Kiyoshi Kiyosawa in the United States
—His Writings for the
San Francisco Shinsekai—

Shinichi KITAOKA

KIYOSHI KIYOSAWA (1890–1945), a liberal diplomatic critic whose writings were suppressed by the authorities during the Pacific War, always stressed the importance for Japan of friendly relations with the United States. There were many Japanese who feared war with the United States during the prewar decade. But no Japanese was able to explain more clearly the background, meaning, and consequences of every important U.S. diplomatic move toward the Far East than Kiyosawa did in the 1930s. As the famous journalist Tsunego Baba reminisced later, he was in Japan “the only one who had accurate understanding of the United States on the eve of the Pacific War.”¹ He understood not only the American power but also the American mind. Kiyosawa considered himself an expert on U.S. affairs. “If I could claim my expertise in some fields,” he said, “they would be ‘America’ and diplomacy.”²

It is noteworthy that Kiyosawa started his career in journalism as a reporter for Japanese-language newspapers on the West Coast. He first wrote for Hokubei Jiji [the North American Times], a Seattle newspaper, the copies of which have mostly been lost, and unfortunately

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¹ Bokkō Matsubara, “Kiyosawa-kun no henrin” [A Glimpse of Mr. Kiyosawa], Nichibei jidai, (August 1 and September 1, 1954).

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no collection of this paper has been found in Japan or the United States. However, a good set of the San Francisco Shinsekai [New World], which became the next stage for Kiyosawa’s career in journalism, is preserved at several libraries in the United States. From his writings on this paper, we can gain considerable knowledge about Kiyosawa’s thinking in his younger days.

Kiyosawa stayed in San Francisco from 1914 to 1918, from twenty-four to twenty-eight years of age. What were the characteristics of the Japanese immigrant community as Kiyosawa observed them? What were his comments on them? And in what way did his experiences in the community influence his later intellectual outlook?

This author suggested in his book on Kiyosawa that his later views on diplomatic matters were greatly influenced by his experience as an immigrant in the United States. Making use of his articles and shorter items in Shinsekai as sources, this essay is addressed to the above questions to prove the author’s thesis.

I

THE SEATTLE YEARS

First, it may be appropriate to describe briefly Kiyosawa’s early life before his start as a reporter for Shinsekai.

Kiyoshi Kiyosawa was born in 1890, as a farmer’s son in Nagano prefecture. When he finished elementary education, he wished to go to a high school. Since his father was unwilling to send his son to a high

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4 This author was able to examine the microfilm copy of the Shinsekai held by the library of University of California, Berkeley. He would like to thank Mr. Nobuhiro Hiwatari, graduate student at University of Tokyo, who kindly helped him obtain the microfilms.

school, however, Kiyosawa entered instead a small private school in the neighborhood called Kenseigijuku. The principal of the school was Kigenji Iguchi, a non-church Christian who followed Kanzo Uchimura's teachings. Kiyosawa was greatly influenced by Iguchi. In short, Iguchi taught the young boy, who dreamed simply of his personal success, to strive to be "a light for the whole world, and salt for all mankind." At the age of sixteen, Kiyosawa decided to emigrate to America. Some of the alumni of Iguchi's school had already been there. While most Japanese immigrants to the United States simply wanted to make money, Kiyosawa was motivated by religion and by a desire to gain more education.

In 1906, the year Kiyosawa left Japan for America (he arrived in the following January), the San Francisco Board of Education proceeded to segregate the children of Japanese immigrants in public schools, thus precipitating a diplomatic dispute between Japan and the United States. Kiyosawa arrived in the State of Washington where the anti-Japanese mood was not quite as strong as in California; nevertheless, he had to endure much prejudice and discrimination. Working his way through school was also very hard. After trying various jobs in order to stay in school, Kiyosawa began to think of earning his livelihood by writing, something he enjoyed doing. So he contacted Hokubei Jiji, asking them to permit him to open a branch office at Tacoma. His offer was accepted, and he became the director and only worker of the Tacoma branch, where he did everything from delivering the paper to gathering news. It was about five years since Kiyosawa had arrived in the United States.

Kiyosawa's articles quickly gained a reputation in the Japanese community in the state. In 1913, he returned to Japan from January to May. During his stay in Japan, he was admitted to Waseda University in Tokyo, but went back to the United States after finding it impossible to pay the school expenses. He resumed and continued his activities with Hokubei Jiji until his transfer to Shinsekai in 1914.

Unfortunately, as mentioned before, few issues of Hokubei Jiji have been preserved. But Kiyosawa's writings in his Seattle years are not entirely lost, for he contributed three articles to Shinkokyo [New Homeland], a coterie magazine of the Hotaka Club, composed of alumni of Kenseigijuku living near Seattle. Kiyosawa wrote "Nichibei Mondai no genjō" [Current Issues in Japan-U.S. Relations] for the third volume (published on January 1, 1914), and "Nichibei no mondai to so-
no kaiketsu no michi” [Issues in Japan-U.S. Relations and How to Solve Them] for the fourth volume (published on August 20, 1914). He also wrote “Hikan ka rakkan ka sonogono Nichibei kankei” [Recent Japan-U.S. Relations—Should We Be Pessimistic or Optimistic?] for the fifth volume (published March 25, 1917) though he had already left Seattle and lived in San Francisco.6 In all these cases, he was asked by the editor to write on the same theme, that is, Japan-U.S. relations. We may therefore surmise that Kiyosawa’s concern on Japan-U.S. friction over Japanese immigration was deep, and also that the people around him knew it.

