INTRODUCTION

The second-largest contingent of US military forces deployed overseas is in Japan,¹ and they have played an important role in the US national defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Along with the development of joint activities by American forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, the military bases in Japan are also at the center of the US-Japan relationship in the context of bilateral cooperation for regional peace and stability, as well as being a source of tension, as evidenced in the relocation controversy concerning the Marine Corps Air Station in Futenma, Okinawa. Military bases were even more of a domestic political issue in regard to the US-Japan 1951 Security Treaty, which was essentially a base-lease agreement, as there was no formal US commitment to guaranteeing the military security of Japan. Throughout a decade after the Occupation ended, the presence of US troops stationed in Japan forced Japanese conservative leaders to face a dilemma: the bases served as a deterrent to aggression by the Soviet Union, but they infringed on Japanese sovereignty.

The literature on US-Japan relations in the 1950s covers how both governments tried to maintain or modify the political, economic, and
security structure built during the Occupation and the peace process. The bilateral negotiation of the revision of the Security Treaty is one of the highlights of this decade, and, accordingly, many scholars focus on the security framework agreed on by both governments in the late 1950s. In contrast, some historians who deal with problems connected to the bases elaborate on how the daily lives of Japanese citizens in areas surrounding US bases were disrupted and how antibase protests developed, thus shedding light on human rights, democratic values, and nationalism in Japanese society during this era. The former scholars usually refer to base problems merely as the background of the revision of the Security Treaty; the latter do not necessarily pay attention to the political and diplomatic context of base problems and antibase movements. There has been little connection between the two narratives, which makes each incomplete for understanding bilateral security relations in the 1950s. General studies of base politics analyze US military bases in Japan as one case and explain the mechanism by which military bases in Japan have been maintained for over fifty years. However, the base-politics approach does not necessarily consider how the two governments dealt with the use of military bases by US forces.

Through an exploration of the treatment of issues related to facilities and areas by the Japanese government and US forces stationed in Japan, I seek to clarify how and what type of consensus the United States and Japan developed regarding the use of military bases in Japan during the 1950s. US bases were a problem in terms of their threatening the livelihoods of nearby residents. At the same time, they were the way both governments fulfilled their obligations or took advantage of rights under the 1951 Security Treaty. Day-to-day communications and coordination between the Japanese government and US forces on base issues, mainly through the Joint Committee (JC) under the Administrative Agreement, gradually led to a cooperative relationship regarding the use of military bases in Japan. Such processes gave opportunities for Americans to learn about local interests surrounding military bases as well as the Japanese government’s strong aspirations for legal stability to protect their sovereignty, while Japanese leaders complied with US strategic requirements in the region as far as they could. Here, I wish to portray a different picture of US-Japan relations in the 1950s than the usual presentation of the period as a turbulent one.

I. FROM “OCCUPATION FORCES” TO “GARRISON FORCES”

The 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty did not automatically ensure the
right to the United States to utilize military bases in Japan. This was provided under the Administrative Agreement signed on February 28, 1952, in which Japan agreed, in article 2, “to grant to the United States the use of the facilities and areas necessary to carry out the purposes stated in Article I of the Security Treaty.” Bilateral arrangements were necessary for specific “facilities and areas” concluded through the Joint Committee, provided for in article 26 of the agreement, if they had not been agreed on by April 28, 1952. Despite the demand by US forces not to drastically change the legal status of facilities and areas that the military held during the Occupation, the Truman administration decided to accept claims by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that “Garrison forces” under the Security Treaty should be legally distinct from “Occupation forces” described in the Potsdam Declaration. Yoshida and the MOFA staff well realized that many citizens did not welcome US troops remaining in Japan after the Occupation formally ended, no matter how integral they were to the defense of the islands. Meanwhile, the government was expected to favorably respond to the US military’s request to retain existing reservations as well as provide them with more facilities and areas. According to the Administrative Agreement, “the facilities and areas used by the United States armed forces shall be returned to Japan whenever they are no longer needed for purposes of this Agreement.”

