Recent Works on the American Occupation of Japan: The State of the Art

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It is no exaggeration to say that the history of the American Occupation of Japan has become a “booming field” in Japan during the past decade.¹ Several reasons readily come to mind. First and most obviously, the declassification of State, Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff documents under the “twenty-five year rule” has been a great boon to Japanese historians, who even today have only limited access to the Japanese archives. Pilgrimages to Washington, Suitland, and Norfolk—as well as other major depositories of basic sources—have become common among Japanese scholars in the fields of both contemporary American and Japanese history.

Secondly, the lapse of a quarter of a century since Japan’s defeat has enabled us to re-examine the American Occupation with detachment: it has become possible to treat the Occupation period as history, to assess its legacy, and to seek the origins of contemporary Japan. In this connection, there has been a vague but growing uneasiness that, despite her “economic miracle,” Japanese political, social, and cultural developments are heading for a blind alley, that this “deadlock” must somehow be broken and the direction changed. The search for Japan’s national

identity has naturally come to be related to the reassessment of Occupation-sponsored reforms.

Thirdly, I must underscore the generational factor. The scholars most active in the study of the American Occupation—Ikuhiko Hata, Eiji Takemae, Rinjiro Sodei, among others—are in their mid-forties or early fifties. Like myself, they were just old enough to see something of the war's devastations and later to remember what seemed to us a "benevolent" and exhilarating occupation by the Americans.\(^2\) This generation of scholars, who came to maturity during or after the Occupation, is not encumbered with the kind of "complex" that still haunts the older generation who, in retrospect, feels "ashamed" for having too willingly or obsequiously "collaborated" with the American conquerors. Our generation of historians can write about the American Occupation with greater self-confidence.

As the editor of this Journal points out in his Introduction, it was only in 1970 that a solid, full-length monograph on the American policy for the Occupation of Japan appeared. Eiji Takemae's Amerika tai-Nichi rōdō seisaku no kenkyū [A Study of American Policy for Labor Relations in Japan], published that year, is a pioneering work, rich in details and based on a wide range of American archival materials.\(^3\) This is a much more ambitious and comprehensive study than its title suggests, for it treats the American Occupation policy as a whole and places the labor policy within this broader context as well as against the background of the onsetting Cold War. Because the American documents had not yet become available for the latter phases of the Occupation, the author devoted the first third of this 400-page book to wartime policy-planning in Washington. His is the first systematic study by a Japanese scholar (or, for that matter, by any American scholar with the possible exception of Harley Notter's official study)\(^4\) to delve into the labyrinth of the overlapping policy-making structures and processes from August 1942 on.

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\(^4\) Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945 (Department of State Publication 3580, Washington, D.C., 1949).
The second part of the book paints a rather sophisticated analysis of the multiple splits within the GHQ personnel. Rectifying stereotyped dichotomies of the “New Dealers” vs. “anti-New Dealers,” “progressive reformers” vs. “right-wing conservatives,” or “the military” vs. “the civilians,” Takemae emphasizes that the basic conflict within GHQ revolved round the question of how to combine carrot and stick in introducing the “American way of life”—in this particular instance, what the American occupiers believed to be “sound” industrial relations. Going to the heart of the matter, the author concludes that the American labor policy was defined by a number of factors: “peculiarly American” political culture and economic philosophy; American labor relations in theory and practice; the conflicts among competing groups within GHQ and differences between SCAP and Washington; and the overall American Occupation policy as it was affected by the shifting diplomatic-strategic considerations.

Although primarily focusing on American policy, Takemae attempts to trace, as far as the limited Japanese sources allowed, the reactions of and “feedback” from the Japanese. The most climactic event that took place in industrial relations during the American Occupation—SCAP’s forcible intervention to prevent a general strike scheduled for February 1, 1947—is described in revealing detail. This incident, which came as a great “shock” to Japanese labor leaders, is one instance of mutual failure of understanding and communication as well as ideological differences. The author concludes with some thoughtful observations on the difficulty of harmonizing American reform programs with Japan’s traditional socio-economic system.