From the three essays cited above, it is possible to conclude that Kiyosawa held little hope that the immigration issue could be solved through diplomatic means. In “Nichibei no mondai to sono kaiketsu no michi,” Kiyosawa examined several conceivable ways of solution, such as a treaty revision, immigrants’ acquisition of the naturalization right, and a settlement by arbitration. He concluded that none of these plans were really possible, and finished his essay with the following remark: “In short, it is not at all promising to solve these problems through diplomatic negotiations. The Japanese immigrants in the United States as well as the Japanese in the homeland with interest in the United States must be ready to cope with their problems by themselves, and they should not expect much help from the Japanese government.”

In spite of these views, Kiyosawa was very optimistic with regard to the future of the Japanese in America. In “Nichibei mondai no gen-jō,” Kiyosawa assured that as long as the developing West needed a labor force of good quality and the Japanese in America could offer it, they would not need to worry about their future. “When the Panama Canal is opened and immigrants flow in from Italy and Greece,” he wrote, “Californians, who have looked down on us as an inferior race, will realize that we are really a better and more diligent people. Then they will begin to think of cooperating with us.” Also in “Hikan ka rakkan ka . . . ,” Kiyosawa referred to the rapid increase of children among the Japanese immigrants. He pointed out that those children were Americans as well as Japanese. “Is not the increase of these

6 All three essays are collected in Minami-Azumi-gun Kyoikuinkai [The Board of Education, Minami-Azumi County, Nagano Prefecture] ed., Iguchi Kigenji to Kenseigijuku [Kigenji Iguchi and the Kenseigijuku School], (A Publication of the Minami-Azumi Board of Education, 1982).
young people a new development of the Japanese race? We Japanese, a newcomer in the world arena . . . are going to prove how well we can fare in the competition with the white race. What a joy it is for us to be given such an opportunity! I would say, therefore, that we have a very promising future.”

Kiyosawa held this very optimistic view on the future of the Japanese in America, while he was very pessimistic about a satisfactory diplomatic solution of the immigration issue. This contrast in his views continued throughout his life, and it formed a basis of his diplomatic thought. Kiyosawa’s second point, the rapid increase of Japanese children, became impossible later mainly because of the proscription of the “picture bride” in 1920. Yet, when we look at the state of the Japanese-Americans today, it may be said that Kiyosawa’s prediction of a bright future for the Japanese in the United States was basically correct.

Then, the next question is what was his perception on the Japanese immigrant community that led him to these views. His writings for Shinsekai reveal much on this question.

II

TRANSFER TO SHINSEKAI

Kiyosawa left Seattle for San Francisco to become a reporter for Shinsekai, a Japanese-language paper in the Bay area, in October 1914, when Bokkō Matsubara, who had edited Hokubei Ji Ji, moved to San Francisco and started to manage Shinsekai.

Kiyosawa had already gained a high reputation in the Japanese community around Seattle by that time. Shinkokyō, the coterie magazine mentioned before, introduced Kiyosawa in its first volume as “a famous writer on this coast,” and added that “his activities as the chief of Hokubei Ji Ji’s Tacoma branch in the past two years have established him as the foremost writer in this area.” This was only two years after Kiyosawa had started his writing activities, and he was still twenty-three. The magazine spoke again very highly of Kiyosawa in the third

7 Kiyosawa wrote on Shinsekai of July 25, 1915, in a signed essay “Mizukara tatsu tsuyoki kokoro [The Courage to Stand on One's Own]” that it was “only ten months since” he had left Seattle. Based on this statement, the author considers that Kiyosawa must have moved into San Francisco in September or October of 1914.
volume: "As a reporter of Hokubei Jiji, he voices brave and constructive opinions. Recently, his prose has become more articulate, his ideas more matured." And also in the fourth volume, "he is a genius whose pen really amazes everyone. We hope he would continue to strive and achieve greater success." The fact that Shinkokyō is a coterie magazine must be taken into account, but it was obvious that Kiyosawa was highly regarded among his compatriots. Bokkō Matsubara wrote later: "He was a remarkably brilliant young writer in the Seattle-Tacoma area; his essays revealed his articulate and critical mind. He and the fiction writer Kyūin Okina were the two most eminent figures in the Japanese literary circle of the West Coast."

When the young and talented Kiyosawa followed Matsubara to join Shinsekai, it apparently caused some frictions within the staff of the newspaper. Byōgan Ninomiya, Keitoku Takamura, Kōshin Ikeuchi and Heizō Kitazawa were the reporters of Shinsekai at that time. According to Matsubara, Kiyosawa got along ill with Kitazawa and also with Takamura who took the latter’s side. Those men never helped Kiyosawa at work. Consequently, Kiyosawa had to manage the social pages all by himself. He would go around to gather news until two or three o’clock in the afternoon, and then write about them with tremendous speed.8

There are certain clues to determine which news items and columns were written by Kiyosawa. When he did not sign his own name, Kiyosawa often used the pen name of "Tarō." "Tarō Shinano" was a pen name Kiyosawa used in his Seattle years and also in the years of his affiliation with Chūgai shōgyō shimpō (1920–25). Although he did not use "Tarō Shinano" as a pen name in his San Francisco years, there are articles by a Tarō which are unmistakably Kiyosawa’s. Some are signed Tarō Sōkō (Sōkō is the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese characters that stand for San Francisco). There are also many articles signed "ichī kisha [a reporter]" which may be judged Kiyosawa’s from their content and style. Kiyosawa used this title "a reporter" frequently in the Chūgai years.9 He was a show-off in a way,

8 Bokkō Matsubara, loc. cit.
9 Among the items left by Kiyosawa, there are scrapbooks which contain almost all the newspaper articles and columns written by him after the great earthquake of 1923. These scrapbooks are especially helpful in knowing what pen names Kiyosawa used during his years with Chūgai shōgyō shimpō. These scrapbooks are owned by Mrs. Mariko Ikeda, Kiyosawa’s daughter.
and seemed to have wished to leave some sign of his authorship on items which did not need be signed or even should not be signed. "A reporter" must have been a good title to use in such cases. Any reporter could have used this title. Given the fact that other reporters were not on good terms with Kiyosawa, however, it is unconceivable that some other reporters used the same title. Nevertheless, this author would cautiously limit his reference only to those pieces which show clear characteristics of Kiyosawa's writings in both content and style.

