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The Yoshida Doctrine as a Myth

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INTRODUCTION

During the Allied occupation of Japan after World War II, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida developed a set of postwar foreign and security policies that came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine. Masataka Kosaka has defined the doctrine as follows: (1) Japan ensures its national security through an alliance with the United States; (2) Japan maintains a low capacity for self-defense; and (3) Japan spends resources conserved by the first and second policies on economic activities to develop the country as a trading nation.¹ The term “Yoshida Doctrine” was coined in 1977 by Masashi Nishihara, a prominent expert, as a way to define a consistent, pragmatic strategy in postwar Japan.² It became a fixture among Japanese scholars in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when US hegemony was gradually declining and Japan was becoming an economic giant.³ This interpretation of the postwar era appropriately validated an emerging self-confidence about Japan’s role in the world. This article addresses a following research question: What were the terms and conditions for Japan, a vanquished, weak country, to be able to establish the Yoshida Doctrine? This article verifies my hypothesis that it was possible for Japan to do so

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because the United States acquiesced to it.

Many scholars have since analyzed the significance of the Yoshida Doctrine, and, roughly speaking, their interpretations fall into two categories: those that criticize Yoshida’s naïve judgements, secrecy, and inappropriate policies; and those that praise Yoshida’s foresight, strategic thinking, and pragmatic approach. The latter interpretation is the more widely accepted, along with the assumption that Yoshida, or for that matter Japan, was powerful enough to resist consistent and strong pressure from the United States for rearmament and instead was able to implement (wisely) an economy-first policy favorable to Japan.

Yet how could it have been possible for Japan, a vanquished, weak country after World War II, to implement such an important independent policy if it went against the wishes of the United States, a hegemonic power at that time? In short, Japan could not and did not, and the policy was not. The doctrine was possible only because it satisfied the interests of the United States—or at least because the United States acquiesced to it. Thus this article focuses on American perceptions and policies that established the framework within which Yoshida and other Japanese policymakers tried their best, in a rational and strategic manner, to advance Japan’s national interests. Ultimately, the Yoshida Doctrine proves to be not only of historical interest but also still relevant to the understanding of Japan’s current foreign and security policies.

I. REARMAMENT

As early as 1946, the Joint Staff Planners, a principal planning agency serving the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), began considering Japan’s rearmament in preparation for a presumed Soviet attack against Japan. Within General Headquarters in Japan, Gen. Charles Willoughby, Chief of Intelligence Division, and Lt. Gen. Robert Eichelberger, Eighth Army commander, were earnest advocates of Japanese rearmament. In March 1948, when Washington considered starting peace treaty negotiations with Japan, Under Secretary of the Army William Draper stated that the War Department was generally in favor of Japanese rearmament. In response to an inquiry by the secretary of defense, the JCS stated: “Solely from the military viewpoint, the establishment of Japanese armed forces is desirable” to offset “our own limited manpower.”

Yet there were those who had reservations about Japanese rearmament. George Kennan, director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department,
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asserted that Washington should neither proceed with the peace treaty nor allow Japanese rearmament. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), vehemently opposed the idea of Japanese rearmament as running counter to US international commitments and Occupation objectives. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall supported Japanese rearmament in principle, considering the critical shortage of manpower in the US military; however, Japan’s depressed economy at the time precluded pursuing this idea.

Without consensus among Washington officials, NSC13/2, an important document prepared by the National Security Council, represented a turning point in US thoughts about the Allied occupation of Japan. It supported strengthening the Japanese police force without making any definite commitment in US policy on the matter of Japanese rearmament, and it was approved by President Harry S. Truman on 9 October 1948. NSC13/2 checked the desires of the JCS to promote Japanese rearmament. Even limited Japanese rearmament was deemed inadvisable because it would require amending the new Japanese constitution, abrogate the Potsdam Declaration, and adversely affect Japanese economic recovery. Thus, the JCS had to be content with merely planning for future limited rearmament in Japan while still insisting that “the terms of NSC 13/2 should now be reviewed.”

