Re-Gendering Citizenship in Post 9–11 America

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I. INTRODUCTION

It is generally believed that the United States practices civic nationalism, thus anybody committed to American political belief can become American citizens in principle. Until the twentieth century, however, the reality of American citizenship remained exclusive and it was only in the last one hundred years that citizenship crossed over gender and racial boundaries, thus fulfilling the principle of civic nationalism. For minorities, gaining universal suffrage was only one of the first steps toward substantiating their citizenship.

One of the obstacles standing before minorities’ exercise of full citizenship is an understanding that in the United States, with its tradition of civic republicanism, citizenship is not just a legal status that guarantees certain rights, but also that it comes with certain civic responsibilities that full citizens are expected to fulfill. Citizenship and the fulfillment of civic responsibilities that embody it, however, are deeply rooted in the traditional value system. Taking a feminist perspective, for example, Ruth Lister points out that although the ideal citizen is defined as an abstract, disembodied individual, the ideal of citizenship essentially represents male characteristics. Women, lacking in the characteristics of “citizens,” are thus disqualified for full citizenship.1

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Moreover, the most demanding civic responsibilities, namely those of citizen soldiers, have traditionally been assigned exclusively to men. The differentiated civic practices between men and women, thus, have long reproduced the gender boundaries that also prevent women from fully embodying citizens. While men were obliged to bear heavier burdens as citizens, it is often overlooked in the history of American citizenship that women did also engage in civic practices of their own.

While women had long been excluded from the political sphere, they did engage in “public” practices in a different “public sphere” than political sphere, or in civil society. Feminist scholars have argued that the practice of locating the definitions of “civic engagement” and “citizenship” predominantly in the political sphere, from which women were excluded, has failed to truly represent the whole picture of civic practices. Such feminist scholars have been working towards a de-gendering of the framework for citizenship in order to truly reflect the history of women’s public activities.

As women gained suffrage close to a century ago and substantially advanced into the political sphere in the latter half of the twentieth century, we naturally expect that such a de-gendering of citizenship has long since been completed. In particular, the civic responsibilities of soldiers, which used to symbolize women’s inferiority, have been voluntary for several decades and are now open to women as well. However, not only has women’s status in the political sphere continued to be disadvantaged, but a recent renewed interest in civil society has also reintroduced the division of the political and civil spheres in line with traditional gendered values, thus effectively “re-gendering” American citizenship. This situation is being accelerated by the increasing militarization of American society in the post 9–11 war on terror.

This article examines the gendered nature of the “public sphere” through an analysis of three cases: attempts to de-gender politics starting in the 1970s, conservative aims in the renewal of civic engagement of the 1990s, and the succeeding call for “citizen service” under the war on terror. Given the gendered dichotomy not only between politics and civil society, but within civil society itself (let alone within the political sphere), it is necessary to examine the ways in which it might be possible to prevent the further gendering of American citizenship.
II PERSISTENT GENDERED DICHOTOMY

Just as “citizenship” is defined by the citizens in power, what falls within the realm of “politics” is defined by those who have control over politics. Even after women gained suffrage they continued to play a passive role in politics for several decades, and thus were not in a position to define which issues could be considered political. As women have traditionally been assigned domestic tasks, their daily concerns also centered on domestic issues for much of the twentieth century. These concerns, however, were not included on the political agenda and remained as “private,” not public, concerns.

Domestic issues that were left out of politics, such as health concerns, were then taken care of by civil society, in which women were more engaged than men. This combination of issue, actor, and space created a multi-phased gendering of politics: issues of concern to women tended to be taken care of by women outside of the formal political process. Such a division also twisted the perceived relationship between civil and political spaces: instead of looking at these two spaces on equal terms, we come to regard them as stratified, with civil society serving the needs of politics.

In the second wave of women’s liberation in the 1970s, American women started to become actively engaged in politics. The catchphrase “the personal is the political” was used to challenge the existing division between the public and private realms. They made a point that certain issues had been excluded from politics not because of their lack of political importance, but because the voices representing these issues were not heard in the political arena.

