A Global Superpower or a Model of Democracy?:
Images of America in Post-Cold War Japan

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I INTRODUCTION

On September 8, 2001, a ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Peace Treaty between the Allies and Japan was held in San Francisco, California. The atmosphere was, as expected, quite warm and celebratory. Sponsored by the Japan Society for North California and organized by a private initiative called the U.S.-Japan 21st Century Project, the ceremony was attended by former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, the past and present secretaries of state, George P. Shulz and Colin Powell, and ambassadors from Japan and the United States. Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, quoting from Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida’s words that the treaty was “an instrument of reconciliation and trust,” expressed amazement at how the two countries, after such a prolonged and devastating war, have established so strong a partnership. The peace treaty, together with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty signed on the same day fifty years ago, played a crucial role in bringing about Japan’s postwar development and in consolidating “the most important bilateral relationship bar none.”

Five years prior to the ceremony in San Francisco, another project commemorating a historic event between the United States and Japan
had been under way in Washington, D.C. The National Air and Space Museum, part of the Smithsonian Institution, was at the time preparing an exhibit centered around the *Enola Gay*, the B-29 that dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The planning of the exhibit was turning out to be an extremely strenuous process, since the curators, museum directors, veterans, and the Congress were unable to agree upon the historical context in which the atomic bombings should be placed and what messages should be conveyed to the visitors. After acrimonious debates that lasted for over a year, the initial proposal, that described the bombings as both the acts of war that led to Japan’s surrender and the acts that signaled the opening of the nuclear arms race, was thrown away. The exhibit that opened on June 28, 1995 was drastically cut down in scale and presented a sanitized and innocuous display of the restored airplane.2

The contrast between the two commemorations is symbolic of the relationship between the United States and Japan. On the one hand, policymakers on both sides of the Pacific have made consistent efforts to cultivate a strong partnership both politically and militarily. Although sometimes erratic, economic relations between the two countries have also prospered. Furthermore, the editorials in the Japanese newspapers around the 50th anniversary of the Peace Treaty suggested that there were few misgivings regarding the existence of the alliance between the United States and Japan. The categorical opposition to the U.S.-Japan alliance, especially to the strengthening of military cooperation that has erupted time and again over the past fifty years seems to have been finally put to rest.3

On the other hand, people in the two countries have disagreed with each other, as well as among themselves, over perceptions of peace, war, and history. Although the people of the United States and Japan have overcome hostilities against each other on the whole, some incidents are bitterly ingrained in their memories. The attack on Pearl Harbor and the atomic bombings are the two outstanding examples. Thus, the Japanese media and the general public were disturbed by the way the *Enola Gay* exhibit became the focus of a political tug-of-war in the United States and by the final decision at the Smithsonian. When veterans and some members of Congress denounced the original script for letting “Japanese perspectives” overwhelm the story of a United States victory and sacrifice, they seemed to be insisting that Japanese and American narratives depicting the bombing should never be presented side by side. Beneath
the repeated vows of partnership between the two governments lay a deep schism that cannot be easily dismissed.⁴

It is important to note that in Japan, incidents like that at the Smithsonian arouse two groups of people whose ideas about peace and whose attitudes toward the United States are quite far apart. One group consists of peace advocates, who oppose war in general and consider nuclear weapons to be inhumane. They uphold the preambles and article 9 of the Japanese Constitution that renounce war, and are critical of the United States’ development into a military superpower. The other group consists of nationalists, who believe that history in Japan must be told from a Japanese perspective. They resent that Japanese narratives of history were taken away at the end of the war by the vindictive Allies. Although they consider the Asian countries that decry Japanese war crimes as their primary enemies, they also denounce the United States for forcing a winners’ justice onto Japan.

