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## The United States and the British Withdrawal from South Arabia, 1962–1967

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The period from the late 1960s to early 1970s constituted the final phase of the British Empire in the Middle East that dated back to the nineteenth century. The sphere of British influence that had reached its zenith at the end of World War II shrank rapidly thereafter as pro-British leadership was replaced by anti-imperialist and progressive nationalists in such states as Egypt and Iraq. By the early 1960s its range had shrunk to a strip running along the northern and eastern fringes of the Arabian Peninsula. On the Persian Gulf side, the British retained an exclusive position formalized in a series of protective treaties with Bahrain, Qatar, and seven smaller sheikhdoms of the Trucial States, which formed the United Arab Emirates after 1971. The British were responsible for diplomatic and defense matters of these sheikhdoms and effectively controlled internal security through seconded or contracted British officers. The British presence in the Persian Gulf was closely linked with that of Aden and South Arabia, which came to constitute South Yemen from 1967 to 1990. The military base in Aden, the locale of the integrated British Middle East Command since 1958, guaranteed the British ability to dispatch forces swiftly to the Gulf. The importance of the Aden base was so great that it was counted as one of the three main British bases along with those in Singapore and the British Isles. Located close to the southern end of the Red Sea, Aden also served as one of the world's busiest bunkering ports into the early 1960s. The British position in South Arabia, however, deteriorated rapidly in the 1960s and collapsed

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miserably in 1967. Soon thereafter, the British government, pressed by extreme exigencies of the home economy, decided on a complete military withdrawal East of Suez, including the Persian Gulf, by the end of 1971.

These final phases leading up to the demise of the British Empire in the Middle East have been studied principally from the British side. This tendency of existing studies is understandable considering that the schedule of withdrawal was almost unilaterally set by the British, and the direct involvement of the United States in these developments turned out to be minimal. However, US policy on British withdrawal and the perspective behind it, including the reason for the absence of its direct involvement, is worth considering because the British presence had a significant meaning in overall US strategy.

In this article I consider the British withdrawal from South Arabia and the US policy toward it. Only a few works have dealt with US policy toward South Arabia, and, somewhat surprisingly, the development of British policy in the final two years has been scarcely studied using declassified British and American documents. Moreover, existing studies tend to attribute US behavior largely to the economic and financial predicaments in which the United States along with the United Kingdom was placed in the 1960s.<sup>1</sup> In contrast, I reveal in this article that US policy and behavior toward South Arabia can be understood within the context of the existing regional policy framework as well as the Anglo-American mutual understanding dating from the late 1950s, and the economic/financial problems that came to the surface in this period only reinforced these existing policy frameworks.

In retrospect, the South Arabian episode proved to be just the first act of the final phase of British withdrawal from the Middle East. But putting the first act in a larger context will provide a better perspective from which to comprehend the whole drama, including the next act in which the British finally retreated from the Persian Gulf. In other words, this article provides a point of view from which continuity and consistency of US policy toward the Middle East can better be comprehended, even though it deals specifically with a rather anticlimactic act in the whole drama.

## I. THE SETTING

In the 1960s, policymakers of the United States and the United Kingdom shared an understanding that the British should play the role of protector of Western interests in the Persian Gulf.<sup>2</sup> The United States would support the British diplomatically and, if need be, militarily, but it was the British who

should take the primary responsibility for maintaining the stability of the Gulf. This mutual understanding dated back to the Iraqi revolution of 1958. Thus, to put this tacit Anglo-American agreement in perspective, we need to go back first to the development of US regional policy for the Middle East leading up to the Iraqi revolution.

In the early to mid-1950s, the US government consistently endeavored to establish an alliance between the West and the Middle East as a whole that was characterized as a partnership based on a community of interests. Such an ambitious and persistent endeavor, which could be called an alliance project, faced formidable obstacles posed by nationalists of opposing political strands. Emerging progressive nationalists, who came to be personified in the Egyptian president Gamal Abd al-Nasser, took neutralist or sometimes pro-Soviet stances, which by definition precluded close alliance with the West. In contrast, pro-Western nationalists at the helm of such countries as Turkey and Iraq, which constituted the Baghdad Pact in 1955, were willing to align closely with the West; but at the same time they pursued confrontational foreign policies against progressive-neutralist nationalist regimes, partnership with whom the United States deemed equally essential to accomplish the alliance project. The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower tried tirelessly to overcome the growing intraregional political polarization, which proved antithetical to the alliance project to create a pro-Western Middle East as a whole by whatever means available such as persuasion, inducements, political and economic pressures, and covert operations. Even the Suez Crisis and the war that ensued did not daunt the will of US officials to carry through the project. They made another try in early 1957 by proclaiming the Eisenhower Doctrine, which, they optimistically envisaged, could resuscitate the alliance project by submerging the stigmatized Baghdad Pact and providing a new framework that a pro-Western silent majority, which they believed to exist even in the countries controlled by neutralist regimes, would find more palatable.