One approach women activists adopted in order to include these issues on the political agenda was to increase the number of female politicians so as to bring the voices representing these issues directly into political discussion. Due to several factors such as the incumbency edge and the lack of fundraising network, the increase of female politicians at national level remained incremental, while more changes were observed at local levels. Just as electing more women to Congress was hotly discussed in the early 1990s, the sexual harassment investigation of Clarence Thomas in the male-only Senate Judiciary Committee took place, which turned out to symbolize how the deliberation of the legislative process is also defined by those who have direct access to politics.
In the 1992 elections, the coordinated efforts of women activists to elect female politicians resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of female congressional members. The number of female House members almost doubled (from 32 to 54) and that of female Senators tripled (from two to six), and 1992 was proclaimed to be “the Year of the Woman.” The presence of a larger number of female members in Congress, Sue Thomas argues, helped put underrepresented issues on the political agenda and introduced new perspectives in discussing issues already on the agenda.4 Here lies the dilemma, however, in that the process of de-gendering politics by increasing the presence of women in politics and emphasizing the positive difference women can bring into the political process can in effect work to reinforce the gendered structure of politics.5

While issues such as education, health, children’s issues, the environment, or poverty ought to be universal concerns, those who are on the periphery of society suffer more than those in the center, and as such voices representing those issues are marginalized in politics. If, in order to promote the merit of female politicians, feminists put forth the argument that only women, who share the experience of being on the political periphery, can address these underrepresented concerns, then concerns which ought to be more fully considered by politicians in general are made into “women’s issues.” In the same way, if we admit that women bring into the political process a different standard of judgment or code of conduct, we end up strengthening the existing gendered dichotomy rather than overcoming it, even though the aim is to reverse the male-dominant order.

The increased number of women in politics did not effect changes in the structure of politics, but rather increased the influence of female politicians within the gendered division of labor: female politicians, with their caring and non-controversial manner, were thought to be better suited to deal with “women’s issues” than other issues which their male counterparts had traditionally dealt with, such as national security, foreign policy, or the economy.6

This gender split within the political arena runs parallel to the gendered division of labor in civil society. “Civil society” is a space where both men and women are voluntarily engaged in civic activities. For a long time, however, American civil society functioned as an alternative political sphere for women. Even after women advanced into politics, gender difference is observed in the candidates’ recruiting process: while
male politicians’ previous positions tend to be business/professional, female politicians’ previous positions tend to be education or housewife. McCarthy introduces us to the concept of women’s “parallel power structure” in civil society that resembles commercial and political arenas of men.

Given the limited opportunities that existed for women in the political sphere, proportionally more women than men are engaged in public activities in civil society. But the disproportion between men and women does not stop at the number. Among civil society activities with varied nature and purposes, predominant areas women are involved are health, welfare and education, and the way they are involved is mostly as volunteers. American nonprofits developed, in a way, to substitute for lacking government services. In the 1960s, for example, nonprofits increased in large numbers to fill the need created under the Great Society programs of the Johnson administration. One of the reasons why the government contracted out these programs to nonprofits was cost-effectiveness. In a sense, predominantly female citizens’ well-intentioned service replaced the tax money spent on delivering goods and services to those at the margins of the society. It is ironic that the tax money saved in this way was spent on such areas as war and national security, equipping male-dominated citizen soldiers. What is more, whether the actual service providers of the nonprofit sector were women or men, the nature of its dominant activities, namely caretaking, was regarded as women’s responsibility, and accelerated the gendering of nonprofits as a whole.

While the political and civil spheres are stratified to reflect the gendered order of American society, the internal structure of the civil society organizations is also gendered. As stated above, activities in civil society are mostly staffed by women volunteers, while more men than women are in management positions in these nonprofits. Thus civil society is just replicating the management style of the rest of the society, rather than introducing a different kind of inter-personal relationship.

