Transnational Labor Activism against Migrant Labor: The Post–World War II U.S.-Mexican Labor Alliance for Border Control

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INTRODUCTION

The United States and Mexico are gradually becoming an economically unified region, with labor unions in both countries struggling to establish alliances across the border, especially around the issue of migration. Such efforts are not a new phenomenon. For example, the extension of the Bracero Program of contract farmworkers from Mexico after World War II, along with an influx of unauthorized immigrants, prompted the American Federation of Labor to organize domestic farm labor, which led to the establishment of the National Farm Labor Union in 1946. The NFLU criticized the Bracero Program and called for stricter border control and penalties for employers of “illegal” migrants. These were Mexican nationals who were working in the United States without having gone through the formal procedures established by the binational Bracero Program or the migration laws of the United States and/or Mexico. Although this seems to be a typically exclusionist and restrictionist position that is often held by U.S. labor, interestingly the NFLU sought an alliance with the Mexican government and Mexican labor unions to achieve its goals. From the late 1940s until the 1950s,

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the NFLU/AFL (AFL-CIO after 1955) and Mexican unions formed an alliance to curb undocumented Mexican migration while seeking to establish effective protection for both Mexican and U.S. workers. What made such an alliance possible? How did the transnational cooperation between Mexican and U.S. unions relate to the migration and border control policies of both countries?

Drawing on diplomatic records from Mexico and the United States, as well as archival sources relating to labor history, I examine the formation of transnational labor cooperation during this period and its political context. I suggest that the government of a receiving country is not the sole actor in defining who “illegal” migrants are, since Mexican and U.S. labor unions, actors other than the U.S. government, saw undocumented or “illegal” migration as a problem.

There are only a limited number of studies on the activities of the NFLU and/or binational cooperation between U.S. and Mexican labor unions in the post–World War II period. For example, a 2004 article by Gigi Peterson on the alliance between U.S. unions and Mexican leftist unions examines binational labor cooperation during the war and promotion of the Good Neighbor Policy, along with efforts to curb racism toward Mexican Americans and Mexicans in the United States, but she barely discusses postwar activities. Zaragoza Vargas focuses on organizing drives aimed at Mexican and Mexican American workers by leftist labor during the 1930s and 1940s and points out that in the late 1930s the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM, Confederation of Mexican Workers) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) cooperated to organize Mexican workers in the United States. Although these studies offer a good analysis of the transnational character of the leftist labor groups during the 1930s to 1940s, they do not direct sufficient attention to the more conservative AFL-affiliated unions such as the NFLU.

As for studies of the NFLU’s international activities, Ernesto Galarza, a Mexican American labor leader who was deeply involved in the NFLU from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, offers detailed accounts of the union’s organizing efforts, but he gives only a passing reference to the cooperation with Mexican labor. Harvey A. Levenstein and Juan Gómez-Quiñones focus mainly on the U.S. unions’ initiatives and argue that the AFL and CIO called on Mexican unions for aid because they failed to secure enough support within the United States to launch an effective campaign against undocumented immigration.
makes a similar argument but situates the NFLU’s activities in a history of immigration restriction and control in the United States. She shows how labor unions, including the NFLU, shaped their opposition to the immigration of Mexican workers into the United States in line with their understandings of and commitments to nation-state boundaries.

These studies, however, have some limitations. Except for Ngai’s work, they do not sufficiently describe relations between the immigration policies of both countries’ governments and the policies maintained by both countries’ unions.

In the first and second sections of this article I examine the impact of the Bracero Program on U.S. and Mexican unions and their reactions to the program, centering on the birth and growth of the NFLU. In the third section, the main topic is the development of postwar U.S.-Mexican labor cooperation on migration issues, especially the issue of undocumented migration. Finally, I focus on obstacles to the transnational labor alliance that U.S. and Mexican unions faced in the 1950s, and then offer an explanation for the demise of this alliance.

I. THE WARTIME BRACERO PROGRAM AND LABOR UNIONS

According to the U.S.-Mexican labor agreement that went into effect on August 4, 1942, braceros were to be recruited in Mexico for work in the United States for the duration of the harvest season and returned to Mexico after the completion of the harvest. Both the Mexican and U.S. governments assumed responsibility for the recruitment and transportation of braceros. The U.S. government covered the transportation and living expenses under the wartime agreement. The agreement also provided many benefits to the Mexican workers, such as minimum wage and subsistence payments during unemployment, while U.S. agricultural workers were not covered by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and a minimum wage was not guaranteed. Still, agricultural labor advocates in the United States were not opposed to the contract labor program during the war since they regarded the benefits braceros received served as a model for similar guarantees they sought for domestic workers. In fact, organized labor called for an extension of the NLRA to agricultural workers after World War II, citing the bracero guarantees as its precedent.

