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INTRODUCTION

In June of 1881 the Boston-based periodical The Atlantic Monthly—“A Magazine of Literature, Science, Art, and Politics”—carried the ninth installment of its serialization of Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady. It also included, in the anonymous “Contributor’s Club,” a short discussion of the critical reception of James’s earlier novel, The American.¹ In its ninth month, The Portrait might still have seemed on course for a satisfyingly conventional conclusion: the widely negative reaction to its lack of a “regular dénouement” was yet to come.² Nonetheless, as the “Contributor’s Club” essay points out, James had refused the “natural and reasonable request” of his readers for a conventional ending at least once before, in The American. This clash between James and his audience over what constituted a “real conclusion” is not surprising: sophisticated writers routinely challenge conventional narrative expectations and influential ones change them. Nonetheless, at issue here was much more than a disagreement over literary form. In calling its narrative expectations not only “reasonable” but, specifically, “natural,” the Atlantic was appealing to a much
wider set of cultural assumptions; it was appealing, in fact, to a specific construction of nature.

The *Atlantic*’s placement of installments of serialized fiction between essays on natural history, traveler’s tales, book reviews, short stories and social criticism provides the modern reader with a useful historical contextualization. Reading the *Atlantic* month by month we can rediscover the connections between cultural assumptions and literary form which disappear when a component text is cut from its original surroundings and pasted into the literary canon. In the *Atlantic* of the early 1880s, for example, attempts at the American “society novel” run alongside critical reviews of that particular genre and reflections on the current state of society life in Washington DC. This kind of historical contextualization also works usefully on a finer scale, too, when we find details of a shared geography being used as figurative points of reference. Comparing the figurative images of the *Atlantic*’s literary criticism with the way in which it writes about nature and the environment, we are able to see how the *Atlantic*’s assumptions about what is “natural” in the novel are related to its fundamental (but unacknowledged) assumptions about what is “natural” in the physical world.

In referring to “the *Atlantic*’s assumptions” and “the way in which it writes about nature” I am relying here on the suggestion made by the literary historian Louis James that a bound volume of a particular periodical can be read as a single text by a corporate author. Stressing the ways in which a periodical can acquire a “specific identity” through the “total effect of its contents, tone and style,” James argues that it can therefore be read as “a microcosm of a cultural outlook.” Linda K. Hughes and Michael Lund, also writing on the Victorian periodical, support this suggestion with the argument that as subscribers read the magazine month by month the whole text became linked together in their minds. In treating the *Atlantic* as a single text with a particular point of view I am also acknowledging the tone of the individual authors, who speak confidently of “us” and “our novels” and the things that “all readers must feel.” This community, this “us,” was, of course, in a constant state of redefinition: I am therefore setting the boundaries of my “single text” to include ten volumes, starting in 1880 and ending in 1884. This period usefully includes the whole of *The Portrait*, much debate on literary realism, “happy endings,” Zola and the naturalists, and a wide ranging variety of articles on the
American environment.

"The unsatisfactoriness of tales which appear to have no real conclusion is something that all readers must feel." So claims the Atlantic contributor in June of 1881 who refers to the reader's "natural and reasonable request" for some concluding "hints" about a hero's fate "after the curtain has dropped." While such a request may seem nothing more than unsophisticated to the modern reader, who brings a radically different set of narrative expectations to text, in the Atlantic of this period the request is indeed "natural" in the sense of being "conventional," unsurprising. But the demand for the conventional "happy ending," disparagingly defined by Henry James as "a distribution at the last of prizes, pensions, husbands, wives, babies, millions, appended paragraphs, and cheerful remarks," was not just a question of literary convention or literary competence. Attention to the way in which "nature" itself is understood in the Atlantic of this period makes it clear that the demand for a neatly parcelled conclusion was not only seen as "natural" in the sense that it was "conventional"; it was also seen as "natural" in the sense that it seemed "true to nature." For the Atlantic of the early 1880s, one of the major characteristics of the natural world was that within that world all things possessed the inbuilt tendency to move, in accordance with natural law, towards an appropriate and recognizable destination. An inconclusive novel would for this reason seem not only unsatisfying but actually unrealistic in its contradiction of this essential aspect of the natural.

The idea that James's Atlantic audience failed to understand his endings largely because his narratives struck them as running perversely counter to the laws of nature may at first sight seem far-fetched. The underlying assumption, that connections can actually be made between conventions in narrative construction and culture-specific versions of nature, may itself seem unlikely. For this reason, before turning to the specific investigation of ways in which narrative convention and geographical assumption are interrelated in the Atlantic of the early 1880s, I would like to review briefly some of the recent work in cultural geography that supports and illustrates this kind of analysis. I will then return to the Atlantic, to sketch the text's particular understanding of "nature," and to point out how this understanding is connected to the figurative articulation of its narrative expectations. This will lead into a discussion of the ways in which the text creates its version of the "natural" form of narrative ending (a narrative arrival at destination), a form
that is taken to be both conventional and realistic. This in turn will lead into an explanation of the reasons why this version of the “natural end” led to the Atlantic’s resistance to James and his innovative endings.

I

SUBJECTIVE GEOGRAPHIES

The study of naturalized narrative conventions which this paper undertakes is, essentially, an analysis of the textual expression of subjective geographical knowledge, and as such it relies heavily for its theoretical context on recent work in cultural geography, specifically, on the idea that all understandings of the physical world are historical, contextual, and localized, and that one of the tasks of geographical analysis is the rendering of “invisible geographers” and their subjectivities visible.8 This line of work challenges the separation of an “objective” geography belonging to professional geographers from the “subjective” geography of the rest of us; it also questions the separation of a “correct” modern geography from the “mistaken” views of an unenlightened past. Instead, rejecting the idea of an objectively knowable “essential nature” and emphasizing the multiplicities of geographical knowledge, geographers working in this new tradition have been concerned with “denaturalizing” particular views of the environment and with “unwriting” the hidden geographies that work (or have worked) to make constructed social and political systems (and cultural conventions) seem natural.