NSC13/3, a revision of NSC13/2, was adopted on 6 May 1949, but no amendment was made under the subtitle, “The Post-Treaty Arrangements.” Taking NSC13/3 into consideration, the JCS claimed, “from the military point of view, that a peace treaty would, at the present time, be premature.” However, according to the JCS, “plans . . . for limited Japanese armed forces for self-defense to be effectuated in war emergency” should be included in peace negotiations. Agreeing with the JCS, the Defense Department advocated Japanese rearmament as being “consistent with the overall strategy of the United States of concentrating its power in Europe and maintaining minimum strength in the Far East.”

Nevertheless, the Central Intelligence Agency emphasized that, no matter how important Japanese rearmament might be for the US military establishment, it could have unpredictable consequences. “There would be no assurance that those forces would be used in opposition to Communism, if there were compelling economic reasons for an accommodation with the Communist world,” one memo cautioned. Aside from the trust issues, the Central Intelligence Agency was also worried about negative reactions to Japanese rearmament from Japan’s former enemies.
special adviser to the secretary of state, was likewise distrustful and asserted that “a decision to rearm Japan should not be made without more adequate assurances than are now present that Japan will continue to be friendly, or at least not hostile, toward the United States.”

Harboring similar suspicions, the JCS pursued a limited Japanese rearmament that would be easy to control.

In November 1949, the Defense Department recommended postponing the decision about Japanese rearmament, given that Washington officials could not yet reach a consensus. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made it clear that “the rearming of Japan for self-defense is not under present circumstances an acceptable alternative.”

Even Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the JCS, grudgingly agreed that Japan should have its armed forces in the future but that “at the present it was not feasible to permit Japan to rearm.” In April 1950, William Sebald, political adviser to SCAP, concluded that Japanese rearmament “in the immediate post treaty period must be rejected.”

II. Impacts of the Korean War on Japanese Rearmament

The outbreak of the Korean War seemed to decide the controversy in favor of rearmament. In July 1950, SCAP issued a directive to the Japanese government to establish a Police Reserve Force totaling 75,000 men and increasing the number of the Maritime Safety Force by 8,500 men. SCAP claimed that the Police Reserve Force was separate and distinct from the regular police. Gen. Willoughby even devised a plan to organize the Police Reserve Force into four armed divisions. Changing his opinion, Sebald acknowledged in September that “Japan must be partially rearmed” to defend against a possible Communist attack. Facing a “new situation radically different from that envisaged in the Potsdam Proclamation,” the Policy Planning Staff also expressed its support for Japanese rearmament.

US officials were not, however, monolithic in their opinions of how much pressure they should apply to Japan for rearmament. Even after the outbreak of the Korean War, John Foster Dulles, special consultant to the secretary of state, said that former victims of Japanese aggression as well as the Japanese themselves would oppose the plan to rearm Japan. General MacArthur argued that the Allied Powers should be more concerned about the threat from a remilitarized Japan than a threat of attack against Japan.

Searching for a compromise between these two opinions, a working group in the Department of Defense circulated a draft peace treaty that...
would allow Japan to possess its own armed forces, stipulating that “such prohibitions against the rearmament of Japan” during the Allied occupation “shall cease to be operative.” The draft nonetheless paid careful attention to the anxieties of those who remained distrustful, specifying that “no land, sea, or air forces will be established by the Japanese government . . . except with the advice and consent of the United States government.” Moreover, to prevent the Japanese armed forces from becoming independent, “all armed forces in Japan . . . shall be placed under the unified command of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States government.”

The secretary of defense gave the JCS memorandum to the secretary of state, insisting that Washington should face “the necessity of a Japan eventually adequately rearmed for effective self-defense.” The State Department concurred. In the end, on 7 September 1950, the secretaries of state and defense agreed on the following security matters and wrote a joint memorandum for the president, stipulating that the peace treaty “must not contain any prohibition, direct or implicit, now or in the future, of Japan’s inalienable right to self-defense in case of external attack, and to possess the means to exercise that right.” In other words, the Departments of State and Defense agreed not to impose on Japan any restrictions on rearmament.

In January 1951, President Truman decided to start a peace settlement negotiation and sent John Foster Dulles to Japan. Dulles regarded his real purpose as discovering “how dependable a commitment could be obtained from the Japanese Government to align itself with the nations of the free world against Communist imperialism.” Considering the strong demand from the military, Truman and Dulles anticipated obtaining even a nominal rearmament commitment from Japan. Contrary to Dulles’s expectation, however, Jiro Shirasu, aide to Prime Minister Yoshida, indicated that instead of rearmament, the United States “should utilize Japanese industrial capacity to the full in the coming period of shortages to help supply the needs of the free world. There can be no more effective way of firmly binding Japan to the free world.” Because the Japanese economy greatly benefited from US special offshore procurement after the outbreak of the Korean War, Shirasu sought to use Japan’s economic productivity for the security of the Western bloc as Japan’s ideal “military” contribution to the West.