In addition to the obligation to grant facilities and areas to the United States, Japan was obliged to furnish “without cost to the United States and make compensation where appropriate to the owners and suppliers there of all facilities, areas and rights of way” and to make available without cost to the United States “an amount of Japanese currency equivalent to $155 million [55.8 billion yen] per annum for the purpose of procurement by the United States of transportation and other requisite services and supplies in Japan”—known as the “Yen contribution” (section 2, article 25). The 1951 Security Treaty and related arrangements emphasized Japan’s commitment to the operation of military bases by US forces for the maintenance of international peace and stability in the Far East. However, it is doubtful whether the Yoshida Cabinet viewed itself as actually underpinning America’s Cold War strategy. There was widespread disappointment with the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement, which seemingly created not a give-and-take but a give-and-give bilateral relationship; many Japanese lawmakers, including members of Yoshida’s Liberal Party, regarded the security framework associated with (though not part of) the Peace Treaty as provisional, while opposition parties in particular denounced
the Administrative Agreement as infringing on the basic human rights of Japanese citizens by placing Japan under the colonial rule of the United States.9

At the time when Japan’s independence was officially restored in April 1952, US forces held more than 135,000 hectares (about 333,600 acres) of land as military reservations.10 Generally speaking, major ground bases, airfields, depots, arsenals, and maneuver areas had been expanded, newly seized, or given new roles as East-West tensions increased during the late 1940s, predominantly after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area, which underwent a large-scale expansion around 1949, was finally authorized in September 1950 for use for live weapons and operational training for units deployed to Korea.11 Originally seized as a logistics base, Camp Zama, Kanagawa, changed its mission to becoming the headquarters of the 8th US Army in June 1950.12 Likewise, the Atsugi Airfield had been utilized as a field depot of the US Army, but it came under the command of the US Marines in December 1950.13 Two squadrons of the 39th Air Division, whose main fighters were F-84G Thunderjets, were deployed to the Misawa Airfield after the Korean War broke out.14 Seeing the Occupation drawing to a close, the US military rushed to incorporate various facilities and areas in Japan into its Cold War strategy, which became a fait accompli when the Japanese and US governments chose “facilities and areas” under the Administrative Agreement—military barracks, airfields, naval facilities, ground and naval maneuver areas, depots, residences, and communication sites—by the end of July 1952. Yoshida and other government officials wanted to reduce the presence of US forces to a minimum,15 yet the “facilities and areas” scattered throughout mainland Japan numbered 1,300 (not including communication sites).16 Simultaneously, the Yoshida Cabinet enacted several bills in April and May 1952 that enabled the Japanese government to implement these agreements domestically by requisitioning necessary land and buildings granted to US forces by compulsion and, if necessary, restricting or banning fisheries in the waters the US military used as well as limiting the property rights of nearby landowners and the livelihoods of agricultural, forestry, and fisheries workers. All bills surprisingly cleared the Diet with little opposition because many lawmakers and the public were paying more attention to freedom of expression issues in the Subversive Activities Prevention Act, which was also under discussion.17

Okazaki Katsuo, the Japanese representative during the negotiations over the Administrative Agreement, revealed to his US bargaining counterpart,
Dean Rusk, that his office was filled with landowners and holders of rights lobbying for release of their lands and facilities seized during the Occupation.\textsuperscript{18} They awaited the Peace Treaty to get their lives back to normal. The mayor of Tozawa Village, which hosted the Otakane Maneuver Area, testified before the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee:

We had been prepared to endure such hardships as having our land seized for a maneuver area and only allowed partial access because Japan was a defeated country. With the expectation that the Japanese government would compensate us for damages, we cooperated with the Japanese government and the Occupation forces in military exercises. Yet US forces have intensified artillery live-fire trainings after the Peace Treaty became effective. Moreover, they have been doing exercises in the immediate vicinity of local homes, which inevitably afflicts the village people, with life-threatening damage in some cases.\textsuperscript{19}