III

CONCERN FOR THE HOMELAND

The most conspicuous characteristic of Shinsekai was its strong interest in the affairs of the homeland. The top news with the largest headline on the front page was always news from Japan. International affairs were often reported on the front page, but were mostly discussed from the viewpoint of Japan. Editorials that appeared on the front or the second page frequently discussed Japanese domestic affairs. The advertisements in the paper were all for Japanese products or Japanese stores. English was used only for the translated title of the paper, the date of publication and the address of the office. In short, Shinsekai looked very Japanese. The reader would not realize the paper was published in America until he or she was halfway through the second page where local Californian news was printed.

An editorial written by Kiyosawa may illustrate the paper's interest in Japan's domestic politics. On December 13, 1914, Kiyosawa wrote "Muigi naru seisō [A Meaningless Political Dispute]." The dispute between the Ōkuma cabinet and the Seiyūkai party, then the major opposition party, Kiyosawa observed, seemed to be leading to a Diet dissolution, but this was absolutely meaningless. The Government party and the Seiyukai, he argued, both supported the creation of new Army divisions, and both coveted the favor of the elder statesman Aritomo Yamagata. A dissolution of the Diet would change nothing. The Japanese people would bear military expansion, if necessary, but would not bear "meaningless struggles for power nor unconstitutional competition for Yamagata's favor." This was a clear and persuasive argument. But it is doubtful how meaningful it was to argue about Japan's domestic politics in a Japanese-language paper published in
the United States, when the opinion of the paper had no influence on Japanese politics and when such a domestic issue had no influence on the life of the Japanese living in America.

Apparently Kiyosawa did not like to write on such matters, for, as far as the author is aware, this is the only editorial Kiyosawa wrote on Japanese domestic affairs. As a matter of fact, he was the most critical of Japanese-language papers’ preoccupation with affairs back home. About two years later, an editorial entitled “Dōhō shokun ni iu koto ari” [A word to my compatriots in the U.S.] appeared in Shinsekai. This editorial was not signed, but the content and style was unmistakably Kiyosawa’s. Here he referred to how often Japanese in the United States discussed such matters as the change of the cabinet in their homeland or the current conditions of the war in Europe. This was quite natural, and he was not necessarily against it. But this should not lessen their concern for their personal affairs and for the well-being of the Japanese residents in America. For neither a change of cabinet in Japan nor the conditions of the European war would have much influence on the future of Japan or on its U.S. policies or on the Japanese living in the United States. Was there any merit for them in arguing about issues of Japan’s domestic politics as if they had been politicians back home, while neglecting their own problems in America? Thus he admonished the Japanese in the United States of their excessive concern over Japan’s affairs.

IV

THE PERSISTENT DISEASE OF THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA

Why were Japanese in the United States so interested in Japan’s domestic affairs? This question was indeed related to the frame of mind prevailing in the Japanese community in the United States. Kiyosawa pointed this out in “Kashū dōhō no koshitu” [The Persistent Disease

10 Also in January 1, 1917, Kiyosawa wrote sarcastically in a signed essay titled “Beikoku ni okeru Nihonji-shimbun [Japanese-Language Newspapers in the United States]” that once the papers have secured a sizable number of regular subscribers, they “can go on simply by copying Japanese papers back home for a month or so, without incurring any reader’s complaint.” Thus he was critical of the Japanese-language papers and their readers for giving too much importance to news of Japanese domestic affairs.
of the Japanese in California], one article in the series of seven published from January 25 to February 1, 1915. At that time, the Japanese Association of America was holding a convention in San Francisco. Some delegates proposed to invite a person of a high status from Japan with an annual salary of ten thousand dollars to solve the immigration issue. Others favored the idea of sending a mission to Japan to thank the people back home for their efforts on behalf of the Japanese in America and to ask for further cooperation. Having observed this convention, Kiyosawa began the article with these words. ‘I feel I have seen the fundamental cause of the incurable and persistent disease the leaders of the Japanese residents suffer from.’

Commenting first on the proposal to invite a leading person from Japan, he argued that no one with a really promising political future in Japan would leave the country to involve himself in the tangle of the immigration issue even for a high salary. He pointed out that even when some very competent person agreed to come, he would not be of any help in solving the difficult issue which had defied all the diplomatic efforts by the Japanese government.

What of the proposal to send a mission to express gratitude? Such a mission might be exchanged between two organizations of equal rank, but not between an immigrant association and the Japanese government. Anyway, he stated, there was nothing to thank Tokyo for when there had been no progress in solving the immigration problem. ‘If the Japanese in the United States should send an envoy to Japan, his real task would be only to solicit for assistance in coping with their problems in this country. Even if he stated the conditions of one hundred thousand immigrants eloquently, could he effectively appeal to the Japanese public?’ To answer this question, Kiyosawa mentioned an incident that had happened sometime before.