In their efforts to “denaturalize” and to “unwrite,” these geographers are responding to what Gillian Rose identified in Feminism and Geography as the need to resist anyone’s claims to see space transparently, to “challenge the transparent geography created by hegemonic subjectivity,” and to admit that “the grounds of [geographical] knowledge are unstable, shifting, uncertain and, above all, contested.”9 This need to challenge “transparent geography” is urgent because (as feminist geographers, among others, have argued) “essential nature”—an unquestioned, unproblematic, construction of the natural—has “served as a resource to fix the boundaries of what passes for the (un)real, the (ab)normal, the (un)human and the (un)natural.”10 As James Duncan noted in 1993: “increasingly the opinion of cultural ge-
ographers appears to be that culture is a constructed meaning system composed of representations (images) that, although often appearing "natural" to people within that central system, are far from innocent." Cultural geographers are now questioning those constructions both within the profession and beyond it. To take two examples: while Gillian Rose has exposed ways in which "concepts of place and space are implicitly gendered in geographical discourse," Steve Pile has investigated the connections between geographical experience, language, and the naturalization of social relations in a field study of Somerset dairy farmers.

The key point about the "new cultural geography" for this particular textual study is its willingness to focus on the role of the geographer in the creation of geographical knowledge while widening the definition of "the geographer" to include non-professionals and even texts. Where previous geographical approaches have treated the geographer as invisible and have, in so doing, accepted as natural particular ways of geographical seeing (male, for example, academic, Anglophone), this approach recognizes the subjectivity of all geographies, and abandons the idea that nature can be known as a reality distinct from its depiction. It therefore undercuts completely the distinction between a professional geography (which describes "reality") and a popular geography (made up of "images"), and renders both open to interrogation. This shift in the definition of "the geographer" is part of a new awareness of the validity and importance of non-professional geographies. In his 1993 Progress in Human Geography review of the field of cultural geography, James Duncan bemoaned the fact that despite the increasing importance of a postmodernist emphasis on multivocality, geographers still tended to "focus on their own interpretation of place, space or landscape rather than the inhabitant's interpretations." But Felix Driver's remark, made in the same journal in 1995, that historians and philosophers of geography had tended "until recently" to "limit their focus to more refined, scholarly texts" suggests that this focus is shifting.

There is, apparently, a growing interest among geographers in "the vast communicative realm through which geographies are popularly imagined, produced and consumed." In this way, the academic differentiation between work in the history of geography and work in historical geography has become blurred, and J.K. Wright's interest in "geosophy"—defined by Patrick McGreevey as "the study of the world as
people conceive of and imagine it”—has joined the mainstream. In this way, cultural geography has expanded its field to include as meaningful popular geographies and image systems that would once have been marginalized as naive or “less real” than the “élite, detached representations” privileged by professional geographers. The image-reality duality has broken down, and the two (if indeed they are “two”) are now seen to be interconnected and equally important. Geographers Michael Keith and Steve Pile, for example, identify as central to their recent collection of essays the ideas that “the metaphoric and the real do not belong in separate worlds,” that “symbolic and literal are in part constitutive of one another,” and that “meaning is never immanent.”

In his retelling of the history of geography, *Geographical Imaginations*, Derek Gregory insists that “the form of the story is part of the story.” His description of the “formidable box and flow diagrams” of an earlier generation of geographers highlights, as Felix Driver points out, “the ways in which the lines and boxes spoke particular kinds of language” and “the way they ironed out difference.” This focus on explanation, text and narrative, “the form of the story,” is an important aspect of the new cultural geography. Language has become a central concern, and scholars are beginning to read “texts” as “geographers” in the sense that these artifacts participate in the creation and maintenance of particular geographies. “Written texts,” as Duncan and Ley explain it, “contain an often hidden geography and an examination of that geography may clarify the unreflected ideologies of the text.” Geography is able, in this way, to “undermine dominant cultural representations of the other, by revealing that they are less regularities of nature than conventions of a situated—geographic—imagination.”

There is a long tradition of the use of specifically “literary” text in geographical study, but as the Canadian geographer Marc Brosseau has pointed out, most of it is connected with an outmoded image-reality version of the text-nature relationship. Problematically, “most geographer’s accounts consider poetic language and forms in strictly transitve terms that rest on an instrumental conception of literature whose relevance, therefore, is to be found outside itself.” Most geographical uses of literature serve to confirm previously held ideas and “obliterate” the text. In line with the recent emphasis cultural geography and culture studies in general have placed on language and the structures of texts, Brosseau emphasizes the need for geographers to “spend more
time on the text itself—its general structure, composition, narrative modes, variety of languages, style, etc.—before embarking on any type of interpretation whatsoever.” He is stressing the need for geographers to become sensitive to the peculiar geography of the text: geographers should not overlook “the specificity of its form” or “its singular use of language,” in order to remain open to “the particular way it writes people and place, society and space.”

“It seems important,” Brosseau concludes, “to consider more closely how the literary text may constitute a ‘geographer’ in its own right as it generates norms, particular models of readability, that produce a particular type of geography.” This is exactly what the following analysis of five years of the Atlantic Monthly attempts to do. Reading the Atlantic 1880–84 as a “single text with a corporate author,” we are able to put together a sense of the way in which—as “a ‘geographer’ in its own right”—it understood (in fact, constructed) its taken-for-granted version of ‘nature.’ If we decide to take the text as the characteristic voice of its implied audience, we are then able to connect this particular geography to a group of politically, socially, and culturally powerful Americans. While the magazine’s circulation was actually in decline in this period, it still occupied a position of considerable cultural authority, and it took for granted the cultural hegemony, moral superiority, and political privilege of its implied readership. Its “hidden geography” was both authoritative and influential: the Atlantic of this period provides the modern reader with a case study of the ways in which culturally influential texts are implicated in the social construction of naturalized geographies, and thus in the naturalization of power relationships, definitions of “otherness,” conventional moralities, and literary forms.

