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INTRODUCTION

The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union was established in 1874 in Cleveland, Ohio, as a response to the widespread consumption of alcohol that was prevalent in the last half of the nineteenth century in the United States.¹ It expanded quickly, especially under the leadership of Frances E. Willard, becoming one of the largest women’s organizations in the United States at that time.² In addition to appealing to Americans, Willard organized the World’s WCTU, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois, to spread the temperance cause and carry out domestic reform throughout the world. She dreamed of spreading virtuous Victorian ideology and Christianity symbolized by the slogan, “organized mother’s love,” and of binding the world together with the white ribbon, their emblem, symbolizing unblemished purity and peace. Mary Clement Leavitt, a former union organizer on the West Coast, was the first to assume the role of organizing branches of the World’s WCTU throughout

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the world, and she went to Japan and China in 1886 to organize branch unions there.

Subsequently, the World’s WCTU expanded rapidly by utilizing the frameworks of expansion characteristic of U.S. and British imperialism and global Protestant missionary networks. By the 1920s, the WCTU had grown internationally to cover more than 40 nations and regions, and even called itself the “White Ribbon League of Nations.” Meanwhile, its national branch in Japan had aggressively taken part in transnational networking of women by dispatching its delegates to international meetings since the beginning of the twentieth century. Later, Chinese women came into the global arena and participated in the trans-Pacific dialogue. Ostensibly, the frequent interaction of American and Asian women promoted their friendship. But their quest for mutual understanding was constantly challenged by racism and imperialism, both of which characterized trans-Pacific relations during the first two decades of the twentieth century. American women affirmed their superiority over Asian nationals, Japanese women thirsted for equal status with westerners while looking down on their Asian neighbors, and Chinese women disagreed with imperial exploitation of their homeland by both Western powers and Japan. The military dispute between Japan and China over the hegemony of Manchuria in 1931 made the cracks in the white ribbon sisterhood more evident and the rise of hatred deriving from violent conflicts gradually made it harder for the World’s WCTU to achieve its anticipated ends.

This study examines the trans-Pacific dialogue of the World’s WCTU and its national chapters in the United States, Japan, and China between 1931 and 1945. Recently, more and more scholars have given attention to the non-official elements of international relations and have demonstrated close ties between domestic arrangements of race, gender, class and international affairs. Indeed, various studies have examined women’s collective and individual efforts to incorporate their voices into the agendas of international affairs. However, in general, these studies have focused on women from western nations and their trans-Atlantic connections while leaving Asian women in the background of their examinations. Unlike such Eurocentric studies of transnational women’s activities, this essay concentrates on women of both America and Asia, especially Japan and China, and their role in constructing the wartime trans-Pacific dialogue. It also explores the vicissitudes of the white ribbon sisterhood during the wartime period.
DETERIORATING SISTERHOOD: JAPANESE MILITARY AGGRESSION IN CHINA AND THE WCTU

After the financial avalanche initiated by the collapse of the New York stock market in 1929, the Japanese leaders assumed that securing Japanese hegemony in Manchuria was crucial in order to save Japan from an economic crisis. However, the outbreak of war in China drove American WCTU members into an awkward position between their Chinese and Japanese sisters. These American women, who constituted 57 percent of the membership of the world union, refrained from blaming Japan and prudently avoided becoming entangled in the crisis by favoring either China or Japan.8 The aloofness of the World’s WCTU to the Manchurian disputes during the early 1930s protected the White Ribbon League of Nations from disintegration.9

In sharp contrast to the retreat of the American union from the realpolitik of the Far East, both the Japanese and Chinese WCTUs aggressively involved themselves in the Manchurian crisis. A letter from Chinese women in Shanghai triggered a heated dialogue between the two groups. The letter was predicated on the fact that the Manchurian Incident was against the Washington Conference agreements and requested the Japanese union to lobby the government against the escalation of military aggression.10 The Japanese union, however, declared that the Manchurian dispute was nothing more than a defensive action and never violated the Washington Conference agreements, although the union would support peaceful resolutions of international disputes.11 In addition to making a public statement, the Japanese union sent Hayashi Utako and Kubushiro Ochimi to China to inspect Manchuria and negotiate with Chinese women leaders, including Ting Shu-ching, the national secretary of the Young Women’s Christian Association in China, Wu Yifang, the female president of Ginling College, and Liu-Wang Liming, the president of the WCTU and the Shanghai Women’s National Salvation Alliance. These Chinese women greeted guests from Japan with great anger and accused Japan of assaulting the fragile new Republic that had already been torn apart by domestic political turmoil and numerous natural disasters.12

What annoyed the Japanese union members more was that some women’s organizations in the United States stood behind China and initiated political actions to put pressure on Japan. The U.S. Section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), for instance, lobbied the White House, the State Department, and politicians
to invoke the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty and pressure Japan through economic sanctions and an arms embargo. Such actions led Japanese women to make an international statement that they were the victims of mounting anti-Christian feelings within Japan after the Manchurian dispute, not perpetrators of rising militarism. Kubushiro Ochimi and Kawai Michi, the general director of the YWCA, co-authored a book in English, *Japanese Women Speak*, and argued that Japanese Christians were “closely watched and severely criticized by the non-Christian elements of the country, as well as by the Christian peoples of the West.” Addressing the international audience, *Japanese Women Speak* argued, “Morally speaking we cannot say Japan is all wrong, but religiously speaking we must acknowledge and confess we are wrong” (italics in original). This statement revealed a departure from her original legitimization of Japan’s military actions in Manchuria as purely defensive.