Women’s citizenship, thus, did not get de-gendered in the late twentieth century, but the argument women used in the process of political advancement that women have different qualities than men, ironically kept women’s activities within the framework of gendered dichotomy of “difference” versus “equality.” In order to move ahead in the male-dominated society, women had to break the existing order even by introducing a reversely gendered value system, meaning that women should
deserve special, not equal, treatments than men. As such a “reverse” value system relied on gendered dichotomy in essence, though, the strategy of female political advancement itself fell short of de-gendering citizenship.13

III GENDER IMPLICATIONS OF CIVIC RENEWAL

As American society directed attention to universal civic engagement in the 1990s, gendered dichotomy of citizenship seemed to be finally replaced by a new, multicultural citizenship. The motivations for promoting civic engagement actually varied among liberals and conservatives across the ideological spectrum. Conservatives, using the same gendered dichotomy women themselves used in their political advancement, expected a larger role from women, given their “different” virtues, which were thought better suited to civil society activities. Mark Warren, in his essay discussing the relationship between American religious life and democracy, points out that women provide indispensable human resources for the activities of religious organizations.14 Thus “Civic Renewal” movements ended up with gendered, rather than gender-neutral implications.

“Democratic deficit” is the term used to characterize the lack of political participation among the general public in many industrialized nations towards the end of the twentieth century. Those who have the right to participate in politics remain inactive, as if they were “spectators” of the game called politics. While American civil society has historically functioned as the foundation of American democracy, Theda Skocpol warns that democracy is “diminishing” as more professionalized organizations have become active and large, but faceless members are reduced to the role of writing checks. In such “diminished” democracy, ordinary people have become less active in “doing” something together, as Putman points out.15 As America has traditionally cherished participatory democracy, the lack of pro-active, rather than passive, civic engagement should become the focus of concern. This spectator rather than participatory democracy is paralleled by the reduced interest in politics, reflected in the recent low voting rate and the declining trust in the government.

The early move toward renewing civic engagement was launched by those in the higher education in 1985 as Campus Compact, formed by college presidents to support civic education, community building and
campus engagement. One of the underlying ideas is that college students who are invested by the society must fulfill their social responsibility by paying back to the society with what they have earned. Especially, since many urban campuses are surrounded by disadvantaged populations of American society, for students to receive higher education in isolation from the surrounding community equals to being socially irresponsible.

President George H. W. Bush responded to the increasing interest in civic engagement, and launched an office in White House to support community service in 1989, and started to recognize individual services in his “Weekly Points of Light” program, the name of which means that the good deeds of individuals cover the nation as if lights are lit one by one. In the following year, the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (PL101–610) was enacted through Democratic senators’ initiative, creating the Commission on National and Community Service with presidential appointees to oversee financial and logistical support for national and community services as well as service-learning programs. As a Republican addition to the National and Community Service Act of 1990, the Points of Light Foundation was created. The foundation came to administer volunteer activities, that were commended by the President’s Weekly Points of Light program.

President Bush’s initiative was succeeded by that of President Clinton, but more emphasis was put on empowerment of those at the margin of the society than on individual responsibility. In the first year of Clinton’s presidency, the National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993 (PL103–82) was enacted. Under this legislation, the Corporation for National and Community Service was created to support various service programs. A new addition was that education awards similar to GI benefits were introduced so as to empower the disadvantaged youth who joined the program, while at the same time strengthening the community through their service activities.

Although serving others is said to be an American tradition, it is rather new for the government to take part in the activities of civil society as a collaborator. One of the reasons why the consecutive administrations were committed to the civic engagement was to have the national and community “service,” which is civilian in nature, replace the universal military service young men used to be engaged in during war time. Suzanne Mettler argues that one of the reasons why American people have become self-oriented and less caring to public issues is the lack of
common experience for the majority to serve the nation through conscription. According to this way of interpreting the development of civic engagement, what is important is for every young person to be engaged in national service and to become conscious of publicness. And that task was assigned to the civil society.