Such a silent majority, however, proved illusory. By summer 1957, US policymakers found that the upsurge of Nasserite nationalism had created a political climate in the region in which alignment with the West was deemed contradictory to the legitimacy of nationalism. This realization was fatal for the alliance project, because US policymakers had recognized nationalism as the predominant force in the Middle East for the foreseeable future and deemed winning over the hearts of nationalists indispensable for establishing an enduring alliance with the countries in the region. Abandoning the existing regional policy was one thing, but envisaging a

new one proved quite another. During an interregnum in regional policy that lasted for a year, US officials could neither define policy goals nor means to achieve them. As a result, US policy fluctuated wildly between conciliation and confrontation with nationalists in such countries as Syria and Lebanon.

Then came the Iraqi revolution. Right after the revolution, US policymakers were struck by the highly disquieting thought that monolithic Nasserite nationalism was sweeping away the residue of Western influence in the Arab world. In a few months, however, they found sufficient reasons to reconsider their extremely pessimistic outlook. Pro-Western dominos did not fall, partly because of the successful British and American interventions in Jordan and Lebanon respectively. More important, the fallacy of the assumption of a single monolithic Arab nationalism became clear when infighting took place within the revolutionary Iraqi government between the faction of Nasserite pan-Arabists and that of Iraqi nationalists who rejected Nasser's tutelage and pursued Iraq's independent national interests. The latter emerged triumphant by fall 1958, and the serious schism among the Arab nationalists became an established fact.

A new framework of US regional policy gradually took shape thereafter. Instead of setting a grandiose objective of creating a pro-Western Middle East, policymakers now determined to concentrate on pursuing the two fundamental interests of the United States and the West; that is, preventing the Soviet Union from attaining dominant influence in the region and maintaining an uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. In order to pursue these objectives, the United States would unilaterally maneuver and manipulate each Middle Eastern country so as to create a regional configuration of power conducive to Western interests. Endless balancing acts replaced the alliance project. In other words, the United States employed an offshore-balancing strategy as a new regional policy for the Middle East.

The US offshore-balancing strategy for the Middle East had two conspicuous characteristics. First, all the Middle Eastern states, both neutralist/anti-Western and pro-Western, were considered *equally* objects to be manipulated. There was an increasing tendency for US policymakers to evaluate each Middle Eastern state against the criteria of utility values. The United States would extend support to particular states when they were expected to further Western interests but withdraw it whenever they were not. As a result, the American relationship with each Middle Eastern state could not but be temporary in nature. Second, the United States tried to avoid direct involvement in political and military affairs in the Middle East

as far as possible. Except for Turkey, a NATO member, the United States did not extend a formal commitment to defend any state in the region. Though the United States sent military advisory missions to the recipients of military aid, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, its only combat force in the region was a small naval unit stationed at Bahrain named the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR), which consisted only of a command vessel and two or three destroyers. The United States also tried to steer clear of intraregional disputes and conflicts by rejecting siding with any party and maintaining a correct attitude toward everyone. This added flexibility and space for maneuvering. On balance, the United States distanced itself from the region rather than intensified its involvement in it. Precisely as Christopher Layne formulates in the concept of the offshore-balancing strategy, the United States was trying burden shifting rather than burden sharing.<sup>3</sup>

Someone, however, had to shoulder the burden that the United States shied away from. It was the British who willingly accepted the role of protector and guarantor of stability in the Persian Gulf. In contrast with its alienation from the Middle Eastern countries, the United States drew closer to the United Kingdom. A closer Anglo-American relationship could be found in their contingency planning for intervention in the Persian Gulf, which began to develop confidentially in the wake of the Iraqi revolution. Though there are some indications that US officials contemplated the possibility of military intervention in case of an interruption of the flow of oil from Saudi Arabia, it was the British who took the primary responsibility for maintaining stability in the Gulf, especially in the military field.<sup>4</sup>

The efficacy of this Anglo-American understanding was tested in summer 1961 when Iraq claimed the territory of Kuwait, which had just become fully independent, and moved its military force to its border with Kuwait. The British swiftly landed forces in Kuwait to deter the Iraqis. The administration of John F. Kennedy, while showing its readiness to send a small fleet to back up the British operation, benignly acquiesced in every move the British found necessary and shifted to the British virtually all the burdens from the military operations and the debate at the UN Security Council to the multiple diplomatic negotiations that would lead to an arrangement by which British forces in Kuwait were replaced by Arab League forces. At the same time, however, US officials held a much broader view than their British counterparts, who were busy dealing with day-to-day problems on the spot. The State Department, for example, envisioned a solution to the Kuwait crisis involving “a balance of Arab forces in the area, Kuwaiti, Iraqi, UAR [the United Arab Republic, effectively meaning Egypt]

and Saudi, that [would] work to assure Kuwait's independence, along with the propinquity of British forces." Thus, the department welcomed the injection of elements of the Arab League, in which Egyptian influence was predominant, reasoning that "the UAR is less of a direct threat to US-UK interests in Kuwait than is Iraq, largely because the UAR is not in a position to take Kuwait into the UAR or to control Kuwait both by reason of geography and by reason of Iraqi and Saudi opposition."<sup>5</sup>