In 1913, when the so-called Anti-Japanese Land Law was enacted in California, the Japanese Association of America passed a resolution to ask their compatriots in the homeland not to be overly excited. But newspapers in Japan angrily wrote, ‘it is a sign of cowardice for the immigrants to request us to restrain our outrage.’ Indeed, Japanese public opinion was more infuriated then than in 1906, and if it became extremely hostile to the United States, it might in turn provoke strong American hostility toward the Japanese immigrants. As a result, they would possibly be exposed to greater danger. So it was reasonable for the immigrants in the United States to make such a plea, and Kiyosawa
supported it. But he pointed out that it was also natural for the people in Japan to take different views on the matter, as Japan had many other problems with the United States. In short, Kiyosawa emphasized, it was a mistake to expect Japan to stand always in the immigrants’ shoes.

Kiyosawa argued that there lay an incurable worship of higher authorities behind those proposals. In the Japanese Association of America, “the members depend on the leaders, the leaders depend on the president, and the president depends on the consul. The source of power is always traced to the Japanese authorities.” He declared that the Japanese living in the United States were “a people who are unable to depend upon themselves and to manage their own affairs.” This worship of authority, according to Kiyosawa, was one of the causes that made the Anti-Japanese Land Law a political issue and made a satisfactory solution impossible. “The leaders of the Japanese Association of America and the high officials of the consulate are supposed to be the leading figures of our immigrant community. But once the Anti-Japanese Land Law question arose, they did not know how to cope with the situation. All they did was to be panicked and to turn to the Japanese government for help. This has led to the present dispute between the two nations concerning this law.” In Kiyosawa’s view, worship of authority is a characteristic not only of the Japanese residents in the United States but also of the Japanese people in general. Thus he wrote, “no people are more fit for military training and less fit for self-governing than the Japanese.”

The Japanese community in San Francisco seemed to Kiyosawa to be full of worship for authority. The Yokohama Specie Bank, the Nihon Yusen Company and the Mitsui Trading Corporation were called the “Gosanke” [the Big Three], and the pioneers of Japanese communities in the various localities were all called “genrō” [the elders].11 Kiyosawa

11 “Beikoku ni okeru Nihonji shimbun,” ibid. Later Kiyosawa wrote an essay, “‘Minchoku’ in Taiwan” (Bungei shunjū, April 1935), which criticized the habit in the Japanese community in Taiwan of making too much of government and too little of private people. He recalled that influential members of the Japanese community in Taiwan were called “Minchoku,” which meant “private citizens of chokuninkan rank.” (Chokuninkan was a high ranking official of Imperial Japan whose appointment was made by the Emperor himself.) Toward the end of this essay, Kiyosawa mentioned that in the Japanese community in the United States influential persons were called “genrō” [elder statesmen] and introduced an episode of a prince who was much amused when he saw some “genrō,” probably comparing bossy immigrants with dignified Kimmochi Saionji, the real genrō back home. Although these examples both
added that the clothes also showed the symptoms of worship of authority. Except for laborers, Japanese in San Francisco often went around in a morning coat or a frock coat and "you can say that those coats are more popular in the Japanese section in San Francisco than any other place in the United States." Kiyosawa called this a symptom of "unconscious bureaucratic formalism."

Kiyosawa criticized the worship of authority in the Japanese immigrant community on many other occasions, including "Kokoku yori kishadan shōtai no gi ni tsuite" [On the Proposal of Inviting the Press from Japan] (Shinsekai, July 11, 1915). In this essay, he criticized the proposal of inviting 20 to 30 journalists from Japan for the purpose of solving the immigration issue. Since Japanese immigration had become an international dispute, he wrote, it would be important to win public support, in order to influence the diplomacy of the Japanese government. Inviting newspapermen from Japan might be effective for this purpose. But we already know that arousing public opinion in Japan had little effect in reaching a diplomatic solution, as the San Francisco school case had indicated. What then should Japanese journalists in the United States do? We should urge fellow Japanese residents to stand on their own. This was the most important and only sensible thing we journalists could do, he asserted.

V

THE AMERICAN SPIRIT

While reminding the readers of the fault in the attitude of Japanese immigrants, Kiyosawa also called on them not to forget America's greatness. For instance, he wrote an essay entitled "Dokuritsu saishishi Beikoku no dai o omou" [Reflections on the Greatness of America on Independence Day] in 1915.

Because of the anti-Japanese movement, Kiyosawa wrote, we tended to emphasize America's faults, but we must remember its virtues. "The spirit of the Pilgrim Fathers and of the American Revolution might seem to be lost on the surface. In the midst of this chaotic American civilization, however, we can find the sturdy spirit of Puritanism still represented Japanese worship of authority, Kiyosawa probably felt that the habit of calling the influential members "genrō" was more naive than the habit of applying ranks and titles of officials to leading immigrants.
alive." "When we dig a well, the first water we get is brackish, but when we dig some more, the water will become clear. The deeper we dig, the colder and clearer the water will be, and finally, it will be crystal clear." "The anti-Japanese movement, strikes, and riots—if you look only at these phenomena, the United States may seem to be a country of the most violent civilization. But if you look beneath its rough skin, then you will find this country full of an uncorrupted spirit."

To illustrate his point, Kiyosawa wrote about William Jennings Bryan, who had just resigned from his position as the Secretary of State protesting against President Wilson’s policy toward Germany. Kiyosawa admitted that he could not subscribe to Bryan’s extreme pacifism, but he respected Bryan’s "sincerity" in living up to his principles and the way he gave up his important position to be faithful to his beliefs. He also admired Dr. Hamilton Wright Maybie and former President William Howard Taft, whom he considered representative of thoughtful Americans, for their courage to criticize Californians for their anti-Japanese bigotry.