II

THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 1880–84

A Stable and Meaningful Nature

To be good, to be healthy, to be purposeful—to be moving in the right direction and heading for the right place—to be serene, strong and organized: this, in the Atlantic of the early 1880s, was to be natural. The “nature” that created this reading of the “natural” was a sta-
ble and meaningful environment that expressed, in ever-changing physical form, the benevolent organization of a divine mind or some other absolute universal order. The stability of nature’s physical forms was articulated in images of repeating organic cycles of growth and decay; the meaningfulness of its metaphysical order was suggested in images of progressive movement ‘upwards’ ‘onwards,’ and ‘homewards.’ ‘Beings of nature belong in cycles,’ we are told. ‘Only the species lives, the individuals all perish.’ But human beings, by virtue of their spiritual aspect being part of both the physical and the metaphysical orders of nature, are able to escape from the growth/decay cycle of natural material; the decaying individual human can take comfort from the idea that at the same time that science was showing how matter recycled itself, another of the ‘truths of science’ was that ‘everything hastens where it belongs.’ This image of purposeful movement in the physical world provides the figurative parallel for the metaphysical progress of the human individual who is more than a simple ‘being of nature’—for just as ‘the smoke-wreaths curl upward, and the water leaps downward, as crystallizing atom flies to atom, so my soul will find its home.’ In this sense, humanity can participate in the stability of physical cycles and also join in the metaphysical journey of essential nature as it progresses toward some ultimate destination: physical decay can be accompanied by spiritual arrival.

This was a view of nature, then, that provided a sense of both stability and progress, and interacted well with social views that were both conservative and confident. Cycles would start and finish as waves rise and fall, but the essential structure of physical nature would always remain the same. Science was daily demonstrating ‘the varying forms in which the same particles of matter may exist, the appearance only changing, the essence remaining the same; showing us that matter, as far as it can be traced, is imperishable,—that no motion once begun is ever ended, no sound ever dies.’ And so, ‘listening to the pulses of any great water,’ we receive the impression ‘not of inconstancy, but of changelessness through all change.’ In a performance of Beethoven’s symphonies the passages ‘swell and sink like the rising and falling of the wind;’ in their ‘majestic ebb and flow’ the music ‘resembles the sublime harmonies of Nature obeying her eternal laws.’

In the Atlantic, nature’s eternal laws not only regulate stable natural cycles, they also produce inevitable progress: ‘nature’s forces’ are
“working always and by impulsion towards what is highest.”

“Height” is one way of articulating improvement; “consolidation” is another. And so the natural “progress of mankind,” we are told—in the history of human languages, as in general—“is from fragmentariness to solidarity.”27 “Nature” thus provides the Atlantic with a reassuring, constantly regenerating physical context whose forces, naturally moving always “towards what is highest,” also function as the visible evidence of metaphysical progress to destination: “Nature’s forms only image to man in fragmentary manner the soul that he has.”28

It is in the consolidation of fragments, in the use of perspective or the imagination to create a whole from parts, that the artist exemplifies for the Atlantic the particular way of seeing connections between the physical and its abstract contexts that it takes to be a true representation of the “natural.” “Nature” includes both form and meaning, the characteristic and the significant, physical cycles and metaphysical progress, and it is the imperative duty of the artist to connect the two, to consolidate the fragmentary evidence of metaphysical purpose into an artistic whole. The artist is responsible for articulating and justifying an assumption of natural unity and purpose: “for,” as one contributor explained, “we all believe (do we not?) that the world is a universe, governed throughout by one Mind,” and that “whatever holds in one part is good everywhere.”29

This way of seeing “nature,” always placing the “part” in the “everywhere,” demanded strenuous and constant contextualization: the local had to be placed within the universal—or, at least, the continental—the particular taken as an example of the general, the individual connected to species; even the cataclysmic had to be accepted as incidental and local, a reordering rather than a destruction.30 Behind, beyond, above the physical lay the basic moral order that provided it with significance. Every day, modern science was providing “new illustrations of the uniformity and harmony of that nature of which we are a part;” the benevolence (or at least the intelligence) of the creating mind was not to be doubted.31

“All about the human world, so chaotic and incomprehensible, lies the world of nature, strong, serene, beautiful, and harmonious.” And no matter what was happening at the local level—the Civil War, for example, or the eruption of Krakatoa—the Atlantic was confident that it would always find this natural world “still rejoicing, undisturbed by our disasters, as if knowing them to be ephemeral and unreal.”32
world of nature is the stable, large-scale, spatial and temporal context for local, temporary, human-scale disruptions. What appears to be a world disordered may simply be an ordered world whose order is going unrecognized; or it may be a world whose order has been disrupted by a disobedient law-breaking. One contributor insists that "avalanche, sirocco, shipwreck, famine, and disease," are not in themselves "manifestations of natural law," but are often, in fact, "manifestations of man's violation of natural law." "Disease, I supposed," this writer casually remarks, "was now universally admitted to be the result of disobedience of natural laws, not an inevitable condition of nature." From a limited viewpoint or a lack of obedience—the law-breaking perhaps the result of the ignorance—the "human world" has a tendency to be at odds with the "natural." It is in this way resisting its own nature, for, to be most natural is, in the end, to be most lawful. The lurking laws of nature govern not only the growth and decay of the individual cycle, but also the steady progression of all that is truly natural along clear paths towards satisfying destinations.

For this reason, the hero of one of the Atlantic's short stories, who is "a good deal like the ocean," in his "apparent freedom of action," in fact has a freedom only "apparent" because really "a nature so full, so many-sided, so nearly rounded, presents more faces to the laws that lurk everywhere about us." The hero thus has little choice in his destiny: "the sphere floats free in air, but chooses not its own path. The more symmetrical the nature and the wider the intelligence, the less is the actual freedom." The confident movement of this symmetrical hero towards his most natural destiny is unusual: most people need help in recognizing the path of nature, and this is where the artist steps in, as "one of nature's forces," to place, for an audience, the local within the universal, the temporary within the eternal, and the disruptive within the harmonious. This view of the artist has obvious implications for particular forms of narrative structure, in which crisis and resolution represent, metaphorically, disruption and destination.