Another possible reason for U.S. labor’s support for the Bracero Program may have been the general wartime cooperation between U.S and
Mexican unions. During the war, the U.S. government became interested in promoting Pan-American labor unity. Supported by the Office of Inter-American Affairs, the AFL and the CIO were engaged in promoting interchanges of labor delegations between the United States and Mexico to gain Mexican labor’s support for a pro-U.S. labor alliance in Latin America. Since cooperation with Mexican labor was a major concern for the AFL and the CIO during the war, they supported the program as long as it was supported by Mexican unions and the governments of both countries. In Mexico, too, political and labor leaders were generally supportive of the program. Blatant racism that was directed against Mexican and Mexican American residents in Texas offended some Mexican union leaders, who argued against sending Mexican workers to the United States. Nevertheless, opposition to the program per se remained relatively low-key, in part because of the Mexican government’s support for the program.

After World War II, the situation changed drastically. As an extension of the program began to be discussed, agricultural workers in the United States expressed concern that the Bracero Program threatened them. Moreover, a large number of undocumented immigrants from Mexico—derogatorily called “wetbacks”—had begun to directly compete with domestic farmworkers. These conditions prompted a new attempt to organize U.S. farm labor.

II. BRACEROS, “WETBACKS,” AND FARM LABOR UNIONIZATION

Between December 1945 and July 1946, Congress twice authorized temporary extensions of the Bracero Program. These extensions were originally proposed by the Department of Agriculture to enable braceros to work in the United States following the expiration of their contracts, since it would take time to complete repatriation due to the limited availability of transportation. The majority of policymakers in the United States supported extension of the wartime program. Some called for a permanent farm labor supply program, while many farmers and elected officials from the border region claimed that there was too much bureaucracy involved in the program and began a campaign for freer movement of Mexican workers.

Among Mexican officials, there were several different attitudes toward the Bracero Program. The Ministry of Labor and Social Provisions criticized the emigration of Mexicans into the United States on the
grounds that braceros were subject to poor working conditions there and received insufficient wages.\textsuperscript{17} However, President Manuel Ávila Camacho decided to continue the program in consideration of maintaining good relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{18} Another reason that Mexico continued the program was that the growing number of unauthorized migrants into the United States threatened the ability of both countries’ to control the U.S.-Mexican border. In an effort to prevent further unauthorized emigration, Mexico preferred to allow the movement of workers who were authorized by binational agreement.\textsuperscript{19}

As the Bracero Program began to lose its temporary status and to become part of a long-term government-administered strategy to stabilize the seasonal farm labor market, U.S. agricultural workers began to feel its adverse effects. In December 1945, the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, which was based in Memphis, Tennessee, changed its name to the National Farm Labor Union and rechartered itself to organize farmworkers outside the South.\textsuperscript{20} Henry L. Mitchell, the president of the NFLU, approached William Green, the president of the AFL, to secure funding from the AFL.\textsuperscript{21} In August 1946, the NFLU expanded its jurisdiction to all farmworkers throughout the United States and started organizing drives on large farms specializing in cotton, fruits, and vegetables, crops that required a large number of workers to harvest.\textsuperscript{22} Immediately following its inception, the NFLU attempted to organize Mexican American workers in California and Texas, employing Spanish-speaking organizers. Ernesto Galarza, the son of a Mexican immigrant family and who had received a PhD in economics and Latin American affairs from Columbia University, led efforts to organize Mexican Americans.\textsuperscript{23}

The union demanded higher wages for farmworkers (not less than five dollars per day) and advocated a legislative program “designed to raise living standards for all types of farm people,” including an extension of national labor laws to cover farmworkers.\textsuperscript{24} The NFLU initially adopted a strong anti-immigrant labor policy,\textsuperscript{25} and its leaders, especially Mitchell, became heavily involved in lobbying to strengthen border controls. Nationality played an important role in separating potential union members from the unorganizable others. It should be noted that although the NFLU advocated equal rights for all ethnic and racial groups, the union sometimes claimed that domestic workers were “native white American citizens” and emphasized their Americanness. At the same time, foreign agricultural workers from Mexico, the West Indies, and the Philippines
were depicted as something contrary to “freedom loving white farmers.”26 It is difficult to surmise how Mexican Americans reacted to the NFLU’s foreign-labor policy. Since many Mexican Americans believed that immigrants from Mexico were the direct cause of their economic and social problems because of competition for jobs, and because they perceived “racial degradation” in being associated with braceros or “wetbacks,” the strong emphasis on citizenship and legal status allowed most Mexican Americans to draw a line between themselves and Mexican immigrants.27 The NFLU generally refrained from using racist remarks directed at Mexican workers, with whom many of its members shared a common ethnoracial identity.