Takemae’s impressive study was followed in 1976 by Ikuhiko Hata’s magnificent work, Amerika no tai-Nichi senryō seisaku [American Occupation Policy toward Japan] that covers a much wider spectrum. This voluminous book remains the most authoritative single book—the standard account—on the U.S. Occupation policy as a whole. For this task Hata was superbly qualified: one of Japan’s foremost military and

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5 At the time of Takemae’s research and writing, the archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs—not to mention other branches of the government—were completely closed.

naval historians, he is also well versed in twentieth-century American diplomatic and military history; and as a Councillor in the Japanese Ministry of Finance, he led the team of scholars and bureaucrats in compiling the projected twenty-volume official history of the postwar Japanese public finance.  Hata's book is meant to be the capstone of these volumes. In his official capacity he extensively searched American archives and manuscript sources as well as interviewed a number of surviving principals of U.S. Occupation with unmatched energy and gusto in the early 1970s. And he arranged this vast collection of American sources so conveniently in the office he headed, that it almost became a mecca for American scholars studying in Japan on the Occupation period.

Unfortunately, Hata's book has not attracted the attention it deserves among our American colleagues—except for one good review by Roger Dingman. For this reason I would like to take up this work in some detail. Unlike most American historians of the Occupation period, Hata applies a sophisticated analytical approach, decision-making process, without marring his narratives with political-science jargon. The fresh insights such a methodology yields are quite obvious in the first chapter, which is devoted to a detailed analysis of wartime policy-planning in Washington, with all its overlapping confusions. Placing the Far Eastern experts George H. Blakeslee and Hugh Borton at the center of the stage, Hata meticulously probes the deliberations that took place within the multifarious committees and subcommittees set up, reshuffled, and then reorganized in the State Department. At times, the very virtue of the book—massive documentation—tends to obscure his conclusions, but any careful reader can draw his own.

The picture which emerges is that of almost academic discussions among Far Eastern experts about postwar Japan in isolation from momentous day-to-day developments both on the battle fronts and at wartime summit conferences. To me, at least, it seems as if these

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7 Organized in 1971, this team began publication of the series in 1968. Of the projected twenty volumes, twelve have come out so far.

8 The most important of these materials are scheduled to be published as Shiryōhen [Collected Documents, 2 vols.] in the same series by the autumn of 1982. One and a half volumes (edited by Takafusa Nakamura) will be devoted to Japanese documents, mainly of the Ministry of Finance. The remainder of the volume (to be coedited by Hata and William Wray) will contain some 500 pages of American documents on diplomatic as well as economic and financial matters, and is intended to match Hata's monograph (Vol. 3).

specialists were proceeding with their postwar planning almost in a political vacuum, so to say, in the absence of any clear instructions from President Franklin D. Roosevelt. (As late as April 16, 1945, some of these planners were complaining that further policy discussions would be futile until the President’s basic attitudes could be confirmed.) As the war drew near the end, the American government had hardly reached any clear conclusions with regard to such controversial issues as the fate of the Japanese Emperor, the form of control over the defeated Japan, the possibility of her future rearmament, and the measures for her economic democratization, etc. Obviously, in the pragmatic mind of President Roosevelt, the more urgent problems of Europe (including the occupation of Germany) took precedence over the less pressing plans for postwar Japan. And on the lower levels of his administration, conflicts between “the Japan Crowd” and “the China Crowd” (to cite one example) further delayed and precluded any consensus on the future treatment of Japan.

Yet, in the end, the substantial portion of policy recommendations prepared by the Blakeslee-Borton group came to be adopted by Roosevelt’s successor Harry S. Truman, who tended to depend on State Department bureaucrats. One can only speculate whether Roosevelt might have rejected these lenient recommendations had he lived on a while longer. Another chance element was the unexpectedly quick surrender of Japan, which left a number of important pending problems about Japan undecided at the Washington end. Hata’s observations on these broad questions would seem confirmed by my own research at Hyde Park and the National Archives, as well as by the most recent book on Roosevelt’s foreign policy by Robert Dallek.10

The very same conflicts in political ideas, economic theories, and bureaucratic interests that had encumbered the wartime planning in Washington continued to plague the implementation of American policy in Japan once the Occupation began. As Hata reminds us, there was no clear line to be drawn between policy formulation and implementation: more often than not, these overlapped and proceeded simultaneously. He is particularly helpful in unravelling the maze of bureaucratic infightings in Washington as well as the internal struggles for power within GHQ in Tokyo. And he shows the shrewd way in which egocentric MacArthur maximized his control against such a background

During the Occupation period the Japanese were not mere passive and obedient recipients of American reforms. Hata makes full use of the limited Japanese archival materials, then available, to examine Japanese reactions to and efforts to mitigate the Occupation policy. He also presents, in Roger Dingman’s succinct expression, “a crazy-quilt pattern of cooperation and conflict between Americans and Japanese in implementing individual reforms.”