On 29 January 1951, Yoshida and Dulles had their official meeting. Dulles solicited Yoshida’s view on Japan’s rearmament. His purpose was to confirm Japan’s willingness to commit itself to the free world. Dulles states, “No one would expect the Japanese contribution at present to be large but it was felt that Japan should be willing to make at least a token contribution
and a commitment to a general cause of collective security” (emphasis added). Yoshida responded in a vague manner without specifying what kind of contribution Japan would make. The US delegates repeatedly requested that Japan contribute to the defense of the free world, not only by the use of its police forces and industrial power, but also to a certain extent with its ground forces. They understood that Japan could only increase its forces gradually but wanted to know the rough size of the first stage. When the US delegates offered assurances that they would provide enough assistance, both fiscally and materially, to build up Japanese ground forces, their Japanese counterparts asked to know the amount they would receive. Thus the Japanese government accepted, in principle, the US proposal to establish ground forces and tried to secure the best possible deal. The focus of the negotiation was not on whether Japan would implement a rearmament program but rather on the terms and conditions of Japan’s rearmament. Finally, on 3 February 1951, Tokyo submitted its “Initial Steps for a Rearmament Program,” which stipulated that the “security forces, land and sea, totaling 50,000, will be created apart from the existing police forces and the National Police Reserve.”

Because Japanese rearmament was deemed necessary in the post-treaty era, Dulles compelled Yoshida to make a concrete commitment to rearmament so as to obtain approval from the military. Dulles was satisfied with Yoshida’s somewhat nominal commitment, keeping in mind the US strong reservations about Japanese rearmament. For the United States, acquiring base rights would be more secure, more practical, and more useful than forcing Japan to implement rapid rearmament.

III. US Base Rights and Armed Forces

Because President Truman argued that the United States should play a leading role throughout the Pacific in times of war and peace, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes asked Truman in February 1946 whether the United States would withdraw all armed forces or maintain them for an indefinite period after a peace conference. In August 1947, the Navy Department demanded “base rights at Yokosuka and necessary air fields to provide protection for the base.” General MacArthur, however, opposed the idea as being “imperialistic in concept, in purpose, and in form.” He argued that given adequate US forces at Okinawa, the United States would not require military bases in mainland Japan. With this split in opinion over US base rights, NSC13/2 made no concrete mention of US base rights or
stationing its armed forces in the post-treaty era.\(^{46}\)

The JCS could not concur with MacArthur and insisted that Okinawa was not suitable for a naval base, arguing that Yokosuka should continue to be used as a base.\(^{47}\) A peace treaty seemed premature. The JCS justified its attitude by claiming that it would be necessary first to obtain “assurance of Japan’s economic, psychological, and political stability, and of her democracy and western orientation.”\(^{48}\) Disagreeing with the JCS assessment, the State Department asserted that the early conclusion of a peace treaty would preserve Japan’s current democracy and Western orientation.\(^{49}\) Two critical issues emerged: how to find a compromise between these two agencies and, likewise, how to forge some consensus between MacArthur and Washington.

In December 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson about the essential security requirements. Based on the JCS demand, Johnson replied that the United States should be the only power to have military forces and base rights in any part of the Japanese islands. He did not include Japan’s rearmament in the essential military requirements.\(^{50}\) Concurring with the JCS, Acheson explained the US stance to the British ambassador: “It would be essential that there be retained United States forces in Japan.”\(^{51}\) The Joint Strategic Survey Committee of JCS agreed with the State Department and argued that as long as US forces remained in Japan, “the prohibition against rearmament in the Japanese Constitution may remain in effect.”\(^{52}\) Maintaining US armed forces in Japan after the Occupation offered a way to bridge the gap between the State Department and the military. In February 1950, John Howard of the State Department reported that “the minimum security requirements . . . [included] US bases and forces on Japan itself;” while the maximum demands would be “the rearmament of Japan and the reactivation of Japanese armed forces.”\(^{53}\)