While pursuing domestic campaigns against the influx of Mexican workers, the NFLU also sought cooperation from Mexico to deal with the problem. During World War II, some Mexican labor groups began to engage issues of labor migration. In 1943 an organization called the Alianza de Braceros Nacionales de México en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica (National Alliance of Braceros in the United States) was established in Mexico City by former braceros who had returned from the United States.28 The Alianza was affiliated with the Confederación Proletaria Nacional (CPN, National Proletarian Confederation).29 and was involved in organizing contracted braceros before their departure north. In a letter to President Miguel Alemán, José Hernández Serrano, the leader of the Alianza, condemned unrestricted emigration as having a detrimental effect on agricultural production in Mexico and called for closer concern for braceros from the Mexican authorities.30

In June 1948, at an executive meeting of the Inter-American Confederation of Workers/Confederación Interamericana de Trabajadores (CIT), Serafino Romualdi, an AFL representative in Latin America and the secretary of international relations of the CIT, suggested that a conference of Mexican and U.S. union organizers be held to discuss migration issues.31 In October representatives from the NFLU and the CPN, the Mexican affiliate of the CIT, met to create a permanent joint committee. They also agreed that all braceros who were affiliated with the CPN and legally working in the United States would be treated as members of the NFLU so that they could not be used against U.S. labor as strikebreakers.32 It should be noted that at the conference the NFLU did not call for a total abandonment of the Bracero Program but stressed the need to make amendments to the program to provide for Mexican and U.S. labor representation in intergovernmental negotiations.33 This was
the first attempt by the NFLU to seek cooperation from its Mexican counterparts and set a precedent for following campaigns.

III. THE “EL PASO INCIDENT” AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. AND MEXICAN LABOR

During 1947, Mexican and U.S. officials discussed the extension of the Bracero Program. After World War II, the United States and Mexico began to define the Bracero Program not only as a labor importation program but also as an approach to effectively control the transnational flow of workers. By allowing Mexicans to work in the United States legally, both countries believed that they could decrease the unauthorized migration of Mexican workers. The agreement of March 1947 proposed a legalization procedure for undocumented workers, which would allow them to be put under contract after being apprehended in the United States. At the same time, under this agreement and Public Law 40, which was passed in Congress on April 28, 1947, the U.S. government would no longer pay braceros’ transportation costs.

The Mexican government believed that unauthorized emigration impeded its attempt to regulate the flow of migration through the Bracero Program. Although the Mexican government and the NFLU worked separately, both pressured the United States to take action to stop unauthorized migration. In February 1948 Mexico and the United States agreed to renew the binational program. The new agreement stipulated that the employer would cover the cost for each bracero’s lodging, food, and transport of personal belongings during the round-trip between the place of contract in Mexico and place of employment in the United States. This reflected the attitude of many legislators who basically supported a foreign-labor program but wanted the employers of foreign workers to bear the cost. Agricultural interest groups, however, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Grange, began to argue that braceros were getting more expensive to hire while agricultural interests were not reflected in the formulation and operation of the program.

The new program did not decrease undocumented migration. The income disparity between U.S. and Mexican workers increased even more after the peso was devalued in July 1948. The inflation following World War II diminished the real wages of workers in Mexico by roughly 30 to 40 percent. These factors prompted increased emigration
from Mexico. In autumn 1948, so many Mexican potential farmworkers were gathering along the border that they overwhelmed the capacity of recruitment centers in Mexican border cities such as Ciudad Juárez and Mexicali. In mid-October, several thousand Mexican workers, both those who had applied for a bracero employment and those without any official contract, gathered along the U.S.-Mexican border near El Paso and entered Texas without authorization. After crossing the border, they were immediately sent to nearby cotton fields by waiting contractors.42

