

Architects of a Masquerade Peace: The United States and the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games

*Sayuri GUTHRIE-SHIMIZU**

Among international social movements that have endured into the present, few have more intimately associated themselves with peace and human solidarity than the Olympics Games. Since their resurrection by French aristocrat Pierre de Coubertin in 1896, the Olympics have become entrenched in popular imagination as a symbol of world peace and international brotherhood. Despite—or because of—this composite symbolism, the Olympic Games have been exploited to render their metaphoric power to other, often blatantly political, causes.¹

Scholars and observers of the modern Olympics generally agree that during the movement's first half century, the Berlin Olympics of 1936 was the most egregious case of political manipulation and propagandizing committed by a host country. It was held in the immediate aftermath of the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, one of the opening gambits of Nazi military expansionism, which threatened the tenuous—and flawed—post-World War I peace in Europe. The Nazis' spectacular success in hosting the festival of peace increased the regime's popularity at home and enhanced its prestige abroad. Because of the perverse irony of this achievement, the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games have been more intensely studied than others.²

From the beginning of the modern Games, held in Athens in 1896, the United States has been a crucial non-European player in the international

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*Associate Professor, Michigan State University

Olympic movement and, in 1904, was the third nation to host the Olympiad (in St. Louis). In rough correspondence to its growing national power, the athletic prowess of the United States in international competition began to radiate internationally in the first two decades of the twentieth century. In the four successive post-World War I Olympics—in Antwerp, Paris, Amsterdam, and Los Angeles—the U.S. team brought home the most medals. The phenomenal success, commercial as well as organizational, of the 1932 Los Angeles Games ushered in a new era in Olympic history, establishing the United States as the movement's driving force. Because of this prominence, U.S. participation was deemed essential to the success or failure of the next Games, to be held in the German capital. The United States sent the largest foreign delegation to this controversial sports festival and contributed memorable Olympic moments and heroes, including African American sprinter and long jumper Jesse Owens, who, by winning four gold medals, exploded the Nazi claim of Aryan supremacy.³

Between 1933 and 1936, however, U.S. citizens of all political stripes and religious persuasions debated intensely the wisdom of sending U.S. athletes to the Games that would be hosted by a regime sworn to racist ideology. The controversy involved not only athletes and leaders of amateur sports groups but also labor and religious organizations. A broad coalition of Americans, disturbed by reports of Nazi discrimination against German Jews, tried persistently, but ultimately failed, to get U.S. organizations to boycott the Berlin Games. Similarly, their efforts to recruit the U.S. government to the cause were unsuccessful. The failure of the boycott in the United States deflated parallel campaigns in Canada and Western Europe.⁴

In this article I seek to elucidate the matrix of historical forces in which American amateur sport leaders, civic groups, diplomatic representatives, and key officials in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration contended with the polarizing question of U.S. participation. I also shed light on the complex motivations that drove them, and on how their actions or inactions mirrored broader ideological strands in American society at the time. How did they define the individual and collective stakes inherent in U.S. participation in the Nazis' national enterprise and its manipulation of the emerging international iconography of peace? How did they confront moral ambiguities entailed in their choices? How did high-ranking officials in the FDR administration define their role in matters intersecting civil society and statecraft? How did that response bespeak FDR's complicit embrace of the European appeasement of the Nazis later in the decade? By addressing these questions, I illuminate the United States' less than sure-footed approach to

“peace in our time” in the mid-1930s.

NAZI ASCENSION TO POWER AND THE EARLY DEBATE OVER
THE BERLIN OLYMPICS

In May 1931, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded to Berlin, the capital of the Weimer Republic, the right to host the 11th Olympic Games. The choice symbolically ratified Germany’s full rehabilitation in the post-World War I international community. At the time, the nation was ruled by a centrist coalition government with Heinrich Brüning as chancellor. Two German sports officials were instrumental in securing this Olympic bid: Theodor Lewald, the president of the German Olympic Committee (GOC), had been an IOC member since 1924; and Carl Diem, the founder of Germany’s university for sports science, had captained the German team in the 1912 Stockholm Olympics. Both had been involved in planning for the canceled 1916 Berlin Olympics and commanded wide respect in Europe for their expertise in sports administration.⁵

Within a scant two years, however, Germany came under the control of the National Socialists. Within a few months of Adolf Hitler’s appointment to the chancellorship, nationwide campaigns for the boycott of Jewish small business were unleashed, and discrimination against Jewish students in schools and universities began. As Hitler consolidated his dictatorial power, the intimidation and exclusion of Jews in the professions of medicine, education, and law began. The German sport community could not be immune from these alarming trends. Lewald was removed from the GOC presidency because of his partial Jewish heritage. Diem was forced to resign as GOC secretary on account of his wife’s Jewish ancestry.⁶

Prior to their ascension to power, neither Hitler nor his Nazi cohorts were devotees of modern sports. Nazi spokesmen like Bruno Malitz had condemned modern sports, and the Olympics in particular, as “too international” and “infested” with “Frenchmen, Belgians, Polacks, and Jew-Niggers.” Hitler himself had maligned the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics as “an infamous festival organized by Jews.”⁷ On assuming power, however, Hitler did not halt preparations for the Olympics. Indeed, he reversed course and threw the full support of his regime behind the prospective Berlin Games. His conversion to Olympism came when his propaganda minister, Josef Goebbels, convinced him that the Olympics would afford a splendid opportunity to showcase the national vitality and organizational skills of “New Germany.”⁸

Intervention by IOC president Count Henri de Baillet-Latour helped

Lewald retain a nominal position on the GOC, but real authority was transferred to Hans von Tschammer und Osten, a Hitler appointee to the Sports League of the German Reich. Diem was also permitted to remain as secretary. After this tenuous reinstatement, Lewald and Diem became the Nazi regime's uneasy collaborators. In the fall of 1933, Hitler toured venues for the Olympics and ordered the construction of a grand new sports complex befitting a Nazi spectacle. He declared his regime's full financial support, with a sum later set at 20 million reichsmarks (\$8 million).⁹