General MacArthur found himself at odds with Washington. He was at first completely opposed to the maintenance of US military bases in Japan during the post-Occupation period, but he gradually learned to compromise. He suggested that US forces of 30,000 to 35,000 men should be stationed in Japan for five years to prevent Soviet aggression.\(^{54}\) In April 1950, MacArthur explained to Sebald that “95% of the Japanese people are opposed to American bases in Japan and that unless a wholehearted request for American troops and bases is made by the Japanese, the entire proposition should be abandoned.”\(^{55}\) Thus, it would be ideal for the United States if Japan made a voluntary request for the retention of US bases in Japan in the
post-treaty era. This is exactly what Prime Minister Yoshida provided.

In spring 1950, Yoshida sent Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda to the United States. On 2 May 1950, in his talks with Joseph Dodge, financial adviser to the SCAP and fiscal adviser to the under secretary of the Army, Ikeda conveyed Prime Minister Yoshida’s secret message to the effect that the Japanese government “desires the earliest possible treaty. As such a treaty probably would require the maintenance of US forces to secure the treaty terms and for other purposes, if the US Government hesitates to make these conditions, the Japanese Government will try to find a way to offer them.” High-ranking officials, including Acheson, Butterworth, Dulles, and MacArthur, read the summary of the conversation. Butterworth wrote on the copy that “the conversation is regarded as significant because it is the first expression we have had at an official level of the attitude of the Japanese Government on the peace treaty and related questions.” This voluntary offer seemed to give Washington what it wanted. But Yoshida was clever enough to confuse Washington officials and keep them guessing about his real intentions. Shirasu, who accompanied Ikeda to Washington, explained the difficulty in accepting the retention of US forces and bases as a sovereign nation. Talking with Shirasu, Butterworth perceived that there was “growing popular opposition in Japan to the retention of post-treaty US bases.”

While Washington officials were left to wonder about Japan’s own aims, they tried to convince MacArthur to agree with them about the base issue. In June 1950, Secretary of Defense Johnson visited Japan with General Bradley to assess Japanese conditions and exchange opinions with General MacArthur. On 23 June 1950, before the outbreak of the Korean War, MacArthur made a drastic proposal: “The entire area of Japan must be regarded as a potential base for defensive maneuver with unrestricted freedom reserved to the United States.” He changed his opinion probably because of his keen sense that, without an appropriate security arrangement, Washington would not terminate the Occupation in the foreseeable future.

IV. IMPACTS OF THE KOREAN WAR ON BASE RIGHTS AND ARMED FORCES

"I am against leasing military bases to any foreign country,” Yoshida claimed in July 1950 at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors. “Allied powers do not intend to present such a demand, as it is the desire of the Allied powers to keep Japan out of war,” he asserted. His
goal in the moment and for that audience was to increase his bargaining power in dealing with the United States, to contain anti-US forces in Japan, and to demonstrate Japan’s pacifist posture to neighboring countries. When Sebald asked Ichiro Ohta, vice minister of foreign affairs, to reveal Yoshida’s real intentions, Ohta replied that no Japanese politician could say in public that he would grant the base rights to foreign countries after the Occupation. Privately, however, Yoshida informed Sir Alvary Gascoigne, the head of the British Liaison Mission in Japan, that he intended to permit US troops to be stationed in Japan for its security after the Occupation.

Regardless of Yoshida’s shrewd tactics, MacArthur’s volte-face led Dulles to draft a proposal to be discussed with Tokyo. Then, Dulles telephoned Johnson and said that the proposal “gave the United States the right to maintain in Japan as much force as we wanted, anywhere we wanted, for as long as we wanted, and I did not see very well how the Defense Establishment could want more than that.” Johnson, delighted by the proposal, told Dulles that the two of them could “get together and go places.” Now there emerged a solid triad among MacArthur, Dulles, and the military. The secretaries of state and defense jointly sent a memorandum to President Truman insisting that the United States “should now proceed with preliminary negotiations for a Japanese Peace Treaty.” They argued that the peace treaty “must not contain any prohibition, direct or indirect, now or in the future, of Japan’s inalienable right to self-defense.” They also demanded that the treaty “must give the United States the right to maintain armed forces in Japan, wherever, for so long, and to such extent as it deems necessary.” This memorandum demonstrated the essence of their consensus: acquiring bases in Japan proved to be more imperative than Japanese rearmament. The agreement between the Departments of State and Defense culminated in NSC60/1, which was approved by Truman on 8 September 1950.