The El Paso Incident, as it became known, drew significant attention to the problem of unauthorized migration from Mexico. The Mexican government unilaterally suspended the Bracero Program because the U.S. Border Patrol facilitated the illegal entry of Mexican farmworkers into the United States. The entry of braceros into Texas without the consent of the Mexican government also violated the binational agreement, since Mexico banned sending braceros to that state because of its history of discrimination against Mexicans.43 Mexican labor leaders were generally critical of bracero emigration because they feared that braceros would be subject to exploitation in the United States, but most of them did not openly call for a permanent termination of the program. Some pointed out the need for studies on social problems that prompted the rural population to emigrate as braceros.44

The AFL called for immediate repatriation of unauthorized entrants from Mexico and for prosecution of the government employees and agricultural employers who conspired to bring the undocumented workers into the United States in violation of U.S. immigration laws.45 Meanwhile, Mitchell sent an open letter to the Mexican press that pointed out the detrimental effects of the Bracero Program on U.S. farmworkers. This letter condemned the use of braceros as strikebreakers and the lack of proper action by both the U.S. and Mexico for violations of the agreement by U.S. farmers. However, the letter emphasized that the AFL did not oppose the program per se and stated that what the AFL had been opposing was the mistreatment of braceros. The letter also called for a U.S.-Mexican alliance to solve the problems that affected farmworkers in both countries.46 Judging from these statements, it seems that Mitchell did not want to antagonize his Mexican allies and stressed that the AFL’s opposition to the Bracero Program was not based on a xenophobic attitude toward Mexicans.

From 1949 to 1950, the NFLU continued negotiations with the Alianza. The Alianza maintained that the termination of the binational program
would not solve any problems and that Mexican workers had a right to live and work in the United States, at least through a legal channel.47 The NFLU pointed out that braceros had been used as strikebreakers on many occasions and that their presence in the United States had allowed growers to reduce wages for domestic farmworkers.48 However, it seems that Mitchell and Galarza began to realize that preventing legally contracted braceros from entering the United States would not be a practical solution to labor problems. In a letter to Hernández Serrano, Galarza wrote (in Spanish, my translation): “I have been thinking that the only way to protect both braceros and U.S. farmworkers is to integrate them into the union [NFLU] so that every farmworker on a particular farm would be working under the same conditions and receiving the same wage.”49 He also stressed that the economic interests of braceros should be represented by “an authentic labor organization, not by a [Mexican] consul or other bureaucratic agents.”50

The impact of the El Paso Incident was strong enough to make U.S. and Mexican labor unions aware of the problems of undocumented migration. After this incident, they began to clearly differentiate between “illegal migration” and recruitment of braceros under an international agreement. The latter was deemed acceptable under strict enforcement, if “an actual or clearly impending” shortage of U.S. workers existed. At the same time, undocumented migration itself was regarded as a serious issue, and U.S. union leaders continued to advocate strengthening the Border Patrol while playing down their previous opposition to the Bracero Program.51 Thus, there was finally a basis for international cooperation. Nevertheless, the newly created U.S.-Mexican alliance was not as effective as was hoped.

IV. THE EXTENSION OF THE BRACERO PROGRAM AND THE U.S.-MEXICAN LABOR ALLIANCE

Despite the interruption caused by the El Paso Incident, the Bracero Program achieved semipermanent status with the 1949 agreement and was continued until 1964. The U.S. State Department and Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared that its termination would cause further incidents on the border, and thus they began negotiations in early 1949 to reestablish the binational labor program.52 Delegations from both countries were especially concerned that some growers in the United States were hoping that abrogation of the official program would lead to
unlimited contracting of Mexican workers at the border, and that this would accelerate the influx of undocumented workers. The new agreement that was signed in July 1949 included protective clauses for braceros and permitted the Mexican government to establish a special committee for the investigation of discriminatory acts. In exchange, Mexico removed Texas from its “blacklist.” The new agreement also banned recruitment on the border, because Mexico did not want a large number of immigrants assembling in the border towns. Mexico initially asked for legislation that would penalize employers of undocumented workers. However the United States objected to this and suggested a legalization procedure for unauthorized workers that would ease the burden on the understaffed Border Patrol and avoid employer sanctions. The rather prompt conclusion of the negotiation was due to the concern that if a new agreement failed to materialize, U.S. farmers would resort to hiring undocumented workers. The U.S. Department of State also wanted to establish a new agreement as soon as possible so that labor unions such as the NFLU, which was calling for labor’s full participation in binational negotiations, could be kept away from the process.