Finding "The Right Place"

The satisfyingly explicit social re-arrangement that occurs in the conventional conclusion to an Atlantic story fulfills a desire to solve problems through placement, and demonstrates metaphorically how "nature" moves through disruption to re-established order. The idea that unhappiness and discomfort spring from some form of misplacement,
which fits easily with this convention, comes up several times in the text in connection with images of natural stratification and natural placement. An essay on “Faults,” for example, draws out the parallel between faults of character and geological faults, “upheavals in the geologic column and dislocations of strata”; these natural (“innocent”) faults are apparently “very like” human faults, which are truly only “unexpected juxtapositions in the column of character, more or less regrettable departures from balance and symmetry.” If they could only “be made to take their proper place in the stratification,” then “our very faults, it sometimes seems, might be counted to us for virtues.” “Transplantation” is another handy metaphor for this kind of rearrangement. If we could only exchange faults with some appropriate other, then the “transplanted” problem could be solved: “our fault transplanted to his soil, as his to ours, might flourish as a kindly, wholesome plant, where now it is escaped from the garden, and become wild and poisonous.”

The working out of plot and character to achieve a satisfying sense of placement at a story’s conclusion is also connected to an implied emphasis on social place and social order: in this configuration, unhappiness and disruption spring from unhealthy ambitions or social misplacement, and the novel’s dénouement works out a re-establishment of order in the sense of a rearrangement. There is, after all—we are told—“a social as there is a natural atmosphere, which acts powerfully but invisibly, compelling objects to maintain their position, yet exerting no violence.” This idea comes in the context of a discussion of the “natural” and “not disagreeable” distance between social classes mingling in a public garden in England. It transpires that humanity has “an instinct of order,” and that “people who are kept in place” are not necessarily “held there by a demonstration of force.” Remarkable on how hard life is for the poor in cities, while the country “is kind to all” because there things seem “genuine” and “everything that is real is wholesome, bitter or sweet,” another contributor insists that “everything becomes so easy if one is only so fortunate as to slip into the right place.” While the modern reader may have trouble determining why exactly the country is the “right place” for the poor, and in what way life there might suddenly become “so easy” for them, it is clear nonetheless that the rhetorical force of the argument is coming from the idea that finding the “right place” is the solution to life’s problems.

The paramount duty of the Atlantic’s artist, then, is to place things:
to use perspective in the visual arts and imagination in the literary to
order scene and event in such a way that their place in some universal
order, their significance, becomes apparent. “The artist of nature must
believe that nature stands for something and must express on canvas
that persuasion.” If he fails to do this, “his work, however skillful and
picturesque, is uninteresting.”39 The author, similarly, must focus on
making the connection between form and meaning. As one book rev-
iew puts it: “It is yet the business of art, when portraying life, to
choose that which is significant, not merely that which is characteris-
tic.”40 The novel, in imitation of nature, needs “one supreme creative
consciousness”—and this is why “combination novels,” written by
committee, don’t work. The novelist, a metaphorical divine creator,
needs to enclose a story in “some grand inclusive outline that shall sug-
gest beauty and harmony,” needs, in other words, to provide it with
the equivalent of a natural context.41

Realism, Perspective, and the Imagination

“The true function of the poetic art,” apparently, “is to lift up,
refine, and inspire us.”42 Photographic realism, as defined by the Atlantic,
is therefore valueless. “Art requires an idealization of nature,” and
to praise fiction for its “photographic fidelity” is to condemn it; “art is
selection and idealization, with a view to impressing the mind with hu-
man, or even higher than human, sentiments and ideas.”43 The imagina-
tion is a “truth-finding faculty, not less valid because it presents truth
in a wholly different way from the purely logical intellect;” a text may
lack “the truth of actuality” and yet still possess “the higher imagina-
tive truth.”44 In geological terms, the artist needs to consolidate: the
poet whose work is described as “crystalline in structure, beautiful, or-
dered, perfect in form when taken part by part, but conglomerate on
the whole” has failed in his duty to “give unity to his work.” He is criti-
cized for failing to develop, and condemned for his failure to synthe-
size: in obliterating himself from his work he has become a “mirror”
rather than a “creator,” and has failed to give his material “back to
the world, transformed, and yet essentially true.”45

The use of perspective in painting and the use of the imagination in
fiction are both defined in the Atlantic as forms of ordering which cre-
ate particular, purposeful views of nature. They are both regarded as
methods of placement that serve to reveal an inherent natural order
which is lost in a photograph or a piece of aggressively “realistic” writ-
ing. When Zola, in one of his essays, "blames all use of the imagination, and affirms that the novel-writer can busy himself solely with observed facts," he is, in the view of the Atlantic, simply wrong. For to "assert that the imagination is an obsolete thing is like saying that henceforth perspective must never be used in pictures," and this is to say that we are stuck at the level of visual chaos and unordered event. Despite the fact that Zola is roundly castigated in the Atlantic for his "vulgarity," his true crime is that he is provincial, in the sense that he is limited to the local and has no vision of any larger (abstract) context.

The almost moral distinction that the Atlantic makes between the writer with "perspective" and the writer without is made clear in a comparative review of the biographies of two journalists. Both were country boys who pursued their careers in large cities: but where Thurlow Weed is portrayed as remaining local in his attachments, "to the end of his days a countryman," William Cullen Bryant is respected for the way in which he transcended his local beginnings, referring always in his thinking "to certain large, elemental conceptions of nature and society." Weed's limitations in this respect are indicated by the condescending remark that even when he was working in the thick of the New York political world, he displayed a "delightful parochialism" and an "absence of perspective." Bryant, in contrast, was distinguished by his ability to see the whole picture: his "nature comprehended professional duty, poetic inspiration, and religious faith within one consistent, large, and simple whole." Where Weed was distinguished by his "human picturesqueness," Bryant possessed a "more classic dignity." In this way Bryant, "a sort of human mountain," exemplified the Atlantic's desire for an "uplifted," distanced, ordered sense of nature: he was distinguished by "simplicity, love of truth, and a lofty conventionalism," and, furthermore, he had a "confidence in the order of things."