Such feelings motivated many residents near the military facilities and areas to claim damages or try to reclaim their property before and after the Occupation. The US military facilities that interfered with economic activities in Yokohama, for example, were soon considered for release;\textsuperscript{20} however, in less urban areas, US military activities disrupted residents’ daily lives, while local economies’ dependency on American bases, such as at Tokorozawa, increased.\textsuperscript{21} The unified campaign in Nagano Prefecture against the US Army’s plan to set up a training camp for mountain warfare at Mt. Asama in May 1953 was a complete success, mainly because the Japanese government was afraid of the adverse effect of a military training camp on the earthquake research conducted there by the University of Tokyo.\textsuperscript{22} A similar case, but with a different outcome, involved the small fishing village of Uchinada in the middle of Ishikawa Prefecture. Although the first contract, in fall 1952, for use of a beachside firing range stipulated it would be for a limited period, the following May, the Japanese government decided to permit long-term use there by US forces, which generated strong resentment from residents. The protests in and around the village became radicalized when labor unions, student activists, and left-wing parties joined local residents in conducting sit-in strikes at the firing range, which resulted in the Yoshida Cabinet mobilizing police to remove the protesters. In September, after offering compensation and infrastructure to local communities, the Japanese government finally received consent from
Uchinada residents for the long-term use of the area as a firing range.23 Although the legal basis of US troops stationed in Japan changed after the Peace Treaty was enacted, the reality that Japanese facilities and areas were occupied by foreign troops was virtually unchanged. Moreover, the use of farmland, shellfire danger, jet aircraft noise, water pollution, and laxity of morals threatened the life and livelihood of residents surrounding the military bases. For many Japanese, this was the truth of the Security Treaty. It seems inevitable that many Japanese regarded the American forces stationed in mainland Japan as occupier of “our properties” and interfering with their everyday lives, rather than as a protective barrier against Communist powers, which were usually invisible and thus unimaginable for many people. Caught in the middle between the demands of US forces and local communities, the Japanese government, which had responsibility for mediating the procurement of arms and equipment, land requisition, and compensation for landowners through the Procurement Agency (PA), was placed in a difficult position. Support for residents from labor unions, antiwar advocates, student activists, and left-wing parties, which occasionally participated in local protests, complicated the government’s mediation process. Resentment against “areas and facilities,” simple but instinctive and rooted in local requirements, began to coalesce into nationwide powerful “antibase” movements during 1953 through connections with peace movements that called for the abrogation of the US-Japan Security Treaty based on the ideals of the Japanese Peace Constitution.

II. THE 1954 “CRISIS”

The Truman administration adopted US national security policy, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan” (NSC 125/2) on August 7, 1952, which stated that the US government expected “a strong, stable and independent Japan” with close alignment with the United States. Achieving a prosperous Japanese economy and consolidating a democratic political system in Japan were considered essential. The policymakers in Washington envisioned Japan with the capability of “defense against internal subversion and external aggression” and the willingness and ability “to contribute to the security of the Pacific Area” before too long.24 The Eisenhower administration basically continued this comprehensive US policy toward Japan, pursuing not only economic but also military development of America’s former enemy, now expected to be a key member of the Western bloc.25
As early as 1953, however, the US government became pessimistic about these primary objectives. A drastic decline in special procurement following the Korean Armistice in July 1953 and hard-core inflation with an increase in imports and a reduction in exports led to a Japanese balance-of-payments deficit in fall 1953, which consequently caused a sharp decrease in Japanese foreign currency reserves. William Leonhart, a Japan specialist in the US State Department, criticized Yoshida’s management of the Japanese economy, which had been largely dependent on the boom caused by the Korean War as well as financial and technical assistance from the United States, and alerted policymakers in Washington to the threat of national bankruptcy. The Yoshida Cabinet inevitably made the decision to formulate a balanced budget for the 1954 fiscal year.

This critical situation delivered a blow to the financial basis of the 55.8 billion yen defense contribution for US forces stationed in Japan. After a plea from the Yoshida Cabinet to reduce the Yen contribution in return for increasing the budget of the National Safety Agency (reorganized as the National Defense Agency in July 1954), and considering the critical Japanese economic situation, Ambassador John M. Allison agreed with Foreign Minister Okazaki on April 6, 1954, to reduce Japan’s contribution by 2.52 billion yen for the current fiscal year. The Japanese government had to promise that it would build up the strength of its defense forces and carry over about 20 billion yen from fiscal year 1953 to 1954 for the National Safety Agency. Within three months, however, the Yoshida Cabinet unilaterally chose to cut the defense budget by 10 percent because the supplemental budget had shrunk by 19.9 billion yen. A ceiling of 90 billion yen for the total budget was placed on fiscal year 1955. Officials of the US Far East Command (FEC) and the American Embassy were angered by such a “violation of [the] spirit [of the] Japanese commitment in Allison-Okazaki letters [of] April 6, 1954” and anticipated that it would undoubtedly affect the transition of ground defense responsibilities from US troops to Japanese. While strongly requesting that the Japanese maintain the defense budget for fiscal year 1955, and to ensure “some increase” in the defense buildup, the Eisenhower administration nevertheless feared Japan’s economic collapse.