Hitler's unexpected embrace of Olympism was a mixed blessing to officials of the international Olympic movement. The contradiction between the Olympic Charter banning discrimination on the basis of race and creed and the Nazis' racial doctrine initially led the IOC to question the regime's willingness to accept the terms of the Olympic Charter. Initial reports from Germany were not at all encouraging. In April 1933, von Tschammer ordered an "Aryan only" policy in all German athletic organizations. Jewish or "part-Jewish" (as defined by Nazi sports officials, someone with a Jewish parent or grandparent) and Gypsy athletes were systematically excluded from sports clubs, public pools, gyms, and other sports facilities.¹⁰

Concern over early signs of Nazi discrimination against Jewish athletes spread beyond the IOC. In the spring of 1933, the *New York Times* and other organs in the mainstream press in the United States began to question the appropriateness of Berlin as the site for the next Olympics. Jewish Americans also took issue with the prospect of the Nazi Olympics. Bernard S. Deutsch, on behalf of the American Jewish Congress, addressed an open letter to Avery Brundage, president of the American Olympic Committee (AOC), the organization that presides over matters concerning the Olympics in the United States. The letter alerted Brundage to violations of the spirit of the Olympic Charter committed against German Jewish athletes. In these early days of the controversy, Brundage himself was greatly worried about the damage the Nazis' newfound enthusiasm for the Berlin Games might deal to his beloved cause, the international Olympic movement. Confiding to a fellow sports administrator, AOC treasurer Gustav Kirby, Brundage agonized that the very foundation of the modern Olympic revival would be undermined if individual IOC member countries were allowed to restrict participation in the Games on account of class, creed, or race.¹¹

Jewish athletes' right to train and compete for the German Olympics was a key item on the agenda of the IOC's annual meeting held in Vienna in June 1933. There the IOC agreed to request a written guarantee from the German Olympic Committee that Jews would not be excluded from national Olympic

teams and that all laws regulating the Games would be faithfully observed at the Berlin Olympics. One of three U.S. members, Brigadier General Charles Sherrill, was at the forefront of the IOC push to secure the German pledge of conformity to the IOC rules and regulations. After a flurry of consultations with the government in Berlin, Lewald issued a statement addressed to Count Baillet-Latour: “[A]s a principle German Jews shall not be excluded from the German Olympic teams.”¹²

What came to be known as the Nazis’ “Vienna pledge” did not quite convince U.S. amateur sports officials. Gustav Kirby was one such skeptic.¹³ In November 1933 at the AOC’s national convention Kirby sponsored a resolution that subtly threatened a U.S. boycott of the Berlin Games unless German Jews were allowed, in fact as well as in theory, to prepare for and participate in the 1936 Olympics. Kirby’s gambit dismayed Baillet-Latour and embarrassed Brundage. The AOC president maneuvered for adoption of a less confrontational version of Kirby’s resolution, but the AOC declined to formally accept the Olympic invitation at this time. Another key player in the American Olympic movement, the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), the largest governing body for amateur sport, also publicly expressed skepticism about the Vienna pledge. As the organization charged with certifying the amateur status of U.S. athletes, the AAU made its point by withholding its certification of athletes for the Berlin Games until it obtained definitive proof of the Nazis’ compliance with the IOC’s nondiscrimination rules.¹⁴

Keenly aware that their activities were under an international microscope, Nazi sports officials went to great lengths to reassure concerned sports officials around the world. Given the United States’ prominence in international athletic competition, Nazi officials were particularly eager to appease Americans. As early as December 1933, von Tschammer issued a statement, prominently reported in the *New York Times*, claiming that Jews were not barred from athletic events and sports clubs by any *official* government decree or proclamation. Although Brundage was not fooled by this legal and rhetorical hairsplitting, he did not publicly object to its narrowness because he did not wish to cause gratuitous trouble for his friends Lewald and Diem. Brundage’s personal aspiration for gaining an IOC membership also made him reluctant to embarrass Baillet-Latour, who had brokered the Vienna pledge.¹⁵

THE AOC’S FACT-FINDING MISSION

In early 1934, Americans skeptical about the Nazi pledge began to express

their doubts and concerns publicly. One prominent example was the American Jewish Committee's anti-Nazi rally held at Madison Square Garden in New York City on March 6, 1934. The event drew twenty thousand attendees. Twenty-two witnesses took the stand in a people's court and denounced Hitler and his regime's crimes against civil society, including the flagrant denial of basic human rights. The witnesses included high-profile political figures such as former New York governor Al Smith and New York mayor Fiorello La Guardia. To Brundage's chagrin, Kirby was among the witnesses. German ambassador Hans Luther had asked the U.S. government to ban the meeting, but the State Department did not oblige.¹⁶

As the continued exclusion of Jewish athletes was reported out of Germany, the IOC felt compelled to pressure the Germans again, and its annual meeting in Athens in May provided that opportunity. There Lewald was asked point blank by IOC members, including American William May Garland, the successful organizer of the Los Angeles Olympics, if his government's words could indeed be trusted. An embattled Lewald reassured his IOC colleagues that German athletes of non-Aryan origins, if duly qualified, would be allowed to compete in the Berlin Olympics. To impress on the IOC the sincerity of this pledge, von Tschammer named five Jewish athletes, including fencer Helene Mayer and high jumper Gretel Bergmann, as candidates for the German national team. Two Jewish sport clubs were invited to nominate twenty-one athletes for possible inclusion in the German Olympic team. None of them were actually invited to national training camps, on the grounds that their athletic abilities were not up to par. These token gestures, however, were good enough for most IOC officials, including Sherrill and Garland.¹⁷

By this time, the American amateur sports world had become deeply divided over participation in the Berlin Games. American IOC members Sherrill and Garland's acceptance of the Nazi guarantees only accentuated that internal schism. Brundage spearheaded the pro-participation group.¹⁸ The opposing faction formed around Jeremiah Titus Mahoney, a longtime member of the AAU and a former Olympian and former New York Supreme Court justice. The basis of Mahoney's opposition was twofold. He believed that participation in the Berlin Games would damage the Olympic movement in the long term and would also violate the AOC's own national rules against discrimination on account of race or creed.¹⁹