True "realism," for the Atlantic, has to demonstrate this "order of things." It is not enough to be "the same thing [as naturalism] without the indecency." That would simply be a more genteel form of parochialism. According to the Atlantic, true realism has an obligation to connect the particular to the general, and to indicate purpose and conclusion. An 1881 review of "Realism in Art" argues that there are two types of realism, the more Zolaesque of which should be renamed "actualism" or "materialism." The actualist confines himself to the factual, limited, and actual; the true realist includes the imaginative,
the “ideal” and that which transcends any particular truth. An artist
“who has a true conception of an ideal has the right to call the cre-
tions of his imagination made after the image of that ideal truth, real-
ities,” and so “the idealist is the only true realist.” Some other name
should be given to the artist “who clings to the material, particular
fact, and is indifferent to the spiritual truth in virtue of which the par-
ticular fact exists.”

A “Wild and Unfinished” Environment

The most serious problem with Zola’s naturalism is not that it is
“shameless and disgusting” but that, like American “actualism,” it
limits itself to the particular and the characteristic, denying, through a
lack of perspective, its responsibility to create an overview and work
towards a sense of achieved order and placement. The inability to
achieve overview, the difficulty of projecting a future state of achieved
order from a present state of disconnection, is a problem also connect-
ed in the Atlantic at this time with the American environment. This
difficulty springs largely from the fact that the basis for the Atlantic’s
approach to overview is strongly connected to its habits of “seeing na-
ture” in Europe. “There is an education needed for the appreciation of
nature,” and “the eye and taste require experience and training to com-
prehend and analyze the beauties of the outer world,” an author writ-
ing on the Italian lakes insists, telling of a personal conversion to the
educated appreciation of the European. “There was a time when I
resented as hotly as most other Americans the idea that any scenery
could surpass our own;” that, however, was before the “classic form
and profile” of the Italian landscape had done its work. In the Atlantic,
the “love of natural beauty” is not in itself natural: “this love does
not spring up and grow in people without education.” It is, in fact, a
“class thing,” closely connected to a conventional, Eurocentric educa-
tion and a familiarity with Cook’s Tours.

Comprehension and analysis are vital to the appreciation of nature:
the particular needs to be placed. In Europe this process is easily initiat-
ed for any educated tourist by a rich cultural context and sense of histo-
ry with which they can identify personally: their luggage includes guide-
books, gazetteers, and appropriate volumes of poetry, and their jour-
ney is taken to be, in some form, a home-coming. In the USA, the At-
lantic rejects the land’s pre-European history and its native American
cultural associations, and thus radically reduces the range of its contex-
ts of significance. For the Atlantic, the "American" is, by descent, also a "European:" native American words, for example, cannot be "Americanisms" because they are "aboriginal." "What have we to do with them?" the Atlantic asks. "We are not Indians."\(^{51}\) As the imaginary "Mr. Washington Adams" puts it, "we are not products of the soil. We are not the fruit of Niagara or the prairies, which most of us have never been within five hundred miles of." "We," conventionally, travel in the other direction.\(^{52}\)

The problem the Atlantic has with the American environment is not only its lack of a visible past but also its extent: it presents such a vast front to the organizing mind that it becomes almost impossible to grasp the divine order lying behind it, especially when the mind is not able to rely for help on the work of previous generations as represented—in Europe—by cultural associations and historical monuments. It is easy to feel overwhelmed by the scale of the Americas. The "vast Sierra of the continent" has a "calm immensity that transcends any mountain view the Alps can afford" for example, and while "the scene can never have anything of the graciousness or human interest that lends beauty to the Alps," it has "a grandeur all its own." Like "all the feature lines of this rather grim continent," it is "cast in a large mould."\(^{53}\) No wonder, really, that a Boston matron traveling west in the short story "Niagara Revisited" should be unnerved by a sudden vision of "the continental immensity that advanced devouringly upon her."\(^{54}\)

The problem with the American environment, then, is its resistance to recognized landscape conventions and its "continental immensity." In Europe the "ways of seeing" that create defined landscape were culturally conventional and readily accessible to the educated American tourist, but, in the USA, these learned "ways of seeing" often didn't work. Without this observing system and way of seeing order, terrain could appear to be simply physical space, boring and disorganized, lacking "scenery." It could in this sense seem—like crudely realist novels—merely actual, or material, lacking any visible encouragement of that imaginative ordering which was necessary for the appreciation of the natural as significant. It is for this reason that a view from a Red River steamboat could seem not only "wild" but actually "unfinished." "There is scarcely anything that can be called scenery," the visitor complains, and "we do not often see a definite landscape, with well marked features or outline."\(^{55}\) The views have no plot; they are heading for no conclusion. Hence we are advised that in the USA,
“where traveling is not always interesting, especially in the western country, where the day’s journeys are like reading a page of a book over and over, it is a good plan to consider a comfortable way of spending one’s time.”

Re-reading the same page and staring at “unfinished” scenery are similarly unsatisfactory experiences: neither involves any reassuring sense of an approaching conclusion, destination, or overview. The Atlantic has a basic desire, when reading a novel and when looking at a landscape, to move through the story or the view with a sense of organizing purpose. A “finished” piece of scenery, like a finished novel, will embody the Atlantic’s sense that, in Nature, “everything hastens where it belongs.” The essential problem the Atlantic had in recognizing this in its own national environment came in two parts: America was so vast that any sense of the “everything” was hard to grasp, and it was taken to be so new that all emphasis still fell on the “hastening”—there was as yet little confidence in an agreed sense of where anything, finally, was going to belong.