The Kuwait crisis shows that the United States and the United Kingdom shared interests in the Persian Gulf, but there was a division of labor: the former, while eschewing direct involvement, engaged in maneuvering the configuration of power in the region conducive to Western interests, while the latter willingly played the role of proxy to protect these interests on the ground. This division of labor was also applied to South Arabia, where the British retained formal rule into the 1960s.

## II. EROSION OF THE BRITISH POSITION

The British rule of South Arabia had a multilayered structure. The city of Aden and its immediate vicinity had been a Crown colony since 1937, while its spacious hinterland constituted the Aden Protectorate. The protectorate was administratively divided between east and west, but in reality it remained a bundle of tribal polities—sultanates and sheikhdoms—with whose rulers the British had concluded a series of protective agreements. The primary function of the protectorate was to provide a buffer to protect Aden from outside influence inimical to British rule. Accordingly, British officials in the field tried to expand and intensify British influence in the protectorate in the 1950s in order to forestall the expansion of the influence of Yemen, where Nasserite Arab nationalism was growing in influence. In addition, in 1959, the British began to organize pro-British rulers in the western protectorate into a loose federation in expectation of stiffening the buffer.<sup>6</sup>

The British position in Aden, however, rapidly became precarious in the early 1960s. The internal political situation grew unstable as the increasingly influential Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC) intensified its demand for the expansion of the franchise to temporary workers in Aden in the Legislative Council of Aden, which enjoyed certain autonomy from the British governor (later high commissioner). A substantial number of temporary workers were Yemenis, receptive to the ideas of Arab nationalism. Moreover, the revolution that broke out in Yemen in September

1962 further invigorated Arab nationalists in South Arabia.<sup>7</sup> The ensuing civil war in Yemen between the revolutionary force that declared the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the royalists now in opposition became a major focal point of intraregional politics when two regional powers intervened on behalf of opposing parties. Egypt, responding to the call for help from the YAR, dispatched a large number of troops as well as civil administrators and soon established a firm presence in Yemen. Saudi Arabia, perceiving a serious threat to the security of its own regime, began to arm royalist tribes in Yemen.

Precisely when the Yemeni civil war broke out, the British scheme to ensure political stability in Aden by annexing it to its hinterland, which proved more amenable to British rule, was in the final phase of preparation. In January 1963, the colony was transformed into the State of Aden and incorporated into the federation of rulers of the western protectorate, now renamed the Federation of South Arabia (SAF).<sup>8</sup> The British tactics, however, backfired. Many Adenis were displeased with the new political arrangement of the federation in which the city of Aden was relegated to a definite minority position vis-à-vis the hinterland, whose backwardness they tended to despise. Moreover, as the Yemeni civil war dragged on, its effects permeated into South Arabia. Anti-British nationalist elements in South Arabia, under the strong influence of the YAR and Egypt, formed the National Liberation Front (NLF) and began to attack British positions and pro-British elements both in Aden and the hinterland. In December 1963, following a failed attempt to assassinate the British high commissioner in Aden, a state of emergency was declared. However, anti-British activities, including terror attacks by various nationalist forces, never ceased.<sup>9</sup>

Meanwhile, there developed differences between the British and US policies toward southwest Arabia. The Kennedy administration, convinced that an early conclusion of the Yemeni civil war would prevent possible disorder in the area, recognized the YAR. At the same time, the administration tried to persuade Nasser to refrain from intervention in Yemen while extending large amounts of economic aid to Egypt as inducement. The British, in contrast, concerned that recognition of the YAR might seriously damage British credibility and enfeeble the morale of pro-British elements in South Arabia, refrained from offering recognition.<sup>10</sup>