In this increasingly contentious atmosphere, the AOC met in June 1934 to discuss whether to accept the official German invitation to the Berlin Games. The internal division forced the AOC to postpone its decision, but members

agreed to send Brundage to Germany to evaluate in person the local conditions for Jewish athletes. This supposedly impartial inspection was tainted even before it started, however. Garland and Sherrill privately urged Brundage to deny what they now believed to be exaggerated reports of discrimination against German Jewish athletes. While traveling in Europe en route to Berlin, Brundage also received advice from his friends on the IOC, including Swedish former Olympian Sigrid Eström, who suggested that “they [Jews] must be kept within certain limits.” A German diplomatic representative in the United States was quite prescient in his prediction: Brundage’s personal friendship with Lewald, Diem, and German IOC member Karl Ritter von Halt made him predisposed to favor U.S. participation. As a sports bureaucrat, Brundage also believed that the AOC, the IOC’s U.S. arm, had no business second-guessing the supreme governing body’s decision to accept the Nazi guarantees as sufficient.²⁰

The impartiality of Brundage’s on-the-spot investigation was highly suspect on other accounts. His lack of proficiency in German forced him to rely on interpreters provided by his German hosts. Brundage interviewed Jewish sport officials and athletes, but never without the presence of monitoring Nazi sports officials. In the end, Brundage chose to believe what he was inclined to believe: that there was no definitive evidence of discrimination against German Jews seeking a spot on the German Olympic team.

Not surprisingly, Brundage’s post-tour report was positive. In it Brundage assured his fellow AOC members that the German Olympic organizers could be trusted to follow the IOC’s nondiscrimination rules and provide an equivalent degree of hospitality for foreign Jews as well. His statements to the press affirmed the Nazis’ intent to honor IOC codes of conduct. Sherrill similarly vouched for the Nazis’ good faith on his return from an IOC meeting in Berlin, saying the Nazi sports authorities “generously provided for Jewish representation” on the German Olympic team. In October, basing their decision on Brundage’s report, eighteen members of the AOC executive committee voted unanimously to formally accept the invitation to the Berlin Olympics. Even erstwhile skeptics like Kirby fell in line with this decision.²¹

The AOC’s decision did not put the matter to rest. Outraged by the Brundage report, the Anti-Defamation League launched a campaign for a boycott of the Games. Prominent public officials also entered the fray. House Democrat Emmanuel Celler of New York organized congressional hearings, during which the Jewish legislator charged that Brundage had “prejudge[d] the situation before he sailed from America” and allowed himself to be hoodwinked

the Reich Sports League officials.²² Brundage's "firsthand" report also alienated the AAU leadership. Since the AAU was still withholding certification of U.S. athletes, its unexpectedly strong reaction alarmed Brundage and others in the pro-participation group. To their relief, a contentious year-end AAU convention held in Miami deferred a decision on certification. But the election of Mahoney as new AAU president suggested that the debate over the Berlin Olympics would only intensify.²³

THE BOYCOTT MOVEMENT AND THE EMERGING RHETORIC OF ANTI-SEMITISM

On March 16, 1935, Hitler took the first in a series of international gambles by announcing Germany's intention to rearm. Flaunting a censure resolution passed by the League of Nations, on May 9 Germany announced the existence of an air force and, a week later, reinstated compulsory conscription. Britain, France, and Italy, the victors at Versailles, did no more than confer among themselves at Stresa and issue protests against this open breach of key provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Across the Atlantic, the Roosevelt administration did not even protest what amounted to violations of its own 1921 peace treaty with Germany. After the crushing congressional defeat of the administration's proposal to join the World Court a few months earlier, Roosevelt was all too conscious of the sway of isolationism in Congress and felt helpless in the face of the insipient crisis in Europe.²⁴

By summer, a boycott campaign was under full steam in the United States as well as in Canada, Britain, and France. The U.S. boycott movement was galvanized when Mahoney, following mass attacks on Jews in Berlin, openly challenged the Brundage report and the IOC's official position. He claimed that the spirit of the international Olympic movement could not be sustained under the current conditions in Nazi Germany and that U.S. participation was tantamount to moral and financial support for the Nazi regime, which was "opposed to all that Americans hold dearest." His grim view of the reality of Nazi racial practices was corroborated two months later with the German announcement of the Nuremberg Laws. At that point, Mahoney went a step further. He published an open letter to Baillet-Latour in the *New York Times* in which he exposed numerous specific examples of athletic discrimination in Germany, openly questioning the IOC's judgment in accepting the Nazis' explanations.²⁵

Mahoney's public break with the AOC added fuel to the boycott agitation that had by then attained a broad organizational base encompassing Con-

gress, news media, academe, and religious groups. Labor groups, including the American Federation of Labor (AFL), urged that no U.S. team go to Berlin. Non-Jewish religious organizations also joined the cause. Because of the persecution of Catholics in Nazi Germany, American Catholics had been one of the first religious forces to demand a boycott. Leaders of the liberal wing of Protestant Christian denominations proposed that the Olympics be moved elsewhere. A number of former Olympians, including speed skater Jack Shea, a gold medalist in the 1932 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, New York, joined Mahoney. Forty-one college presidents from more than twenty states publicly supported a boycott. More than one hundred thousand letters had poured into the AAU by the eve of its national convention in New York City in December.²⁶

Since black athletes were central components of the U.S. track-and-field team, the black press passionately engaged in the boycott debate. As historian David Wiggins has aptly demonstrated, the black press was split over the boycott. New York's *Amsterdam News* supported it, but *the Pittsburgh Courier-Journal* and most other black newspapers outspokenly rejected the idea of denying black athletes the chance of a lifetime. The black press also pointed out the hypocrisy of white advocates of the boycott, noting that most of their charges against Nazi racial practices could just as well be used to deny the United States an Olympics. Many black athletes were anxious to participate at the Berlin Games. Sprinter Ralph Metcalfe told the *Chicago Defender* that he and other black athletes had been treated well during a 1933 tour of Germany. Some blacks even expressed anti-Semitic sentiments, blaming Jews for economic exploitation and crimes. While anti-Semitism did not make African Americans sympathetic to the Nazis' racist ideology, neither did it make them less indignant about "the Jewish problem" that seemed to stand between black athletes and Olympic glory.²⁷