A humorous essay on the generic “Boomtown” that was always being built at the latest end of some railway track or other provides a clear picture of this sense of “hastening” without “belonging.” “That migratory city, Boomtown,” was forever moving westward; by the time any “slow and healthy growth” appeared, the frontier town had its own name and “Boomtown” had moved on. There is no comforting sense of historical context here: “new things crowd new close and fast in the opened wilderness, and the very words “old” and “new” lose significance from shifting and interchanging with each other so perpetually.” Even the nation’s capital is “tantalizing and provoking” rather than settled: it is “a city of the future” and “like our democracy,” it is “magnificent in conception, but crude, unfinished, unsatisfactory in its actual condition.” Southern scenery is wild and unfinished; Washington is crude and unfinished; both are unsatisfactory. The disorganized nature of the nation’s social life is a further problem for the American novelist, another source of dissatisfaction. “It is one of the difficulties of writing sustained fiction in this country,” we are told, “that, society being a state of flux, indeterminate and shifting, and there being no recognized theory as to its rules, structure, movement, each novelist has to make his own theory.”
Reading and Traveling: Reaching Conclusions

To be "true to nature," to fulfill the artist's duty to "choose that which is significant, not merely that which is characteristic," to create some "grand, inclusive outline that shall suggest beauty and harmony," to show, in fact, how "everything hastens where it belongs," the novelist needed to create a strong narrative voice that moved plot towards conclusion. A writer needed to create, metaphorically, that sense of purposeful movement which was most problematic for the Atlantic in its view of the American environment. The experience of reading ought to parallel that of a satisfying walk or journey, and these are the metaphors within which evaluations of both poetry and prose are often articulated. Wordsworth, for instance, is an "unequal poet" who often simply asks the reader to accompany him along a rambling and uneven path. At his best and most directed, he takes us from "the low and external and accidental shows of things into purer regions of contemplation and imagination," leading us "onward and upward through nature, in her manifold symbols of beauty and truth, towards nature's God." Too often, however, "we follow him, as we would in one of his long country walks, through loose, monotonous sands, over rough rocks and furze and wide, barren moors, and up steep mountain heights into regions of clouds and sunrises and sunsets,—an uneven path, and often requiring patience."61

The reader who wants to accompany a metonymic "everything" as it "hastens where it belongs" needs an author with the confidence of a native guide, and the organization of a Baedeker. The right kind of author would not "make tedious our progress through his tale by leading us over dry wastes of description, or afflicting us with stony little facts flung upon the pathway."62 Nor would he daunt us with prose too "rigidly and conscientiously correct and exact in point of grammar and construction," because sentences "too uniformly short and abrupt" have the overall effect of being "fatiguing and discouraging to the reader." They give "the sensation of climbing a slippery hill, where you fall back one step for every two you take."63 The best authors, because they are aware of the tour group at their heels, do not "jog calmly on their tedious way, never suspecting that the public are not contentedly accompanying them at this slow regulation pace."64 The best authors, in other words, do not lead us over dry wastes, take us up slippery hills, or move us along too slowly. Nor do they send us off in the wrong direc-
tion, or plunge us into environments specifically designed to frustrate purposeful movement. When the confusing use of a pronoun "puts you on a wrong track, and keeps you there through half a chapter," the writer's grammar is misleading you.\(^65\) When the convoluted construction of a story-within-a-story plunges you into a maze, narrative construction is at fault, for the "infuriated reader, before he is halfway through this labyrinth of incident, has lost the thread that was to guide him."\(^66\)

Reading, then, is progress towards destination: the "real story" in a novel is the one which is heading for the "right place." In the case of the novel *Phoebe*, reviewed in September of 1884, the "right place" is taken to be the satisfactory untwisting of a knotty ethical problem, an untwisting that needs to be achieved through the unfolding of character revealed in incident. Unfortunately, according to the review, the knot is cut rather than untied: "incidents which give promise of a thorough development of the ethical forces" lead, in fact, nowhere. The reader finds, "to his surprise," that "he has gone down a blind alley" with one of these incidents, "on a road that leads no whither. He is not a bit further into the real story." The story has a deeply unsatisfying dénouement, and "when the wreck is cleared at the end very few valuables are saved." Order is re-established, but not in any meaningful way. A destination is reached, somehow, but even having reached it, the reading tour group are still not sure exactly where they are.\(^67\)

It is not enough to have a destination, then; it must be one which provides the right kind of view. Bret Harte's novel *Gabriel Conroy* fails in this regard, walking its reader briskly out of reach of any kind of view at all. An unfortunate moment of narrative bathos, coming at what had promised to be the crisis of the novel, "has the effect of crumbling the entire structure of the story," so that "the reader looks back upon all the dark passages through which he has been wandering as leading not into the light, but into the vegetable cellar."\(^68\) The light which, cast upon a hero, indicates his post-narrative future is quite naturally missing in the manuscript of Hawthorne’s "Dr. Grimshawe's Secret," which is literally unfinished. At the point where the manuscript stops, "Redclyffe, the hero, is left in an aimless position, the result of his adventures is not even shadowed forth."\(^69\)

It is clear, then, that for the *Atlantic* the reading process was supposed to resemble a purposeful journey towards a destination which would provide, to put it metaphorically, a good view. This kind of jour-
ney would healthily parallel the tendencies of "nature" itself. The ending to a novel should make absolutely clear the way in which the narrative had organized its arrangement of the particular to demonstrate significance. This understanding of narrative conclusion is thus closely related to an understanding of "nature" as a purposeful, stable system in which "everything hastened where it belonged." Two of the scathing criticisms of "unfinished endings" that Charles Dudley Warner makes in his 1883 Atlantic essay on "Modern Fiction," both articulated in terms of frustrating and disturbing landscape images, will help to elucidate this point. Firstly, Warner expresses his exasperation with modern endings. "I confess," he says, "that I am harassed with the incomplete romances that leave me, when the book is closed, as one might be on a waste plain, at midnight, abandoned by his conductor and without a lantern." The reader is lost, in the dark, in a wilderness. "I am tired," he continues, "of accompanying people for hours through disaster and perplexity and misunderstanding, only to see them lost in a thick mist at last." The reader and the characters have both been abandoned by the author. A page later, Warner continues his excoriation of the incomplete in an attack on the kind of fiction which thought it "artistic" to focus on "the shady and the seamy side of life," while "giving to this view the name of 'realism.'" These "artistic" productions were likely, apparently, not only "to drag us forever along the dizzy, half-fractured precipice of the seventh commandment," but to end—"the latest and finest touch of modern art"—by leaving "the whole weltering mass in chaos, without conclusion and without possible issue."70