Renewing civil society, however, was supported with different, sometimes contradicting motivations as mentioned above. On the liberal, reformist side, the meaning of re-generated civic engagement is to empower those who have been marginalized in American society, and thus to take the power away from the privileged. On the conservative side, civic renewal helps make members of American society more responsible for themselves, including the poor or immigrants who depend on the government. Moreover, tracing back the development of civil society and appreciating the contribution of religious institutions and women within the traditional family role, the conservative side emphasizes the appropriateness of women’s activities in the civil society as opposed to their political advancement.

In 1996, with the funding by the Pew Trust and located at University of Maryland, the Commission on National Civic Renewal was launched. After conducting research for a couple of years, it published its final report called “A Nation of Spectators.” Senior bipartisan congressional members co-chaired the Commission, and scholars of various backgrounds contributed to its discussion. Having pointed out the importance of civil society as the foundation of American democracy, however, the final report very much reflected the opinion of conservatives who regard American “traditional” moral values coming out of family and religion, as the indispensable elements in renewing civil society. For example, an index to show the civic health of Americans, or Index of National Civic Health, was calculated in such a way that the importance of “traditional family values” and church-related activities is larger than what average American people might evaluate in their daily life.

As if rewinding the time back to the nineteenth century, the morality and virtue of women as caretakers in the family and civil society, but not in the political sphere, were reemphasized through the conservative side of the civic renewal movement of the 1990s. What is more, by integrating service into the government-led civic renewal efforts in order to promote the sense of public obligation as citizens, there emerged a danger that activities in civil society cease to be “another path” for individuals to raise political questions. One study shows that this worry turned out
to be a reality: while many young volunteers saw satisfaction in caretakers’ roles, saying they feel good by doing others good, they did not feel their role was to connect the problems they face with politics, and thus use their political efficacy in fundamentally solving the problem.22

We can say that despite both men and women participating in the actual caretaking, the whole civil society, in a sense, is de-politicized and gendered under the stratified division of labor. Such gender implications became more obvious in the mobilization of civil society for the purpose of fighting terrorism.

IV MOBILIZING CITIZENS FOR THE WAR ON TERROR

1) The Creation of the Citizen Corps

The impact of 9–11 on American civic life was tremendous, and it had both positive and negative effects for American citizenship. What is clear is that the government was more interested than ever in using civil society for its political purposes, and civil society was more than ever reconciliatory to such a role. Right after the attack was made, President George W. Bush claimed that it was an attack on American freedom, and the American people were determined to defend that freedom.23

In his first State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, President Bush introduced a new program aimed at deepening the commitment of the American people as citizens of the United States to defend American free society through their service to the nation.24 This program, named “Freedom Corps” actually combined existing programs with the similar purposes of community and national service, but naming it “freedom” was important as Bush characterized the challenge of the terrorists in the previous year as one posed against American “freedom.” He characterized the program as follows: “One purpose of the USA Freedom Corps will be homeland security. America needs retired doctors and nurses who can be mobilized in major emergencies; volunteers to help police and fire departments; transportation and utility workers well-trained in spotting danger.”25 President Bush then issued Executive Order 13254, establishing the USA Freedom Corps.26

President Bush asks each American citizen to take 4,000 hours, or two years, out of his or her entire life for service. But the government’s role does not stop there. The Bush administration has even set up a system to match the volunteers seeking opportunities and the tasks in need of
volunteers online. The Freedom Corps website even includes a page to register how many hours each person has contributed to voluntary service, and awards for individuals or corporation are presented to recognize their superb services to the nation and community. All these governmental initiatives are presented to the people in the name of protecting American freedom.