The Eisenhower administration had been dissatisfied with the tempo and scale of Japan’s rearmament throughout the first half of the 1950s and continuously put pressure on Yoshida to promptly establish a ten-division ground force. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the framework through which the US government was to provide military and economic
assistance with countries that make self-defense efforts, was concluded in March 1954 between the United States and Japan, but in the end it failed to accelerate Japan’s defense building. In June 1953, President Eisenhower believed that the United States needed to be careful not to urge readiness standards on nations, such as Japan, that were too high. Nevertheless, US authorities were irritated by the inactive Japanese defense policy, which to Leonhart seemed to be a quiet but persistent rejection by the Japanese government of “the power role US strategic planning had hoped it would assume,” at least within the short term. The Yoshida Cabinet’s performance during the buildup of Japanese forces was poor from America’s point of view, and the long-range Japanese goal, a maximum of 180,000 men, was “one-half of what the Joint Chiefs of Staff regards as a minimum defense force.”

The threat of Japanese national bankruptcy, the reduction in Japan’s support cost for the garrison forces, and slow progress in Japanese rearmament contributed to growing American frustration with Japan during fall 1954. The Eisenhower administration also nervously watched anti-American sentiment rising among Japanese people, spurred by the Daigo Fukuryu-maru (Lucky Dragon) Incident in which Japanese tuna fishermen received radiation exposure from American hydrogen-bomb testing in the Pacific, in spring 1954, but fundamentally coming from national pride humbled by Occupation rule. Then numerous conflicts over security-related issues strained US-Japan relations. Three letters that commander in chief of the FEC, John E. Hull, sent to Prime Minister Yoshida in September 1954 in unusually strong and even undiplomatic terms indicate America’s grave concerns about Japan’s cooperation with the United States.

The first letter urged the Japanese government to immediately offer the necessary land and easements for the extension of runways at six air bases: otherwise “the combat capability of the Far East Air Forces is seriously jeopardized.” Because jet aircraft needed about 10,000 feet of level runways for takeoffs and landings, the FEC formally asked for additional land through the JC meeting for the Itami Air Base in July 1953. Then similar requests for Kisarazu, Niigata, Komaki, Yokota, and Tachikawa Air Bases were submitted to the JC from January to March 1954. Without having received a formal reply to any of the requests, due perhaps to disagreement at the cabinet level, and “in view of the urgency of this matter,” Hull requested Yoshida “to inform me that land and easements will be forthcoming promptly at all the locations under consideration.” In the second letter, Hull accused the Yoshida Cabinet of negligence in presenting
a concrete defense plan. Hull warned that “continued failure to develop an authoritative long range program which has the support of the executive branch of the Japanese Government will unquestionably retard the MDA [Mutual Defense Assistance] Program.”

The last letter concerned strikes by garrison force workers. It might be strange, and slightly comical, to see that the most powerful armed forces in the world were swayed by unarmed labor. The All-Japan Garrison Forces Labor Union (Zenchuro), a united labor organization with close relations with the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), demanded wage and retirement allowance increases and unemployment measures, and they went on strike to protest the US military’s discharge of workers who were engaged in labor union activities, which became a serious obstacle for American troops in management of facilities and areas on a daily basis. Already in 1953, strikes by motor pool workers at the US Army base in Tokyo appeared as an issue to the State Department. In addition to offensive and sometimes illegal behavior by garrison force labor unions, what angered the FEC the most was the malfunctioning of Japanese law and order. Despite being PA employees, Japanese nationals working at US military bases were legally categorized as not public servants, and thus they had the right to strike; the Japanese police merely kept an eye on labor unions in case of accidents. After complaining about this situation, Hull wrote, “In my opinion it is essential that this special privilege of the right to strike now accorded to the labor force of the United States Forces be eliminated,” hoping that the Japanese government would “promptly take those steps necessary if the United States Forces are to be able to carry out their mission of defending Japan and if the spirit and letter of the Security Treaty are to remain valid.”

Without a majority in the Diet, as a result of constant fractional struggles within the conservative parties and the rise of left-wing parties, and finally hit by political scandals, the Yoshida Cabinet did not have enough energy to push through Hull’s requests. In mid-November, Vice Prime Minister Ogata Taketora, under the direction of Yoshida who was visiting North America, told Hull and Allison that the Japanese government expected to make surveys of the land needed for expansion in Kisarazu, Niigata, and Komaki Air Bases the following month. Ogata then mentioned that the Defense Agency had not completed its final self-defense plan, but he did not clarify when it would be finished and what it might be. He was relatively negative from a legislative viewpoint to controlling garrison force workers by force in the manner that Hull demanded and asked the FEC to settle the labor-
management confrontation in a satisfactory manner. In less than two months, the Yoshida Cabinet collapsed, leaving the security issues in the hands of its successor, the Hatoyama Ichiro Cabinet.