The purpose of this paper is to explore Japanese perceptions of the United States during the past decade and consider how such perceptions have interacted with post-cold war definitions of peace and interpretations of history. By looking at three representative arguments in present-day Japan, I will analyze how developments after the cold war have affected the way in which people in Japan have come to approach the problem of peace and to redefine a possible agenda for a new U. S.-Japan relationship.⁵

II THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD AND THE UNITED STATES—THE BACKGROUND TO A NEW RELATIONSHIP

The end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were perceived as a triumphant moment in the United States. The chain of events culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall appeared to be a vindication of the policy of containment enunciated more than forty years earlier. Whatever mistakes the United States had made during the cold war years now seemed aberrations that could be subsumed under the grand narrative of historic victory. According to Tony Smith’s America’s Mission, the whole process should be interpreted in the context of American efforts to promote democracy worldwide, and although one cannot exaggerate the American contribution, its role in bringing about the collapse of communism and “the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe” was indispensable.⁶
Despite the euphoric atmosphere, there was an uncertainty in the United States as to how it should direct its foreign policy in the post-cold war era. It had lost not only its chief enemy but also the cold war frame of mind, from which it was used to viewing the world. While an overwhelming number of people in the foreign policy establishment believed that the United States should not renounce its role as the leader of the “free world,” that old bogeyman, isolationism, seemed never too far away. The question was to what extent the United States was willing to forego its familiar frame of mind and see the world from a new perspective. Amid such uncertainty, a barrage of books and articles appeared seeking to analyze the implications of the changes brought about by the end of the cold war.7

One best-selling author who, at least partly, epitomized the intellectual atmosphere surrounding both policy-oriented scholars and the public in this period was Francis Fukuyama, who was working for the RAND Corporation and the State Department. In 1989, Fukuyama published an article entitled “The End of History?” in the *National Interest* in which he argued that a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy was emerging throughout the world and that liberal democracy would constitute the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution. He pursued the same theme in *The End of History and the Last Man*, published in 1992, in which he identified two reasons that he believed make liberal democracy the ultimate ideology in “History”. First, it is supported by the “logic of modern natural science” which has had a uniform effect on all societies and has dictated a universal evolution in the direction of capitalism. Second, it satisfies “the desire for recognition” by creating a system of government characterized by universal and reciprocal recognition. Fukuyama made it clear that history as the occurrence of events had not come to an end and that he was not arguing that the millennium had come. Still the thrust of his argument clearly indicates that for him, the end of history could be equated with the inevitable future triumph of liberal democracy.8

On the other hand, not everyone was as optimistic as Fukuyama. In 1993, another celebrated article, “The Clash of Civilizations?” by Samuel P. Huntington, appeared in *Foreign Affairs*. In this article, and in the book he subsequently published under the title of *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Huntington argued that in the post-cold war world, what shaped the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict were not ideologies, politics or economy, but
“civilization identities.” In his view, in a world which was becoming increasingly multipolar and multicultiational, the influence of the West was in relative decline, whereas those of Islam and Asia were expanding. Warning that the West’s universalist pretensions might bring it into conflict with other civilizations, especially with Islam and China, he called for Americans to reaffirm their Western identity and unite with other Westerners to preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. It was a battle cry for Western civilization.9

These two arguments, despite their apparent disagreement, provide a clue to understanding American attitudes toward the outside world in the post-cold war era. On one hand, Americans were confident that they had played a historic role in universalizing the idea of democracy and that their moral, as well as material, superiority was incontestable. On the other hand, many were anxious about the seemingly-ever-increasing number of people in the world who were bent on rejecting American values and challenging the United States at every opportunity. It was this juxtaposition of confidence and anxiety that lurked behind American foreign policy after the cold war.

By the time Huntington’s article appeared in Foreign Affairs, the United States had finished fighting the first war of the post-cold war era under the Bush administration. Immediately after Iraq invaded and subjugated Kuwait on August 1, 1990, President George Bush denounced Iraq for its blatant violation of international law, enforced economic sanctions, and stepped up military preparedness around the Persian Gulf. The eight months of diplomacy preceding the invasion saw the emergence of some outstanding features that would influence the shape of international relations during the next decade.10

The first of these was the importance accorded to multilateral approaches in general, and the United Nations in particular. The United Nations Security Council, which had been dormant for almost half a century due to U. S.-Soviet stalemates, suddenly leapt onto the front stage of international negotiations. From resolution 660 which denounced the Iraqi invasion and urged an immediate withdrawal of the troops, to resolution 686 that stipulated provisions after the ceasefire, the Security Council passed more than ten resolutions concerning the crisis in seven months. The unanimity of the permanent members seemed to point to a rejuvenation of the United Nations.11

Second was the predominance of the United States in the policymaking process of the United Nations. While eagerly seeking the approval
of the Security Council, the United States never relegated its power to decide when and how to strike Iraq to any multilateral body. By carefully orchestrating the Security Council to approve economic sanctions, and eventually, military actions, the United States succeeded in turning its will into that of the United Nations. The international organization that American policymakers had planned almost a half-century before was at last coming into reality.12

