitsu, “Prince Fumimaro Konoe and the Institute of Pacific Relations during His Visit to the United States in 1934,” *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* [Chiba University] 29 (September 2014): 10–11.

<sup>36</sup> Howard to Matsuoka, 1933/3/29, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>37</sup> Howard to Mrs. Charles Laval, 1933/5/14, box 85, Roy Howard Papers. Itoh, *Naiseishi Kenkyukai Sokkiroku: Yoshizawa Seijiro*, 139.

<sup>38</sup> 1933 Diary, 1933/6/22, book 65, Joseph Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University; hereafter, Joseph Grew Papers.

<sup>39</sup> JACAR (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records) Ref. B02030975200 (3rd picture), 1933/5/29, Muto to Uchida, Gaikoku Shinbunkisha, Tuushinin Kankei Zakken/Beikokuzin no Bu (Miscellaneous Documents relating to Foreign News Reporters and Correspondents: Americans), vol. 2 (A–3–5–0–2), Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; hereafter, Diplomatic Archives. Ariyama, “Manshujihenki Nihon,” 148.

<sup>40</sup> Itoh, *Naiseishi Kenkyukai Sokkiroku: Yoshizawa Seijiro*, 139. Ariyama, “Manshujihenki Nihon,” 148–49.

- <sup>41</sup> 1933 Diary, 1933/6/22, book 65, Joseph Grew Papers.
- <sup>42</sup> Beard, *Newsmaker*, 167.
- <sup>43</sup> 1933 Diary, 1933/6/22, book 65, Joseph Grew Papers.
- <sup>44</sup> JACAR Ref. B02030975300 (1st and 3rd picture), 1933/6/23, Wakasugi to Uchida, Gaikoku Shinbunkisha, Tuushinin Kankei Zakken/Beikokuzin no Bu, vol. 2 (A-3-5-0-2), Diplomatic Archives.
- <sup>45</sup> JACAR Ref. B02030975200 (22nd and 23rd pictures), 1933/6/23, Horinouchi to Uchida; (7th and 8th pictures), 1933/6/14, Muto to Uchida, Gaikoku Shinbunkisha, Tuushinin Kankei Zakken/Beikokuzin no Bu, vol. 2 (A-3-5-0-2), Diplomatic Archives.
- <sup>46</sup> Ariyama, "Manshujihenki Nihon," 150.
- <sup>47</sup> Howard to Suma, 1933/9/8, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>49</sup> Beard, *Newsmaker*, 165-75.
- <sup>50</sup> JACAR Ref. B02030975300 (16th and 17th pictures), 1933/7/8, Wakasugi to Uchida; (18th and 19th pictures), 1933/7/8, Debuchi to Uchida, Gaikoku Shinbunkisha, Tuushinin Kankei Zakken/Beikokuzin no Bu, vol. 2 (A-3-5-0-2), Diplomatic Archives.
- <sup>51</sup> J.W.T. Mason to Howard, 1933/7/8, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
- <sup>52</sup> Hirobe, *Japanese Pride*, 155, 173. Before the Manchurian Incident, Howard was relatively favorable toward the Japanese cause regarding the immigration problem.
- <sup>53</sup> Howard to Nelson T. Johnson, 1933/7/31, box 85, Roy Howard Papers. Johnson, who was US minister to China, wrote to Howard that he agreed with Howard's statement. Johnson to Howard, 1933/8/29, box 85.
- <sup>54</sup> Hirobe, *Japanese Pride*, 173, 277n.
- <sup>55</sup> "Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi: Takaishi Shingoro," 22-53.
- <sup>56</sup> Howard to Takaishi, 1933/6/23, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
- <sup>57</sup> Howard to Vaughn, 1933/9/16, box 83, Roy Howard Papers.
- <sup>58</sup> Howard to Grew, 1933/7/26, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
- <sup>59</sup> Beard, *Newsmaker*, 176-79.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid., 197-201. Winfield, *FDR*, 128-34.
- <sup>61</sup> Toshiyuki Maekawa, *Taiheiyo Senso to Shinbun* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2007), 50-57, 65-79, 106.
- <sup>62</sup> "Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi: Takaishi Shingoro," 43-47.
- <sup>63</sup> Takaishi to Howard, 1933/11/4 and Howard to Takaishi, 1933/12/8, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
- <sup>64</sup> Mason to Howard, 1933/7/8, box 86, Roy Howard Papers.
- <sup>65</sup> Howard to Horiguchi, 1933/12/27, box 86, Roy Howard Papers. Howard was sincere in his belief in press freedom. He protested against the Chinese government on occasion such as the attempted assassination of Wang Ching-wei. Howard to Madam Chiang, 1935/11/4 and Howard to Soong, 1935/11/6, box 108, Roy Howard Papers.
- <sup>66</sup> Satomi, *News Agency*, 71.
- <sup>67</sup> Takamitsu, "Prince Fumimaro Konoe."
- <sup>68</sup> Mitsunaga to Howard, 1934/2/24 and Howard to Uyeda, 1934/4/2, box 97, Roy Howard Papers.
- <sup>69</sup> Dorothy Borg, *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 46-99. Katsumi Usui, "Hirota Koki Ron," *International Relations* 33 (1967): 64. Toshikazu Inoue, *Kiki no nakano Kyoutyou Gaikou* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1994), 107-42. Akami, *Soft Power*, 43-45.
- <sup>70</sup> Howard to Uyeda and Howard to Mitsunaga, 1934/5/21, box 97, Roy Howard Papers.
- <sup>71</sup> Grew to Secretary, 1934/6/23, 711.94/959, RG59, National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD.