For lack of space, however, Hata does not treat each reform in depth.

One of the most controversial issues among Japanese historians concerns the so-called “reverse course”: why the United States “reversed” its Occupation policy from reform to economic recovery of Japan in 1947–48. Was it in direct response to the aggravating Cold War with the Soviet Union? (Incidentally, this question sparked a lively debate among the participants—historians as well as former Occupation principals—at the Amherst Conference on the Occupation of Japan held in August 1980.) As usual, Hata was quick to delve into the newly opened American sources to modify simplistic traditional interpretations and examines the intricate intragovernmental conflict of views between Washington and SCAP regarding their basic purposes and policy orientations.

With regard to the “reverse course,” Hata implicitly takes issue, without naming names, with Akira Iriye of the University of Chicago. The latter has asserted, in a number of articles and a major monograph, that there was a high degree of continuity in American policy toward Japan throughout the 1940s; that the United States consistently sought both before and after 1945 the aim of “reintegrating” Japan into the international order as a non-militaristic, capitalistic nation; and that the American Occupation policy toward Japan would have taken the turn it actually did even without the effects of the Cold War.

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interpretation, Hata persuasively argues that the open declaration of the Cold War, dramatized in the Truman Doctrine, was “the single most important external factor” that brought about the “reversal” of the American Occupation policy.

All in all, Hata’s book is a major tour de force, which American historians of U.S.—East Asian relations cannot afford to ignore. His work, however, is not without inherent limitations. As an official historian, he was not entirely free to include his bold hypotheses and unique interpretations. While he had attempted to cover the whole spectrum of the American Occupation policy, he of necessity had to give greater weight to its economic and financial aspects, since this was a volume in the official series sponsored by the Ministry of Finance. Considering these circumstances, it is to Hata’s credit that he did manage to include as much political-diplomatic-strategic background as he did even at the risk of losing his senior position. After he resigned from the Ministry of Finance to accept a professorship, he finally became free to publish on subjects which would have been regarded as “inappropriate” for an official historian. The resulting by-product of his massive volume was a highly readable yet scholarly book, Shiroku Nihon no saigunbi [History of Japan’s Postwar Rearmament], which should be read as an essential supplement to his official history.

The scope of this book is much broader than its title suggests. Its most arresting thesis concerns the origins of Article Nine of the new Japanese Constitution that renounces war, the provision which has become increasingly politicized—not only in Japanese domestic politics but also in U.S.—Japanese relations in recent years. This provision is traced back to the MacArthur-Shidehara conversations of January 24, 1946, and was more concretely spelled out in the “MacArthur Note” of February 3, but the point at issue is who first brought forward this important matter.

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15 In fact, the Ministry of Finance demanded that he eliminate the expression “the Imperial Institution” [tennō sei] though this is the official term used by the Washington planners and the Occupation authorities in their papers.

In the absence or withdrawal of any Japanese record pertaining to this delicate question, Hata marshals all the available American sources, carefully scrutinizes the domestic and international factors involved, and comes out with a rather startling but plausible "hypothesis" of his own. Dismissing the "idealistic" motivations, which previous studies tended to emphasize, as "more becoming to a sentimental teen-age girl," Hata asserts that there must have been more realistic considerations on the part of the septuagenarian American shōgun and the veteran diplomatist. Using a technique that approaches the best of detective stories, Hata argues that MacArthur and Shidehara must have "made a bargain," whereby Japan would renounce war in her new Constitution in return for retention of the Imperial Institution. Thus the United States and its Allies gained an "assurance" from Japan that even though she kept the Emperor, she would never again become a militaristic nation. Thus viewed, Hata concludes, Article Nine could not have been other than the "joint work" of Prime Minister Shidehara and General MacArthur.