Under the umbrella of the Freedom Corps, existing service programs such as the AmeriCorp, Senior Corps, and Peace Corps were integrated, and the Corporation for National and Community Service continued to administer the various programs. Among the pillars of Freedom Corps was a newly established program of “Citizen Corps.” Citizen Corps is defined as “a grassroots, locally-based effort that is designed to mobilize and train volunteers to respond to acts of terrorism and other emergencies.” They are also expected to assist local law enforcement efforts, so as to remove the extra burden officials might have in a time of crisis. Thus Citizen Corps Council (CCC) is formed at city/county/state levels, and originally four programs were to be run under the CCC: CERT (Community Emergency Response Team), Medical Corps, VIP (Volunteers in Police), and Neighborhood Watch, to which Fire Corps was later added. These programs were originally jointly administered by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Justice, and other federal agencies, but as the Department of Homeland Security was launched and FEMA came under the jurisdiction of the new department, the primary responsibility for the Citizen Corps programs was assigned the Department of Homeland Security.

As of this writing, there are more than 1764 local CCCs and 55 state/territory CCCs, serving communities totaling over 195.6 million people (approximately 68% of the total US population). Some states have 100-percent coverage by local CCCs, while others have lower coverage, reflecting such factors as a sense of vulnerability, social and commercial capital, or the political culture of each community.

2) The Gendering of Civic Engagement

Although Citizen Corps was introduced to “strengthen” communities, the meaning of a “strong community” is differently understood among different CCCs. In order to understand how local Citizen Corps leadership recognized Bush’s purpose, I conducted a questionnaire-based study with the coordinators of existing CCCs in six states, namely California, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas, as
Since the number of responses remained small, I will analyze the data collected qualitatively below.

Since the name “Citizen Corps” was chosen with the political intention to stimulate a sense of civic responsibility among the American people, the questionnaire asked about respondents’ understanding or expectation regarding the core qualities of “citizens.” While some answers referred to legal citizenship status as a core quality, many answers tended to emphasize residency as community members, including those who are not legal citizens. One answer specifically points out the multicultural nature of its program, saying that “everyone regardless of age/race/religion/creed/nationality” is considered a citizen.

The majority of CCCs cite qualities of citizens either in terms of attitude or conduct. What is expected in a civic attitude is mutual understanding, such as interest or concern for others and cooperation in the community. Expected conduct listed in the answers include “service to the community and the nation,” “helping others,” “volunteering and giving back to the community,” or to “consolidate and coordinate skills for survival.” Other expected qualities include “value and civic virtue,” such as “good social standing,” “high value [placed] in home and culture,” “loyalty and commitment to the U.S., freedom and liberties,” “compassion, integrity, morality, and honesty.” One answer lists “serving in the military” as a qualification for being considered a “citizen.” Some answers add the conditions for becoming a Citizen Corps volunteer, such as “undergoing a background check,” “[having] no criminal record,” and being of “reasonably good health.” These criteria may well be used to exclude certain community members, even though the intended aim of the Citizen Corps is strengthening the community.

These differences in understanding are reflected in how the actual programs are run. For example, Fresno City CCC, which was one of the first CCCs in the nation to be launched, tried to create a web-like structure among the public and private organizations, rather than a top-down stream, so that all of the organizations have contact with each other. The ideal of strengthening the community is understood by Fresno CCC to mean that no one in the community is left out and that each individual makes use of his or her own capacity in his or her given place. This understanding is reflected in the fact that multiple languages are used in its VIP program so as to help non-English speakers, mostly the area’s large Asian population, in the community.
Not many CCCs, however, emphasize community building or empowering people as priorities, but rather focus on emergency management. A typical answer was given by the Headquarters Commander of the State Guard Reserve of North Carolina, who regards the Citizen Corps program as predominantly a national security matter, and thus he refused to provide any information on their program to the author, a foreigner. This type of understanding is not peculiar given the fact that the majority of CCCs are administered under emergency management agencies and far fewer are administered under volunteer centers or community service agencies.