In January 1951, President Truman sent Dulles to Japan to start a peace settlement negotiation with Japan. A series of formal negotiations between Dulles and Yoshida began on 29 January 1951. On 1 February, the Japanese government submitted its “Formula concerning Japanese-American Cooperation for Their Mutual Security” to the US delegates, clearly stating, “Japan will agree to the stationing of United States forces within the Japanese territory.” Japan also assured free movement of US armed forces anywhere in Japan.
Demilitarization and democratization proceeded smoothly in occupied Japan, but economic recovery was indispensable to solidify these earlier achievements. The National Advisory Council on International Monetary Affairs, a council to coordinate the policymaking of US government agencies involved in foreign lending, foreign exchange, or foreign monetary policy, argued that economic stabilization would be a prerequisite for the effective use of US aid to Japan. NSC13/2, which was a crucial document emphasizing economic revival as a major occupation objective, stipulated that “second only to US security interests, economic recovery should be made the primary objective of United States policy in Japan for the coming period.” President Truman sent Joseph M. Dodge, president of the Detroit Bank, to Japan in February 1949 to achieve this objective with the following message: “Recovery rather than relief must be our aim.”

Dodge requested the Japanese government to implement Japan’s economic recovery based on a rigid balance between the consolidated budget, which included those of the general, special, other government-related institutions, and local governments. Inflation spiraled downward almost immediately after the so-called Dodge Line was cast. The Dodge Line not only brought stability to the Japanese economy but also laid the groundwork to support the rise of the financial community by establishing a close linkage among Dodge, Ikeda, and Hisato Ichimada, governor of the Bank of Japan. Their common objective was to establish and maintain the balanced budget by implementing a tight-money policy. Ikeda was determined to execute the Dodge Line in earnest because he was convinced that the Japanese economy “was a green-house economy and there was a need to break some of the windows in it.” Delighted with the Dodge Line, Ichimada explained that “the grand policy for Japanese economic rehabilitation which you so clearly put into effect was a policy which I had always earnestly desired to put into practice myself but had not succeeded in doing so due to my lack of power.”

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 generated an economic boom, which increased imports far more than exports. Although Japan was faced with a large trade deficit throughout the 1950s, it was financed by special offshore procurements amounting to about $500 million annually until 1961. In September 1951, Ichiro Ishikawa, president of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), publicly announced that Japan
should develop a domestic military industry. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry actively promoted a program to increase exports and develop technology by soliciting US subsidies for the development of a munitions industry. In March 1952, the United States allowed Japan to resume weapons production. Two months later, the US military began placing orders for finished weapons, stimulating the resumption of weapons production in Japan in earnest. In August 1952, Keidanren established the Defense Production Committee to analyze how to improve Japanese defense capabilities. From the outset, the committee assumed the creation of thirty military divisions in six years.

In contrast, the financial community, led by the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Japan, opposed the militarization of the Japanese economy because it would take much scarce capital that might otherwise be used for more productive purposes. The financial community remained powerful enough to maintain the balanced-budget policy with consistent strong support from Dodge and Yoshida, which in turn checked Japan’s rapid remilitarization. Indeed, Japan was leaning in the direction of large-scale rearmament and dependence on a defense industry between 1951 and 1953, but the consistent conviction of preserving the tight-money, balanced-budget policies shattered the possibility of this militarized course. The Dodge Line channeled the development of the Japanese economy along a path charted by the financial community. This specific type of economic development set the conditions to allow Japan to implement its restrained rearmament.

VI. IMPLICATIONS: REARMAMENT, BASE RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY

The US decision to strengthen Japan in the Cold War power struggle narrowed the range of policy options toward Japan: It was imperative for Washington to ensure that Tokyo would not join the Communist bloc and to implement Japan’s economic recovery to assure its orientation toward the United States.