The reasons why and the processes through which the official interpretation of Article Nine underwent drastic changes within half a year after its drafting are also analyzed in detail. Reacting to the intensified Cold War and rapid changes in Japan's international environment, Washington reversed its policy in 1948, when it adopted NSC-13/2. Hata's book concludes with a fascinating drama of "the politics of rearmament," involving complex interplays among many actors: General MacArthur and his staff; the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the tough negotiator Premier Shigeru Yoshida; Japan's bureaucrats and her former Army officers.

Whereas Hata's book contains a good treatment of the "Emperor question" from political-diplomatic-military viewpoints, Kiyoko Takeda has addressed herself to the same problem as an intellectual historian in her Tennōkan no sōoku [Conflicts of Views on the Emperor]

17 The minutes of the Shidehara-MacArthur meeting of January 24, 1946, cannot be found in the Archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. For somewhat different interpretations of the origins of Article Nine, which do not necessarily contradict Hata's hypothesis, see Hideo Tanaka, Kempō seiteitai katei oboegaki [Notes on the Process of Framing the New Constitution of Japan] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1979); and Theodore McNelly's lecture, summarized in The Asiatic Society of Japan (Tokyo) Bulletin (September 1981), pp. 2–4, which emphasizes the role of Col. Charles L. Kades as the "prime mover."

published in 1978.19 Although a recognized authority on the history of modern Japanese thought, Takeda is weak in her handling of archival materials and treatment of policy formulation and decision. Rather, her forte is a close analysis of the conflicting views on the Imperial Institution—“the key to postwar democratization policy”—held by foreign statesmen, diplomats, and commentators. She describes the divergent “images” of the Emperor and the Imperial Institution as reflected in the American “mirror,” and asserts that they also encompassed the general American views of Japanese patterns of thinking and collective behavior. Be that as it may, the dichotomy she draws between the “pro-Japanese group” and the “pro-Chinese group” within the State Department is, as should be clear by now, too simplistic. On this premise, she goes on to describe what effects such conflicting views had in shaping the nature of the post-war Imperial Institution.

On the Japanese side, Takeda examines the reaction of various groups of leaders to the democratic reform programs. Also, she throws some fresh insights into Japanese public sentiments at the time, pointing out ambiguities and confusions between the “Imperial Institution” as such and the “person” of the Emperor. The process through which SCAP transformed the Emperor into a “symbolic existence” is explained as a sort of “compromise agreement” between the American zeal for democratization and the prevailing Japanese desire to retain the Imperial Institution. Perhaps so, but in the light of the considerable literature already available on the Constitutional reform,20 Takeda’s contention seems to be somewhat offhand—especially in contrast to Hata’s close-knit arguments.

However, this is not to belittle Takeda’s contributions. Her book also discusses the British, Canadian (mainly E. Herbert Norman’s), Australian, and Chinese views of the Imperial Institution. More importantly, Takeda’s book, though rather loosely structured, is conceived in

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a broader cultural context—mutual “impacts” that take place between the “indigenous value system” of a defeated Asian nation and “the democratic logic” of the victorious Western powers. Though this underlying theme is not fully developed in her book, such a comparative cultural approach can potentially yield stimulating and rewarding results in the hands of those scholars more empirically oriented. Takeda’s book, which has been highly praised in Japan, is more suggestive and stimulating than informative, but it should serve as a good springboard for further research for those who wish to study the history of Japanese-American relations in terms of “Power and Culture” à la Akira Iriye.

One major reform which General MacArthur and his senior advisor handled with more subtlety than the Constitutional revision was land reform. The subject is ably treated in a recent study by Keiki Owada, *Hishi Nihon no nōchi kaikaku: Ichi nōsei tantōsha no kaisō* [The Secret History of Japan’s Land Reform: Reminiscences of an Agricultural Administrator]. The subtitle is too modest and misleading: the author as a young bureaucrat directly witnessed the entire process of the reform, but he deftly combines his personal recollections with substantial research into the American archives and interviews with surviving American principals and advisors. The result is an authoritative study which shows that land reform was one rare instance in which the Japanese government took a “surprising” degree of initiative from the very beginning, although SCAP carried it much further. Owada demonstrates how the “internal factors” (various domestic pressures in Japan and her government’s preparations prompted by accumulated historical forces) converged with the “external factors” (the American demand to remove the rural roots of Japanese militarism and conflicts within the Allied Council for Japan) to bring about successful land reforms.