The variation among CCC management systems can be explained by the multiple tasks Citizen Corps is expected to perform and the priority given to different tasks, or the means to achieve them, among different CCCs. The Bush administration’s primary aim for Citizen Corps is to prevent American citizens from becoming “sitting ducks,” vulnerable to another terrorist attack. The Bush administration’s understanding of “community strengthening” actually refers to “damage control,” not unlike Civil Defense during the Cold War. For example, FEMA characterizes Citizen Corps as Homeland Security’s grassroots program which “localizes Ready’s [Department of Homeland Security program] preparedness messages and provides local opportunities for citizens to get emergency response training; participate in community exercises; and volunteer to support local emergency responders.”

Corresponding to FEMA’s emergency-oriented priority, the Red Cross and other voluntary organizations supporting Citizen Corps’s emergency management activities emphasize that spontaneous volunteers cause more harm than good, since they stand in the way and prevent emergency responders from dealing with the situation. Volunteer centers under Citizen Corps explain that their role in emergencies is actually to keep volunteers away from the site of the damage. It has even been said that the obligation of general citizens is “not to stand in the way.”

Ironically, the treatment of certain citizens with specific capacities as assets to society, while treating others as liabilities has been observed through the Citizen Corps programs even though they call for citizens in general to participate and serve. For example, volunteers in VIP programs do not pursue their own initiatives but rather work as substitutes doing the routine tasks of the police so as to free the police to deal with more serious cases. Opportunities for Medical Reserve Corps are even
more limited to those who have specific qualifications. What is more, the
task assigned to Neighborhood Watch volunteers is to survey and iden-
tify who within their community “might” be a terrorist, and in most cases
such identification can only be made based on racial profiling. This is
exactly the attitude that the multicultural community building efforts of
the 1990s were trying to reverse.

The same term “community strengthening,” thus, is used differently
by the administration and those who have been involved in community
service. For community activists, it means first and foremost strength-
ing each individual and the mutual relationship among individuals.
Nurturing trust and mutual understanding among the community mem-
bers, which is the core of civil society, makes for a strong base in times
of crisis.

Opposite to what these community-based organizations aimed for, the
emergency-oriented aspect of Citizen Corps is administered from the top
down with the government standing at the top and civil society subordi-
nate to it. The organizational structure of many of the CCCs is based on
two supporting pillars which represent not only division of labor but also
a gender divide. One pillar is the local emergency agency, which is
mainly represented by work considered to be “masculine” and staffed by
full-time government employees. The second pillar is a volunteer cen-
ter, which is staffed mostly by women who have previous experience as
volunteers. Some CCCs, such as the Ohio State CCC, are even headed
by part-time coordinators. Ordinary volunteers constitute the bottom tier
of such a hierarchical structure.

The Bush administration claims that since Freedom Corps was
launched, the number of those who volunteer has surged in the United
States. For example, 64 million people volunteered in 2004, five million
more than in 2002.35 According to the Labor Department, however,
although the overall number of volunteers increased in the same period,
women volunteered at a higher rate than men across age groups, educa-
tion levels, and other major characteristics.36

American civil society activities are not identical to Citizen Corps
activities, but the influence of government funding, such as AmeriCorp’s
budget for colleges, permeates daily civil society activities at the grass-
roots level. The “hard” side of Citizen Corps activities, establishing the
mechanism for fighting terrorism, tends to overshadow the “soft” side
of activities, empowering the marginalized people in the community,
resulting in the stratification of both the internal structure of civil society.
and the civil society-government relationship. This stratification, in turn, overlaps with and reinforces the traditional gendered dichotomy.

V CONCLUSION: RE-GENDERING CITIZENSHIP

The Citizen Corps website formulates the expected role of CCCs as follows: “With the added support of citizens, emergency service providers have more time to fulfill their highly skilled responsibilities.” By using such rhetoric, the administration make the public believe that the value of citizens depends on how much they can serve the nation in times of emergency. From the beginning, the emphasis on national service emphasized in civic renewal has had a tendency to make use of civil society for policy purposes, and the gendering of civil society under the governmental guidance and funding was implied in the program. With the war on terror and the resulting national priority on the militarized aspects of civic service, an implied stratification emerged categorizing civic services into “first grade” and “second grade.”