Yoshida had a steadfast belief that strong ties with the United States were indispensable to Japan’s survival. It is also undeniable that he needed America’s support to stay in power, and thus he often tried to obtain US commitment to special military procurement in Japan, capital investment, financial assistance, and other Japanese requests such as the reversion of the Amami Islands and the release of war criminals. Meanwhile, he never changed his incremental rearmament policy despite continuous pressure from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to immediately develop ground forces. Although building Japan’s own defense forces was the prerequisite for withdrawal of US forces stationed in Japan, financial restrictions on the defense budget did not allow Japanese policymakers to facilitate rearmament as the Americans expected. Furthermore, left-wing parties benefited from antiwar and antimilitary sentiment among Japanese citizens, which sometimes merged into anti-American feelings. Undertaking to build a full spectrum of armed forces and rough handling of base problems might galvanize citizens who had such feelings; poor economic performance might undermine Yoshida’s political legitimacy and accordingly his conservative rule. In this situation, the Yoshida Cabinet seemed to have no choice but to maintain the tempo and scale of defense buildup as before, while taking a judicious approach to dealing with issues related to “facilities and areas.”

After touring Japan in early 1954, US Congressman Walter Judd was surprised and puzzled by “the fact that anti-American sentiments [were] widely spread in the Japanese society,” because “he had no idea at all in what way the Japanese people [could] resolve a variety of difficult issues with regard to their survival without US assistance.” For many Americans, it was difficult to understand anti-American sentiment among Japanese citizens as an expression of Japanese aspiration for independence. US policymakers, particularly military leaders, were inclined to simplify anti-American feelings among the Japanese as a sign of neutrality, even complaining that the Yoshida Cabinet did not do its best to foster pro-American feelings and lacked a strong will to contribute to the peace and security of free countries. There was a huge recognition gap between the two countries, and it seemed to be the essence of the crisis in the bilateral relationship in 1954.
Accomplishing “true independence” was the most important objective for Hatoyama Ichiro and the people around him. Their hasty overtures to the Soviet Union and Communist China, and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru’s attempt to revise the Security Treaty in the summer of 1955, were, and still are, interpreted as a willingness to conduct a more independent foreign policy and to establish an equal-basis relationship with the United States. Along with lingering bilateral negotiations over the yen contribution, these issues reinforced distrust of the Hatoyama Cabinet among American policymakers. Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to disregard that Hatoyama was suddenly exposed to matters his predecessor had left behind that were already too complicated to be solved quickly. Moreover, both governments worked to tackle base-related issues through the bilateral-consultation framework of the US-Japan Joint Committee.

Antibase protests throughout mainland Japan became increasingly well organized in 1955. In June, representatives of several antibase movements, Sohyo, and several left-wing Diet members set up a national campaign, the National Liaison Conference on the Antibase Movement (Zenkoku Gunji Kichi Hantai Renraku Kaigi), which integrated individual antibase campaigns. The various peace and antiwar movements that were coordinated in this campaign made their goal “the fight for protecting our livelihood as well as for peace and independence.” As a matter of course, this national campaign identified itself as fighting for world peace and advocating the removal of all military bases in Japan that could possibly be mobilized for a nuclear war, as well as abrogation of the US-Japan Security Treaty to pursue “true independence” for Japan. Military bases thus became more costly for both governments.

Numerous issues related to the facilities and areas, and then base problems, poured into the JC. This committee usually met every two weeks, and it was at first overwhelmed by requests for the return of facilities to owners or rights holders, which were generally processed in the light of how urgent they were in terms of military requirements, necessity as public spaces, and meaningfulness in the political context. In April 1955, US representatives had barely promised that the facilities at Osaka City University would be released within half a year before the Diet session took up this issue. The Japanese welcomed the news that the building used for the Officers’ Club in Tokyo would be returned to the owner, former foreign minister Arita Hachiro, who was the socialist candidate for governor of
Tokyo, since they thought it would be a good opportunity to establish a friendly relationship between the US forces and him in case he won the election. Occasionally, Japanese representatives put certain facilities, such as Maizuru and Kokura, on the negotiating table for joint use by the United States and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The American side accommodated Japanese requests on the condition that alternate facilities were provided and US forces retained the right to re-enter the original facilities in case of emergency.