For exhaustive studies on the economic policies of the American Occupation, we shall have to wait for the completion of the massive *Shōwa zaiseishi* series sponsored by the Ministry of Finance. Especially valuable is Takafusa Nakamura’s work (in Vol. 12: *Kin’yū* [Money and Banking]) which treats U.S. policy in great detail on the basis of the Finance Ministry’s archives and such basic American sources as the Joseph M. Dodge papers. Also important is Morio Uematsu’s excel-

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22 Ōkurashō zaiseishi shitsu, ed., *Shōwa zaiseishi, 12, Kin’yū (1)* [Economic and
lent study of tax administration under the Occupation (Vol. 11)—one of the few treatments of this particular subject. The most thorough study of the anti-monopoly policy will be Ryoichi Miwa’s, which will appear shortly as the second volume of the series. On the American policy concerning zaibatsu dissolution, an ambitious Ph. D. thesis by Masahiro Hosoya at Yale is now in the process of completion. Well trained in American history, Hosoya traces the legacy of the anti-trust movement in late nineteenth-century America and carefully examines wartime planning and its implementation in Tokyo as well as Japanese reactions, on the basis of massive American sources and some key Japanese materials he has painstakingly unearthed.

Having reviewed half a dozen important recent works, I would like to make my personal observations on the state of the art. The present mood among Japanese historians is a rather somber one. Thirty-six years after Japan’s defeat and almost twenty years after the Occupation ended, Japanese scholars (as well as intellectuals in general) are questioning how much the Occupation-inspired or imposed reforms have actually amounted to, after all. How deeply and genuinely has “postwar democracy” taken root in Japanese soil? Such reflective thoughts characterize the most recent general book by Eiji Takemae, Senryō sengoshi [The American Occupation and Postwar Japanese History] published in 1980. In this perceptive book the author argues that the Japanese accepted or were forced to accept political, economic, and social institutions but failed to learn enough from “the democratic spirit” which underlay them. In his strong denunciation of the “crass materialism” of the Japanese people today, can one not detect a note of nostalgia, ever so slight, for the early Occupation period—the period

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25 Eiji Takemae, Senryō sengoshi. See especially the long introductory chapter, pp. 9–57. In this new book Takemae powerfully asserts that any study of the American Occupation of Japan should include the plight of Okinawa which, because of its strategic importance, was placed under the direct military rule of the United States, unlike “Japan proper,” and whose Occupation lasted long after Japan regained her independence.

when the Japanese, at least of our generation, felt somehow optimistic about the future despite the sheer poverty and hunger?

Be that as it may, Eiji Takemae, the recognized doyen of Occupation studies in Japan, has come to emphasize how the nature of the American Occupation was subtly (and sometimes not so subtly) affected by such intangible factors as cultural, social, and linguistic differences. (For example, he devotes a delightful chapter to a highly popular radio program of English conversations—sprinkled with Americanisms—designed as a part of cultural “democratization.”)

Recognizing that a comprehensive research project must, of necessity, be conducted jointly, Takemae heads the Japanese Association for the Study of the Occupation Policy, with about fifty members, which meets monthly in Tokyo and publishes a newsletter. Needless to say, any collaborative study requires careful coordination. As Takemae himself is critically aware, too many of previous joint works are simply “mosaics” of separate treatments of various topics, a mere collection of individual essays, without great efforts to integrate them. One example is the volumes compiled and edited by *Shisō no kagaku kenkyūkai* [Research Association on the Science of Thought], which are a hodgepodge of essays by scholars, philosophers, local chroniclers, amateur historians, journalistic writers, school teachers, etc. Although they contain some penetrating essays written from the occupied side, these volumes hardly constitute systematic studies.

Another example, which purports to be an authoritative academic work, is *Iwanami kōza: Nihon rekishi, 22, Gendai* [The Iwanami Series on Japanese History, 22, The Contemporary Period], Vol. 1. This volume contains solid articles by Takemae and Akira Yamagiwa, but other

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26 The most active members of this association include: Eiji Takemae *ex officio*, Rinjiro Sodei, Akira Amakawa, Eiichi Shindo, Takeshi Igarashi, among others.