The published statement was, however, not made in the Japanese language. It was aimed primarily at an international audience, not a domestic one. Rising militarism accompanied by increased oppression of peace movements and mounting suspicion of Christians as foreign spies might have made it difficult to overtly challenge the national policy and publish critical statements within Japan. In order to cope with these sociopolitical situations, the Japanese union and its allies directed a peace-loving image toward the international audience while meeting the expectations of the authorities at home.

Liu-Wang Liming of the Chinese union extended certain sympathies to these Japanese women who were caught in difficult circumstances between public pressure and a desire to repair estranged relations between Japan and China. In particular, the letter of apology from the Women’s Peace Association led to her resuming a dialogue with the Japanese women; Gauntlett Tsune of the WCTU headed this association at that time. In the spring of 1934, Liu-Wang made a daring trip to Japan in spite of opposition from her family and friends. During her stay in Japan, she met many influential Japanese women, including the WCTU leaders. She discovered little anti-Chinese sentiment in Japanese society and felt sorry for “a great many Japanese men and women who were helpless with their militarists and who desire universal brotherhood just as much as peace-loving people do in all other parts of the world.”

The sense of coalition between women of Japan and China built by Liu-Wang’s trip, however, did not completely eliminate disagreement
with each other. Rather, the smoldering discord between the women of China and Japan remained deep in their minds and occasionally came to the surface. The eruption of the discontent of the Chinese with Japanese rule took shape during the presidential election for the Pan-Pacific Women’s Association which was organized by ruling male elites in Hawaii in 1928. When the association elected Gauntlett Tsune as the next president in 1934, out of ten nations and regions, only the Chinese delegates voted against her. After the election, China decided not to send any delegates to the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference (PPWC) as a protest against the Japanese presidency. Therefore, Gauntlett visited China and convinced the Chinese female intellectuals to send delegates to the next conference in Vancouver.

**THE ESTRANGEMENT OF JAPANESE AND CHINESE UNIONS AND INCREASING PRO-CHINESE SENTIMENT IN THE UNITED STATES**

When Japanese and Chinese forces clashed at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937, Gauntlett Tsune was in Vancouver preparing for the forthcoming PPWC. Since she and the other executives of the association excluded the issue of the new all-out war in Asia from the agenda, the meeting proceeded smoothly. However, the intensification of fighting in China entailed snowballing suspicion, fear, and hatred between Japan and China.

Japan’s military action and the shocking report of its atrocities against civilians as the “Rape of Nanking” received considerable attention from the American public and excited sympathy for the Chinese. In addition, Japan’s bombing of the U.S. gunboat *Panay* infuriated Americans. The notoriety of the Japanese force grew along with the positive Chinese reputation. China’s heroic resistance became a major story that year.

Behind the expanding sympathy for China’s plight and the growing belief in Japan’s culpability, there were pro-Chinese individuals and groups who promoted pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese sentiments in the United States. Pearl S. Buck, author of the best-selling novel *The Good Earth* (1931), and Henry Luce, owner of an influential media conglomerate, Time Inc., were representative spokespeople who disseminated positive images of China. The nominal unification of China under Chiang Kai-shek and his conversion to Christianity, and the presence of American-trained Chinese in his regime, also improved China’s image in the United States. Furthermore, Soong Mayling, or Madame Chiang
Kai-shek, captivated Americans and presented a picture completely opposite to that of Japan, represented by brutal Japanese male soldiers. Unlike her husband, she spoke flawless English and developed ties with prominent Americans who were later called the “China Lobby.”

These positive images of the Chinese symbolized by Madame Chiang Kai-shek compelled more and more Americans to support China. Since the late 1930s, certain Americans had engaged in relief efforts in China that merged to become United China Relief by late 1940. The American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, organized in New York to influence legislation preventing the sale of war supplies to Japan, included Carrie Chapman Catt of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War (NCCCW) and other prominent women.21

The presence of Catt at the Committee signaled the women’s peace organizations’ increasing concern about hostilities in Asia and rising compassion towards China. The Chinese WCTU moved to make the most of it and increased its presence in the United States. In her answer to letters from Americans who were anxious about the safety and the condition of the WCTU in China, Liu-Wang harshly attacked Japan’s invasion of China as an attempt to crush China and establish itself as a continental empire.22 At the same time, she denounced the hands-off policy of the American unionists and urged them to take immediate action to end destructive militarism and abandon their fence-sitting neutrality.23 However, the American union as an organization avoided officially condemning Japan even after the beginning of the all-out war, and to Liu-Wang’s frustration, did not call for stronger actions to halt Japan’s militarism. Instead, the American union kept portraying the Japanese as peace lovers and separated the militarists from the rest.24