<sup>72</sup> Uyeda to Howard, 1934/6/8, box 97, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>73</sup> Marshall to Howard, 1934/6/25, box 95, Roy Howard Papers. Marshall wrote to Howard about a donation from wealthy people that amounted to some 800,000 yen, but probably this was a misunderstanding. According to official Japanese documents, the total contribution was 120,000 yen. Amou asked for more assistance from other sources and obtained 40,000 yen from the South Manchurian Railway Company, 30,000 yen each from the Mitsui and Mitsubishi companies, and 10,000 yen each from the Foreign Ministry and War Ministry. JACAR Ref. B02030999700 (15th picture), 1933/7/27, Gaikoku Shinbunkisha, Tuushinin Kankei Zakken/Beikokuzin no Bu, Hounichi Koukan Kishadan Kankei, vol. 1 (A-3-5-0-2), Diplomatic Archives.

<sup>74</sup> Rengo Bulletin No. 1227, box 85, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>75</sup> Takamitsu, “Prince Fumimaro Konoe,” 9. *Osaka Mainichi*, 1934/6/30.

<sup>76</sup> Takamitsu, “Prince Fumimaro Konoe,” 9–13.

<sup>77</sup> Uyeda to Howard, 1934/6/8, box 97, Roy Howard Papers. Nihon Shinbun Kyokai was a nationwide organization of newspapers, news agencies, and advertising organizations. It was established in 1913, and Mitsunaga assumed the role of chief director in 1926. Dentsu 100 Nenshi Hensyu Iinkai, *Dentsu 100 Nenshi* (2001), 79.

<sup>78</sup> Howard to Uyeda, 1934/7/5, box 97, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Howard to Mitsunaga, 1934/8/14, box 97; Howard to Marshall, 1934/9/4, box 97, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>81</sup> Howard to Mitsunaga, 1934/11/27, box 97, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>82</sup> 1934 Diary, 1934/9/19, book 72, Joseph Grew Papers.

<sup>83</sup> Howard to Amau, 1935/10/16 and Howard to Horinouchi, 1935/10/21, box 108, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>84</sup> 1935/10/21, Howard to Amau, box 108, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>85</sup> Mock Joya’s interview with Howard, October 1935, box 108, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>86</sup> “Kikitori de Tsuzuru Shinbunshi: Kusuyama Yoshitaro,” *Bessatsu Shinbun Kenkyu* 14 (1982): 32–37.

<sup>87</sup> Howard to Takaishi, 1935/10/20, box 108, Roy Howard Papers.

<sup>88</sup> Nancy Snow, “Rethinking Public Diplomacy,” in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 6.

<sup>89</sup> Akami, *News Propaganda*, 143–292.

<sup>90</sup> Yukichi Iwanaga, “Teikoku no Zenkeniin ni Taisuru Gojin no Kibou (September 1921),” in *Iwanaga Yukichi kun* (Tokyo: Iwanaga Yukich kun Denki Hensan Iinkai, 1941), 59–60.