Did such broad-mindedness exist in Japan, too? Kiyosawa mentioned as a negative example how savagely the Japanese public had attacked in 1915 Nagao Ariga, a venerable scholar of international law, who had been serving as an adviser to Yuan Shih-kai. Ariga worked hard to persuade the Japanese government to eliminate the Group V, the most controversial part of the infamous "Twenty-One Demands," from the final list of demands to China. He achieved his purpose, mainly by appealing to the elder statesman Aritomo Yamagata. Ariga did so because he believed such a compromise would benefit Japan as well as China, but the Japanese press treated him as if he had been a traitor, followed him around and denounced him in the strongest possible terms. Kiyosawa argued that such a narrow-minded people as the Japanese were not qualified to listen to the courageous words of American intellectuals who criticized bigoted Californians. There was corruption in American politics, of course, but it was far better than politics in Japan, where Diet members never minded using obscene words to criticize their opponents and never paused to think of what adverse influence their words would have for the civic education of their people. Thus, he wrote "we cannot help envying the great and warm spirit that flows beneath the chaotic civilization of the United States."
Kiyosawa was no longer a Christian at that time, but his previous religious education enabled him to feel the spiritual qualities that existed in American civilization. Also, as he himself lived within the immigrant community, he was able to understand the real significance of the voices opposed to the anti-Japanese movement. In later days, Kiyosawa always remained an advocate for friendly relationships with the United States. This was not only because he knew the great power of the United States but also because he respected American civilization.

VI

COOPERATION WITH ORGANIZED LABOR

What could be done to solve or at least to ease various problems confronting the Japanese immigrants? On June 2, 1915, Kiyosawa wrote on this theme in a signed essay entitled "Rödōtaikai to zairyū dōhō no jikaku" [The Labor Union's Convention and the Consciousness of the Fellow Japanese]. He wrote the essay because an AFL convention was scheduled to take place in California that September. As is well known, organized labor was the leading force of the anti-Japanese movement. The Japanese community recognized that it would be impossible to bring the movement to an end without cooperating with labor unions. The problem, however, was the means of cooperation. Leading Japanese residents often invited labor union leaders to a luncheon, and they also held conferences with union members. But Kiyosawa thought that such meetings were ineffective since there was a fundamental conflict between them.

Then what was the basic problem at the root of the conflict? Kiyosawa argued that the lack of self-consciousness as workers among the Japanese immigrants and their resultant inability to assert their rights as workers were the fundamental causes of the conflict. At that time, AFL was fighting for an eight-hour day. "The ten-hour day we ourselves now enjoy is AFL's achievement," Kiyosawa pointed out. "We must first express our gratitude to the labor movement, and we have the duty to help the causes of labor." Thus Kiyosawa concluded that, in order to achieve cooperation with American workers, Japanese immigrants as workers ought to make efforts to improve their own labor conditions.
In this connection, the visits of Bunji Suzuki of the Yūaikai [Workers’ Brotherhood Union] to the United States in 1915 and 1916 are interesting. Suzuki’s visits were promoted by Sidney Gulick, an American missionary who had always been an ardent advocate for Japan, and Eiichi Shibusawa, the most respected business leader and the most prominent proponent of friendly relations with the United States. In the United States, Suzuki attended the AFL conventions in Eureka and Baltimore and made friends with its members including its president Samuel Gompers. He made very good impressions on Americans, but many people in Japan were rather critical of him. The Foreign Ministry had been negative to Suzuki’s trips from the beginning. In 1916, Kazan Kayahara, who was also visiting the United States, called him a traitor. In response, Kiyosawa defended Suzuki in an article “Kokoronaki hihan o surunakare [Do not Make an Inconsiderate Criticism],” praising Suzuki’s efforts as a milestone in the history of Japanese-American relations, especially in the context of the immigration issue.

VII
INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Kiyosawa was not always writing critical essays for the paper. He must in fact have spent more time in writing objective reports. As for those objective reports, however, their authorship is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, Kiyosawa’s contacts with diplomats and other people involved in diplomacy are worth mentioning.

William Rockhill was among those whom Kiyosawa met and admired. A solid scholar on Tibet and one of the best informed American

12 Suzuki, “Nichibei kankei to rōdō-undō [The Japan-U.S. relations and the labor movement],” (The Shinsekai, October 17, 18, 20, 1916). “Yuaikaicho Suzuki Bunji ron [On Bunji Suzuki, the President of Yuaikai],” (The Shinsekai, January 1, 1917) by a “Mr. Anonymous” also reported Suzuki’s activities in detail and praised him.

13 The editorial of Shinsekai of December 5, 1914, argued that one important way for friendship between Japan and the United States was left untried. It was “to become acquainted with the anti-Japanese groups, to argue with and persuade them, and to find ways to make them take our side.” Though the editorial is unsigned, most probably it was written by Kiyosawa. Kiyosawa continued to argue on the necessity of meeting not only labor union members but all kinds of anti-Japanese Americans. He himself practiced what he argued for. It can be known from his diary (held by Mrs. Mariko Ikeda) that he interviewed several anti-Japanese Americans and had a relatively friendly talk with them during his stay in the United States from 1929 to 1930.
diplomats about China, Rockhill is now best known as the real author of John Hay’s famous Open Door notes. Invited by Yuan Shih-kai to become his adviser, he left the United States for China in November 1914, and it was on his way to China that Kiyosawa met him in San Francisco (Shinsekai, November 29, 1914).