The careful ideological separation of militarists from the rest of the Japanese was however, soon overwhelmed by the tragic death of Liu-Wang’s husband in April 1938. This incident not only turned her into a celebrity as a symbol of Chinese patriotism but also brought a drastic change in the neutral and noncommittal position of the American union members. Liu-Wang’s husband, Liu Zhan’en or Herman C. E. Liu, was president of Shanghai University and the chair of the Shanghai National Salvation Association. When the Japanese puppet government in Nanjing tried to recruit him as the minister of education, he refused the post and continued his resistance against Japan. On April 7, 1938, Chinese secret agents working for Japan assassinated Liu.25 Liu-Wang skillfully used this personal experience to obtain sympathy and support
from the international community. Soon after the death of her husband, she published a book, *The Death of My Husband, Dr. Herman C. E. Liu*, in both Chinese and English. In this book, she highlighted the brutality of the Japanese militarists in their treatment of the Chinese. In sharp contrast, she described her husband as a saint-like patriot who sacrificed his life for national salvation “like Lincoln, like Jesus, [to] die in his work of saving others.” Then, she expressed her indomitable determination to follow in his footsteps. In her narrative, she did not clearly state who actually shot him to death even after the arrest of two Chinese suspects. Instead, she obscured the puzzling political situation of China, which was torn into pro- and anti-Japanese factions.

Liu-Wang’s self-representation as a celebrated martyr’s widow seemed decisive in propelling a previously neutral American WCTU to side with China. After the death of Liu-Wang’s husband, the American union became predominantly supportive of China and against Japan. In December 1938, the *Union Signal*, American union’s biweekly journal, carried an article entitled “Japs Land Beer After Fall of Hankow” and critically reported that Japan unloaded 2,000 cases of Japanese beer on the Hankow Bund. This was the first time that the *Union Signal* used a racial slur in referring to Japanese. Having been persuaded that Japan was fundamentally to blame for the ravages of China and the dissemination of alcohol, American temperance workers switched their previous neutral position to the Chinese side. Liu-Wang succeeded in letting the White Ribbon League of Nations discard a hands-off policy regarding regional conflicts, even at the risk of offending its Japanese members.

The Japanese unionists, on the other hand, grew less patient with the rapidly increasing pro-Chinese sentiment in the United States. Kubushiro Ochimi deplored the fact that “Japan has been changed from a hero of the international community into a hated person since the Manchurian Incident in 1931. After the Incident of China, Japan has been treated as a consummate villain.” Restoring Japan’s international honor became a primary objective of the Japanese union.

**The Strengthened Tie Between the Temperance Women of China and the United States**

The Japanese union members thought that a rapid spread of anti-Japan and pro-China sentiment in the United States was produced because Japan lacked the equivalent of Pearl Buck. Unlike China, Japan did not
have a popular and sympathetic messenger to defend Japan.\textsuperscript{29} Kubushiro began publishing a monthly English journal entitled \textit{Japan Through Women} in the beginning of 1938 and started conveying Japanese voices to Americans. This journal carried articles about the social reform movement in Japan of which the Japanese WCTU had been the vanguard. It also published biographies of Kubushiro’s late husband, who dedicated his life to religious work, and various news regarding prominent Japanese women and their church activities. Through the narratives of the Japanese who dedicated their lives to the cause of the least privileged people and world peace, Kubushiro endeavored to present an alternative to the image of the Japanese as brutal warmongers. However, this journal, with its limited circulation, was far from influential enough to rival Buck’s \textit{The Good Earth}.\textsuperscript{30}

The Japanese women also attributed the popularity of Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the ascendancy of other intellectual Chinese women to the pro-Chinese sentiments of Americans. Seeing the example of Madam Chiang’s noticeable influence in international politics, the Japanese recognized the prominent contributions of Chinese intellectual women to various aspects of politics and social reforms at home and abroad. Although Japanese women looked at the Chinese as inferiors in need of their guidance, they became aware that middle-class, educated Chinese women could rival Japanese. This discovery challenged the modern assumption of the Japanese that positioned themselves above other Asians in terms of the “progress” of women.

Japanese WCTU members and their allies became highly apprehensive about the rise of Chinese women when they heard that Madame Chiang Kai-shek was about to attend the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference in New Zealand scheduled in January 1940. The WCTU Japan dispatched Gauntlett Tsune, then the first vice-president of the Pan-Pacific Women’s Association and well known in the women’s community of the Pacific Rim, to the United States for the preparation of the forthcoming conference.\textsuperscript{31} They were afraid that the presence of Madame Chiang at the PPWC would further strengthen pro-Chinese sentiments and disadvantage Japan in the Pacific community. The Japanese women expected Gauntlett to counter Madame Chiang and manipulate the conference procedure so that the discussions would not be taken over by her. An expected confrontation between Gauntlett and Madame Chiang, however, never occurred. The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and the declaration of war by New Zealand against Germany led to the cancellation of the conference. The PPWC was adjourned until 1949.
Germany’s invasion of Poland and the beginning of World War II in Europe soon involved Asia. Nazi Germany’s sweep over Europe fascinated Japanese policy-makers who were looking for raw materials and markets in the South Pacific. The Japanese occupation of northern Indochina and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy compelled Washington to place an embargo on aviation fuel, top-grade scrap iron, and later, all scrap metals. The Japanese WCTU looked upon the deteriorating relations with the United States with mixed feelings. Its members still held emotional ties to the United States and Great Britain, especially to the former. In sharp contrast, American women exhibited increased antipathy to Japan and sympathy for China. The chasm of feelings between the women of the two nations grew wider and wider with the worsening diplomatic relations. The deteriorating relations between Japan and the United States compelled Gauntlett Tsune to meet with American women to redirect their anti-Japanese agenda. When war broke out in Europe, she was in the United States exchanging ideas with her old acquaintances, Carrie Chapman Catt, and other prominent leaders of women’s movements, the academy, and religious groups.