Test firings or trainings sporadically aroused tension between the governments. When the US military informed local Japanese governments about their schedule for tests of the Honest John rocket launcher at the Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area in November 1955, the MOFA representative to the JC, Chiba Kou, became furious at “the manner in which the announcement had been handled by the local USFJ [United States Forces in Japan] unit allegedly tantamount to an ‘ultimatum’ rather than ‘coordination’ expected by the Japanese.” He described the strong opposition of local Japanese authorities and recommended that the US consult in advance with the PA on such matters so that the latter could be in a position to mediate with local officials. US inflexibility in implementing a scheduled test-firing plan with little consideration for local politics also made the Japanese government uncomfortable; but, finally, the US agreed to postpone the test firing for ten days. This case illustrates that US forces were not able to disregard local requirements when utilizing facilities and areas, while the Japanese side tried to satisfy America’s military requirements as well as local interests.

The JC did not function well, however, regarding the runway extension programs for major air bases, one of the most pressing issues between the two governments. Commander in Chief Hull’s letter to Yoshida became the springboard for the Japanese government in deciding to expand the airfields in question only the necessary minimum in September 1954. However, the adviser to Foreign Minister Kase Toshikazu, in a telephone conversation with Ambassador Allison at the end of December 1954, observed that the problem was that left-wing organizations might exploit the opposition campaigns for anti-American propaganda if the government mishandled the issue. The Hatoyama Cabinet feared that runway extensions would have an adverse impact on his party, the Japan Democratic Party, in the general election scheduled for the following spring, yet the Eisenhower administration repeatedly urged the Japanese government to acquire the necessary land and easements for the extensions. The PA was concerned that landowners around the airfields in question had no idea “how much
land will be required, what type of aircraft will be employed on the fields, and to what extent the fields will be used by the Air Self-Defense Force,” and “the military situation in the region—specifically the number of Soviet aircraft and bases and the length of Soviet runways.” Yet the US military refused to declassify information on the aircraft that the military planned to deploy. Without a convincing explanation for the relationship between runway extensions and the defense of Japan, and without appealing benefits granted to residents and landowners, Japanese authorities had to go ahead with the defined procedures. No wonder local communities vehemently opposed the government’s decision to acquire necessary land for expanding airfields, such as at Sunakawa.

As dozens of hectares of land had been seized for the Tachikawa and Yokota air bases at Sunakawa since 1946, many residents of Sunakawa were shocked at the PA announcement in May 1955 that part of downtown Sunakawa, including the main road through the town, would be further requisitioned. Fearing damage to farming and the separation of the town, residents and landowners, supported by labor unions, undertook a sit-down protest to prevent the PA from making a survey of the planned site between June and August. As a corollary, the PA’s enforcement of the survey in mid-September, over objections from half of the landowners, led to a collision between the police and labor forces that had been mobilized by outside opposition groups. In the midst of the chaos, the Hatoyama Cabinet decided to expand the Tachikawa air base and permitted the PA to seize the necessary land, which invited additional reaction from local inhabitants and labor unions, declaring a struggle to protect their “land and livelihood.” Opposition groups shortly split up over strategies toward the government. Nevertheless, the “riots at Sunakawa” attracted considerable attention from policymakers in Washington and forced them to confront that local residents believed the runway extensions contributed only to America’s strategic interests. Just as PA director Fukushima Shintaro had warned in August that making a survey in a high-handed manner would have a “harmful effect on Japanese-American friendly relations,” the opposition groups gathering at Sunakawa turned their rage on the US-Japan Security Treaty. The riots at Sunakawa dragged on throughout the rest of the 1950s and became the symbol of antibase movements and the legal battle between opposition groups and the Japanese government over the constitutionality of the Security Treaty.