In this interview, Rockhill commented on Japan’s aims in World War I and told Kiyosawa that Japan should return Chingtiao to China to regain the latter’s trust. He also suggested that Japan had better refrain from holding the Marshall and Caroline Islands in order to maintain amicable relations with the United States. On the Anti-Japanese Land Law, Rockhill admitted that arguments on Japan’s side were more reasonable, but advised the Japanese people to be patient. Rockhill was already ill at that time, and died in Honolulu soon after. Kiyosawa was strongly impressed by Rockhill, who was willing to give him an interview and answered his questions so frankly while lying in bed. When he died, Kiyosawa wrote a tribute (Shinsekai, December 10).\(^{14}\)

Another person whom Kiyosawa admired was George W. Guthrie, Ambassador to Japan. He was appointed Ambassador to Japan by President Wilson, but incurred his displeasure for he appeared too sympathetic to Japan during the “Twenty-One Demands” controversy. When he temporarily returned to the United States in May 1915, it was announced that the ambassador returned home since his wife was sick and needed rest, but many suspected that that might not be the real reason. Kiyosawa had the chance to interview Guthrie in San Francisco when he arrived from Japan (Shinsekai, May, 5).

Ambassador Guthrie died in Tokyo in March 1917. His remains, accompanied by his wife, returned to San Francisco on the Japanese warship named Azuma on May 25. Kiyosawa wrote on Guthrie twice that year, first when he died, and later when Azuma arrived in San Francisco. He described Guthrie as “a person who resembled a warm and gentle clergyman,” and as “an American gentleman with a noble personality,” and praised his achievements saying that the once troubled Japan-U.S. relations became undoubtedly better after Guthrie had become ambassador (Shinsekai, March 9, and May 25).\(^{15}\)

\(^{14}\) The essay of November 29 is not signed, and that of December 10 is signed “a reporter.” But the latter makes it clear that the two essays were written by the same person.

\(^{15}\) Only the essay of March 9 is signed “a reporter,” but it is evident that the other two were also written by the same person.
Although the evidence is insufficient, the author surmises that Kiyosawa also wrote the articles on the President of Johns Hopkins University Frank Goodnow, who became Yuan Shih-kai’s adviser after Rockhill’s untimely death, on Willard Straight, the once anti-Japanese diplomat who was then trying to play a role in forging Japan-U.S. cooperation, and on George Kennan, an authoritative writer on Russian and Far Eastern affairs (*Shinsekai, October 8, 1915, March 11, December 14, 1916*). This George Kennan was a great uncle of the American diplomat and scholar who happened to have the same name and the same interest in Russia. San Francisco was a place where many Americans with important roles in U.S. policy in the Far East frequently stayed on their travels to and from Asia. Kiyosawa must have taken a personal interest in them and gathered information about them, even though he could not interview all of them. In this sense, Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, a future critic on diplomatic issues, started his preparation for the career during his San Francisco years.

VIII

**JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS**

In Kiyosawa’s eyes, as stated earlier, the immigration issue was merely a small part of Japan-U.S. relations. His views on overall Japan-U.S. relations must be discussed apart from his views on the immigration issue.

Soon after Kiyosawa came to San Francisco, an international exposition to commemorate the opening of the Panama Canal took place (February to December, 1915) in the city. When the exposition was closed, Kiyosawa wrote an essay reviewing the meaning of the exposition for Japan-U.S. relations. Kiyosawa said he had initially been opposed to Japan’s participation in the exposition. This was because there had been too excessive expectations on the part of the Japanese government and also among the Japanese immigrants that Japan’s participation in the exposition would improve Japan-U.S. relations and particularly that it would be effective in cooling down agita-

15 “Yamawaki jimukanchô ni atauru no sho—taihaku sankajigyo o renjii awasete Nichibei mondai ni oyobu [A Message to Secretary General Yamawaki—Comments on the Participation in the Exposition and on Japan-U.S. Relations]” (December 4, 1915). Kiyosawa signed his own name on this essay.
tions against Japanese immigration. To Kiyosawa, such optimism had seemed to be extremely unrealistic. But he now admitted that Japan’s participation was a good thing, after all. Many Americans became interested in Japan and organized various groups on Japan-U.S. relations; Japanese-exclusion bills submitted to Congress were safely tabled by the committees concerned. Kiyosawa admitted that the anti-Japanese mood had somewhat eased.

But Kiyosawa argued that these changes did not have any effect upon the basic character of Japan-U.S. relations, and would only make Japan-U.S. rivalries severer after the exposition. “We must become competent. Nothing but building up Japan’s and Japanese immigrants’ strength would solve the problems that lie between Japan and the United States,” said Kiyosawa. Thus he urged the Japanese immigrants to look into the fundamental problems of the Japan-U.S. relations, without deluding themselves with the superficial atmosphere of friendship.

In April, 1917, Japan-U.S. relations saw a sudden change when the United States declared war against Germany, making Japan America’s ally as a result. Naturally, this caused a great sensation among the Japanese immigrants who had always been worried about the confrontation of their homeland and the United States. Shinsekai carried on the top of the front page an editorial entitled “Zairyū Nihonjin ni geiku” [An Appeal to the Japanese in the United States]. The paper welcomed U.S. participation in the war, and called to the Japanese residents to be prepared to serve for the common cause and to cooperate with the American Red Cross as the first step. The editorial concluded by saying: “We ask all the good men to support the United States in this war. Thus we shall be able to wipe away the misunderstandings the Americans have of us, and we will also be of assistance in defeating the enemy.” Such an exhortative message may illustrate their earnest hope for Japan-U.S. friendship and their feverish excitement.

The friendly mood between the two countries grew further with the special envoy Kikujiro Ishii’s arrival in the United States in August 1917,17 and reached its peak with the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii

17 For instance “Sansen to Nichibei mondai—tokushi haken o jitsugen seyo [The U.S. Entry to the War and Japan-U.S. Relations—Send a Special Envoy]” of April 13 showed the utmost welcome to the situation and wrote as follows. “The United States decision to wage war against our common enemy, Germany, is the most delightful event for us because of its contribution to human civilization.” The essay went on to
agreement in November. On Ishii’s arrival, *Shinsekai* welcomed and praised him, likening him to an envoy in ancient China (August 13). When the agreement was concluded, the paper congratulated this achievement: “No doubt this will contribute greatly to world peace.”

