

Strategic Innovation or Strategic Nonsense? Assessing the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy

Yasuhiro IZUMIKAWA*

I INTRODUCTION

In a speech at the West Point military academy graduation on June 1, 2002, US President George W. Bush laid out what seemed to be a drastic departure from the previous US military strategy: the concept of preventive war. This idea that a state can attack a potential enemy before the threat from the latter fully develops goes beyond the established norms for use of force. In defending this new military doctrine, President Bush argued that the United States “faces a threat with no precedent,” and that “deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks.”¹

Partly because of the West Point speech, and partly because of the war against Iraq, most commentators focused on the concept of preemption when the Bush Administration released *the National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (hereafter the NSS) in September 2003.² Many of them doubted the morality or legality of preemption.³ Others regarded the logic of preemption as the surest way to worsen US security.⁴

While the concept of preemption is surely the most controversial element of the new US strategy, it is not the only notable issue in the NSS.

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*Assistant Professor, Miyazaki International College

Indeed, some foreign policy analysts have recognized the high level of logical integrity of the NSS. Ivo Daalder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, stated that “this (document) is much more than preemption,” calling it “the most comprehensive statement of this administration’s view of the world and America’s role in it.”⁵ Renowned historian John Lewis Gaddis says, “There’s coherence in the Bush strategy that the Clinton national security team . . . never achieved.”⁶ In fact, compared with the two NSS documents by the Clinton Administrations, the Bush NSS is much shorter but better organized along main principles that run throughout the whole strategy.

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, this article attempts to identify the underlying logic of the Bush NSS by examining its three main components: *the new defense strategy, the new vision about great power relations and the promotion of free-market democracy*. In so doing, I compare the Bush NSS with the two NSS documents by the Clinton Administration to highlight the differences between them and the logical parsimony of the Bush NSS. Furthermore, this article shows that the Bush NSS envisions a type of international system different from what the previous administration had sought.

Second, this article seeks not simply to describe the Bush NSS but also to address its weaknesses by utilizing theories of International Relations. So far, many works on the Bush NSS purport either to describe its contents or to critique legal and moral aspects of preemptive war doctrine. After analyzing the NSS in its totality, this article points out its flaws based on theoretical knowledge accumulated through IR scholars. By doing so, I argue that the Bush strategy may undermine its own efforts to realize the international system that it envisions.

In the following, I first explain the underlying assumptions of the Bush NSS and how the three components stated above are integrated into a coherent strategy. Then, I point out potential problems that the Bush strategy may encounter. Lastly, I conclude this paper by pointing out that the fundamental problem of the NSS is the Bush Administration’s belief that simply possessing vast material power (military and economic resources) enables the US to exert political influence.

II THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE

In general, there is an interesting contrast between the Clinton and Bush strategies: while the Clinton Administration tried to preserve the

US role in a drastically altered international order, the Bush Administration seeks to alter the existing international order to suit US interests.

With the end of the Cold War, foreign policy experts feared the rise of isolationism in US public sentiment. As a result, foreign policy debates tended to be centered on whether or not the United States could afford to continue enduring the cost of world leadership.⁷ Under such circumstances, the Clinton Administration's main concern was to maintain US commitments to world affairs. Reflecting such a concern, the first Clinton NSS published in 1996 claimed that US foreign policy goals could be achieved "by ensuring America *remains engaged* (italic added) in the world" and that a purpose of "this report is to help foster the broad . . . understanding and support necessary to sustain our international engagement."⁸ This so-called *strategy of engagement* remained evident in the second Clinton NSS published in 1999, which stated that US strategy is "founded on *continued* (italic added) U.S. engagement."⁹

In contrast, the Bush NSS envisions to alter the existing international order based on two assumptions. One is the self-recognition of US hegemony. The very first sentence of the NSS states that "the United States possesses unprecedented—and unequalled—strength and influence in the world" (p.1). Although conventional International Relations theories point out that a concentration of power in the hands of one state will trigger power balancing against it, the Bush Administration is confident that a challenge to US hegemony will not arise in the near future.

The other assumption is that the most serious security problems today are asymmetric threats from rogue states and terrorists. The NSS is clear on this point, stating that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones" (p.1). Furthermore, since the diffusion of technology enables "shadowy networks of individuals" to "bring great chaos and suffering to our (US) shores" (the preface to the Bush NSS), how to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a serious problem.