The black press by no means had a monopoly on misguided indignation directed at Jews. In the fall of 1935, key AOC officials' rhetoric became tinged with blatant anti-Semitism. As an apostle of amateur sport, Brundage had always held that sports and politics should be strictly separated. This imperative shaped his response to the debate over the Olympic boycott. As the boycott campaign swelled, Brundage began to see it as his solemn mission to protect the Olympics from political controversies stemming from racial and religious grievances. The doctrine of separation of politics and sports also meant, at least in his legal universe, that the only thing the IOC could legitimately ask of the Nazis was that they honor the Olympic rules when hosting the Games in Berlin.²⁸

Once Brundage exonerated the Nazis' general racial practices in this way, his ire was naturally redirected at those who doggedly refused to accept the Nazi promises to honor the IOC Charter at the Games. In this epistemological shift, Brundage began to ascribe the boycott movement to a Jewish-Communist conspiracy. In his numerous public pronouncements, Brundage branded advocates of the boycott as "inspired by Communists" trying to tear down "true Americanism." The pro-boycott Jews were putting "their own people and their own clan" before the "patriotic enterprise" supported by "one hundred and twenty million non-Jews in the U.S." Brundage's Midwestern conservative Protestant background inclined him to look askance at East Coast political liberalism and its Jewish adherents. In the heat of the boycott controversy, this tendency found an outlet. He even made a diabolical prediction to a confidant that a wave of anti-Semitism would follow if the Jews dared persist in opposing the Games.²⁹

THE BRUNDAGE-MAHONEY SHOWDOWN AND THE AAU CONVENTION IN DECEMBER 1935

Brundage's relationship with Mahoney descended in a downward spiral following the latter's open call for a boycott in July.³⁰ The dueling positions taken by the two paramount figures in American amateur sports were crystallized in arguments made in two pamphlets published amid the boycott controversy to gather public support. *Fair Play for American Athletes*, a sixteen-page pamphlet published by the AOC in October 1935, bore clear ideological imprints of the organization's president. An opposing group, the Committee on Fair Play in Sports (CFPS), organized by Mahoney and made up of twenty-six religious leaders, politicians, academics, and labor leaders, published its own pamphlet a month later. Sixty-one pages in length, it frontally disputed the AOC's claims of Nazi fulfillment of its earlier pledges and castigated officials such as Brundage and Sherrill for virtually endorsing the Nazi regime and its repressive policies. To participate in the Nazis' Olympics, it argued, was to relinquish "America's moral standing as the world's key defender of human rights."³¹

In *Fair Play for American Athletes*, ten thousand copies of which were distributed to sports groups and high school and college athletic coaches, Brundage resorted to every rhetorical device that might tug the emotional strings of mainstream America. Framing his rhetorical question in not-so-subtly religious terms, Brundage asked if the American athlete should be allowed to be made "a martyr to a cause not his own." Are Jewish "organized

minorities” not using the Olympic Games as a political weapon to undermine a foreign government accused, falsely perhaps, of persecuting “their own people”? After all, “the Jewish problem” was Germany’s internal affair, and to involve innocent American athletes in “the present Jew-Nazi altercation” would “completely invert the object of the games.” George Washington, who had advised against “meddling” in foreign affairs, was invoked in Brundage’s crassly nationalistic appeal to “every loyal, red-blooded citizen of the United States” to support the AOC and its “patriotic enterprise.” Japanese participation in the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics was held up as a model to be emulated. The strained relationship with the United States after the Mukden Incident notwithstanding, Japan chose to send a delegation of athletes, and “their sportsmanship and accomplishments won over the American admiration.” The Olympic Games helped bridge the differences [between nations] “through solidarity, not boycott.”³²

By the time of the AAU’s national convention in early December, Mahoney had garnered formidable support for his position within the organization. The venue of the meeting, New York City, also worried Brundage because of its high concentration of Jews. Determined to block his nemesis’s endeavors, Brundage left no stone unturned, and in this he had a staunch ally in Baillet-Latour. IOC regulations required the signature of an AAU representative on each athlete’s eligibility form to verify the amateur status of the competitor. The AOC’s decision to send a U.S. Olympic team to Berlin thus did not automatically guarantee that athletes would actually be able to compete in the Games. Anticipating a close vote in New York, Brundage secretly cut a deal with the IOC president to render AAU amateur status authorization unnecessary for participation in the Berlin Games.³³ Brundage also marshaled the AAU’s allied bodies with no stakes in Olympic events to attend the convention to neutralize the Mahoney group’s advantage.

At the AAU convention, long remembered for its climactic vitriol, Mahoney’s motion to investigate further before certifying American athletes failed by a vote of 58¼ to 53¾ and the AAU agreed to support sending a U. S. team to the Winter Games at Garmisch-Partenkirchen and to the Summer Games in Berlin.³⁴ U.S. participation in the Berlin Olympics was thus finalized, albeit with a perfunctory face-saving declaration that the AAU’s decision to certify U.S. athletes did not mean endorsement of the Nazi regime or its policies. Historian Stephen Wenn’s detailed study of the fateful convention has convincingly shown that the virtually unanimous support from the AAU allied bodies rounded up by Brundage clinched his narrow victory. Outmaneuvered, Mahoney refused to run for a second presidential term, and

none other than Brundage was elected to take his place. Brundage's successful delivery of the U.S. team to the Berlin Olympics also paved the way for his election to the IOC, the organization over which he would reign as president, the iron chancellor of amateur sport, between 1952 and 1972.³⁵

A TRANSNATIONAL COALITION OF NAZI OLYMPIC APOLOGISTS

Brundage's willful collaboration with the IOC's marching orders showed but a tip of the transnational iceberg of partnership among Nazi Olympic apologists. Pierre de Coubertin, whom the German Olympic Organizing Committee for the Berlin Olympics had persistently courted since 1933, came out of retirement in August 1935 to accept an invitation to visit Berlin to tour the Olympic venues. In the Reich's capital city, the founder of the modern Olympic movement recorded a radio message in which he declared his full confidence in the arrangements for the forthcoming Berlin Games. Not even a lavish reception held in his honor at Berlin's Pergamon Museum could match the flattery bestowed on the founding father of the modern Olympics when the Nazi regime nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize a few months later.³⁶