28 *Iwanami kōza: Nihon rekishi, 22, Gendai*, Vol. 1 [The Iwanami Series on Japanese History, 22, The Contemporary Period], Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1977). According to the leftist contributors, America’s reform programs were simply a part of her global “imperialistic” or “neocolonialistic” attempt to re integrate “world monopolistic capitalism” under American control, and the Japanese ruling class successfully tried, under the American Occupation, to consolidate their road to “bourgeois dictatorship.”
contributions are rehashes of old leftist interpretations. (Such an ideological framework is losing the influence it once exerted because of the appearance of new empirical studies based on archival research.)

Also disappointing is the eight-volume study, *Sengo kaikaku* [The Postwar Reforms of Japan], produced by a group of scholars affiliated with the Social Science Research Institute, University of Tokyo.29 With the exception of able works based on U.S. archival materials—such as essays by Takemae on labor policy (Vol. 5) and Akira Amakawa on reforms of local government (Vol. 3), most of the papers focus primarily on the Japanese side, thus minimizing American impact. The confused reader might get an impression that the postwar reforms took place somehow independently from and without the driving force of the Occupation authorities. Foreign scholars about to undertake Occupation studies will find more stimulating and helpful *Nihon senryō-hishi* [A Secret History of the Occupation of Japan, 2 vols.], co-authored by Takemae and Amakawa (Vol. 1) and Hata and Sodei (Vol. 2) in a popular vein but informed by archival research.30

The most recent, well-documented, collaborative study is Takafusa Nakamura, ed., *Senryōki Nihon no keizai to seiji* [The Politics and Economics of Japan during the Occupation Period].31 Takeshi Igarashi, whose earlier article is translated for this *Journal*, contributes two substantial essays based on further research into the American archives: “The Transition of the [U.S.] Occupation Policy toward Japan” and “George F. Kennan and the Shift of the Occupation Policy.” Skillfully applying the “bureaucratic politics” approach, he carefully analyzes the conflicts between the State and War Departments to explain the shift in the Occupation policy. In my view, Igarashi somewhat overemphasizes the role of Kennan and the Cold War fixation. More importantly, Igarashi—a specialist in American history—simply ignores the Japanese side, especially the initiatives taken by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who shrewdly exploited American fears of Soviet expansion to gain for Japan an improved position in international relations and an opport-

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29 Tokyo Daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyūsho [Social Science Research Institute, University of Tokyo], ed., *Sengo kaikaku* [The Postwar Reforms of Japan], 8 vols. (University of Tokyo Press, 1974–75).
31 Takafusa Nakamura, ed., *Senryōki Nihon no keizai to seiji* [The Politics and Economics of Japan during the Occupation Period] (University of Tokyo Press, 1979).
tunity to rebuild her economy. A similar failure to treat the Occupation policy as the product of complex interactions between the conquerors and the defeated mar other essays in Nakamura’s volume—with the exception of Takemae’s distinguished essay on the change in the labor policy and Ryoichi Miwa’s article on the 1949 revision of the anti-monopoly law.

Given the need for bifocal perspectives, it is not surprising that some of the best studies on the subject are produced by a handful of scholars trained in or familiar with both the American and Japanese fields: Hata, Takemae, Amakawa, Makoto Iokibe, not to mention Akira Iriye who continues to provoke both Japanese and American scholars alike.

One young Japanese historian who has taken up Iriye’s challenge is Iokibe. Originally trained in modern Japanese political-military history, he has shifted his research interest to America’s Occupation policy, and has written a number of excellent articles. A major monograph he is now completing, Beikoku no Nihon senryō seisaku [The U.S. Occupation Policy toward Japan in the Making], is solidly based on the most recently opened American archives and some Japanese materials. It will systematically analyze U.S. policy-making in 1942–45 within the context of

32 Going beyond a bifocal approach, Roger William Buckley extensively utilized the newly opened British archives (as well as American and Japanese sources) to write an excellent Ph.D. thesis at the London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), which is scheduled to be published by Cambridge University Press under the title, Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan, 1945–52.