Third was the reaffirmation in the belief that “right” must be accompanied by “might.” Vowing not to repeat the mistakes made in the Vietnam War, the Bush administration started the war with intensive air bombings, keeping troops out until the very last minute. With the help of carefully controlled press coverage, the Gulf War became a show of spectacular air attacks, while gruesome scenes of death and destruction were kept out of the public eye. The war, in other words, encouraged those who believed that a country with superior technology and destructive weapons could not only enjoy victory but fight humanely.13

On March 6, 1991, thirteen days after Iraq announced the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait, President Bush appeared before Congress to deliver a policy statement on the post-Gulf War world. After reiterating his administration’s commitment to peace in the Middle East, he went on to say that a new world order, “where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders” was coming into view. Four months later, in the political declaration of the Summit in London, the G7 joined in praising the revitalization of the United Nations and reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen international order. The new order thus defined enabled the United States to pursue its interests while at the same time claiming to serve the interests of the world community as well.14

III THE SEARCH FOR JAPAN’S ROLE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

During the Gulf War the U.S.-Japan relationship was severely tested. After the end of the cold war, some people in Japan had started to question the rationale for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the main purpose of which had been the “containment” of communism. However, when the Gulf War broke out, the controversy over the nature of the alliance was replaced by the question of what kind of contribution Japan could make to help the United States’ war effort. The war also intensified the debate over what role Japan should play in the new world order.15
Two concerns that had been circulating since the cold war years led to the argument that Japan should break out of the old mold and act decisively in the Gulf War. One was that Japan had been too reluctant to cultivate a closer relationship with the United States. Recognizing the United States as the only remaining superpower in the post-cold war world, and as Japan’s most important ally, those who believed in strengthening the U. S.-Japan alliance felt that the Gulf War provided an opportunity not to be missed. The way in which the Bush administration handled the crisis through the Security Council, they felt, should make it easier for the Japanese government to extend support to the United States, since public opinion in Japan revealed a decided preference to act under the auspices of the United Nations.16

The other concern was that Japan had been too subservient to the United States, too willing to play the role of a junior partner. For those who wanted the United States and Japan to be more equal in their partnership, what Japan needed was to demonstrate its willingness to act determinedly, if necessary, and to reassure the world that it would become a “normal country” that would employ force under appropriate circumstances. Beneath the explicit commitment to stand by the United States during the Gulf War, therefore, lay a strong nationalistic sentiment calling for an assertive foreign policy in order that Japan be accorded a proper status in the community of nations.17

The heated debate over how to respond to the Gulf crisis and how to meet the United States’ demands for assistance left a deep impression on the foreign policy establishment in Japan. A bill that would have enabled the Self Defense Forces to participate in the United Nations’ efforts was introduced as early as October 1990, but amid the ensuing uproar and criticism, it was abandoned within a month. Both within and outside the government, there existed a wide range of people who adamantly opposed sending military forces abroad. Meanwhile, the United States was becoming increasingly irritated by what it perceived as tardiness and hairsplitting in the policymaking process in Japan. Caught between the two, the Cabinet, led by Hideki Kaifu, first decided to contribute financially by paying $13 billion to the United Nations’ effort, and then, after the ceasefire, sent minesweepers to the Gulf. This Japanese assistance, coming “too little, too late,” however, was little appreciated, and bitterness and frustration were left among the policymakers.18

The inability of the Japanese government to formulate a coherent policy during the Gulf crisis provoked criticism and suggestions that would
dominate the debate over Japan’s foreign policy during the next decade. First was the insistence that it was time to reexamine the Constitution, especially article 9, which stipulated Japan’s renunciation of war. This tendency to regard the Constitution as an obstacle inhibiting Japan from playing a more active role in the international community was by no means new. While the memory of World War II was still strong, however, it was considered taboo to question the appropriateness of that article. The Gulf War helped to lift the taboo, and increasingly, renowned scholars and politicians came to insist that article 9, especially the second part, that stated Japan’s resolve not to maintain military forces, was out of date and should be revised.