Her interactions with American leaders were, however, far from frictionless and comfortable. Strong anti-Japanese feelings pervading various aspects of American society depressed her. Carrie Chapman Catt, for instance, did not stop public denunciation of Japan for its military actions in China and the NCCCW supported Roosevelt’s policy of withdrawing economic aid from Japan and giving aid to China. The Program of the NCCCW for 1940 included giving economic aid to China and renouncement of U.S. special rights there. This program was adopted in the presence of Chinese guests; the Japanese were absent.

While Gauntlett carried out fruitless private diplomacy in the United States, Liu-Wang and her Chinese sisters of the WCTU deliberately strengthened U.S.-China ties through her constant presence in the publications of the American union. She kept informing American readers of the indescribable suffering caused by the Japanese invasion and of her people’s “beautiful spirits which are vital to the upbuilding of New China.” As a result, China received sizable grants and financial support from the world’s and American WCTUs. Upon the request of Liu-Wang, between 1937 and 1940 the world union granted the largest amount of financial support it had ever given to China. In 1937, 700 dollars or about 16.7 percent of the total appropriation to its member nations went to China; the amount jumped to 1800 dollars or 20 percent in the
next year, 1938. In 1940, the total budget of the World’s WCTU shrank due to the outbreak of war in Europe. However, 24 percent of all money sent to its branches was allocated to China.\textsuperscript{37} The American union also called for donations and sent money and gift packages to China. Liu-Wang used the aid from the world and American unions for her social reform projects.\textsuperscript{38}

**The Women’s Version of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere**

The increasing support to certain nations manifested a departure from the World’s WCTU’s original policy of neutrality. Through massive amounts of financial support to China, the world union was indirectly involved in the war and fought against Japan. The WCTU of Japan looked unhappily upon the strengthening of emotional and economic ties between China and the U.S. in the late 1930s.\textsuperscript{39} Instead of seeking the favor of Americans, possibly in vain, it seemed more productive to build a solid and better bridge with China. The rejection by the United States led the Japanese union women to embrace the Asiatic cause of the war propagated by the Japanese authorities, such as the New Order of East Asia and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Soon, they embarked on benevolent works for poor Chinese. Among various new enterprises, the creation of a medical settlement called *Airinkan* (the hall of neighborly love) in the slum district of Beijing was the best manifestation of such an attempt. The establishment of the *Airinkan* was the collective project of the Japanese Christian women’s community, and the WCTU took the initiative in this new work.\textsuperscript{40} At its opening ceremony in 1939, not only the women who were involved in the project, but also high-ranking officers of the Japanese military, representatives of the Japanese embassy, and Chinese officials of a puppet Japan-oriented provisional government attended and/or delivered congratulatory addresses.\textsuperscript{41} The *Airinkan* thus began with the deep involvement of Japanese imperialism. In addition to the creation of the *Airinkan*, the WCTU established educational and social reform institutions in various parts of China.

These new WCTU enterprises aimed to alleviate distress, not to eliminate the cause of the suffering—i.e., Japan’s imperialist thrust into Manchuria and China. The union supported Japan’s military offensive as a punitive action for China’s “irrational resistance” and accepted the
propaganda of the Japanese military force as an agent for bringing stability and prosperity to China. The enforcement of discipline and tightening of morality promoted by the authorities under the rationale of a national emergency also pleased the union women. They hailed stoic Emperor Hirohito, who did not drink, smoke, or have a concubine, as the apotheosis of their ideal manhood. Therefore, they found no reason to oppose spreading his authority throughout his expanding empire.

Contrary to their expectations, their reform projects in China did not mitigate the strong public indignation of the Chinese toward Japan, nor did it thwart the rising sympathy of Americans toward China. Their American union also ignored such Japanese enterprises in their publications. Instead, the white ribbon binding China and the United States jointly refuted Japan’s dream of becoming the moral leader of Asia and shattered its intention to win the recognition of Americans. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, confirmed the estranged relations between the “White Ribbon Co-Prosperity Sphere” and its rivals, the United States and China.