Although the Clinton NSS documents also pointed out asymmetric threats, they were just a part of the whole list of threats.¹⁰ They also recognized US hegemony, but instead of regarding its maintenance as a strategic goal, it emphasized the aspect of responsibility for taking leads, stating that "the American leadership will remain indispensable." (Preface to the Clinton NSS) In contrast, the Bush NSS enhances these to make them the core assumptions based on which its strategy is founded, and addresses how to apply US hegemonic power to deal with

asymmetric threats. In the following, I will explain the three major components of the Bush strategy.

(1) Military strategy: the shift from deterrence to preemption and defense

In general, the Bush NSS is underscored by the Bush Administration's resolve to act unilaterally if necessary. It declares that the United States "will be prepared to act apart when our interests . . . require," and that it "will not allow disagreement [among allies] to obscure our determination to secure . . . our shared fundamental interests and values" (p.31). According to classic and structural realists, who regard international politics as an endless competition among states, unilateralism is a logical result of US hegemony. In the world of anarchy, states have no choice but to rely only on themselves (self-help), and seek to maximize their security. Since a hegemon is the least constrained by international system, it acts without worrying about how other states might respond.¹¹

This emphasis on unilateralism is distinct from the Clinton NSS. Although the Clinton NSS recognized the necessity of unilateral actions, its preference for multilateral actions was evident. Its statement that "international cooperation will be vital for building security in the next century because many of the challenges we face cannot be addressed by a single nation" reflected this preference for multilateralism.¹²

Aside from the emphasis on unilateralism, there are three elements of the military strategy noteworthy in the Bush NSS. The first is the assumption that rogue states and terrorists cannot be deterred (pp.13–14). As proponents of deterrence argued during the Cold War, successful deterrence requires rationality on the side of an enemy.¹³ However, the NSS assumes that leaders of rogue states are "more willing to take risks" unlike "status quo, risk-averse adversar[ies]" (p.15), and cannot be deterred. Deterrence will not work against terrorists, either, because they are determined to "seek martyrdom in death" (p.15). In a nutshell, rogue states and terrorists do not act rationally, and are too risk-prone to be deterred.

This leads to the second element: the declining importance of deterrence and the increasing significance of preemption and defense (pp.13–14). Preemptive strategy, or striking enemies even before threats fully materialize, becomes a viable option when enemies cannot be deterred. In particular, the Bush NSS reasons, since today's enemies see WMD as weapons of choice, the United States "cannot let our enemies strike first" (p.15), and that "the only path to peace and security is the

path to action” (the preface to the NSS). As many critics point out, this shift from deterrence to preemption is the most significant change from the previous US defense policy.

For the same reason why preemption is justified, passive defense has also become more important than during the Cold War. In this context, it makes sense that the NSS justifies missile defense to defend against missile attacks by rogue states. In terms of protecting the US homeland, measures taken by the Department of Homeland Security play key roles. These requirements need drastic improvements in intelligence capabilities and military technology. The Bush Administration’s commitment to the so-called military transformation—technological innovation and revision in force structure of the US military—is premised on this thinking.¹⁴

The third characteristic is the skepticism toward the existing arms control regimes. Although the NSS does not explicitly discuss how the Bush Administration views the existing arms control regimes, its classified version states that traditional nonproliferation has failed.¹⁵ Instead, the NSS emphasizes the enforcement of “strengthened nonproliferation” (p.14), consisting of such measures as active interdiction.¹⁶ This attitude is in a sharp contrast with the Clinton NSS, which expressed strong US commitments to such arms control regimes as Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).¹⁷

(2) Peaceful competition among great powers

The second main component of the Bush NSS is its emphasis on great power politics. Previously, the Clinton Administration simply sought cooperative relations with great powers based on the strategy of engagement: it regarded NATO and bilateral alliances in Asia as the linchpin of US security in Europe and Asia respectively, while expanding an area of cooperation with such countries as Russia and China to prevent them from becoming enemies.¹⁸

On the other hand, the Bush NSS emphasizes *peaceful competition among great powers*, as the Bush NSS envisions a world in which “great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare[ing] for war” (the preface to the NSS). This phrase indicates two things. On one hand, the phrase reflects the Bush Administration’s awareness that competition among great powers will persist, as realism considers the world to be a continuous struggle for power. On the other hand, the phrase signals US willingness to cooperate with its potential adversaries on issues in which they share common interests. As explained, the NSS views not

great powers but rogue states and terrorists as today's main enemies, and cooperation with potential adversaries is possible because they find themselves united by common dangers of terrorist violence.