Second was the argument that Japan’s attitude toward the right of collective self-defense stipulated in article 51 of the Charter should be reevaluated. Throughout the Gulf crisis, the Japanese government, especially the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, maintained that while the right of self-defense was guaranteed under the Japanese constitution, the right of collective self-defense was not. Therefore, Japan, despite its membership in the United Nations, had to abstain from any activities that might be regarded as an exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Such narrow-mindedness, the critics claimed, was the very reason the international community held Japan in derision, and unless the government retracted from that position, Japan would never be able to become a responsible member of the United Nations.

Third was a suggestion that Japan should actively seek a new identity for itself. For too long, the argument went, Japan had been complacent in playing the role of the only hibakukoku (country exposed to the atomic bombs) and a country with a pacifist constitution. For too long, Japan had been hiding behind the U. S.-Japan alliance and had failed to formulate a foreign policy on its own. Considering such negligence disturbing, an increasing number of people came to think that Japan needed a more assertive foreign policy. The effort to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council, undertaken by the Foreign Ministry in the early 1990s, may be seen as one example of this sentiment. The desire to see more Japanese volunteering for the various jobs in the field of international cooperation was another. The enactment in 1992 of the so-called PKO law, that sanctioned Self Defense Forces’ personnel to participate in the United Nations Peace Keeping activities, was, therefore, considered a significant step in this direction.

The Gulf War turned out to be crucial for Japan and its relationship
with the United States. It gave an impetus for Japan to experiment with a foreign policy not constrained by the old cold war framework or by the U.S.-Japan alliance. Nonetheless, the disapproval by the United States of Japan’s performance during the war made the Japanese government extremely anxious about how the United States would perceive Japan, and more eager to meet the United States’ wishes. Japan, in other words, wanted to be more independent of the United States, but at the same time it also desired the approbation of the United States government.\textsuperscript{22}

This desire of the Japanese government to act more independently from the United States, however, may prove to be more superficial than real when we examine the changing definitions of peace in Japan. Throughout the cold war, “peace” as defined by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty had been sitting side by side somewhat uneasily with “peace” as enshrined in the Constitution. The idea entrenched in the alliance that peace depended upon the readiness to use military force if necessary, was never openly recognized in domestic legislation or in official statements in Japan. The Gulf War, however, changed all that, and now Japan was espousing its own idea of “peace,” which in fact resembled the idea upheld by the United States. In opting for a peace that depended on force rather than on “the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world,” Japan was presenting itself as a more responsible ally of the United States.

\section*{IV The Emergence of the Nationalist Group}

The overall perception of the world community that Japan had simply written checks in order to escape from sending its troops to the Gulf left a deep scar in the minds of many Japanese. Despite the contribution of 13 billion dollars, little appreciation was received from the United States or elsewhere. In the list of countries that Kuwait thanked in an advertisement in the \textit{New York Times}, Japan’s name was conspicuously missing. The huge sum that Japan spent became a source of derision and resentment rather than something for which to be thanked. Not a few people in Japan felt slighted and humiliated.\textsuperscript{23}

Against such a background, there was an upsurge of nationalistic movements in the mid-1990s. The most influential of these was a revisionist group called the Liberal View of History Study Group (Jiyushugi Shikan Kenkyukai) started in 1995 by Nobukatsu Fujioka, a professor of education at the University of Tokyo. Two years later,
Fujioka, Kanji Nishio, a scholar in German philosophy, and several other like-minded people, inaugurated the Society for the Making of New School Textbooks in History (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho O Tsukuru Kai; hereafter Tsukuru Kai), in an effort to delete from the textbooks references to the various atrocities and war crimes that have been attributed to the Japanese Empire. Tsukuru Kai, with the support of a popular cartoonist Yasunori Kobayashi and other prominent figures, quickly gained momentum and came to enjoy a large following.24

Tsukuru Kai’s apparent target were the “liberal-leftist” intellectuals and educators that they thought had exerted undue influence in post-World War II Japan. They argued that the history and peace education promoted by the Japan Teachers’ Union (Nihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai) in secondary education was tainted with distortions and self-flagellation. Japan’s war in Asia and the Pacific, according to them, had been fought in order to liberate Asians from Western Imperialism, and to depict it otherwise was tantamount to succumbing to the victors’ perspective. We must teach Japanese history focusing on the positive side, they insisted, because if young people cannot take pride in Japan, Japan will not be respected in the world. Their publications, including Kyōkasho ga oshienai rekishi (History not taught in textbooks) and Kokumin no rekishi (History of the people), are permeated with rebuttals to those Asian people and their Japanese supporters who have attempted to expose war crimes committed by the Japanese Empire, especially those concerning the “comfort women” i.e. the sex-slaves for the military.25