Some U.S. leaders of amateur sports also began to work closely with the Berlin Olympics' propaganda unit. For example, the AOC's publicity director advised Diem that the Reich sports authorities should be more circumspect regarding the timing of their public relations campaigns and refrain from overtly synchronizing their news releases with Brundage's activities on behalf of the Berlin Olympics. Right before the AAU convention, the German Olympic Committee announced that Helen Mayer had accepted its invitation to compete on the German Olympic team. Immediately after Brundage's hard-won victory in New York, Goebbels announced the commissioning of an Olympic "documentary" film to be directed by filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl, who had just made a name for herself with such a film about the 1934 Nuremberg Nazi Party Congress. In rapid succession, the Germans announced plans for an exhibition on the Olympic site to showcase the success of the Nazi system of government: A budget of 400,000 reichsmarks had been earmarked for the purchase of flags that would adorn the site in much the same way as the Nazi Party rally grounds at Nuremberg.³⁷

AOC officials, on their part, masterfully coordinated their publicity with the IOC. Baillet-Latour visited the United States in late November to make good on his promise to Brundage that the IOC leader would help combat the "Jewish boycott campaign." En route, Baillet-Latour visited Berlin to inspect

the Olympic site and met with Hitler. There, he obtained the führer's personal commitment that anti-Semitic posters and signs would be removed from the Olympic sites, a coup he took care to trumpet while in the United States. The IOC president considered it a major concession because Nazi Germany, a sovereign nation, was not required to take any orders from the IOC. As an international organization, the IOC, he reminded Brundage, could no more demand that Jews be on the German team than it could demand the inclusion of blacks on the U.S. team.³⁸

During Baillet-Latour's publicity junket, Ernest Lee Jahncke, the third American IOC member, incurred the IOC kingpin's wrath by publishing an open letter addressed to him in the *New York Times*. A staunch Republican who had served as President Herbert Hoover's assistant secretary of the navy, Jahncke boldly admonished Baillet-Latour that it was "plainly your duty to hold the Nazi sports authorities accountable for the violation of their pledge," and challenged the sitting IOC president to "take your rightful place in the history of the Olympics alongside de Coubertin instead of Hitler."³⁹ The Belgian count branded Jahncke a traitor to the IOC and requested his resignation. Jahncke refused.⁴⁰ In July, the IOC voted to expel Jahncke from the organization—the only such case in IOC history to date. The international governing body then elected fellow American Brundage as the ousted Jahncke's replacement.

The IOC leadership and its U.S. auxiliary closed ranks behind what they saw as a cause far greater than the Nazis' internal repression and looming external aggression: the survival and growth of the international Olympic movement. In August 1935, Sherrill visited Germany and had two audiences with Hitler. Sherrill was personally assured by the führer, with Baillet-Latour's intercession, of the inclusion of two Jewish athletes in the forthcoming Olympic Games. Sherrill returned to the United States mesmerized by the force of Hitler's personality and charisma.⁴¹ From that point on, Sherrill, still claiming to be a friend of the Jews, became a quasi-apologist and publicity agent for the führer's Olympics. In his correspondence with Baillet-Latour, Sherrill prodded the IOC president to ask Mahoney why the latter was not bothered by the plight of the black athletes who suffered from racial exclusion, not only below the Mason-Dixon Line, but in the New York Athletic Club, to which both Sherrill and Mahoney belonged.⁴²

By the time Nazi Germany hosted the Winter Olympics in Garmisch-Partenkirchen in February 1936, the IOC had become irreversibly invested in the Nazis' successful hosting of its sporting festivals. And the institutional investment was mutual. When Baillet-Latour learned that the streets and

roads of Garmisch-Partenkirchen were festooned with anti-Semitic placards and signs, he requested, and summarily obtained, their removal before the Games began. The Nazi hosts also took pains to convince the world that their regime was hospitable and peaceable. Nazi Party members were ordered not to wear uniforms at Olympic venues; the state-run radio stopped playing martial music and propagandistic songs during the Winter Games; and, in an extralegal measure in the era of the Nuremberg Laws, local innkeepers and eateries were ordered by the Reich government to host all their guests, including Jews, courteously. As the Games began, Goebbels proudly declared: "We desire in these weeks to prove to the world that it is simply a lie that Germans have systematically persecuted the Jews."⁴³

THE FDR ADMINISTRATION AND THE POLICY OF NONINTERVENTION

It was a month after the Garmisch-Partenkirchen Winter Olympics that Hitler marched his army into the Rhineland and occupied the demilitarized area. The remilitarization of the Rhineland was a clear-cut violation not only of the Treaty of Versailles, but also of the 1925 Locarno treaties. And yet Hitler and his Nazi cohort clearly assumed, quite correctly it turned out, that this infraction of Germany's international obligations would not cost them the Summer Olympic Games. The British and the French governments protested, as they had done in the previous year in response to Germany's rearmament, but again they did little more.

American advocates of the Olympic boycott intensified their appeals to the U.S. government. By then, concerned officials in the State Department were fully apprised of the Nazis' feigned civility and empty promises to the IOC and U.S. sports officials. George Messersmith, the U.S. consul in Berlin, had been particularly active in reporting on the plight of German Jews since 1933, undertaking extensive investigation and providing copious documentation. In November 1935, Messersmith informed his superiors in Washington that Lewald had confessed to him, in tears, to having lied in attesting to Brundage and other AOC officials that no discrimination against Jewish athletes existed in Nazi Germany.⁴⁴ Even after being appointed U.S. minister to Austria and having transferred to Vienna in 1934, Messersmith did not stop alerting the State Department about the Nazis' exploitation of the Olympics for propaganda purposes.⁴⁵ Higher on the bureaucratic ladder, U.S. ambassador to Germany William Dodd repeatedly complained to Secretary of State Cordell Hull about the AOC's decision to send U.S. athletes to the Berlin Games and the lack of leadership on this matter by the FDR administration.⁴⁶

The existing literature on the administration's policy toward the Berlin Olympics has abundantly demonstrated that Washington's response to these warnings and appeals was a willful and determined nonintervention. This strategy was shaped fairly early on in Roosevelt's administration, probably at the time of his initial exposure to the thorny question of the Berlin Games. In December 1933, Sherrill advised Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, who in turn relayed that advice to FDR, as his trusted adviser, to stay clear of this political minefield.⁴⁷ After the AOC accepted the invitation to the Olympics, the administration found it necessary to avoid any appearance of giving official sanction to U.S. participation in the Games. Louis D. Gross, editor of the *Jewish Examiner*, protested to FDR that the president's title as honorary AOC president had been exploited for the organization's pro-participation campaigns and fund-raising.⁴⁸