It is noteworthy that the NSS envisions improved US relations with potential adversaries—Russia, China and India. Among them, Russia is treated most favorably. The NSS proclaims that Russia is no longer a strategic adversary (p.26), boasting such achievements as the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions and the creation of the NATO-Russia Council. India also receives somewhat favorable treatment: the fact that it is categorized as a potential competitor suggests that the United States acknowledges India's status as "a growing world power" (p.27). Probably causing some bitterness to Chinese leaders, China appears on this list after India, and the NSS is very articulate in its disagreement with China on human rights violations, Taiwan and democratization. Nonetheless, the NSS argues that the United States "seeks a constructive relationship with a changing China" (p.27), dropping the phrase *strategic competitor*, which used to describe the Bush Administration's attitude toward China. Overall, the NSS indicates that while the United States sees China as a more likely challenger than the other two, it is prepared to cooperate with it on issues of mutual interest.¹⁹

With regard to relations with US allies, the NSS states that "America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions" (p.25). This is a subtle difference from its predecessors' emphasis on formal alliances, because it shows a US intention to value informal coalitions, or the so-called "coalition of the willing," more than formal alliances. In fact, the emphasis on coalitions is consistent with US hegemony: since the United States possesses the military ability to accomplish its goals without relying on allies, it is reluctant to allow them to constrain US freedom of action, which will be instead maximized by case-by-case coalitions.

Although the NSS still values bilateral alliances in East Asia (p.26), the decreasing value of NATO is evident. While referring to NATO as one of "the strongest and most able international institutions," the Bush NSS expresses US support for European allies' efforts to strengthen their own defense identity and US commitments to further NATO expansion (p.26). What this implies is that the United States may be willing to trade a more independent Europe for more freedom of action, as long as NATO serves as a venue for the United States to maintain influence in Europe. It is also important to note that none of Arab nations, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, are referred to as US allies.

(3) Promoting Democracy and Prosperity

While the other two pillars of the new strategy are products of realism, the third pillar—expansion of liberal democracy—seems to reflect America’s liberal tradition. The NSS states that expanding a circle of democracy is “a moral imperative,” and promises to increase US foreign aid by fifty percent through the Millennium Challenge Account (p.21). This emphasis on morality and fairness sounds similar to the first Clinton Administration’s declaratory policy of democratic enlargement.²⁰

Nevertheless, there exists realism underlying this policy. The Bush Administration considers that the root causes of terrorism are the lack of democratic institutions and economic underdevelopment in terrorists’ home countries, in the Islamic world in particular. It states that terrorism results not from “a clash of civilizations,” but “the clash inside a civilization” (p.31).²¹ That is, oppressed citizens in Arab states turn to anti-American terrorism because they perceive that the United States upholds authoritarian but pro-US governments such as Saudi Arabia. In this light, promoting democracy in the Islamic world will create legitimate means for frustrated Arab citizens to voice opposition to their governments instead of resorting to terrorism. At the same time, alleviating economic suffering in developing countries helps mitigate the problem of failed states, which provide safe havens for terrorists. In other words, expanding liberal democracy through foreign aid is not just a moral issue, but is linked to the overall goal of defeating terrorism.

There are two characteristics to be noted regarding how the Bush Administration seeks to promote liberal democracy. First, while sharing a strong belief in free trade and market mechanisms, the NSS emphasizes the importance of economic and social institutions, such as tax collection systems, investments in education and health and enforcement of anti-corruption rules (pp.17, 19).²² This awareness of the importance of market institutions may reflect a learning effect from the last decade of economic transitions by the former communist states and the miracle of the East Asian economies.²³ At the same time, it may be also a reflection of strong confidence in American political and economic systems: the NSS states that US values and institutions are “right and true for all people everywhere” (p.3), and that US “principles will guide . . . the character of our foreign assistance and allocation of resources” (p.4).

Second, just as apparent in arms control issues, the new strategy shows the Bush Administration’s negative attitude toward the existing development policies and international institutions. “Decades of massive

development assistance have failed” (p.21), the NSS argues, and it even dismisses conventional assistance as a means to “prop up failed policies, relieving the pressure for reform and perpetuating misery” (p.21). In order to improve the efficacy of foreign aid, the NSS calls for judging the efficacy by measurable results and linking aid to recipient states’ performances (p.22). Therefore, although the NSS makes clear US commitments to increasing foreign aid, it is a responsibility of a recipient state to pursue “the right national policies” (p.21), which will benefit those states which follow US aid guidelines.