Underneath these nationalistic claims lay a serious ambivalence toward the United States. Such ambivalence was demonstrated in Fujioka’s works in the early 1990s, in which he vented his frustrations against Japan which, according to him, was completely incapable of handling the Gulf crisis due to the limitations imposed by the Constitution. In those works, he acknowledged the United States’ criticisms against Japan’s performance and argued somewhat hastily that “opposition to America’s war would mean approving the Iraqi invasion” of Kuwait. He also admitted that even if Japan’s economic assistance to the Allies was extremely generous, the world would remember Japan as a country that did not send its forces to war. In other words, he had no scruples about condemning Japan in the terms used by the United States.26

Nevertheless, Fujioka and his group were reluctant to advocate closer cooperation with the United States. Their assumption that Japan’s war in Asia and the Pacific had been “just” naturally led them to regard the
United States with hostility, since it had not only defeated Japan but had also sought to rebuild Japan in its image. They also regarded the Constitution, “imposed” upon Japan by the United States, as the prime culprit that had taken away the sense of nationalism and pride from the Japanese people. Their prescription for curing Japan’s undesirable position in the world community, therefore, was not to strengthen Japan’s partnership with the United States, but the invention of nationalistic narratives for the Japanese people, which can be attained instead by shaking off the yoke of the United States.27

Those nationalists represented by Tsukuru Kai, in fact, were trying to overcome two different United States, each of which had exerted an enormous influence on post-World War II Japan. One was the United States that had democratized and demilitarized Japan and “imposed” the peace constitution. The other was the United States which regarded Japan as a pawn in its cold war strategies in Asia and had pressured Japan to act as a junior partner in its bilateral alliance. According to the nationalists, the two United States had colluded in depriving Japan of its national identity and in making it completely subservient to the United States. Stated differently, what ran against the grain with them most of all was the immensity of the United States’ influence rather than any specific policies the United States pursued.

In 1985, literary critic Nobuhiro Kato published a book entitled “Amerika” no kage (The shadow of “America”), in which he described Japan’s ambivalence toward the United States. Analyzing contemporary novelists such as Ryu Murakami and Yasuo Tanaka, and juxtaposing them with a senior literary critic, Jun Eto, he explained that many writers in Japan were caught between the desire to cast off the political and cultural influence of the United States and the desire to enjoy the economic prosperity and the good life which would be possible only if Japan remained subservient to the United States politically and militarily. As a result, he argued, Japan was subjected to a profound sense of inferiority, or “weakness” vis-à-vis the United States, although such feelings were considered taboo—not to be mentioned in the post-World War II Japanese society.28

Tsukuru Kai and its supporters represent, in one sense, part of the tradition that has struggled with this taboo. However, there is a crucial difference separating Fujioka and his group from the writers mentioned in Kato’s essays: Tanaka and other novelists considered the shadow of America as a product of history, especially the history of World War II. Their efforts to come to terms with America were thus inseparable from
their efforts to come to terms with Japan’s past in one way or the other. The members of Tsukuru Kai, on the other hand, treated the shadow, as well as Japan’s war guilt, as the inventions of the liberal-leftist intellectuals. For them, America’s shadow would disappear if Japan could adopt a nationalistic narrative that would instill honor and pride in the Japanese people.

V Whither the Peace Advocates?

The end of the cold war and the Gulf War marked a turning point for peace advocates in Japan as well. During the post-World War II years, debates over the definition of peace were closely linked with the question of how to evaluate United States’ cold war strategies and what role Japan should play in a world divided between two camps. Some peace advocates perceived the United States as the perpetrator of the cold war and chose the side of the Soviet Union. Many others, however, sought to set one United States against the other. While enthusiastically endorsing the United States that had democratized Japan and gave it the peace constitution, they opposed the United States that sought to bring every country under a network of military alliances, exemplified by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.29