The treatment of the garrison forces’ labor unions was also a contentious issue for the JC. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles assumed that the
Japanese government ignored the possibility that labor union strikes might impede the combat capabilities of US forces stationed in Japan as well as bilateral relations. For the Japanese authorities, this was a legally as well as politically much more complicated issue than the Americans imagined. Legally, it was imperative to revise existing labor laws or to enact a new law to ban strikes by Japanese nationals under the Master Labor Contract, which was politically impossible as it would provoke fierce reaction both domestically and internationally. Thus, the Japanese representatives asked the US forces to obey Japanese labor laws and follow the necessary measures that the law required, while it proposed to set up conflict-resolution machinery. The US forces’ unfair labor acts, such as dismissing workers for union labor activities, they explained, were not only an overt challenge to the Japanese legal system but also politically unwise, given that it “easily [could give] rise to social repercussions and adversely affect Japan-US relations.” Although US representatives complained about Japan’s too legalistic approach, the Yoshida and succeeding conservative governments could not help but treat labor movements by garrison force workers strictly within the existing legal framework to minimize the risk that left-wing groups would take advantage of the issue. It seems to partly explain why the Japanese government raised the issue of procurement contracts between Japanese companies and the US military at the JC. The reduction in American procurement, due mainly to the Korean armistice, necessitated massive job cuts, the closure of factories, and a decrease in employees’ work hours at some Japanese companies. Fuji Motor Company, for instance, could instantly become a political problem if the socialists moved toward assisting workers who were at risk of unemployment. Financial circles were also not indifferent to the US procurement policy. The existence of these two powerful groups pushed the Japanese government into negotiations with US forces to avoid drastically terminating contracts with Japanese companies.

The records of the Joint Committee show that the Japanese government, with the cooperation of the American side, tried to manage base problems efficiently and to improve the welfare of people whose livelihood mainly depended on military bases, for fear that left-wing organizations and foreign Communist powers might exploit them. Throughout the early 1950s, the JC functioned as trouble-shooting machinery for resolving conflicts related to “facilities and areas.” It may be helpful for a better understanding of this bilateral cooperation to note that the two governments gradually formed a consensus on the military use of bases in Japan through the JC. The FEC
informed the Japanese government about the participation of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team in rotation plans between the United States and overseas commands in March 1955. These plans for the movement of combat teams to and from mainland Japan as well as the reduction in strength of divisions stationed in Japan was orally transmitted to Japanese representatives before such moves.

In spring 1955, the Japanese government agreed to permit foreign national military personnel to enter Japan for training at US facilities. In February 1955, the Japanese government realized that a Republic of Korea navy vessel, escorted by the US Navy, entered the port Yokosuka only after it collided with a Japanese fishing boat. The Japanese government vigorously demanded prior notification of such visits. Seeing that the Diet was making “things rough for the Government,” the American authorities accepted Japanese requests while asking for Tokyo’s assurance not to veto entrance of US allies’ forces into ports or airfields in mainland Japan. Yet the Japanese representatives immediately turned down this request. In the end, the two governments reached an agreement about notification that would be made through JC channels “with the understanding that it is the policy of the Japanese Government to extend every possible cooperation to the US in this respect.” On the one hand, the Japanese government emphasized the need for a notification procedure so that Japan could retain port control as a sovereign country; on the other hand, the government did not contest US use of facilities and areas in Japan for security cooperation among the free countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

CONCLUSION

The framework shaped by the 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty and related agreements contained few legal restrictions on the use of “facilities and areas” by US forces stationed in Japan. Nevertheless, the US military was not automatically provided with land and easements wherever they wished, nor were they allowed in practice to conduct test firing without the consent of nearby residents. The labor law system in Japan had an unanticipated impact on the activities of American forces. Without prior notification, Japanese citizens and the government would not permit foreign vessels to enter Japanese ports, even if they were escorted by the US Navy. These examples demonstrate that it was difficult for US forces to utilize military bases in Japan in the mid-1950s without considering local interests as well as the Japanese government’s sensitivity protecting their national
sovereignty. A series of meetings of the Joint Committee taught the US government and military this fact.

The Japanese government understood its duty under the Security Treaty to grant “facilities and areas” to US forces, and it tried to meet their requests from a strategic viewpoint. However, the Japanese government simultaneously had to pay attention to demands from local communities. If it failed to do so, antibase protests would become massive and out of control, as the example of the “riots at Sunakawa” illustrate, because the leftist, antiwar, and peace movements would merge with the antibase protests of residents and landowners, who simply, but strongly, wanted to protect their land and livelihoods. In general, the Japanese government in the 1950s used the JC as machinery for minimizing the frictions and costs caused by the existence of US troops in the country and for depoliticizing issues by searching for common ground between the US forces and local communities. Moreover, the Japanese government sought to consolidate procedures of prior notification or consultation for certain issues, such as test firing or the entry of foreign naval vessels into Japanese ports. This requirement might limit the combat capability of US forces or regional security cooperation among Western allies, but the US military conceded to Japanese demands as long as Japan maintained a cooperative attitude toward US military activities.