Both Sebald and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Dean Rusk argued that it would be important to convince Japan to make a voluntary commitment to the Western bloc. Gen. Matthew Bunker Ridgway, MacArthur’s successor, also agreed that it was of “vital importance to retain Japan on side of free world.” For this purpose, rearmament was a stumbling block. Many Japanese supported US policies toward Japan, but according to the Psychological Strategy Board, “the situation may radically
change . . . if a serious effort to rearm Japan is undertaken.”83 The American Embassy also warned that opposition to rearmament in Japan was “found throughout wide segments of the Japanese population.”84

As for US base rights, the Japan-US Security Treaty was overwhelmingly favorable to the United States because “all of the basic decisions were left” in US hands.85 As Secretary of State Acheson informed the British ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, this security treaty was “dual in purpose: security against renewed Japanese aggression and security for Japan against Soviet-Communist aggression.”86 Given these two objectives, acquiring base rights was far more important for the United States than Japanese rearmament.

The retention of bases in Japan, however, had forged a double-edged sword for the United States. Freeman Matthews, deputy under secretary of state, emphasized the importance of Japan’s role as a successful model of democracy for other Asian countries; Japan’s spontaneous ties with the United States and voluntary acceptance of stationing US troops would greatly increase “United States prestige and influence throughout Asia.”87 Yet it would be disastrous if the United States forced Japan to accept US bases and armed forces against the wishes of the Japanese people.88

Because the rearmament and base issues might stimulate nationalist sentiments among the Japanese people and stir resentments among people in other Asian countries as evidence of American imperialism, the United States had to be prudent to prevent these issues from becoming part of a heated debate in Japan. Each issue had its supporters and detractors, and debate about one could immediately create repercussions for the other. Consequently, in trying to maintain a low profile, the United States could not compel Japan to carry out large-scale rearmament but had to acquiesce to a constrained rearmament if it was to preserve the image of a benevolent Washington stationing US troops in Japan at Japan’s own request. In February 1952, Acting Secretary of State James Webb and Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett advised President Truman that Japan was strategically important in securing positive US relations with other Asian countries. “Every effort should be made to prevent the security mission, the presence of United States forces in Japan, and the security arrangements with Japan from becoming a domestic political issue in Japan.”89 President Truman approved this memorandum on 20 February.90

As for the economic recovery, because Japan was a former enemy, the United States had to stimulate Japan’s self-interest to side with the West. The Office of Intelligence Research of the State Department concluded that
the United States would need to provide two conditions to retain Japan on its side: maintenance of Japan’s security and assurance of its economic prosperity. Otherwise, Japan might seek a policy of accommodation leading to a position of neutrality. This way of thinking is similar to, if not identical with, the philosophy of the Yoshida Doctrine.

Despite Japanese docility and cooperative attitude during the Occupation, the American Embassy realized that the Japanese people “have developed certain critical and hostile attitudes toward the United States.” The embassy worried about the rise of “a strong neutralist sentiment” among the Japanese. In May 1952, various intelligence organizations, along with the Central Intelligence Agency, predicted that Japan’s “pro-Western orientation [will last] at least during the next two or three years.” Economic prosperity, however, would be essential to maintain this orientation. “Whether this alignment continues and becomes permanent,” an NSC staff study asserted, “is the basic problem to which United States policy must be directed.”

In August 1954, regarding Japan as a realist country, the American Embassy sent the secretary of state a critical analysis of Japan: “Japan does not consider itself an ally or partner of the United States but rather a nation which for the time being is forced by circumstances to cooperate with the United States but which intends while doing so, to wring out of this relationship every possible advantage at the minimum cost.” The embassy pointed to a particular Japanese value system: “We should remember that Japanese have no abstract sense of right or wrong—their guide to conduct is situational and specific rather than general and ideal.” Guided by such pragmatics, Japan was able to make a rational, realist choice: “Japan has no basic convictions for or against the free world or communism. The attitude toward either at any particular time depends upon specific situations and upon whether in the eyes of Japanese leaders cooperation with the one or the other will advance Japanese interests.” Out of this analysis, the American Embassy recommended that the “Japanese must be convinced that ours is winning side.”

The strong and persistent American distrust of Japan, its underestimation of Japan’s power, and its overestimation of Communist power all combined to lead the United States along a course whereby the United States preferred its base rights and stationing its armed forces in Japan to Japanese rearmament and, consistently with this approach, entertained fears about deterioration of Japanese economic performance.