In early 1936, with the AAU denouement safely behind them, AOC leaders began to canvass "lobby" the White House for presidential support for their fund-raising efforts. AOC executive official George Grave wrote to FDR soliciting his personal donation, reminding the president of the monetary contribution he had made to the 1932 Lake Placid Winter Games as governor of New York. FDR declined to oblige, and took care to send in regrets through his personal secretary.⁴⁹ At about the same time, Dietrich Wortmann, chairman of the German American Olympic Fund Committee, began circulating a letter soliciting donations to his group. Since the names of Roosevelt (AOC honorary president), Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War George Dern, and Navy Secretary Claude A. Swanson (honorary vice-presidents) were printed on his letterhead, the implied association of top administration officials with Olympic fund-raising did not escape the notice of boycott proponents. The Anti-Nazi Federation of New York City vocally criticized FDR for what it called the president's "outright cooperation with Germans who hoped to spread Nazi propaganda within the U.S." Hull was compelled to explain at a news conference that the acceptance of such honorary positions was only customary and carried no political meaning and international significance.⁵⁰

The president and the State Department maintained their rigid noninvolvement policy in response to popular efforts to undercut the Berlin Olympics. The CFPS, in cooperation with overseas pro-boycott groups, organized alternative Olympics Games called the People's Olympiad. The event was to take place in Barcelona in July 1936, but it was aborted by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Seeking government support for this undertaking, CFPS leaders George Gordon Battle and Henry Smith Leiper had asked Roosevelt to send a well-wishing message to the team departing for Barcelona. The

State Department advised the president not to oblige. The same hands-off treatment was accorded the AOC weeks later when the committee requested either the honor of the president's presence at the U.S. Olympic team's departure for Berlin or a presidential address to the athletes from Washington via a radio hookup. Neither was granted.⁵¹ The State Department also declined the German Olympic Committee's request that official government identity cards be issued to U.S. athletes.⁵²

Roosevelt clearly found himself in a profound conundrum. Articulate segments of the American public were pressing their government to go on record condemning the Nazi treatment of German Jews. But he was also alerted by administrative officials about the risk of offending the Nazi regime and jeopardizing chances of collecting post-World War I German debts to American banks (and citizens who bought the bonds). Some of his advisers wondered if overt diplomatic pressure might worsen, rather than improve, the situation for German Jews. A savvy politician, Roosevelt was not about to alienate the segment of the American electorate influenced by popular anti-Semitism as he sought reelection. On a more philosophical level, Roosevelt believed that the parameters of U.S. government responsibility did not encompass *German* Jews. Unless *American* Jews were victimized, it was not Washington's affair, and the United States could and should do nothing beyond exerting informal and personal influences.⁵³

FDR's policy of not-so-benign neglect paralleled his administration's general approach to the gathering clouds of persecution hanging over German Jews and to the unfolding diplomatic and military crises arising from Nazi transgressions in Europe in the mid-1930s.⁵⁴ During the nationally high-profile Mahoney-Brundage controversy, Roosevelt made no attempt to influence the debate in one way or another, despite the numerous letters the White House received from private citizens throughout the fall of 1935 and in the weeks following the AAU decision. Those letters were answered with form letters from the State Department's Division of Protocol and Conferences, pointing out that the question of Olympic participation was not the responsibility of the U.S. government.⁵⁵

Nor did pressure from concerned members of Congress visibly move the administration. Besides Celler, who took a prominent leadership role, Senators Peter Gerry (D-RI) and David Walsh (D-MA) and Representative William Citron (D-CT) opposed participation in the Berlin Games and raised concern over the safety of American Jewish athletes. In August 1935, Citron spoke on the House floor in an attempt to garner his colleagues' support, saying his position on the Games was one that great forebears such as Jefferson,

Lincoln, and Wilson would have taken. No formal response came from the White House or the State Department.⁵⁶

CONCLUSION

Between August 1 and August 16, 1936, 4,069 athletes representing forty-nine countries from around the world competed in Berlin, making the 1936 Olympics grander than any previous Games. In many ways, the Berlin Games, the last pre-World War II Olympics, marked the beginning of the mass pageantry and media spectacle that one associates with the Olympic Games today. It was during the Berlin Games that closed-circuit television was introduced, and about 150,000 people watched the competitions in twenty-eight locations. For the first time, a torch relay took place during the Games. Modeled on a relay that occurred in Athens in 80 BC, a torch was lighted at Olympia and relayed by thousands of runners to the Olympic stadium in Berlin, climaxing in the ignition of the sacred Olympic flame. Spiridon Louis, the Greek peasant who had won the first marathon in the inaugural Athens Games in 1896, presented Hitler with an olive branch at the opening ceremony. The organization of events was flawless and the facilities grand and spectacular. Originally constructed for the canceled 1916 Berlin Olympic Games, the main stadium had been expanded to accommodate 110,000 spectators. The open-air Olympic pool arena accommodated 18,000 spectators.⁵⁷ With all the trappings and symbolism, however, the Berlin Olympics were not the triumph of peace and international goodwill that their celebrants, German or not, claimed they were; rather, they were a propaganda coup of colossal proportions for the regime that would in barely two months sign a military pact to launch the Axis alliance.

The tortuous process through which the United States fielded an Olympic team and sent American athletes to Berlin in the summer of 1936 gives a glimpse into the condition of the United States as a society and nation in the turbulent 1930s. Although the plight of German Jewry loomed increasingly in the political consciousness of informed Americans, the FDR administration did not regard itself as required, legally or morally, to intervene to stop racist persecution committed within the borders of another sovereign state. Anti-Semitism was a potent strain in American popular ideology, as well as in the moral universe of the patrician European elite occupying the apex of the international Olympic movement. Some Americans readily accepted the notion constructed and disseminated by Brundage and his associates that the boycott agitation was a Jewish-Communist conspiracy and that supporting

American Olympians against that international conspiracy was an act of patriotism. Hitler's human rights violations appeared less repugnant as long as his regime was seen as an anti-Bolshevist redoubt in Europe.