Through the JC meetings the practice of the use of bases by the United States and Japan was established. US forces had to relinquish unilateral action in utilizing “facilities and areas,” while the Japanese government cooperated with US forces in their activities in mainland Japan for peace and security in the Far East. Japanese conservative leaders in the mid-1950s were waiting for their chance to replace the 1951 Security Treaty with a mutual-defense treaty and to achieve the withdrawal of US forces stationed in Japan. Their motivation became a driving force for revision of the 1951 Treaty in 1960; yet the overall framework in which Japan granted facilities and areas to US forces did not change. In understanding the 1960 Security Treaty, one must not overlook the day-to-day consensus building on issues related to “facilities and areas.” This practice provided momentum for the continuation of the bilateral security relationship centered on the US use of military bases in Japan.

NOTES

This article was supported by a 2013–15 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science,
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, number 25780125.


5 Article 1 of the Security Treaty stipulates: “Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.”


7 “Hikoushiki Kaidan Yoroku” [Summary of the unofficial meeting], no. 1 of 10, Heiwa Joyaku no Teiketsu ni Kansuru Chosho [Records related to the conclusion of Treaty of Peace with Japan], ed. MOFA (hereafter cited as RTPJ), vol. 5 (2002), 279–318. Japanese names in this article are written in Japanese style (family name first).

8 RTPJ, vol. 5, 139–40.


27 Yoshida Naikaku, 669–74.
31 Hideki Uemura, Saigunbi to 55 Nen Taisei [The rearmament of Japan and the 1955 political system] (Bokutaku-sha, 1995); Akihiko Tanaka, Anzen Hosho: Sengo 50 Nen no Mosaku [Japan’s search for security in the postwar period] (Yomiuri Shinbun-Sha, 1997), chaps. 3 and 4.
35 Hull to Yoshida, September 20, 1954, A’-0134.
37 Hull to Yoshida, September 20, 1954, A’-0134.
38 Hull to Yoshida. September 21, 1954, A’-0134.

Hull to Yoshida, September 21, 1954, A’-0134.


See, e.g., Foreign Minister Okazaki to Ambassador Araki, “Gaishi Donyu, Nansei Shoto Mondai ni Kanshu Dulles Chokan he Moshiire Kunrei no Ken” [Request to Secretary Dulles with regard to capital import and the Nansei Islands], April 9, 1953, A’-0134.

Deputy Ambassador Takeuchi to Okazaki, “Judd Kain Giin Naiwa ni Kansuru Ken” [Conversation with Congressman Judd], February 9, 1954, A’-0134.


Ibid.

“Progress Report of Joint Committee Meeting,” April 8, 1955, CD, box 2574. Also see, e.g., Records of the Lower House Plenary Session, March 31, 1955, no. 10.

”Progress Report of Joint Committee Meeting,” April 8, 1955, CD, box 2574.


”Progress Report of Joint Committee Meeting,” January 3, 1956, CD, box 2577.
"Minutes of the 126th Meeting,” December 1, 1955, CD, box 2577.

"Progress Report of Joint Committee Meeting,” January 9, 1956, CD, box 2577.

"DFAA, 24–25.


"Progress Report of Joint Committee Meeting,” June 14, 1955, CD, box 2575.

"Minutes of the 116th Meeting,” June 16, 1955, CD, box 2575.


Sunakawa-cho, Sunakawa no Rekishi, 139–41; Masao Miyaoka, Sunakawa Toso no Kiroku [Records of the Sunakawa protest movement] (Sanichi Shobo, 1970), 45–95.


Sunakawa-cho, Sunakawa no Rekishi, 139–41; Miyaoka, Sunakawa Toso no Kiroku, 45–95; Aketagawa, “1955 Nen no Kichi Mondai,” 81–85.

Parsons to Robertson, “Extension of Tachikawa Air Base and Resulting Riots at Sunakawa,” October 16, 1956, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Miscellaneous Subject Files, box 1, RG 59, NARA.

Dulles to Allison, May 24, 1955, CD, box 2574.

"Reports on 134th Joint Committee Meeting and Suggested Change in Reporting Procedures,” May 16, 1956, CD, box 2576.

Allison to Dulles, no. 396, August 11, 1955, CD, box 2575.

"Progress Report of Joint Committee Meeting,” June 14, 1955 and July 6, 1955, CD, box 2575.

“Minutes of the 110th Meeting, March 10, 1955,” CD, box 2574.


“Reports on 130th Meeting of the US-Japan Joint Committee,” February 27, 1956; Parks to the Joint Committee, “Procedure for Entry into Japan of Korean Military Aircraft, Vessels and Military Personnel,” February 1, 1956, both in CD, box 2576.