True to Life/True to Nature

Emile Zola and Henry James both fail to provide their Atlantic readers with a satisfyingly purposeful narrative journey; Zola because he takes them nowhere and James because he takes them to the heart of a maze and then disappears. Where Warner's authors abandoned their readers on a waste plain at midnight, Zola refuses to start the journey at all: he simply "takes down the side of the house—a disorderly house—and lets the reader see and hear what is going on under its roof." He provides no guidance, removes himself, fails to transform his material: "there is hardly an expression of his own opinion in the whole book. He has no asides for the reader. He expresses no views of the matter before him."71 James, on the other hand, is taken to be
equally static, for different reasons. He is at times so analytical that "it seems impossible to enjoy his work rationally, that is, to follow the fortunes of his characters with a lively interest in them"—"we become critics with him; his own attitude toward his creations, essentially an analytic one, becomes ours," and so, joining him in the analysis, "we get our satisfaction in winding with him through the mazes of their psychology." Very interesting—but where does it get us?72

James did not always frustrate his readers in this way. One contributor records with satisfaction in 1880 that in his most recent novel, Confidence, at least, "we are not balked of our natural if weak-minded desire to have matters turn out comfortably for the good hero and heroine." We need to make a distinction here between the "natural" desire for a conclusive ending and the "weak-minded" desire for a happy one. The Atlantic could be just as critical of the unconvincing happy endings of the "publisher's dénouement" as it could of the lack of any dénouement at all: according to the Atlantic, while publishers may "think that the average 'consumer' of novels would rather see two young people preposterously made happy than have his own artistic instincts gratified," this was not in fact the case.74 Indeed, the absence of the happy ending was not the cause of the Atlantic's quarrel with James. The problem with James's endings sprang instead from differences in the understanding of what was implied by the "artistic." For the Atlantic, the "artistic instincts" of the average reader demanded a recognizably "natural" conclusion. For James, in contrast, the artistic responsibilities of the writer demanded a reconsideration of those conventional (apparently "natural") forms of narrative closure. The problem that the Atlantic has with James's endings is not their "weak-minded" desire for a "happy ending" but their "natural" desire for one they can recognize.

James admits, in "The Art of Fiction," that for many people the "good" novel is "full of incident and movement," so that they are filled with the urge to "jump ahead, to see who was the mysterious stranger, and if the stolen will was ever found." These readers do not want to be "distracted from this pleasure by any tiresome analysis or "description."" The Atlantic, however, does not stress the mysterious stranger angle to plot development; it is focused much more on what James refers to as the "appended paragraphs and cheerful remarks" that come at the end of the story and put everything into perspective. But in both cases the "artistic" idea causes trouble: "its hostility to a
happy ending would be evident”—that is one thing—“and it might even in some cases render any ending at all impossible.” That is the (significant) other.  

James was apparently determined, his Atlantic critics notwithstanding, to follow “the artistic idea.” He did not want to find himself too late admitting, with the novelist in his own story “The Author of Beltraffio,” that he had “always arranged things too much, always smoothed them down and rounded them off and tucked them in—done everything to them that life doesn’t do.” James did not want to be what that novelist calls himself—“a slave to the old superstitions.” This refusal to arrange things was the result of James’s desire for the novel to be true to life; the Atlantic’s insistence on concluding arrangement was the result of its desire for the novel to be true to nature. “A series of unconnected situations leading to nothing is inadequate” for the Atlantic. “There must be a natural end to it all.” This from a contributor discussing “Plot and Character” in the Contributor’s Club, and making a direct attack on James’s approach to fiction. “Mr. James asserts that ‘we care what happens to people only in proportion as we know what people are.’ I think we don’t care a snap what people are (in fiction) when we don’t know what happens to them.”

The emphasis James places on being “true to life” has the effect, for the Atlantic, of limiting his view to the local specificity of the individual cycle. His refusal to append concluding remarks—either metaphorically, through plot resolution, or literally, with authorial comment—becomes equivalent to a refusal to make his fiction “true to nature.” This disjunction between the way James views the novel and the expectations of his Atlantic readership is also connected to a difference in their views of the relationship between text and material: where, for James, the text is self-contained, the Atlantic takes it to be the telling of one significant part of a larger story. It is for this reason that the Atlantic can talk of what happens to a hero or heroine “after the curtain has dropped between them and us.” These characters are taken to have a continued existence somewhere outside the novel. The Atlantic can thus complain of the way James takes a hero “through an experience that must have powerfully and permanently affected him”—the “permanence” is post-narrative—but fails to give “the slightest indication of what he did with his altered life.” The Atlantic feels that it has been left in the middle of the maze, abandoned by the author and left “to wander helplessly among conjectures too various to choose from.” It
agrees with the *London Spectator* that *The American* is "Mr. James's most powerful book," but concludes that for this reason "it is the greater pity that this complaint of its final unsatisfactoriness can be legitimately brought against it." The complaint is "legitimately brought," despite its confidently authoritative tone, by reference to a particular view of the natural: the *Atlantic* is appealing here, once more, to "the laws that lurk everywhere about us," the laws of "that nature of which we are a part."

**CONCLUSION**

It is not easy to end an essay about endings, especially one which has rested its argument throughout on the idea that conventions of textual closure are culture-specific and related to constructed geographies. The ending of this essay, like the endings of the *Atlantic*, inevitably says something about the culture in which it was written and the geography it takes for granted. So this conclusion must at least contain, in an admission of its own specific and non-objective voice, an acknowledgment of its own "hidden geography" and its own particular set of "un-reflected ideologies;" and admit that it, too, is a product of a "situated—geographic—imagination." It is impossible, after such an admission of subjectivity, to end with any version of the conventional academic "it is clear, then, that—" conclusion; and so I would like to end this narrative journey at a crossroads holding signposts pointing in three directions. The first signpost directs our attention to the dangers inherent in the preference Marc Brousseau has noted among geographers for literary texts belonging to what he terms the "nineteenth century realist tradition." The second signpost draws our eyes towards the connections that may well exist between the acceptance of a controlling narrative voice in conventional fictional structures and the justification of social and political power structures. The third signpost invites us to undertake an exploration of the role metaphor plays in hindering communication between different groups of people who share an interest in the contemporary construction of the nature/culture dualism.