Besides, race-based exclusion was America's own Achilles' heel. Sherrill's comment made at the height of the boycott controversy inadvertently shined light on this inconvenient truth about American democracy: "As to obstacles placed in the way of Jewish athletes . . . I would have no more business discussing that in Germany than if the Germans attempted to discuss the Negro situation in the American South or the treatment of the Japanese in California."⁵⁸ Racist exclusion was an entrenched aspect of American sport, amateur and professional. Cloaking themselves in the doctrine of "freedom of association," the AAU's Southern districts did not admit blacks, forcing black athletes seeking to participate in the Berlin Olympics to register in the North. As was noted earlier, Sherrill and Mahoney's own sports club in New York City did not admit blacks.⁵⁹

Finally, officials in the FDR administration had but an inchoate appreciation of international sporting events, most importantly the Olympics, as a vehicle of national representation and mass mobilization in the highly mediated modern world. In this respect, the Nazis were light years ahead in building their arsenal of iconographical weapons. Washington adhered to a forty-year tradition of American Olympism in which the AOC operated autonomously, free of state power. This benign neglect of sports by the state, embedded in mid-decade American liberal ideology, helped create a type of free-enterprise zone in which a perverse partnership grew between amateur sports leaders of certain moral persuasions and institutional allegiances, their overseas allies, and a highly centralized foreign government determined to deploy this emerging vehicle of national representation and mass pageantry to enhance its domestic political legitimacy and international prestige. This transnational coalition played host to a phony peace that would metastasize into the Phony War in the middle of Europe in three years.

NOTES

¹ John Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics, and the Moral Order* (New York: Caratzas, 1986), 1–27.

² The literature on the 1936 Berlin Olympics is extensive. Bill Murray's 1992 review essay underscores the enormous scholarly attention drawn to the Berlin Games. See "Berlin in 1936: Old and New Work on the Nazi Olympics," *International Journal of the History of Sport* (hereafter *IJHS*) 9 (April 1992): 29–42. Representative monographs on the 1936 Olympics include Duff Hart-Davis, *Hitler's Games: The 1936 Olympics* (London: Century Hutchinson, 1986); Richard Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics* (New York: Macmillan, 1971). For studies focus-

ing on U.S. participation in the 1936 Olympics, see George Eisen, "The Voices of Sanity: American Diplomatic Reports from the 1936 Berlin Olympiad," *Journal of Sport History* (hereafter *JSH*) 11 (Winter 1984): 56–78; Stephen R. Wenn, "A Tale of Two Diplomats: George S. Messersmith and Charles H. Sherrill on Proposed American Participation in the 1936 Olympics," *JSH* 16 (Spring 1989): 27–43; Stephen R. Wenn, "Suitable Policy of Neutrality?" *IJHS* 8 (December 1991): 319–35; Carolyn Marvin, "Avery Brundage and American Participation in the 1936 Olympics," *Journal of American Studies* 16 (April 1982): 81–106.

³ Barbara Keys, *Globalization of Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), chaps. 4–5; Allen Guttman, *The Olympics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 37–52.

⁴ For boycott movements in Canada and Europe, see Allen Guttman, "The 'Nazi Olympics' and the American Boycott Controversy," in *Sport and International Politics*, ed. Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan (London: E & FN Spon, 1998), 40–41.

⁵ Susan Bachrach, *The Nazi Olympics* (Boston: Little, Brown), 13.

⁶ Bernard S. Deutch to Avery Brundage, October 8, 1933, Avery Brundage Collection (hereafter ABC), University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, box 153; Allen Guttman, *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 63; *New York Times* (hereafter *NYT*), April 4, 1933; Stephen R. Wenn, "Death-Knell for the Amateur Athletic Union: Avery Brundage, Jeremiah Mahoney, and the 1935 AAU Convention," *IJHS* 3 (December 1996): 261.

⁷ Guttman, "The Nazi Olympics," 31.

⁸ Hart-Davis, *Hitler's Games*, 45–46.

⁹ Guttman, "The Nazi Olympics," 32–33.

¹⁰ Bachrach, *The Nazi Olympics*, 35.

¹¹ International Olympic Committee, *Bulletin du C. I. O.*, September 1933, 9; *NYT*, May 29, 1933; Sherrill to Rubien, June 11, 1933, ABC, box 35.

¹² G. A. Carr, "Sport and Party Ideology in the Third Reich," *Sport History Review* 5 (May 1974): 1–9; *NYT*, June 8, 1933.

¹³ *NYT*, August 27, 1933.

¹⁴ Kirby to Gilbert, December 14, 1933, ABC, box 26; Kirby to Brundage, November 2, 1933, ABC, box 29.

¹⁵ Baillet-Latour to Brundage, December 29, 1933; Brundage to Baillet-Latour, December 28, 1933: ABC, box 42.

¹⁶ *NYT*, March 9, 1934.

¹⁷ The Nazis invited two athletes of "mixed ancestry" to join the Olympic team, Rudi Ball as an ice hockey player and Helene Mayer as a fencer. Mayer, who lived in the United States, won an Olympic gold medal in 1928 and was the U.S. champion from 1933 to 1935. She accepted the German invitation and won a silver medal in the individual saber. She gave the Hitler salute on the medal stand. Gretel Bergmann was denied a place in the team despite her being Germany's best woman high jumper. *NYT*, November 23, 1933, June 19, 1934; International Olympic Committee, *Bulletin du C. I. O.*, October 1934, 8.

¹⁸ For Avery Brundage's biography, see Guttman, *Games Must Go On*.

¹⁹ For Mahoney and his allies' view, see The Committee on Fair Play in Sports, *Preserve the Olympic Ideal: A Statement of the Case against American Participation in the Olympics Games at Berlin* (New York: CFPS, 1935).

²⁰ Wenn, "A Tale of Two Diplomats," 27–42; Edstrom to Brundage, December 4, 1933, ABC, box 240.

²¹ Brundage to Karl Ritter von Halt, October 22, 1934, ABC, box 29; *NYT*, September 26, 27, and 30, 1934, October 17, 1934, December 8, 1934.

²² *NYT*, September 27, 1934.

²³ Brundage to Gilbert, November 17, 1934, ABC, box 28; "Jewish Delegates at the AAU Conventions," undated, ABC, box 153.

²⁴ Roosevelt to Dodd, April 16, 1935, in *FDR: His Personal Letters*, ed. Elliot Roosevelt et al., 2 vols. (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950), 1:475.