However, Kiyosawa held views different from those of *Shinsekai* editorials on the Ishii mission. For instance, in “A Comment from the Desk” (signed “a reporter”) of September 24, he noted the favorable reception given to Ishii’s speeches, but cautioned not to be too optimistic. “In order to achieve real understanding between the two countries, we must not be satisfied with flowery words.” Also in this article, Kiyosawa said he did not expect much from Ishii’s visit. In another article, “Nihon no yūsenken towa nanzoya” [What are the so-called Japanese Preferences?] (signed “a reporter,” October 16), Kiyosawa referred to the news that the United States would recognize certain special rights of Japan in China, suspecting that “the news may turn out to be a disappointment.” In short, Kiyosawa was much less excited than the general tone of *Shinsekai*, expressing his doubts about Ishii’s success.

It is regretful that there are no sources which show what Kiyosawa thought of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement after its contents had been published. For Japan, it turned out to be a more advantageous agreement than Kiyosawa had expected. Although his prediction proved to be wrong, it must be remembered that the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was an exceptional case in the history of U.S. Far East policy. It soon became clear that there was a difference of interpretation between the two governments, and Japan had to agree to abrogate the agreement in 1922 after the Washington Conference. Thus Japan was not able to draw any advantage from it. In the long run, therefore, it did “turn out to be a disappointment,” as Kiyosawa had predicted.

Amid the superficial mood of friendliness between the two countries, Kiyosawa tended to focus his attention on the aspect of conflict in Japan-U.S. relations. In the “A Comment from the Desk” (signed “a reporter”) of September 20, 1917, Kiyosawa wrote as follows. The other day, Ambassador Ishii visited Perry’s grave and said the commodore had done a service to Japan. Perry had not done us a favor in a normal sense, nevertheless it is true he had done so. Similarly, Japan was given a favor by a recent U.S. action. This is the restriction on the urge the Japanese government to send a special envoy to coordinate the interests of the two countries.
export of American iron. Since entering the war, Japan had only been making money for these three years, while the other powers had been engaged in a deadly struggle. Japan had not troubled itself to conceive any postwar plans to build up its power. When the United States restricted iron exports, many Japanese people protested against this, but Washington had reasons of its own. Thanks to this incident, Japan finally came to its senses, and people began to recognize the necessity of formulating fundamental national policies, including a policy for achieving self-reliance in key resources. It may be a little too late, but it is better than doing nothing. We must be thankful to the United States for letting us realize our need to stand on our own. Kiyosawa consistently argued that Japan should pay more attention to its national strength than to superficial friendship, and this emphasis was characteristic of his views.

IX

THE TAKAO OZAWA CASE

Soon after the United States had entered the war, an interesting debate began to develop in the Japanese immigrant community over Takao Ozawa’s lawsuit for the right of naturalization.

Such land laws as the California Anti-Japanese Land Law did not specifically mention Japanese as their targets, but denied the right of land ownership to the foreigners ineligible for naturalization. It was generally assumed that the Japanese were ineligible for citizenship. But it was not entirely clear whether the Japanese could be naturalized or not. The foreigners eligible for naturalization were defined as “free whites” in the first Naturalization Act of 1790, and later in 1870 “Africans and their descendants” were added. But such racial restrictions were not written in the new Naturalization Act of 1906. Thus it became a question whether the old acts’ restrictions were still in effect in the new act of 1906, and if they were, what definition could be given to such an unscientific word as “whites”? The restrictions were rather ambiguous. For example, Mexicans who are neither white nor black were eligible for naturalization. Thus, it was not entirely impossible to argue that a Japanese could be naturalized under the existing U.S. law.18

18 Frank F. Chuman, Banbō piipuru, the Japanese edition of The Bamboo People:
It was Takao Ozawa who tried to challenge the conventional view that a Japanese could not be naturalized. Ozawa initiated legal proceedings to acquire U.S. citizenship. When he lost the suit at Honolulu, he immediately appealed to the circuit court of San Francisco. The court avoided making an instant decision, and handed the case over to the Supreme Court in May 1917. The point at issue was whether a Japanese residing in the United States was entitled to be naturalized. Thus, Ozawa’s case, which started as a case concerning a single Japanese, became an issue concerning the right of naturalization of the whole Japanese immigrants. The Court was expected to make the final decision on the case soon. Some of the Japanese residents had urged Ozawa to withdraw the suit. But Ozawa persisted. Thus started a big argument in the Japanese community over whether to support or oppose Ozawa’s actions.  

There were three points in this argument. Firstly, there was an opinion that Ozawa was not a suitable person to initiate such a legal fight. Some argued that Kinji Ushijima, the president of the Japanese Association of America should do so on behalf of the Japanese immigrants, as the trial would affect them all. But Kiyosawa maintained that it was wrong to put pressure upon Ozawa in the name of the public to make him drop the suit, when Ozawa had brought the issue before the court on his own initiative. 

Secondly, some feared this suit might harm the amicable state of Japan-U.S. relations prevailing at that time. This view seemed to have been shared by the Foreign Ministry. Kiyosawa commented that it was foolish to argue on the basis of a Japanese concept of a lawsuit. He reminded the readers that starting a lawsuit was not necessarily a hostile act in the United States. On the contrary, it was considered the best way to put the matter before the court to settle which side was right. Thus, he strongly disputed the view that Ozawa’s suit would incur resentment among the American people. 