The Clash between the White Ribbon Allies and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

The majority of neither the Americans nor the Japanese desired the outbreak of the Pacific War, despite disagreement over the issue of China. Although the American public was sympathetic toward the victims of aggression, the sense of isolationism still remained strong among the Americans, including the American WCTU. Their abhorrence of war was amplified by the fear of expanding liquor sales in canteens, training camps, and territory adjacent to the camps. For the Japanese WCTU, the military clash between Japan and the United States was the least favorable choice. Its members held their breath watching the diplomatic process between Washington and Tokyo oscillate between war and peace.

However, the failure of diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States and Japan’s stunning victory at Pearl Harbor triggered racialized arguments among the Japanese union members. Giving a standing ovation to the Japanese victory, Kubushiro Ochimi declared that the time had come to challenge Anglo-Saxons for their arrogant sense of racial superiority over the past three hundred years. Until the outbreak of war, she had not blamed the United States for racism against
the Japanese, even when controversy over the exclusion of Japanese immigration was fierce. After the failure of negotiations between Japan and the United States, Kubushiro bitterly looked back at the history of the Japanese exclusion movements in the United States beginning at the turn of the twentieth century. She now stated that war between the two nations seemed to be an “inevitable” result of American hostilities toward Japan since 1900.45 Other Japanese union officers also attributed the cause of the war to the United States and accused it of bluntly turning down Japan’s sincere efforts for peace.46

With the intention of facilitating empire building, the Japanese temperance women moved to inaugurate a new seminar series, “Kôa joshi shidôsha kôshûkai” (a lecture class for female leaders in Asia), where they aimed to train new female leaders in Asia.47 The new training program, geared to middle-class, “respectable” Japanese women, was a countermeasure against the exportation of prostitutes. The union was afraid that the expansion of the empire might encourage the traffic of prostitutes to cater to Japanese as well as native men. The union women also lobbied the government and politicians to raise the minimum drinking age from 20 to 25 years. They justified this agenda by arguing that protecting the youth would increase the efficiency of the military, and that the poisonous influence of alcohol would damage servicemen and future soldiers. The union was also worried about the negative effects of alcohol on health in the tropical climates into which the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere stretched.48 The wartime plans of the WCTU, campaigns against trafficking in women and the sale of liquor to youth, derived from concerns about national honor and the healthy development of the Japanese empire.

The increasing influence of military personnel in the activities of the WCTU during the Pacific War mirrored the growing collaboration between the battlefield and the home front. The union made the best use of the stoic wartime situation to implement their long-time plans of abolishing prostitution and promoting prohibition. The military government needed as many healthy soldiers as possible. Both parties feared that intemperance and exposure to licensed vice would damage national strength and hinder the smooth construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The agreements between the union and the military over moral issues resulted in their frictionless cooperation. The WCTU’s collaboration with the military led it to visit the Yasukuni Shrine and pay its respects.
to the spirits of the dead servicemen enshrined there. It also severed its affiliation with the World’s WCTU.\(^{49}\)

Despite such actions, the authorities maintained their doubts about the loyalty of its members. The Special Thought Police suspected that the patriotism of the Japanese Christian churches and organizations, including the WCTU, was a camouflage.\(^{50}\) These suspicions were ungrounded, but there was some evidence indicating their implicit emotional attachment to their former fellows. Despite its declaration of separation from the World’s WCTU and its substantial support for the war against the Allied Powers, the Japanese union could not completely suppress a subconscious bias toward the Americans and the English; whether for emulation or rejection, the United States and Great Britain still remained a model for the Japanese union members. Anger against the racism of the Anglo-Saxons was the other side of the coin of their longing for full acceptance. Such an ambivalent love/hate consciousness occasionally became apparent during the Pacific War. When Kubushiro Ochimi published a biography of Yajima Kaji in 1942, she mentioned the firm friendship between Yajima and Maria True, a Presbyterian missionary and the pillar of the Sakurai Girl’s School (later Joshi Gakuin) whose principal was Yajima.\(^{51}\) In her article on venereal diseases published during the war, she heavily quoted information obtained from her research trip to the United States.\(^{52}\) When Gauntlett Tsune argued about depopulation issues in Japan, she even encouraged her readers to learn from the efforts of consecutive British Cabinets to solve the problems of the shrinking population in Great Britain.\(^{53}\) In the middle of the trans-Pacific hostilities, the Osaka branch members held an annual meeting on February 17, 1943, the forty-fifth anniversary of Frances E. Willard’s death.\(^{54}\) They never officially announced that they had gathered to commemorate Willard, but it was obvious why they had chosen that particular day to assemble.