Since the binational agreement had to be renewed every two years, the United States and Mexico began discussions again in early 1951. This time Mexico insisted that sanctions against employers of undocumented workers should be included in the new agreement, but this proposal met with strong opposition from growers and from Congress. What finally passed in Congress was a watered-down version of the bill without meaningful employer sanctions. Neither the 1949 agreement nor the 1951 one had any effect on the continued influx of unauthorized immigrants. In fact, the number of apprehensions along the border soared from 278,538 in 1949 to 485,215 in 1950, while only 107,000 braceros were contracted in 1949 and 67,500 in 1950.

To deal with these farm-labor problems, President Harry S. Truman established a commission on migratory labor in June 1950. It held twelve hearings throughout the United States at which the NFLU spoke on several occasions. The report of the commission recommended that the following steps be taken to stop undocumented immigration: a stronger Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) with a clearer statutory authority and more funding; legislation to penalize those who are involved in the employment or transportation of illegal entrants; no more contracting and legalization of illegal entrants; cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican governments to halt undocumented migration by more
rigid enforcement of Mexican migration laws and by preventing the concentration of workers in border areas. These recommendations reflected organized labor's position on the foreign-labor issues. However, backed by growers, many politicians from the Southwest opposed further restrictions on unauthorized immigration and employer sanctions. For example, Senator Pat McCarran (D-Nevada), known for his restrictionist position toward legal immigration, showed tolerance for illegal immigration. He criticized INS raids on farms and supported reductions in appropriations for the Border Patrol.

Although refraining from openly criticizing the program, the NFLU argued that there was no shortage of domestic labor and that therefore no foreign workers were needed. However, the union was careful to limit its criticism to the U.S. farm interests and refrained from antagonizing the Mexican government or unions. For example, in an article that appeared in the American Federationist, Galarza hailed the migration and border control policy of the Alemán administration as an “effective backstop” to corporate farmers’ drive for further importation of unauthorized workers and argued that Southern and Southwestern legislators were falsely blaming the Mexican government for the influx of undocumented Mexicans.

In January 1951, Galarza went to Mexico City, where intergovernmental negotiations for the renewal of the bracero agreement was underway, to meet with U.S. and Mexican government officials and to hold public meetings with representatives from Mexican unions and braceros who had applied for employment in the United States. However, according to Galarza, the public meetings had to be cancelled due to intervention by the Mexican Interior Ministry, which was involved in administration of the Bracero Program within Mexico and also had control over internal security. It is hard to understand why the Interior Ministry wanted to stop the meetings because there is a lack of Mexican primary sources on this matter, but presumably the ministry did not want labor groups to intervene in government policy. Nevertheless, in February, the Alianza and the NFLU formally agreed on a pact that would give a membership of the NFLU to Alianza members while working in the United States. In March, the NFLU concluded a similar agreement with the Unión de Trabajadores del Valle de Mexicali (Mexicali Valley Workers Union), an affiliate of the much more powerful CTM.

During the early 1950s, the AFL, along with the CIO, continued to discuss the migration issues with the CTM. In August 1953, Mitchell
and Fidel Velásquez, the president of the CTM, met in Mexico City. They agreed that braceros in the United States should be unionized and called for participation by Mexican and U.S. unions in the binational negotiations. Velásquez also agreed with Mitchell that control of migratory flow should be strengthened and that more vigilance along the border was desirable. Like Hernández Serrano of the Alianza, Velásquez stressed that authorized emigration of Mexican workers should be facilitated rather than hampered, and he demanded an increase in opportunities for legal employment with contracts that included more protections for braceros. He explained that these measures would discourage undocumented emigration because Mexican workers would find the legal route more attractive. In short, Mexican unions wanted to have more braceros working in the United States and under their control. In December the delegates from Mexico and the United States agreed to set up a joint committee to seek improvements in the contracts of legally imported workers and to call on their respective governments to include labor representatives in future negotiations on international agreements. The U.S. unions decided to concentrate on demanding stricter patrolling of the border on both sides and cooperating with the CTM in obtaining improvements in wages and working conditions for all properly contracted farmworkers. Besides the fact that a penalty for employers of undocumented workers was unlikely to be approved in Congress, and thus lobbying for it in the United States was meaningless, the U.S. unions felt a need to compromise with the CTM. Since the CTM’s position was essentially the same as that of the Mexican government, which accepted the new agreement and needed the income generated from the remittances sent home by braceros, the AFL was unable to continue its opposition to the program per se.