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Even aside from the concept of preemptive war, the Bush NSS contains many characteristics distinct from the previous administration’s strategy. Unlike the Clinton Administration’s strategy of engagement, it emphasizes the need for unilateral actions. At the same time, the Bush NSS considers formal alliances less important than the Clinton NSS. In addition, the Bush NSS pursues the expansion of democracy not just as a liberal goal but also as a means of resolving the root causes of asymmetric threats.

What characterizes the Bush NSS in particular is its high degree of logical sophistication. It presents a logically coherent national security strategy, the three main components of which are highly integrated to achieve today’s overriding national goal: defeating terrorism and preventing the spread of WMD.

Since US hegemony is overwhelming, it is unlikely that any state will challenge US leadership in the near future. Instead, the most serious challenges to US security today will be asymmetric: threats and actual use of WMD by rogue states and terrorist groups. To deal with such threats, the United States must continue investing its resources in renovating its military power. Doing so will also prolong US hegemony by dissuading potential competitors from challenging US leadership. Furthermore, in order to eradicate the sources of terrorism and rogue states, the United States will promote democracy and economic prosperity. In pursuing the course of this action, the United States is determined to act unilaterally if necessary and not allow others to block US actions.

III PROBLEMS IN THE BUSH STRATEGY

The fact that the Bush strategy shows logical consistency does not guarantee that the strategy is flawless. In fact, each of the strategy’s three

pillars entails potential problems. Combined, these problems may produce the very outcome that the strategy is designed to avoid: shortening the longevity of US hegemony and engendering more terrorist threats.

(1) The false premise of preemption

The first problem concerns the logic underlying the principle of preemptive war. As explained, the Bush NSS assumes that rogue states and terrorists cannot be deterred. Generally speaking, successful deterrence requires three factors: second strike capabilities to inflict sufficient damage against an aggressor, a clear signal of strong resolve to use such capabilities, and an enemy's rationality in calculating the costs and benefits of its action. Deterrence does not work against today's enemies, according to the Bush NSS, because the third factor is missing.

However, it is questionable whether or not this assumption is valid for rogue states. Isolated from the rest of the world and threatened by the sole superpower, rogue states do not have a lot to gain in maintaining the status quo, and their capitulation to US threats would endanger the survival of their regimes. Their aggressive behavior may worsen the status quo and prompt US retaliation, but potential gains may still outweigh the risks involved because rogue states have little to lose in the status quo anyway. Under such circumstances, it is not necessarily irrational to choose risky but possibly successful use of threats.²⁴ If rogue states act rationally as these analysts suggest, deterrence against them is by no means impossible.

Moreover, using coercive strategies against rogue states may even be counterproductive if rogue state behavior derives from the motivation of loss aversion. According to prospect theory, an actor seeking to avoid losses is more willing to take a risky option than an actor seeking to make gains.²⁵ Applying this logic to North Korea, Victor Cha argues that what drives it toward risky behavior is its desire to avoid further losses of security.²⁶ If this is the case, trying to punish rogue states with threats may actually force them to take an extreme measure, including development and use of WMD. The accelerated quest for nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran validates this fear.

It is true that terrorists are difficult to deter, because they can reasonably expect to avoid retaliation by changing their whereabouts.²⁷ However, whether preemption is effective or not is a different question. Since terrorists present very few suitable military targets whose destruction would undermine their resolve and capabilities, damaging terrorists' abilities sufficiently to give up terrorism *militarily* is extremely difficult,

even when preemption is possible. Furthermore, more preemptive attacks may simply lead to more terrorist retaliations in the future, thus experts on terrorism argue that “the overt preemptive use of military force is unwise.”²⁸ Robert Jervis explains this succinctly, saying that “an adversary who believes the United States is certain to attack will have nothing to lose by resorting to WMD.”²⁹

Furthermore, combined with the principle of preemptive war, the Bush NSS’s skepticism of the existing arms control regimes may damage the stability of today’s international order without creating a new order. Judging from the analysis stated above, it is quite possible that threats of preemptive war rather increase a danger of WMD proliferation and its use. In addition, the Bush NSS’s emphasis on containing the spread of WMD can entice other actors to disobey the existing arms control agreements, because they consider that US policy operates under a double-standard. On one hand, the US government advocates strengthening safeguards under the NPT.³⁰ However, it continues to reject key components of the CTBT, and even calls for the development of new nuclear weapons.³¹ These US policies could be construed as a systematic challenge by the United States to bend the established international system in its favor, and will intensify other states’ resistance to US efforts.