After the Japanese force started losing to the Allied Powers, the government tightened thought control to eliminate American and British elements from all areas of Japanese life. Thereafter, the names of Americans and Britons completely disappeared from the publications of the Japanese union. In 1944, due to a paper shortage, the government denied allocation of paper to the WCTU; thereafter, the WCTU completely lost its independent voice.\(^{55}\) The intensification of air raids in Tokyo and other cities, large and small, severely curtailed temperance work.
After Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack, the national, state, and local WCTUs assumed responsibility as patriotic citizens and collaborated with authorities as did the Japanese union members. The executive committee of the American union adopted action plans that included cooperation in war activities: purchasing defense bonds and stamps, contributing to the well-being of the armed forces, cooperating with local branches of the Red Cross and Defense Council, and supporting women in war industries and servicemen’s wives. The campaign for wartime prohibition and the prevention of juvenile delinquency were also a part of its primary agendas.56

The American WCTU also participated in perpetuating bestial images of the Japanese, just as many other popular wartime writings portrayed the Japanese as immoral pagans.57 The Union Signal introduced opinions that the war in Asia was “started by men who did not know Christ” and denounced the “Nipponese interpretation” of Christianity.58 These explanations implied that the absence of Christianity or the nativization of Christian ethics and teachings drove Japan to war.

Quite contrary to the expectation of the Japanese unionists, the American union members assumed that the Japanese military advancement would be accompanied by moral corruption and the perpetuation of liquor and drug abuse. They alleged that the Japanese force in Attu fell before the U.S. attacks because they drank too much sake, Japanese rice wine, before going into battle.59 They also shared news that Japan brought “medicines” and “vitamins” such as morphine, cocaine, and heroin, in order to “improve the people’s health” in Thailand.60 The American union argued that intemperance and sneakiness were inherent in Japanese culture and essential characteristics of the Japanese people. They reported that some Japanese in the “Jap Relocations” [Japanese American Relocation Centers] rejected drinking beer and set a new order of prohibition with the assertion that the initiator of the new rule “must be American born.”61 This statement insinuated that Japanese raised in Japan could not resist the lure of alcohol.

These stories and opinions blended temperance issues with highly racialized arguments. By repetitively referring to the Japanese in derogatory terms, these writings reaffirmed the racial and cultural hierarchy allocating the Japanese subhuman status. The temperance advocates in America always identified the Japanese as Japs and Nipponese, whether
they were military officers in China or detainees at a relocation camp in the United States. Historian John Dower revealed that the popular wartime discourse in the United States tended to distinguish between good and bad Germans and portrayed German atrocities as “Nazi” crimes, while the Japanese brutality was almost always presented as being simply “Japanese.” Temperance activists developed similarly essentialized arguments regarding the Japanese and portrayed them as the source of moral corruption. They dehumanized the Japanese by associating them with drugs and liquor and argued that the spread of Japanese rule meant the spread of poisons; they were afraid that Japan would pollute the purity of white nations.

In contrast to the repeated references to narcotics and alcohol, the American union dropped sexual issues from its argument. The prostitution problems that haunted the Japanese union and sexual violence by Japanese soldiers were a life-or-death problem for many women in Asia. But the American unionists paid not the slightest attention to these sexual issues. These problems were part of the life experiences only of women on the other side of the Pacific and not of American women; Japan’s “narcotic invasion” seemed much more threatening to them. Highlighting only what posed an imminent threat to their own lives weakened the effectiveness of the American union as an organization working towards improving their Asian sisters’ lives.

**THE CELEBRATION OF A GREAT HUMANITARIAN IN CHINA: CONFIRMED FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN WCTUs**

The elevated description of the Chinese accompanied the degrading representation of the Japanese by the American WCTU. American WCTU women bestowed an encomium on Liu-Wang Liming, or the “Frances Willard” of China, for her dedication to the welfare of women and children and her patriotic zeal. They often referred to her spiritual strength to stand up to the tragic loss of her husband and to her work on behalf of the least privileged women and children. Her facilities for women and children, an institute for refugee children, an around-the-clock nursery to care for the children of working women, and a vocational school for young women refugees, soldiers’ families, and poor girls, always suffered from skyrocketing prices. Only money sent from the United States enabled her to continue these enterprises.
Liu-Wang’s work for the welfare of needy women and orphaned children and her unshakable determination to resist invaders paralleled idealized images of women in wartime America. Lack of manpower caused by the mobilization of men to the front drew women into the workforce and even into the military. However, the chief propagandists reaffirmed the familiar values of devotion to family despite the war-generated depictions of women in nontraditional pursuits. The wartime emergency also boosted women’s patriotism and utilized their domestic skills, such as canning, knitting, and even the management of personal finances, for the war effort. Through “mothering” orphans and “caring” for war victims, Liu-Wang carried out patriotic activities without undermining the ideology that women’s primary role was devotion to home and mothering. The name of her institution, “Victory Nursery” in Chungking, represented an ideal combination of patriotism and the celebration of motherhood. She perfectly fit into the idealistic wartime gender roles of the United States. The WCTU members in the United States did not hesitate to support her patriotic, yet feminine, mission.

Liu-Wang’s personal connection with Madame Chiang Kai-shek also buttressed her high appraisal among American women. Aware that Madame Chiang was the most popular and celebrated Chinese woman in the United States in those days, Liu-Wang prudently dispatched messages that highlighted close associations between the Chinese WCTU and Chiang’s regime. For instance, she reported in 1942 that the chairperson of the WCTU board of directors was the wife of a high-ranking government official who was second in honor and power only to the Generalissimo. The appearance of such news in the Union Signal coincided with Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s visit to the United States. Her trip created tremendous public appeal among Americans. Her perception that Christianity and nationalism could coexist to reconstruct China and her efforts to utilize the aid of missionaries and Christian churches concurred with Liu-Wang’s ideas and activities.