The first signpost: in the introduction to their *Place/Culture/Representation* Duncan and Ley refer to Bryson's definition of "realism" as "the coincidence between a representation and that which a society assumes as its reality." This is where the danger lies in
any preference shown by geographers for the nineteenth-century “realist” tradition: can they sustain enough distance from their own reading conventions to recognize the constructed nature of the apparently “realistic” text? As Duncan and Ley point out, literary realism is suspect in the way in which, even for the modern reader, it conceals its situated way of seeing. This can lead to precisely the kind of erasure of specificity that Gillian Rose insists we need to guard against. For many of us, “realism” seems natural, characterized, perhaps, by what seems to be the absence of an artificial, intrusive narrative voice. It is, for this reason, all too easy for us to identify uncritically with its narrative point of view and take its constructed version of the natural—and implied definition of the unnatural—for granted. We need to be aware that the texts which fall most easily within our own reading comfort zone are those which will require from us the most conscious attention to their narrative assumptions.

The second signpost is planted in the *Atlantic’s* assumption that one of the duties of the narrative voice in fiction is to place, define and conclude, to be in charge. The *Atlantic* favors a narrative voice that is always in control: the image of the volcano, for example, which comes up remarkably often in the text, is always used in such a way as to indicate uncontrollable force and irrationality while at the same time implying the undisturbed survival, at any textual moment, of the rational observer. In this and other ways the text organizes the uncontrollable and justifies its assumption of the right to control and to place. It is suggestive to compare this form of textual organization and control with Denis Cosgrove’s analysis of the visual organization and control involved in the creation of what he terms “the landscape concept.” Cosgrove defines “landscape” as a way of seeing, a form of visual organization, that was originally explicitly “bourgeois, individualist and related to the exercise of power over space.” He relates linear perspective and “realism” in art to power structures in social class and spatial hierarchies, arguing that “landscape” is a term which “embodies certain assumptions about relations between humans and their environment, or, more specifically, society and space.” To go through Cosgrove’s discussion with a pencil, substituting the words “conventional narrative constructions” for “landscape,” is an exercise which suggests the interesting views that may be found by following the second signpost.

The third direction leading off from the end of this essay would take us through David Demeritt’s 1994 essay on the use of metaphors in cul-
tural geography and environmental history towards a consideration of the ways in which an adjustment in the figurative language we use now to talk about nature and culture might facilitate a productive “destabili-
zation” of our own underlying assumptions. Demeritt’s essay demon-
strates how a clash in the metaphors used by environmental historians and cultural geographers prevents their communication; they are “es-
tranged disciplines” that share common ground but “speak different lan-
guages and use incommensurable metaphors.” Metaphors and nar-
native structures are both what Demeritt calls “enframing devices” that “make the world knowable while always already precluding still other ways of ordering the world.” There are new ways of ordering the world, and there is the potential to bring together “estranged” ways of thinking: Demeritt refers to the new possibilities suggested by the work of Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour. He admits that these new ways of writing about nature may be hard to read, but insists that if Latour and Haraway “seem strange and jarring at first glance, it is because their metaphors for nature destabilize the nature/culture dualism so deeply ingrained in our ‘everyday’ language.”

Conventions in writing and reading, in metaphors and in narrative structure, stabilize particular ways of seeing nature. In order to open up debate between different groups, and in order to acknowledge the validity of different ways of seeing, we need first to recognize the ways in which our own most familiar texts embody and sustain their own hidden geographies.

NOTES

1 Henry James, “The Portrait of a Lady,” The Atlantic Monthly 46–48 (November 1880-December 1881); “Mr James and the London Spectator,” “Contributor’s Club,” The Atlantic Monthly 47 (January-June 1881): 871–72. Further references to the Atlantic Monthly will give the abbreviation AM, volume number, six-month period of publication (1880/a, for example, indicating January-June 1880 and 1880/b July-December 1880) and relevant page numbers for the volume. They will cite the author’s name when it is given in the “Contents,” and use the abbreviation “CC” for an entry in the “Contributor’s Club.”

6 “Mr James and the London Spectator,” 871.
12 Rose, *Feminism and Geography*, 62; Steve Pile, “Depth Hermeneutics and Critical Human Geography,” *Environment & Planning D: Society and Space* 8 (1990): 211–32. Pile argues that certain social relations are taken by the farmers to be “natural” because “by not selecting and thus deleting agency, social relations are stripped of their power relations. Thus social relations have become reconstituted as a ‘natural’ circumstance ‘beyond’ anyone’s control.” Agency “is hidden through the metaphorical construction of language” (222).
14 Driver, “Visualizing Geography: a Journey to the Heart of the Discipline,” 1995,
17 Duncan & Ley, *Place/Culture/Representation*, 368.
20 Brosseau, "Geography's Literature," 349.
23 "Is God Good?", 853.
28 Harris, "Ralph Waldo Emerson," 246.
31 "Is God Good?", 852.
33 "Is God Good?", 854, 855.
35 Paton, "And Mrs. Somersham," 495.
36 "Faults and Faults," *CC*, *AM* 52 (1883/b): 848.
41 George Parsons Lathrop, "Combination Novels," *AM* 54 (1884/b): 802, 804.
42 "Recent Poetry," *AM* 54 (1884/b): 121.
48 "Realism in Art," *CC*, *AM* 47 (1881/a): 731.
40. "The Lakes of Upper Italy," Chapter 4, AM 54 (1884/b): 785.
42. Richard Grant White, "British Americanisms," AM 45 (1880/a): 673.
45. W. D. Howells, "Niagara Revisited: Twelve Years after their Wedding Journey," AM 51 (1883/a): 599.
63. "Characteristics of Mr. James's Last Story," CC, AM 46 (1880/b): 140.
64. "Confidence," CC, AM 46 (1880/b): 141.
70. Duncan & Ley, Place/Culture/Representation, 368.