After the inception of the Joint U.S.-Mexican Trade Union Committee, union leaders from both countries continued to meet regularly until 1957. The committee proposed a binational system that would enable Mexican union members to join U.S. unions while they were seeking employment and/or were working in the United States. However, this plan did not materialize because neither the CTM nor the CPN could organize braceros effectively, since they were not the primary farmworker organizers. Although both organizations had considerable membership in rural areas and small towns among workers in service and industrial sectors, people who potentially might migrate as braceros, farmworkers were generally organized by the Confederación Nacional
de Campesinos (CNC, National Peasant Confederation). The CNC also opposed undocumented migration, especially the uncontrolled exodus of the rural population from the border region, which would have an adverse effect on Mexico’s efforts to develop the region.\(^7\) The CNC incorporated agricultural workers and sharecroppers. However, the bulk of its membership consisted of *ejidatarios*, small-scale farmers whose land had been provided as part of the national land reform program initiated after the Mexican Revolution.\(^7\) Although these three groups shared their opposition to undocumented emigration and were aligned with the ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party), jurisdictional issues prevented cooperation over the bracero issues within the Mexican labor movement. Insufficient commitment by the AFL’s leadership also hampered the binational cooperation. The AFL did not provide sufficient funds for the NFLU’s organizing campaigns in the fields in the United States on the assumption that negotiations between U.S. and Mexican union officials could solve all migration problems.\(^7\) After 1955, the limited funds from the AFL-CIO reduced considerably the activities of the NFLU.

After several massive roundups of suspected “wetbacks” in 1954, the number of apprehensions of undocumented immigrants fell drastically,\(^7\) from 1,075,168 in 1954 to 242,608 in 1955. At the same time, the number of braceros rose significantly during the latter half of the 1950s, from 309,033 in 1954 to 437,643 in 1959.\(^7\) This rapid increase in the number of braceros rearoused opposition to foreign workers among U.S. labor organizers. The AFL-CIO began a major organizing drive in the late 1950s in California, where there was a large concentration of braceros in fruit and vegetable production. The Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee was founded in 1959 as the successor to the now dormant NFLU, which was liquidated in August 1960.\(^7\) The AWOC’s leadership, most of whom had no experience in farm-labor organizing, could not develop any effective strategy to mobilize the majority of California’s non-bracero farmworkers. Rather than organizing the rapidly increasing Mexican American farmworkers, the AWOC chose to concentrate on migrant Anglo workers.

The AWOC thought that halting the bracero traffic was crucial for its organizing effort, since braceros were often used as strikebreakers. The union decided to provoke a diplomatic crisis by physically intimidating braceros so that the Mexican government would demand the withdrawal of braceros from struck fields or perhaps even abrogate the agreement.
This approach was tested in 1961 and resulted in the arrest of several AWOC organizers. While the AWOC was affiliated with the AFL-CIO and enjoyed its sponsorship, the union did not utilize the AFL-CIO’s connection with its Mexican counterparts to unionize braceros. The AWOC leadership also showed considerable indifference to Mexican American workers’ conditions and demands. Consequently, many Mexican American members left the AWOC and joined César Chávez’s emerging farmworker movement after 1962. The AWOC merged in 1966 with the National Farm Workers Association, an independent union that Chávez had started several years earlier.

CONCLUSION

The postwar transnational cooperation between U.S. and Mexican unions did not yield much success. There were many factors that precluded this alliance from achieving desirable outcomes. First, for both U.S. and Mexican labor leaders the unionization of farmworkers was not their top priority. The NFLU received insufficient support from the AFL-CIO in the late 1950s, although it had many experienced organizers such as Galarza and Mitchell, while the AWOC suffered from lack of expertise in farm-labor organizing. Mexican unions also could not form a unified front to deal with the migratory problems because of jurisdictional issues. Second, U.S. labor leaders did not consider undocumented Mexican workers as potential members of their movement, although they made up a large part of the farm-labor force by the 1950s. Their Mexican counterparts also saw undocumented emigration as detrimental to their cause, but they were incapable of halting it. Third, the scope of this U.S.-Mexican cooperation remained limited by the problem of national boundaries, as this alliance aimed at establishing stronger border controls and curbing undocumented migration. The unions did try to establish their own way of controlling the flow of border-crossing workers through binational unionization. However, both U.S. and Mexican unions believed that stricter control of the border was the only way to counter U.S. agricultural interests that used undocumented workers as cheap alternatives to U.S. workers and braceros. Thus labor’s idea of the national border and the boundary between the “legal” and “illegal” did not differ fundamentally from that of the government actors.