Under these circumstances, the Japanese government’s primary task was to find the very minimum defense contribution that would not jeopardize its
alliance with the United States. Tokyo endeavored to acquire security without wasting scarce resources on defense. Japanese officials were excellent at exploiting the hegemon’s Achilles’ heel: they used US security anxiety about Japan as a bargaining chip to entice greater US engagement in Japan’s economic recovery. As a weak ally in an unstable area surrounded by two giant Communist countries, Japan found its weakness to be its best asset for dealing with the United States. Indeed, Japan implemented realist pragmatic policies and carried out interactions with the United States accompanied by concessions and shrewd bargaining, but it did so only within the arena set and approved of, or at least acquiesced to, by the United States.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

My main research question is: What were the terms and conditions for Japan, a vanquished, weak country, to be able to establish the Yoshida Doctrine? This article verifies my hypothesis that it was possible for Japan to do so because the United States acquiesced to it.

The United States was successful in acquiring a firm commitment from the Japanese to rearm. But the decision to rearm Japan narrowed the range of policy options: Washington had to make sure that Tokyo would not join the Communist bloc. Strong and persistent American distrust of Japanese intentions made the United States seek two forms of insurance against any trouble with Japan: acquiring the base rights to prevent Japan from becoming an independent military power and implementing Japanese economic recovery to assure Japan’s orientation toward the capitalist Western bloc.

At the same time, the United States had to hedge against the possible consequences of these two policies. The rearmament and base issues could stimulate nationalist sentiments among the Japanese people and might stir resentment among people in other Asian countries as evidence of American imperialism. Thus Washington sought to maintain a low profile without compelling Tokyo to implement rapid, large-scale rearmament but instead agreeing to a constrained rearmament. Rampant inflation was stabilized by the Dodge Line, and Japanese economic growth was developed along a path charted by the Japanese financial community. This specific type of economic development allowed Japan to maintain its restrained rearmament. Moreover, US underestimation of Japan’s power and its overestimation of the Communist threat stoked fears about allowing the Japanese economy to falter at all. So intense were these concerns that Washington had to preserve
a delicate balance between pushing Japan to spend more money on building up the Japanese armed forces and putting more emphasis on Japanese economic growth.

Tokyo, taking advantage of US anxiety about Japan, set its own goals. Japan would ensure its security without wasting scarce resources on defense and without undermining the US-Japan alliance. Japan exploited the hegemon’s Achilles heel to draw an ever greater commitment from the United States to maintain Japan’s security and economic recovery. As a feeble ally in an unstable area surrounded by two giant Communist countries, Japan transformed its weakness into an asset in dealing with the United States. Indeed, Japan deftly deployed power politics and shrewd bargaining in its relationship with the United States, even if only within the bounds established and approved of by the occupying power—this was the essence of the Yoshida Doctrine.

NOTES

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16 NSC13/3, 6 May 1949, ibid., 731.
17 Report by the JCS, 9 June 1949, ibid., 776.
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21 Ibid.
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61 Memorandum by Green to Allison, 2 August 1950, FRUS, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. 6, 1262–63.
62 The Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State, 9 August 1950, ibid., 1270–71.
64 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Dulles, 3 August 1950, FRUS, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. 6, 1264–65.
65 Memorandum for the President, 7 September 1950, ibid., 1293–94.
68 The NAC consisted of representatives from the State, Army, Commerce, and Treasury Departments, as well as from the Federal Reserve Board. The NAC had the authority to examine and approve all foreign aid budget requests after the implementation of the Marshall Plan.
71 Joseph Dodge, Summary of meeting with Finance Minister Ikeda, 4 March 1949, JDP.
72 Ichimada to Dodge, 5 October 1949, JDP.
77 Kanzo Ohtake, “Boei Seisan Iinkai no Jittai” [Substance of the Defense Production Committee], Keizai Shincho 18 (4) (May 1953), 25; Keizai Dantai Rengokai, Ishikawa


81 Allison to Matthews, 16 November 1951, IAJ, 1950–1954, reel no. 16.

82 Ridgway to Bradley, C-65938, 22 January 1952, CJCS-092.2 Japanese Peace Treaty, RG 218, National Archives, Washington, DC.

83 7 February 1952, Psychological Strategy Board Files, PHST.


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88 NSC 125, 21 February 1952, PHST.

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92 American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 4 April 1952, USPR, 1950–1954, reel no. 2.

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