33 “Beikoku ni okeru tai-Nichi senryō seisaku no keisei Katei: Sono kikōteki sokumen to senryōgun kōsei mondai” [The Formulation of U.S. Policy Concerning the Occupation of Japan: Its Structural Mechanism and the Problem of the Composition of Occupying Forces], Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], Vol. 74, no. 3 (October 1975) and no. 4 (December 1975); “The Blueprints for Japan: Planning for the Occupation,” Hiroshima hōgaku [The Hiroshima Law Journal], Vol. 4, no. 2 (October 1980); “Beikoku ni okeru tai-Nichi sengo seisaku no genkei: Tennōsei no mondai o chūshin ni” [The Origins of the U.S. Postwar Policy for Japan—with Particular Reference to the Imperial Institution], Seikai ronsō [The Journal of Political Science and Economics, Hiroshima University], Vol. 25, no. 6 (February 1976); “Kairo senge to Nihon no ryōdo” [The Cairo Declaration and Japan’s Postwar Territory], Hiroshima hōgaku, Vol. 4, nos. 3 & 4 combined (March 1981). The essence of his valuable work on the unconditional surrender is included in this Journal.
its total vision of the postwar world. He underscores, among other themes, the basic differences between the approach of President Roosevelt, who pursued collaboration among the Great Powers and the unconditional surrender formula, and the State Department’s expert planners who subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and favored moderate treatment of defeated Japan. Eiichi Shindo has also joined the debate on American policy-making by publishing an essay on the question of Japanese territory.\(^{34}\)

In a word, the opportunities facing Japanese and American scholars are great—perhaps too great for a single historian or a group of Japanese scholars. Therein lies the need to promote trans-Pacific collaborative work such as the three-year (1974–1978) project led by Robert E. Ward and Yoshikazu Sakamoto. The eagerly waited book, under their joint editorship, is expected to come out from an American publisher soon.\(^{35}\)

In his recent review article, Ray A. Moore has urged that Japanese scholars have “a special responsibility” for studying the “initiatives” taken by the Japanese, which were sometimes accepted but more often than not ignored by SCAP.\(^{36}\) In an earlier essay, he had chided Japanese scholars for relying almost exclusively on American sources while failing to draw more extensively on “increasing quantities of Japanese materials”—for example, the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which began to be opened in May 1976.\(^{37}\) When Moore himself came to Japan to study these materials, however, he found them highly “sanitized” (to use an understatement) and the most important documents strangely missing or withheld. Unfortunately, there exists no legislation in Japan that prohibits former bureaucrats from withdrawing documents which may prove embarrassing, either personally or otherwise.

A strongly worded appeal for a more liberal archival policy, sent to the Japanese Prime Minister from a group of Japanese and American

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\(^{35}\) Robert E. Ward and Yoshikazu Sakamoto, eds., Policy and Planning during the Allied Occupation of Japan (scheduled to be published in the United States by the end of 1981).


scholars assembled at the recent Amherst Conference on the Occupation, still remains unanswered. If the degree of archival opening can be taken as an index of a given nation’s political advancement, then Japan, I must sadly conclude, must be classified among “backward nations.”

Given this disgraceful state (one is almost tempted to say “crime against history”), it is ironic that the National Diet Library of Japan, generously financed by the government, has been expending so much money and manpower in collecting and microfilming the vast store of American materials in Suitland.38 (For that matter the United States Government is not entirely free from criticism of its archival policy. For example, the decimal files of the State Department regarding Japan have not been opened beyond 1949 despite “the twenty-five year rule,” which was recently shortened to twenty years.) More powerful and repeated


The only important publication from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is: Gaimushō [Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shoki tai-Nichi senryō seisaku: Asakai Koicho hōkokusho [The Early Occupation Policy toward Japan: Reports of Koicho Asakai], 2 vols, (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbash-sha, 1979). These “reports” constitute one of the rare instances in which a (then) young bureaucrat in a key position kept day-to-day personal memoranda on his contacts with GHQ. No student of Occupation history can afford to ignore these revealing volumes.

appeals to Tokyo and Washington are needed from major scholarly associations of both countries working in tandem.

If this selective survey of the state of the art helps to introduce our American colleagues to recent Japanese works—their nature, scope, and limitations as well as strengths—it will have served its provocative purposes. Let us hope that we are jointly coming to a stage of mature scholarship so that no historian will any longer be able to call the Occupation "the least discussed side of postwar American–East Asian relations," as one respected American colleague did almost ten years ago. 39