Thirdly, there was much argument over whether the suit was timely. Since Japanese-Americans born in the United States and also Japanese immigrants without American citizenship had begun to volunteer to  

19 Takao Ozawa, “Kikajiken to yono tachiba” [The Naturalization Case and My Position], Shinsekai, (July 1, 1917) and “Kika mondai towa nanzo” [What is the Naturalization Issue], Shinsekai, (May 13, 1918) and others.
fight war on European battlefields, some said this was the right time for such a trial. Others advised to wait a little more, expecting that Japan-U.S. relations would be improved further in the future. Kiyosawa criticized this kind of argument from a different point of view. He pointed out that these arguments were based on the premise that the Supreme Court would be influenced by the trend of public opinion and politics. But the independence of the court is one of the cardinal principles of the U.S. Constitution. Kiyosawa argued that to distrust the Constitution was to distrust the country itself, and that the Japanese immigrants should trust the Supreme Court and wait for its judgement.20

There seemed to have been a factional dispute among the Japanese residents behind these arguments concerning Ozawa’s suit. But the important fact is that Kiyosawa’s arguments were reasonable and based on his correct understanding of U.S. law and politics.

EPILOGUE

In early 1939 (date unknown), Kiyoshi Kiyosawa wrote in Hokubei Ji-ji an essay entitled “Atami yori [From Atami]” that “there are no people like the readers of Hokubei Ji-ji for me.” He must have thought the same about the readers of Shinsekai. This was not only because he had spent his young days as a journalist in America. These two newspapers were memorable in his mind, because the basic frame of reference for his activities as a critic was formed during his affiliation with them.

It is rather surprising to see that the features which characterize his later criticism already appear in the essays and articles Kiyosawa wrote in Shinsekai. One of these is his accurate understanding of American politics, society, culture, labor, and justice; his admiration for the spiritual value that lay in the very heart of American civilization. Another is his severe criticism on the lack of self-governing ability and the worship of authority among the Japanese. As for Japan-U.S. rela-

20 “Kikaken shiso no giron wa meihakunari” [No Argument is Necessary on the Merit of the Lawsuit for the Right of Naturalization], (unsigned, May 7, 1918). Tarō Sōkō, “Bakuro shitaru sempai no fuyō [the Unpreparedness of the Elders Revealed]” and other essays, (May 8–10). As the argument of the unsigned editorial of May 7 was similar to those that of the Tarō Sōkō essay that appeared on the following day, the editorial may also be considered Kiyosawa’s.
tions, he criticized the Japanese inclination to judge them by superficial friendliness. He showed a deeper insight by looking at the fundamental mutual necessities of the two countries. His interest in diplomatic affairs, which became his specialty later, was developing during his American days through contacts with a number of eminent diplomats.

Kiyosawa’s views were the product of his experience as an immigrant in the United States. Already in Shinsekai years, when Kiyosawa was still very young, at least the basis of his later arguments was formed in his mind. But his views did not represent the majority in the Japanese community in the United States. He was in the minority in almost all cases. In the Japanese community in America, the “Japanese-ness” prevailed even more strongly than in Japan itself. Kiyosawa did not assimilate himself within this community; he was critical of and kept his distance from it. From this position, he acquired a viewpoint to observe the Japanese immigrant community and Japan as well. The critic Kiyosawa was born when his unique personality and his rare experience as an immigrant facing the Anti-Japanese movement were combined together. If either of these features had not existed, we would never have known him as we knew him.

Kiyosawa returned to Japan in 1918, after twelve years’ stay in the United States. He worked at a trading company for a while, and then joined Chūgai shōgyō shimpo in the autumn of 1920. Thus Kiyosawa started his journalistic career in Japan. The first long article he wrote for this paper was “Kashū mondai taiō-saku” [Ways to Cope with the California Problem], in which he treated the second Anti-Japanese Land Law in California (September 21 to 27, a series of seven essays). It was quite symbolic that Kiyosawa’s first substantial work in Japanese journalism was an article on the issue he had been dealing with in America for years.

In this article, Kiyosawa presented the same views as he had published in the United States. He said that anti-Japanese activities would persist, but that did not mean a doom for the Japanese in America. Here he wrote a remarkable phrase: “when you face the problems of life or death, you will always find that the law is full of loopholes.” We find a passage that corresponds to this in the Ankoku nikki [The Diary of the Dark Days] of his last years. In July 29, 1944, he recorded the fall of Saipan and added this comment: “At least, why not order the civilians to stay? If they remained, they might build an economic foundation for the future.” These two passages were written at an interval
of twenty-four years, but both indicate Kiyosawa’s deep insight into the nature of society and human beings, whose lives extend beyond the level of the state and politics.

Kiyosawa regarded economic power as the basis of a nation’s power, and the diligence of the people as the source of economic power. In his views, the role of politics, compared with economy, was secondary. However weak and chaotic China might seem, he reasoned, the diligence of the Chinese masses would eventually bring forth a prosperous economy and therefore a powerful nation. It was in Japan’s interest to develop economic relations with a thriving China, not to try to control a weak China. Thus he criticized Japan’s control over Manchuria and its China policy. Kiyosawa, of course, did not neglect the importance of politics. This was natural for a diplomatic critic. He considered that politics had a limited, but important role, that is, to pursue wise and rational policies appropriate to the economic power of the nation. Thus he was gravely concerned with the direction of Japanese foreign policy in the 1930s and always advocated a foreign policy compatible with friendly relations with the United States. The basic framework of these views was, as we have seen, already established in the Shinseikai years. The insight he had gained in those years led him to criticize Japan’s Manchurian management and China policy and to argue for a foreign policy based on cooperation with the United States.

(Translated by the editor)