When the cold war came to an end with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the group whose sympathies lay with the socialist bloc was shaken from its foundation. Especially drastic was the change that the Socialist Party went through. Already in 1987, the party accorded a de facto recognition to the security treaty and the Self Defense Forces, shifting from a policy of categorical denial of the two in the past. By 1994, when its party leader Tomiichi Murayama became the head of a coalition government which included the Liberal Democratic Party as well as his own, it came to describe the security treaty as the foundation of United States-Japanese friendship and as indispensable for peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific. Many in the party came to argue that since the socialist alternative was no longer valid, it was futile if not wrongheaded to criticize the United States as they had done during the cold war. In order to remain relevant domestically, as well as internationally, they concluded, the party had to cast aside its old cliché of favoring neutrality and pacifism.30

Despite such an atmosphere, some peace advocates continued to uphold their opposition to the use of military forces, Japanese or any
other. For those who regarded peace as an ultimate value, the use of military means in order to meet a military threat was self-defeating. Although, during the Gulf crisis, most of them decried the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a blatant violation of international law, they did not support the United States’ bombing of Iraq since, in their view, such support would have been tantamount to expressing support for the American policymakers, who only seemed to understand the language of force.31

Among the peace advocates, however, there were those who thought that Japan should participate more vigorously in international activities while upholding the principles of the Constitution. One such was Yoshikazu Sakamoto, a renowned scholar in international relations and a formidable critic of the United States’ cold war policies. In articles compiled in Sōtaika no jidai (The age of relativism), he analyzed the structural changes the world had gone through after the cold war and suggested that the issues of peace and war facing Japan had also changed drastically. Perceiving that the challenges confronting international society, such as ethnic conflicts, human rights violations, poverty, and natural disasters, have become increasingly diversified, he advocated that Japan should participate in the United Nations peacekeeping missions dispatched in order to prevent the breakdown of peace. It should be done, he added, by creating a special force independent of the Self Defense Forces, since he believed that sending the Self Defense Forces overseas would be a violation of the Constitution and furthermore, would raise anxiety in the Asian countries to which the Japanese government had not yet properly apologized. Coming from a scholar regarded as the dean of pacifism, his suggestion made a considerable stir among the peace advocates.32

Despite Sakamoto’s efforts to revitalize Japan’s agenda for peace, however, the tendency to marginalize the peace advocates continued. The primary reason for this situation was that the majority of the Japanese people had come to take the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Self Defense Forces for granted. The question of the constitutionality of the two, which had been the major source of contention that had kept alive debates over the problem of war and peace for almost half a century, was quickly becoming obsolete. In the post-cold war world, in which Japan’s military alliance with the United States was interpreted as the basis of stability and peace, it was difficult for peace advocates to induce the public to consider the idea that there might be a different road to peace, other than the one based upon the idea of military deterrence.33
It was as if the discrepancy between the peace enunciated in the Japanese Constitution and the peace upheld by the U.S.-Japan military alliance, that had troubled the peace advocates all along, had finally been brought to a head. They knew well that their claim that Japan, as the only hibakukoku, should oppose wars in general and the nuclear arms race in particular, was being constantly undermined by their government, which was willing to hide underneath the United States’ nuclear umbrella. While the peace constitution could muster the support of the majority who simply abhorred war, the two positions could stand side by side, although somewhat uneasily. When the line separating peace and war became blurred after the end of the cold war, however, the peace advocates became increasingly vulnerable to the criticism that their obsession with the dichotomy between war and peace made them out of step with the realities of a changing world.

VI 9.11 AND AFTER—QUESTIONS OF HISTORY

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D. C. on September 11, 2001 galvanized both supporters and opponents of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Because of the enormity of the attacks, there was an outpouring of sympathy and support towards the victims and the United States. The war in Afghanistan and the militant messages delivered repeatedly by President George W. Bush, however, alienated the peace advocates who became increasingly anxious about the way in which the United States was handling the crisis.