²⁵ *NYT*, October 21, 1935.

²⁶ Hart-Davis, *The Nazi Olympics*, 75–81. For a superb study of the role of liberal Protestant denominational leaders in the 1936 Olympic controversy, see Richard A. Swanson, "'Move the Olympics!' 'Germany Must Be Told!'" *Olympikita* 12 (2003): 39–50.

²⁷ David K. Wiggins, "The 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin: The Response of America's Black Press," *Research Quarterly* 54 (September 1983): 278–92; Bachrach, *The Nazi Olympics*, 55–60.

²⁸ Brundage to Kirby, March 3, 1934, ABC box 28.

²⁹ "Undated Speech Early 1936," "Americanism," ABC, box 232; Rubien to Brundage, October 8, 1935, ABC box 152; letter to Halt, December 10, 1935, and Brundage to Halt, January 14, 1936, ABC, box 153; Lt. Col. M. Hadley to Brundage, December 16, 1935, ABC box 234>; Brundage to Lasker, March 30, 1936, and Lasker to Brundage, April 14, 1936, ABC, box 234.

³⁰ See, for example, Arnd Kruger, "Fair Play for American Athletes: A Study in Anti-Semitism," *Canadian Journal of History of Sport and Physical Education* 9 (May 1978): 42–57; Marvin, "Avery Brundage."

³¹ The group sponsored the People's Olympics scheduled to be held in Barcelona in July 1936. For the People's Olympics, see Edward S. Shapiro, "The World Labor Athletic Carnival of 1936: An American Anti-Nazi Protest," *American Jewish History* 74 (March 1985): 255–73.

³² *Fair Play for American Athletes* (Chicago, American Olympic Committee, 1935), ABC, box 110. Accusing the Jews of trying to take away a "birthright [to compete in the Olympics]" from American athletes was a common theme running through public statements of AOC officials such as Sherrill. See, for example, *Commonweal*, November 11, 1935.

³³ Eström to Brundage, September 12, 1935; Brundage to Baillet-Latour, September 24, 1935; Baillet-Latour to Brundage, November 17, 1935; Brundage to Eström, August 29, 1935; Eström to Brundage, September 12, 1935: ABC, box 42.

³⁴ Brundage to Garland, October 28, 1935, ABC, box 56. Some allied bodies apparently only had a quarter or a half vote.

³⁵ Wenn, "Death-Knell," 273–76.

³⁶ Louis Callebat, *Pierre de Coubertin* (Paris: Fayard, 1988), 206–7.

³⁷ Lasker to Brundage, March 30, 1936, and Lasker to Brundage, April 14, 1936, ABC, box 234; *NYT*, December 10 and 15, 1935.

³⁸ Baillet-Latour to Brundage, November 3, 1935, ABC, box 42.

³⁹ *NYT*, November 27, 1935.

⁴⁰ Baillet-Latour to Brundage, October 10, 1935, December 10, 1935; Baillet-Latour to Jahncke, December 13, 1935; Brundage to Baillet-Latour, January 6, 1936: ABC, box 42. Baillet-Latour to Brundage, November 3, 1935, ABC, box 42.

⁴¹ Wenn, "A Tale of Two Diplomats."

⁴² Eisen, "The Voices of Sanity," 56–78.

⁴³ In those days both the Winter and Summer Olympics were hosted by the same country in the same year.

⁴⁴ In May 1933, Roosevelt took up the issue of Nazi treatment of Jews with a German diplomatic representative. He pointed out the danger it posed for German-American relations, "not necessarily because of American sympathy for the Jews, but out of the old Anglo-Saxon sense of chivalry towards the weaker." Stimson to Sackett, March 3, 1933; Sackett to Hull,

March 9, 1933; Hull to Sackett, March 21, 1933, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, 2:209, 320, 326–27; Wenn, “Suitable Policy of Neutrality.”

⁴⁵ Messersmith to Hull, June 17, 1933; Messersmith to Hull, November 28, 1933, State Department Decimal Files (hereafter *SDDF*) 862.4063 Olympic Games/IOC, National Archives, College Park (MD); Messersmith to Moffat, October 18, 1934; Messersmith to Phillips, August 12, 1935, August 27, 1935; Messersmith to Dunn, October 17, 1935: *SDDF* 862.4062.

⁴⁶ Messersmith to State Department, *SDDF* 862.4063/Olympic Games/57.

⁴⁷ Wenn, “Suitable Policy of Neutrality,” 321.

⁴⁸ Gross to FDR, October 26, 1934, *SDDF* 811.43, National Archives.

⁴⁹ Wenn, “Suitable Policy of Neutrality,” 325.

⁵⁰ Wortmann to Brundage, April 28, 1936, ABC, box 234.

⁵¹ Wenn, “Suitable Policy of Neutrality,” 326–37.

⁵² Edgar B. Nixon, ed., *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), 1:51; Sheldon Neuringer, “Franklin Roosevelt and Refuge for Victims of Nazism, 1933–1941,” in *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Man, the Myth, the Era, 1882–1945*, ed. Herbert Rosenbaum and Elizabeth Bartelme (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 87; Memo of conversation, Dunn and Leitner, December 11, 1935, *SDDF* 862.4062; Memorandum, June 4, 1936, *SDDF* 862.4062; Kirby to Brundage, November 2, 1933, ABC, box 29.

⁵³ Neuringer, “Refuge for Victims,” 88–89; William Dodd Jr. and Martha Dodd, eds., *Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933–1938* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1941), 10.

⁵⁴ Manfred Jonas, *The United States and Germany* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 214–23.

⁵⁵ Weber to FDR, September 26, 1935, *SDDF* 862.4063; Martin Phillipsborn to FDR, October 4, 1935; Hayman to FDR, November 6, 1935; Gamsey to FDR, September 26, 1935, January 13 and 19, 1936; Holmes to Hayman, November 22, 1935; Holmes to Gamsey, January 27, 1936: *SDDF* 862-4163.

⁵⁶ Wenn, “Suitable Policy of Neutrality,” 326–27.

⁵⁷ *Official Report: XIth Olympic Games, Berlin, 1936*, (129-41, 512-4), 196.

⁵⁸ *NYT*, October 22, 1935.

⁵⁹ *Nation*, December 11, 1935, 666.