The postwar transnational cooperation between U.S. and Mexican unions was still significant in several ways. First, the NFLU was one of
the few labor organizations in the 1950s to incorporate both U.S. and Mexican citizens, at least those who were legally working in the United States. The repressive environment in the early Cold War years destroyed left-wing organizations such as La Asociación Nacional México-Americana (National Mexican-American Association), which consisted of progressive Mexican American trade unionists and incorporated Mexican workers in its ranks. Although the NFLU maintained a determinately restrictionist policy toward undocumented migration, as an AFL affiliate, it was one of the few groups that partially filled the void left by left-wing labor or civil rights organizations from the pre–Cold War era.

It should be also noted that the farm labor movement in later years, especially César Chávez’s United Farm Workers, followed the basic organizing strategy that was developed by the NFLU and its Mexican affiliates, at least until the early 1970s, incorporating both documented Mexican workers and U.S. citizens while discouraging unauthorized workers. Like Mitchell and Galarza in the 1950s, Chávez saw undocumented workers as a threat to his movement, supported sanctions against the employers of undocumented immigrants in the early 1970s, and sought assistance from the CTM in the mid-1960s and 1970s to prevent Mexican strikebreakers from crossing the border. Only in the mid-1970s did the UFW begin to fully foster a class- and ethnic-based solidarity with Mexican migrant workers and Mexican American or Chicano groups, taking a more lenient attitude toward undocumented workers. It was only after the U.S. government greatly intensified its efforts to control the U.S.-Mexican border in the late 1970s and 1980s that both Mexican and U.S. labor began to seriously redefine the boundary between “legal” and “illegal” workers, advocating the legalization of those who had been considered “illegal” and permitting their membership in U.S. unions.
1 Since the 1970s, labor unions in the United States have been recruiting and organizing Latin American immigrant workers. See, for example, Leon Fink, *The Maya of Morganton: Work and Community in the Nuevo New South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), chap. 7.

2 Notes on terms: the term *bracero* comes from the Spanish word *brazo* (arm) and means a person who does manual labor. In this article the term signifies a Mexican farmworker in the United States legally contracted under the terms of U.S.-Mexican agreements. A farmworker with U.S. citizenship is referred to as a *U.S. or domestic* worker. A *Mexican* means a citizen of Mexico, while a U.S. citizen of Mexican descent is called *Mexican American*.

3 The NFLU changed its name in May 1952 to the National Agricultural Workers Union. For the purpose of clarity, it is referred to as the NFLU throughout this article.


9 Ibid., 1767–68.


12 In August 1944 a group called Comité Mexicano contra el Racismo (Mexican Committee against Racism) was established. It recommended tough antidiscrimination measures to combat racism in the United States, especially in Texas. See Thomas A. Guglielmo, “Fighting for Caucasian Rights: Mexicans, Mexican Americans, and the Transnational Struggle for Civil Rights in World War II Texas,” *Journal of American History* 92, no. 4 (March 2006): 1212–37.
The term originated with reference to Mexicans who clandestinely entered the United States by swimming or wading across the Rio Grande River, thus presumably getting their backs wet.


The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith), Washington, September 11, 1945 in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*) 1945, vol. 9, 1149–51.


The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, Mexico, DF, February 16, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, vol. 11, 1022–23.

The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, Mexico, DF, March 18, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, vol. 11, 1025–28.

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Thurston), Washington, DC, August 16, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, vol. 11, 1030–33; The Ambassador in Mexico (Thurston) to the Secretary of State, Mexico, DF, December 31, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, vol. 11, 1033–36; The Ambassador in Mexico (Thurston) to the Secretary of State, México, DF, February 7, 1947, *FRUS 1947*, vol. 8, 823–26.


The Southern Tenant Farmers Union was established in 1934 in Tyronza, Arkansas, by H. L. Mitchell and Clay East. The STFU merged in the late 1930s with the United Canary, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America, a CIO affiliate with an organizational base among farmworkers and food processing workers. However, the STFU founders did not get along with the Communists within the UCAPAWA leadership, and their expensive dues were also unpopular with STFU members. The STFU soon seceded from the UCAPAWA. Patrick H. Mooney and Theo J. Majka, *Farmers’ and Farm Workers’ Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture* (New York: Twayne, 1995), 80–89, 138–49.


“Convention Adopts New Program.”