The response of the Japanese government to the attacks was quick and decisive. Within ten days, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced the basic principles and immediate measures to be taken by Japan in support of the United States’ fight against terrorism, including the deployment of the Self Defense Forces to support the United States behind the battle lines. Koizumi’s visit to New York on September 25, placed him alongside such leaders as Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair and demonstrated the government’s resolution not to fall behind the world community in standing with the United States.34

After the bombing of Afghanistan started on October 7, the government stepped up its support of the United States. Koizumi repeatedly emphasized in the Diet that terrorism could not be eradicated without the bombings, and amid an atmosphere of emergency, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law was enacted on October 29 without a lengthy
debate. This legislation allowed the Self Defense Forces to provide logistic and other noncombattant support for the United States forces and others taking measures against terrorist attacks. Subsequently, several naval vessels sailed to the Indian Ocean to provide fuel and other materials to the United States’ forces.35

Many in Japan supported these decisions. For those frustrated by the previous failure of the Japanese government to act quickly, Koizumi’s response was reassuring. Newspapers and journals carried articles which claimed that the interests of the United States and those of Japan were identical, and that for the second time in a decade, the U.S.-Japan alliance was being put to the test. Many remembered the Gulf War and the criticism leveled against Japan that it was selfishly pursuing “checkbook diplomacy,” and vowed not to repeat the same mistake. The turmoil triggered by the newspaper reports that Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage had demanded that Japan “show the flag,” suggested that quite a few people in the policymaking establishment were worried about how the United States would evaluate Japan’s performance this time.36

Meanwhile, on September 22, a small article by Ryuichi Sakamoto appeared in the Asahi Shimbun. Sakamoto, an internationally acclaimed musician and an Academy Award winner, gave his eye-witness account of the attacks in New York and expressed his dismay that music, which had disappeared from the city besieged by terror, might not be able to do more than just to heal the afflicted. What caught the attention of the readers, however, was his unequivocal urging of President Bush to refrain from retaliation, since violence could only result in more violence. He also asked Prime Minister Koizumi to oppose any acts of war that the United States might contemplate on the grounds that Japan had a pacifist constitution. Two months later, he published a book entitled Hisen (No War) in which he compiled approximately fifty messages from people from all walks of life calling for peace.37

That Sakamoto’s messages found a sympathetic audience in Japan was not surprising. While the government expressed its unwavering support for the Bush administration, many in Japan were weary of militant messages coming from the United States. Although the news reports on television and in newspapers continued to depend upon the American mass media and public officials as their sources of information, the works critical of the Bush administration written by Noam Chomsky, Susan Sontag, and other people considered “marginal” in the United States
were quickly translated into Japanese. The derogatory practice of explaining American behavior as analogous to that of cowboys and sheriffs in Western films, once thought to be too banal and simplistic, reemerged in public discourse. Apparently, the temptation to see the United States as a reckless, brash youth was too strong to be resisted.\(^{38}\)

Once again, Japanese perceptions of the United States seem to be polarized between identifying it as the most reliable exponent of world order and deeming it as the very source of world danger and instability. Such a dichotomy, needless to say, has been in place for over half a century. What has distinguished the post-9.11 debates from those of earlier times, however, is that despite President Bush’s assertion that the war on terrorism is a war for democracy and civilization, few people in Japan seem interested in discussing the values and ideals that the United States is purporting to defend.

In explaining the outstanding features of the relations between the United States and Japan, Shunsuke Kamei once coined the phrase: *haibei* v. *haibei*. Although identical phonetically, these two words have opposite meanings in Japanese: admiration of the United States and rejection of the United States. Kamei argued that from the Meiji period onwards, the Japanese people saw in the United States an ideal of democracy and freedom, and either yearned for it, or rejected it when they found out that, after all, the United States was far from living up to its ideal. Referring to such figures as Christian educator Kanzo Uchimura and socialist activist Sen Katayama, he argued that the oscillation between one *haibei* and the other *haibei* has been one of the most conspicuous features of U.S.-Japan relations.\(^{39}\)

In the post-cold war years, however, the number of Japanese who are caught in the *haibei* v. *haibei* dichotomy seems to be dwindling. In a world in which ideological conflicts have ostensibly come to a close, the United States is regarded more as an economic and military superpower than as a champion of democracy and freedom. The Japanese people who were born decades after the end of the World War II see in the United States not a model of democracy but one of wealth, power, and competitiveness. In other words, they are less constrained by the ambivalence that held sway over the elder generation.

Such a trend provides the United States and Japan with both a chance and a danger. If the United States could once again demonstrate the power of its ideas and aspirations as distinct from its physical power,
then there would be a chance for the United States and Japan to work out
a relationship that did not depend solely upon power-relations but upon
common efforts to find an ideal that could be shared with other countries
as well. However, if the United States insists upon exerting its physical
power in order to maintain its position of final arbiter, anti-Americanism
may regain its strength in Japan and elsewhere. The United States, in that
case, would have to relinquish its historic role as the “republic of ideas.”