(2) Treating foes as friends while treating friends as foes

The second problem concerns great power relations. For potential adversaries, the fact that the United States conceives of peaceful competition with them is not bad news. In fact, with moderately improved relations with adversaries and reduced importance of alliances, the NSS seems to envision a global system similar to the Concert of Europe, or the 19th century European security system in which major powers often competed politically but not militarily.

However, more serious problems lie in US relations with its allies. As already explained, the NSS emphasizes informal coalitions instead of formal alliances in order to maximize US freedom of action. Behind this policy exists an assumption that many US allies will choose to join US coalitions anyway: since the United States has an ability to bring about its favored outcomes even when its allies are opposed, the allies will acquiesce in US policies and will not dare to face US ire by challenging its leadership. In other words, for US allies, gains from bandwagoning with the United States would outweigh gains from challenging it, no matter how reluctant they may be.

However, the United States may be overestimating its allies’ willing-

ness to cooperate, while underestimating the negative impacts of its unilateralism on its allies. As Randall Schweller argues, states tend to jump on the bandwagon with stronger states when they seek gains, but are more inclined to balance against them when seeking to avoid losses.³² If this is correct, bandwagoning may not necessarily result because the NSS is unclear on what kinds of gains or rewards US allies can expect from cooperating with the United States. Rather, US allies have a lot to lose in encouraging US unilateralism, which undermines the existing international order in which they have moderate but important influence over US actions through alliances and multilateral institutions. Considering these factors, the Bush Administration's failure to obtain French, German and even Turkish support for the war against Iraq may not be isolated incidents.

Proponents of the NSS may argue, perhaps correctly, that US allies are unlikely and unable to balance against the United States given the gap in material power. However, US allies can still increase the political and economic cost of US actions, which may accelerate the decline of US hegemony rather than perpetuate it. As Stephen Walt argues, "The ability of the United States to achieve its foreign policy objectives at relatively low cost will depend in large part on whether other powers are inclined to support or oppose US policies, and whether others find it easy or difficult to coordinate joint opposition to US initiatives."³³ US unilateralism may be creating the very situation in which other great powers find it easy to unite against US initiatives.

(3) Friendly tyrants, mission contradiction, and democratic instability

The third problem concerns promotion of democracy in the Arab world as a means of removing the root causes of terrorism. The fundamental objective of US policy toward the Middle East used to be maintaining stability in the region by keeping good relations with non-democratic but pro-American regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. However, David Frum, a former speech writer for President Bush, points out that the Bush Administration believes that the previous US Middle East policy is no longer adequate.³⁴ As the September 11 incident showed, US accommodations of the non-democratic Islamic states is creating an animosity against the United States. To alleviate this problem, the Bush Administration has decided to change the "policy of stability" to a policy of promoting democracy, even at the expense of instability in the region.³⁵

The United States has long been plagued by this so-called *friendly*

tyrant dilemma.³⁶ This problem results from a dilemma between the geopolitical necessity to maintain good relations with pro-US authoritarian regimes and the US tendency to criticize violations of human rights by those regimes. This is a practical problem as well, because friendly tyrants are often replaced by radical anti-US regimes supported by popular anti-US sentiments, as the cases of Iran and Cuba show. In fact, this explains why anti-US sentiment in Saudi Arabia has been rising: because Saudi citizens view the United States as patron of the undemocratic Saudi royal family, their hostility toward the latter has been translated into anti-US sentiment. The fact that many of the September 11 terrorists were citizens of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both quasi-US allies, prompted the Bush Administration to realize the magnitude of this problem. This is why it has decided to alter its Middle East policy, so that the United States may play a more assertive role in promoting democracy in the region.

Although the Bush Administration's intention to deal with the friendly tyrant dilemma is commendable, implementing policies for that purpose is a more complex task. First, promoting democracy in the Islamic world is already contradicting another US national security imperative: the war on terrorism.³⁷ In the pursuit of Al-Qaeda, the US government has been soliciting cooperation from such non-democratic Islamic states as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Yemen and Pakistan. As the Bush Administration emphasizes, the war on terrorism is going to require ongoing and relentless pursuit of terrorist groups in the medium and long term. If this is the case, the United States will continue to need cooperation from friendly tyrants in the Islamic world.