Reversing the emphasis on citizen service of the 1990s, minority youth, predominantly male, are now increasingly approached by recruiters to serve in the military. President Bush’s “No Child Left Behind” educational program actually contains a clause giving military recruiters access to students, and schools that refuse to provide requested information to the military are not eligible for federal funding. Ironically, the government is sending the message that “citizen” service is less important than “military” service, even in this quite subdued way.

In mobilizing civil society toward the war on terror and asking citizens to engage in service for the safety of nation and community, the government is aiming not to promote social capital among people, namely the mutual understanding and trust on which civil society are based, but rather to subordinate them under an authorized order not unlike the structure of the military. It is this power relationship that characterizes the re-gendering of citizenship now, not the actual staffing by men and women. It is true that women are not excluded from emergency management, and men are involved in caretaking as volunteers in the activities of the Citizen Corps. However, differentiated value and positioning given to the fighting and caring activities in civil society, and the government’s oversight activities of civil society, reflect a gendered stratification.

Despite the mixed messages from different groups, the call for civic
renewal in the 1990s at least presented American society with an opportunity to stop and think about what it means to be a “citizen,” especially in a multicultural context. The priority placed on fighting terror and the accompanying militarism not only reintroduced and legitimized the gendered stratification of civic engagement, but also marginalized other elements of multicultural citizenship as well. Now we can only wait for initiatives at the grassroots level to shift the priority and value back to the empowering aspect of civil society activities and citizenship.

NOTES

The research on Citizen Corps was conducted under “The State of Political Community in the Global Age,” funded by the 29th Japan Securities Scholarship Foundation Academic Research Grant.

5 Thomas introduces a study that female politicians tend to focus on “women’s issues” as long as they remain small minority, and if female politicians’ ratio exceeds 25%, such intentional focus cease to exist. Ibid., 154.
6 Health/welfare, education, women/children are higher priorities and committee chairpersonship among female politicians. Ibid., 64.
7 Ibid., 45.
11 In the 1990s, 75% of workers in nonprofit organizations were female, while only 20% of their board members were female. Moreover, more prestigious nonprofits had smaller ratios of female board members. Elsa M. Davidson, “Women’s Philanthropy in the United States: Trends and Developments,” http://www.philanthropy.org/publications/online_publications/women_paper.pdf.
12 Lister, Citizenship, 145.
13 Yayo Okano fully discusses the question of this “difference” vs. “equality” dichotomy regarding the feminist citizenship in Chapter 4 of her book, Citizenship as Politics (Tokyo: Hakutakusha, 2003).


17 The author’s interview with Mary Beth Damm, Assistant Director, Center for Community Service and Learning, University of Michigan, July 25, 2001. Dr. Susan E. Stroud, Executive Director, Innovations in Civic Participation, Global Service Institute, who was engaged in launching the Campus Compact, emphasizes the spirit of service of the original three university presidents and their commitment to show how engaged students could be useful to the society through the service-learning program. The author’s interview with Dr. Stroud, September 8, 2005.


20 For example, the health of family is calculated by considering divorce and out-of-wedlock birth, and one of the three indicators for associational health is calculated by church attendance. Ibid, 24.


25 Ibid.


29 For example, Hawaii, Maryland and New Jersey are covered 100 percent while only nine percent of Mississippi population is covered by CCCs (as of August 2005).

30 Questionnaires were sent via e-mail to 143 state/county CCCs between October 30 and November 7, 2003, and 28 CCCs responded. The states were selected based on their CCC coverage ratio as of 2003, except for Texas which is the home state of President Bush. The ratio later changed as more CCCs were established while some stopped functioning.

31 An answer by Ark-Tex Council, Texas.

32 The author’s interview with Carla Glazebrook, Executive Director, Fresno Citizen Corps, September 5, 2003. Given the quite conservative nature of Fresno area, the stated understanding of community strengthening may need further observation.


PL107–110, Title IX, Part E, Subpart 2, Section 9528.