Contrary to the fact that the union women in the United States highlighted points in common between Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Liu-Wang Liming, Liu-Wang actually held a firm nonpartisan position during the war. She supported the position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), acquainted herself with Zhou Enlai and his wife Deng Yingchao, and sent her eldest son to the CCP-run military college, while sending her younger son to a KMT-run military school. Despite her connection with both the KMT and the CCP, she emphasized exclusively
her relation with the former without mentioning her association with the latter in her letters to the American union. She portrayed the KMT leaders and its military force as if they were paragons of virtue, although she dared to criticize KMT corruption openly at home.70

As the result of Liu-Wang’s English publications catering to the interests of temperance women in the United States, generous financial support kept pouring in from the United States and enabled her to carry out her projects throughout the difficult wartime.71 However, the unilateral financial flow from the United States to the Chinese union made the latter dependent on the mercy of its patrons. Moreover, the efforts of the Chinese WCTU to win the favor of Americans reinforced the hierarchical relationship between the Chinese and American women.

TOWARD THE REPARATION OF BROKEN SISTERHOOD: THE WORK OF FORMER MISSIONARIES STATIONED IN JAPAN

When the tide of the war shifted in favor of the Allied Powers and U.S. troops started to gain the upper hand over Japan in the Pacific theater, positive representations of Japan reappeared in WCTU publications. C. Burnell Olds, a former American Board missionary who had lived in Japan for thirty-six years, wrote to the Union Signal in 1944 that the Japanese government applied the law prohibiting alcohol consumption by minors to all territories over which Japan had jurisdiction.72 Other missionaries stationed in Japan also offered pictures of the Japanese as peace lovers. Through narratives about the leaders of the WCTU and their sisters’ efforts for social reform and world peace, these missionaries rejected an essentialist and monolithic description of the Japanese and distinguished the “good” Japanese from the rest.73 Gladys D. Walser, the wife of a former Presbyterian missionary in Japan and member of the Japanese WCTU, acted more aggressively for the Japanese in the United States by trying to help Japanese Americans in internment camps. Since the American WCTU did not collectively respond to the relocation of 110,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry, she found the stage for her action in the WILPF. As the chair of the WILPF’s Committee on Japanese in America, organized in early 1943, she succeeded in convincing the WILPF to support the Japanese in and out of the camp through providing basic necessities and helping evacuees who left the camps for resettlement.74

In addition to former missionaries in Japan, some American union
members concerned with the restoration of world peace stood up against
racism. As the Allied powers defeated the Axis in both Europe and the
Pacific and the war drew gradually to a close, they started thinking seri-
ously about how to restore world peace. The most prominent of this
group was Berthalee Broyles, National Director of the Department of
International Relations for Peace. She was one of the few American
union members who criticized the relocation of Japanese Americans on
the grounds of race. She also deplored the treatment of the Japanese in
American journalism where “the words ‘ape-men’ or ‘monkey-men’
were among the milder of favorite epithets.”

Indeed, interest in the post-war world was evidently growing in the
American WCTU, as its president Ida B. Wise Smith admitted. Plans
for the year’s work adopted by the executive committee in 1943 included
not only patriotic actions but also a post-war agenda to awaken people
to the need for “just and durable peace.” As a Christian organization of
a potentially victorious nation, the American union had started develop-
ing a post-war vision to regenerate the war-torn world prior to the end
of war. They still continued to support the Chinese union, but their vision
gradually shifted from how to fight back against Japan into how to rein-
tegrate it into the white ribbon international community.

Ella A. Boole, president of the World’s WCTU, joined the argument
about the reconstruction of the organization. Even after the Japanese
union disavowed its ties with the world union, the World’s WCTU pre-
served its membership along with other branches of the Axis powers.
This treatment implied that once the worldwide hostilities were over, the
world union would restore associations with these branches. Through
such treatment, the world union laid the groundwork for post-war
activism. The wartime preparation for peace and the reevaluation of the
Japanese paved the way for the reparation of broken sisterhood after the
war. Former missionaries in Japan and several executive members of the
world and the American unions played a pivotal role in redirecting the
agenda.

CONCLUSION

The trans-Pacific exchange of the WCTU women between 1931 and
1945 revolved around the United States. Both Japanese and Chinese
branches sought patronage and support from Americans, because win-
ing the United States over to their side would be key for these nations
in solving pending diplomatic problems. While wooing the United States, the Japanese and Chinese unions disagreed with each other over the military conflicts between Japan and China; the Japanese women endorsed the military operation of their nation as an unavoidable act of self-defense, while the Chinese women rebuked Japanese arguments as self-serving and self-righteous. The American women remained aloof from the Japan-China military disputes and preserved the “White Ribbon League of Nations.” However, the death of Liu-Wang Liming’s husband in 1938 propelled them to switch their previous neutral position to the Chinese side. Thanks to the skillful diplomacy of Liu-Wang, the informal U.S. alliance in the white ribbon world had already been formed before the outbreak of the Pacific War.

Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor transformed the United States into an official ally of China. Through drastically increasing financial and material support to China and the dissemination of highly racialized accusations that the Japanese were subhuman ringleaders of the contamination of the world by liquor and drugs, American white ribboners participated in the war against Japan. Meanwhile, the Japanese union reinterpreted the failure of diplomatic negotiations between the U.S. and Japan as an ultimate rejection by Americans. Seeing themselves as victims of anti-Japanese propaganda and racism in the trans-Pacific community, they came to embrace the Asiatic cause of Japan’s imperialism and contribute to the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere through their social reform agendas.

However, the clash between the United States and Japan did not completely destroy the white ribbon bond which they had nurtured for decades. Japanese women’s long-term desire for full acceptance by the U.S. and tacit respect for prominent American women were inherent in their wartime discourse. Ostensibly accusing Americans, their implicit attachment to Americans remained an undercurrent of their consciousness and paved the way for the post-war reconciliation with the World’s WCTU community.

Meanwhile, the wartime discourse of Americans colored by racial prejudice and hatred did not survive after 1943. When the tide of the war shifted in favor of the Allied Powers, the American white ribboners regained a sense of leadership and started thinking seriously about reconstructing the war-torn world. Their hostilities toward Japan were gradually replaced by a new plan of reintegrating their former enemies into the World’s WCTU. Soon after the end of the war, Ella A. Boole wrote
to Gauntlett Tsune, then the president of the Japanese union, “Even though a nation fought against a nation, our mutual friendship based on Christianity has never changed. We, members of the WCTU, prayed for you during the war.”80 This letter deeply touched the heart of Gauntlett, then the president of the Japanese WCTU. Ashamed of having supported the war and having betrayed the peace promoted by the WCTU, she resumed her work at the union. The world union welcomed back its Japanese branch and moved to post-war activism.

NOTES


5 The American chapter called itself the “National” WCTU. Since this study deals with more than one “national” chapter of the WCTU, it uses the “American WCTU” in order to avoid confusion.


10 Kubushiro Ochimi, “Rimpô Chûka Minkoku” [The Republic of China, our neighbor], Fujin Shimpô, no. 404 (November 1, 1931): 3
11 “Jikyoku ni taisuru honkai no taido” [Our attitude toward the current situation], Fujin Shimpô, no. 405 (December 1, 1931): 6–7.
14 Michi Kawai and Ochimi Kubushiro, Japanese Women Speak (Boston: Central Committee on the United Study of Foreign Missions, 1934), 168.
17 See ibid., 2; Tsuneko, “Nichi-shi kan no kakehashi to narumono: Shanhai Kyôfûkai soukanji Liu fujin to kataru” [Building a bridge between Japan and China: dialogue with Mrs. Liu, president of the Shanghai WCTU], Fujin shimpô 433 (April 1, 1934): 44–5.
19 See ibid., 147.
23 See ibid.
28 Kubushiro Ochimi, “Sennen mo ichinichi no gotoku” [One thousand years seem like a day] Fujin shimpô, no. 489 (December 1938): 5.
30 For the influence of The Good Earth on American society, see Leong, The China Mystique, 26–29.
32 Gauntlett Tsune, “Taibei gokagetsu” [Five months in the United States], _Fujin shimpō_, no. 503 (February 1940): 12–16.
33 Alonso, _Peace as a Women’s Issue_, 140.
35 See ibid., 425.
38 Liu, “Greetings, White Ribbon Comrades!” 5.
40 “Nichi-shi no yûwa to Kirisutosha no shimei” [Appeasement of the Japan-China problem and the mission of Christians], _Fujin shimpō_, no. 483 (June 1938): 14–7.
41 “Tenkyō Airinkan kaikanshiki” [The opening ceremony of Tenkyō Airinkan], _Fujin shimpō_, no. 496 (July 1939): 7–8.
42 Hayashi Utako, “Fujin no kakugo” [The determination of women], _Fujin shimpō_, no. 478 (February 1938): 29.
43 “Resolution Adopted,” _Union Signal_ (August 24, 1940): 11.
45 See ibid.
47 “Kōa joshi shidôsha kôshûkai” [A lecture class for female leaders in Asia], _Fujin shimpō_, no. 528 (April 1942): 18.
48 “Shasetsu” [An editorial article], (September 1943): 2–3.
49 Kubushiro Ochimi, _Haishô hitosuji_ [Pursuing the abolishment of licensed prostitution], 252.
51 Kubushiro Ochimi, “Warera no sendatsu” [Our pioneers], _Fujin shimpō_, no. 530 (June 1942): 5.
55 Thereafter, _Fujin shimpō_ was merged into _Shinseimei_ published by the Japanese Christian Church.


Dower, *War without Mercy*, 34.


From April 1942 to May 9, 1945, China received 21,657 dollars from the American Union. Margaret C. Munns, “Gift of Mercy World War II Style,” *Union Signal* (June 2, 1945), 14.


“Plans for the Years’ Work as Adopted by the Executive Committee,” 5.