Moreover, promoting democracy is in itself a dangerous and extremely difficult task, and the Bush NSS seems to underestimate the negative impact that such a policy may have on the stability of the Islamic world. Some scholars argue that states in democratic transition are more likely to be war-prone than either stable democracies or authoritarian regimes.³⁸ This may be the case because democratization creates a weak central authority incapable of resolving clashes among diverse interest groups, which end up fighting each other. If this is the case, states in democratic transition may gravely threaten the regional order in the Middle East and Central Asia.

In order to avoid such an ominous scenario, the United States must devote significant resources to make democratic transitions smooth. However, the record of US efforts to promote democracy in other countries is not encouraging. As the cases of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and more

recently Afghanistan and Iraq show, US ability and its public's willingness to bear the costs of promoting democracy may be more limited than the Bush NSS assumes.³⁹ Therefore, a suspicion cannot be erased that US efforts to promote democracy fall short of what is actually required to achieve the goal.

IV CONCLUSION

With the war against Iraq officially over, the significance of the NSS may start to be overlooked. As explained in this paper, however, the NSS is not just a written justification for the war: instead, it eloquently reflects a type of international order which the Bush Administration envisions. The new US strategy is based on an articulated view of US power and new security challenges, and its various components are highly integrated into a coherent package of policies. At the same time, it suffers from various flaws, which may actually worsen the very problems that it purports to resolve.

The fundamental problem in the Bush strategy is confusion between material and political power. Political power by definition is an ability to achieve political goals, or to get others to do what they would not do otherwise.⁴⁰ In world politics, states with great material capabilities often fail to achieve their goals because material capabilities may be necessary but not sufficient to exert political power. Classic realist Hans Morgenthau argues that material power is simply "the raw material out of which the (political) power of a nation is fashioned." According to him, the most important element of political power is political skills to translate military and economic resources that the US possesses into political influence.⁴¹

The Bush strategy relies too much on US military and economic power and lacks a serious consideration about how to translate such material capabilities into political power. Although US military power was sufficient to defeat Saddam Hussein's regime, it is hardly adequate for building democracy in Iraq. And although the Bush strategy expects cooperation from US allies to be forthcoming or to be unnecessary, the struggle to restore order in Iraq shows that this may not be the case. It is indicative that a former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski warned, "while the US military power has been never respected like it is today, US political credibility in the world has never been lower."⁴²

Furthermore, unlike the Clinton NSS, which put the United States in

the position of defending the existing international order, the Bush Administration's strategy puts it in a revisionist position, or what Samuel Huntington dubbed a "rogue superpower."⁴³ Aside from the principle of preemption, the Bush NSS's vision of altered great power relations, its challenge to the existing international institutions and radical policy toward the Islamic world constitute systematic US efforts to redesign the international order in its favor. Because other states prefer the status quo in which they can constrain US actions through alliances and institutions, they will resist such US efforts. Therefore, unless the Bush Administration devises an additional strategy of alleviating the concerns of other actors, its national security strategy may replace the existing international system with a less secure, instable world.

NOTES

¹ George W. Bush, Speech at West Point, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html, retrieved on February 20, 2003.

² The United States Government, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (September 2002), at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, retrieved on January 21, 2003.

³ Richard Falk, "The New Bush Doctrine: Fighting Terrorism Requires New Thinking but not a US Imperial Role," *Nation*, 15 July 2002, 9–11; G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (Sept./Oct. 2002): 44–60; "Drums of War, Calls for Peace," *Dissent* 50, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 5–17.

⁴ Stanley Hoffman, "America Alone in the World," *The American Prospect*, 23 September 2002, 20–21; John Mearsheimer, "Hearts and Minds," *National Interest* no. 69 (Fall 2002): 13–16.

⁵ Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, "The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation," *The Brookings Policy Brief*, 4 October 2002, at www.brookings.edu, retrieved on October 15, 2002.

⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy* no. 133 (Nov./Dec. 2002): 54. Also, see Joshua Muravchik, "The Bush Manifesto," *Commentary* 115, no. 5 (December 2002): 23–30.

⁷ Robert W. Tucker, "One Year On: Power, Purpose and Strategy in American Foreign Policy," *National Interest*, no. 69 (Fall 2002): 5.