NOTES

1 “Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Makiko Tanaka at the Ceremony in
Commemoration of 50th anniversary of the Signing of the San Francisco Treaty,”
September 8, 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (http://www.mofa.go.jp/
region/n-america/us/fmv0109/010908.html); homepage, U.S.-Japan 21st Century Proj-

2 For the debates over the Smithsonian exhibit, see Edward T. Linenthal and Tom
Engelhardt, History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996) [translated by Sanzo Shimada, Sensō to seigi:
Enola Gay ten ronsō kara, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1998]; Martin Harwit, An Exhibit Denied:
Lobbying the History of Enola Gay (New York: Copernicus, 1996) [translated by Seizo
Yamaoka, Sumio Hara, Kazuko Watarai, Kyozetsu saretakenbakuten: rekishi no nakano
Enola Gay, Misuzu Shobo, 1997]; Michio Saito, Genbaku shinwa no 50nen: surechigu
Nihon to Amerika [Fifty years of “the myth of the atomic bombs”: Japan and
America on different paths] (Tokyo: Chûkoron Shinsha, 1995).

3 “Let’s Draw a New Blueprint,” Asahi Shimbun, September 8, 2001; “Deepen the
Strategic Dialogue for Strengthening the Alliance,” Yomiuri Shimbun, September 7,
2001; “Independent Decisions Are Required,” Mainichi Shimbun, September 6, 2001;
“Let’s Write a Sequel to the 50-Year Japan-U.S. Success Story, Nihon Keizai Shimbun,

4 Statement by Senator Wendell H. Ford, May 18, 1995, “Excerpts from hearings of
the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Journal of American History
82:3 (December 1995), 1141; Daizaburo Yui, Nichibei sensōkan no soukoku: masatsu no
shinsō shinri [The conflicting perceptions of wars in Japan and in the United States: the
underlying psychology behind the friction] (Iwanami Shoten, 1995), Introduction.

5 For debates over the definition of peace and war in Japan, see Takeshi Ishida,
Nihon no seiji to kotobakah [Politics and language in Japan] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press,
1989), Shoichi Koseki, “Heiwakokka” Nihon no saikento [Reevaluating Japan as the

6 Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for
Chapter 10; see also J. L. Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York and Oxford: Oxford Univer-

Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “After the Long War,” Foreign Policy 94 (Spring
1994), 21–35.
13 The contrast between the “air show” and the civil war in Bosnia intensified such perceptions. See, for example, Ronald Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 384. The Attorney General under the Johnson administration, Ramsey Clark, on the other hand, was a bitter critic of the controlled media coverage. Ramsey Clark, *The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf* (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992).
19 The *Yomiuri Shimbun* published its draft proposal for an amended constitution, the product of two years’ discussions, on November 3, 1994. See also, Yomiuri shimbunsha chōsa kenkyūhonbu, *Teigenhōdo: Yomiuri Shimbun no chōsen* [Reporting with suggestions: the challenges of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*], (Tokyo: Chūokoron Shinsa, 2002),


21 Leitch, Jr., Kato, Weinstein, op.cit., 43–49; For the Foreign Ministry’s effort to obtain a permanent seat in the Security Council, see, for example, Asahi Shimbun, October 9, 1992.

22 For the expression of ambivalence toward the United States, Yukio Okamoto, op.cit.; Koichiro Matsumoto, interviewed by Seiichi Kondo, “Sonotoki gaimusho wa dou taisoshitaka [How the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded then], Gaiko Forum (September 2001), 21–27. See also Yoichi Funabashi, “Kokusai kōken kara kokusai renai e,” [From international contribution to international solidarity], Asahi Shimbun, September 27, 2001.

23 Leitch, Jr., Kato, Weinstein, op.cit., 45.


27 Fujioka, Kingendaishikyoiku no kaikaku, 29–30, 53.


29 The term “peace advocates” connotes a broad range of people who supported the peace constitution, opposed the cold war frame of mind, and were against the nuclear arms race. They were not necessarily pacifists—many of them might have condoned a war of self-defense while opposing Japanese participation in military conflicts beyond national borders.


33 Such tendencies intensified when in 1997 the United States and Japan agreed upon the new “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” in which the two governments attempted to draw a blueprint for building a closer working relationship between the U.S. Forces and the Self Defense Forces both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.