29 The CPN was established in 1942 by former CTM members. It merged with several other unions to form the Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos in 1952 to form an alliance of non-CTM affiliates. However, like the CTM, the CROC was closely allied with the Mexican government and should not be considered as an “independent” or “dissident” labor organization. Olga Pellicer de Brody and José Luis Reyna, Historia de la revolución mexicana, 1952–1960, vol. 22, El afianzamiento de la estabilidad política (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978), 73–82.
30 José Hernández Serrano to Miguel Alemán, August 2, 1948, Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City (hereafter cited as AGN), Exp. 545.3/98.
31 Ernesto Galarza to Dorothy Dowe, June 27, 1948, STFU Papers, reel 32; Summary Report: Conference of representatives of the Confederación Proletaria Nacional of Mexico and the National Farm Labor Union (AFL) held at Laredo, Texas, October 16–18, 1948, Galarza Papers, box 23, folder 4.
33 Before the conference, the NFLU proposed to a U.S. State Department officer the creation of a “proper inter-national agency,” composed of representatives from governments, employers, and trade unions of both Mexico and the United States. Ernesto Galarza to John Fishburn, September 20, 1948, STFU Papers, reel 33.
38 House, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Congressional Record, vol. 93 (March 4, 1947), 1660. It should be noted that after World War II there was considerable disagreement in Congress as to who should bear the cost of importing braceros, as well as dealing with undocumented entrants from Mexico.
40 Before the devaluation one dollar traded for 4.85 pesos. After that devaluation, one dollar was valued at 6.90 pesos. Hispanic World Report 1, no. 2 (December 15, 1948): 5.


Ernesto Galarza to José Hernández Serrano, October 21, 1950, Galarza Papers, box 19, folder 6.

Ibid.


The Ambassador in Mexico (Thurston) to the Secretary of State, Mexico, DF, January 4, 1949, file 811.504 Mexico/1–449, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter cited as NA).

Memorandum: Conversación telefónica sostenida entre el Sr. de la Colina y el Lic. Sánchez Gavito, December 6, 1948, Acervo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City, Exp. III-2486–9.


Robert E. Wilson to A. W. Motley, April 22, 1949, file 811.504 Mexico/4–2049, RG 59, NA; Robert C. Goodwin to Paul J. Reveley, May 9, 1949, file 811.504 Mexico/5–949, RG 59, NA.

Horacio Terán, “Síntesis de los puntos básicos que contendrá el acuerdo internacional para la contratación de trabajadores agrícolas mexicanos que vayan a prestar sus servicios a los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica,” February 3, 1949, Exp. 546.6/1–32, AGN.

Department of State to American Embassy in Mexico, DF, June 9, 1949, RG 59, file 811.504 Mexico/6–949, RG 59, NA.


According to Galarza, Mitchell attempted to obtain an official invitation to the intergovernmental negotiations but was ignored and so he sent Galarza as an unofficial observer. Galarza, *Farm Workers and Agri-business in California*, 154–55.

Galarza reports that Interior Ministry officials picked up three Alianza organizers at the meeting and threatened them with incarceration. Ernesto Galarza to H. L. Mitchell, January 30, 1951, Galarza Papers, box 24, folder 6; Ernesto Galarza to H. L. Mitchell, February 4, 1951, Galarza Papers, box 24, folder 6. A similar incident involving the wife of a CTM organizer occurred in April. Ernesto Galarza to George Rundquist, April 5, 1951, Galarza Papers, box 19, folder 6.


In July 1951, for instance, the AFL sent a delegation to Mexico to meet with Mexican labor leaders and one of the main topics was migration. J. L. Rhodes, Special Report on Visitation to Mexico, August 9, 1951, Galarza Papers, box 19, folder 6.

Memorandum, August 3, 1953, George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland, RG18–009, box 7, file 16.


Jerry R. Holleman to Paul C. Sparks, September 2, 1953, STFU Papers, reel 37.

“We Can’t Contra la salida de brazos,” *El Nacional* (Mexico City), July 26, 1949, 1.


Galarza, *Farm Workers and Agri-business in California*, 352.


Norman Smith, the president of the AWOC and a former ally of Walter Reuther, had no experience in farm-labor organizing. Galarza and Mitchell had little influence within the union. Ibid., 114–20.

Ibid., 157–60.


For example, in the 1950s the Community Service Organization, a California-based community organization, catered to both Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants.


84 For recent cases of U.S.-Mexican cooperation in organizing immigrant workers regardless of nationality or legal status, see Ronald L. Mize and Alicia C. S. Swords, Consuming Mexican Labor: From the Bracero Program to NAFTA (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), chaps. 3 and 4.