⁸ The United States of America, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 1, 3. Although the word *enlargement* was also used in this document, much more emphasis was put on the word *engagement* as the quoted phrases indicate.

⁹ The United States of America, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), 3.

¹⁰ The United States of America, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), 2–3. Here, threats from terrorists are treated as equal to traditional state-centered threats and even environmental and health threats.

¹¹ “. . . the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1972), 402; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 125–7.

¹² *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 3. It also stated, “America must be willing to act alone when our interests demand it, but we should also support the institutions and arrangements through which other countries help us bear the burden of leadership.” (Preface to the Clinton NSS)

¹³ Thomas C. Schelling, *Strategies of Conflicts* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Studies” *World Politics* vol. XLI no. 2 (January 1989): 143–169.

¹⁴ Michael Klare, “Endless Military Superiority,” *Nation* 275 no. 3, 15 July 2002, 12–16; Kensuke Ebata, *America no gunjiryoku* [America’s military power] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2002).

¹⁵ Mike Allen and Barton Gellman, “Preemptive Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic Doctrine,” *Washington Post*, 11 December 2002, Page A1; George Perkovich, “Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation,” *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7–8.

¹⁷ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 8–9.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 29–30, 32, 34–8.

¹⁹ Li Bin, “The New U.S. National Security Strategy: Positives and Negatives for China,” *Center for Defense Information Report*, 26 September 2002, available at www.cdi.org/national-security-strategy/beijing.cfm, retrieved on January 20, 2003.

²⁰ Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” speech at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, 21 September 1993, *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 4 no. 3, 39–46. Lake was the National Security Advisor during the first Clinton Administration.

²¹ Gaddis, “Grand Strategy,” 54.

²² Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

²³ Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *Postcommunism: Four Perspectives* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1996), particularly the chapter by Robert Skidelsky; World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993).

²⁴ John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, two prominent realists, argue that Saddam Hussein’s record of military conduct demonstrates rationality instead of irrationality in his decision making. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War,” *Foreign Policy* no. 134 (Jan./Feb. 2002): 51–59. Experts on Korean affairs also argue that North Korea’s foreign policy behavior exhibits rationality. Narushige Michishita, *Calculated Adventurism: North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2000* (dissertation: Johns Hopkins University, 2003); Denny Roy, “North Korea as an Alienated State,” *Survival* 38, no.4 (Winter 1996/97): 22–36.

²⁵ Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly, eds., *Choosing to Co-operate: How States Avoid Loss* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1993); Jack Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 141 (March 1997): 87–112.

²⁶ Victor D. Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” *International Security* 27, no. 1 (Summer 2002): 40–78. Also, see James Davis, *Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

²⁷ The new US strategy implicitly recognizes this difficulty. It states, "One of the most difficult challenges we face is to prevent, deter and defend against the acquisition and use of WMD by terrorists." The US Government, *National Strategy to Combat WMD*, 6.

²⁸ Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 97, 103–110.

²⁹ Robert Jervis, "Mutual Assured Destruction," *Foreign Policy* no. 133 (Nov/Dec 2002): 42.

³⁰ *National Strategy to Combat WMD*, 4.

³¹ Darryl G. Kimball, "National Insecurity Strategy," *Arms Control Today* 32, no. 2 (December 2002): 2–3.

³² Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning Profit," *International Security* 19, no.1. (Summer 1994): 72–107.

³³ Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping the World 'Off-Balance': Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy," and Charles A. Kupchan, "Hollow Hegemony or Stable Multipolarity," in Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled*, 141 and 79 respectively.

³⁴ David Frum, *The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush* (New York: Random House, 2003), 196–201.

³⁵ Richard N. Haas, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State, "Toward Greater Democracy in the Muslim World," speech at the Brookings Institution, 4 December 2002, at www.state.gov/s/p/rem/15686pf.htm, retrieved on 6 April 2003.

³⁶ Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, eds., *Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma* (New York: St. Martin's, 1991).

³⁷ Daalder *et al.*, 5.

³⁸ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* 46, no. 4 (2002): 529–549. Also, see the same authors' article, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 5–38.

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⁴⁰ Robert A. Dahl, "Power," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Science*, XII (New York: Free Press, 1968), 405–15; David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (1979): 161–94.

⁴¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948), 105.

⁴² Quoted in "*Sekaihatu 2003* (from the world 2003)," *Asahi Newspaper*, 29 July 2003.

⁴³ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2, (Mar/Apr 1999): 40–44.