Under the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, US relations with Egypt soured because of Nasser's failure to fulfill his promise to terminate Egyptian involvement in Yemen. But the Anglo-American difference persisted. By spring 1964, the British, identifying Nasser clearly as "a major



enemy” of Western interests in South Arabia, urged US officials to “frame a joint Anglo-American policy to cope with him,” probably in cooperation with Saudi Arabia.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the British began to interfere, though largely indirectly, in Yemen by providing support to Yemeni royalists in expectation that the prolongation of the civil war would at least hinder Nasser’s supposed designs in South Arabia. In contrast, the Americans, still convinced that an early conclusion of the Yemeni civil war through cessation of outside interference would best enhance the possibility of regional stability, criticized the British for interfering in Yemen even in indirect forms. In order to maintain room to maneuver in intraregional politics, US policymakers adamantly resisted taking sides with parties in regional conflicts. Thus, they rejected the British invitation to form a common front against Egypt, arguing, “If we start actions which will annoy and antagonize Nasser, we have not helped our situation but have hindered it by closing a channel of communication to him and losing what little influence we have in Cairo.”<sup>12</sup> Concurrently, US officials continued their efforts to convince Nasser that “reasonably orderly change in South Arabia, rather than uncontrollable chaos which would ensue in [the] wake of sudden British withdrawal” would serve mutual interests of the US and Egypt.<sup>13</sup> But Nasser turned a deaf ear to American advice.

Too much emphasis on the Anglo-American disagreement, however, obscures the more fundamental consensus, as well as the consistency in US regional policy. Fundamentally, policymakers of both countries recognized Aden as “the key” to the maintenance of the British presence in the Persian Gulf and shared an outlook that “anarchy” would result if “the British political and military influence were removed” there.<sup>14</sup> Regarding Yemen specifically, British officials behind the scenes acknowledged the advantages of an early recognition of the YAR as well as the risks accruing from nonrecognition, but the YAR government’s unilateral decision to sever diplomatic relations left them few alternatives. Their American counterparts recognized this as well as the British need to retain credibility among their friends in South Arabia.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, British officials, while harboring deep-seated distrust of Nasser, looked to American-supported UN initiatives to bring about an Egyptian-Saudi mutual disengagement from Yemen.<sup>16</sup> In the meantime, the US administration carefully avoided anything that might adversely affect the British position in South Arabia. For example, in spring 1964, the British carried out an air attack against Harib, Yemen, as a reprisal for Yemeni republicans’ repeated infiltration, including air strikes, on SAF territory. The United States, though reluctant to offend Afro-Asian countries,



whose voice was rapidly growing in the international arena, abstained on the UN Security Council resolution condemning the British.<sup>17</sup>

The US policy of supporting the British in South Arabia while avoiding direct involvement in regional conflicts was clearly derived from the framework of the offshore-balancing strategy. By the middle of the decade, moreover, the offshore-balancing strategy in the Middle East came to be aligned more closely with US global strategy than before. The British overseas commitments became all the more important for the United States, which was pouring more and more resources into Southeast Asia, precisely when the British began to find it difficult to sustain their overseas commitments indefinitely. Concurrently, the currency system based on fixed exchange rates, the lynchpin of the postwar Bretton Woods regime, was increasingly in jeopardy. Because of Britain's ongoing foreign-exchange deficit and gold drain, the pound sterling had suffered repeatedly from speculation. Now that the value and credibility of the US dollar was also being battered, sterling effectively became the front line in defense of the dollar. The British Labour government of Harold Wilson, while rejecting devaluation, was reviewing defense expenditures, including ones accruing from overseas commitments. The US administration successfully organized an international framework for an aid package to bail out the British from a series of financial/currency crises in 1964 and 1965, aiming at two intertwined objectives of defending sterling and preserving British overseas commitments, including those in the Middle East.<sup>18</sup>

The aid package met the first objective but not completely the second, as the Wilson government decided in the Defence White Paper of February 1966 not only that the British force would be evacuated from the Aden base but also that the British would not conclude any defense arrangement with a South Arabian state after independence, presumably in 1968. The Johnson administration, though "with regret," acquiesced to the British decision for two reasons.<sup>19</sup>

First, such an outcome was not unexpected. Earlier, in June and July 1964, the British, Adeni, and SAF representatives convened in London to discuss the constitutional development of Aden and South Arabia, and agreed in principle that a unitary state of South Arabia would be given independence not later than 1968. It was also agreed at this stage that the British would conclude with an independent South Arabian state "a Defence Agreement under which Britain would retain her military base in Aden."<sup>20</sup> However, the next round of the constitutional conference scheduled for March 1965 was aborted because of increasing pressure from radical Arab

nationalists as well as the internal bickering among conservative SAF leadership.<sup>21</sup> Soon thereafter, a moderate Adeni government was replaced by one led by Abd al-Qawi al-Makkawi, who demanded a lifting of the state of emergency and implementation of UN resolutions calling for the immediate British withdrawal from Aden. Progressive and radical nationalists were gaining ground at the expense of the moderate and conservative elements.<sup>22</sup> Finally, in September, the British suspended the constitution of the State of Aden and reintroduced direct rule. Though the British had made this decision out of desperation in order to prevent the Adeni government's further drift toward an extreme anti-British position and a possible collapse of the pro-British SAF government rather than with a reasonable prospect for an orderly development toward independence, US officials acquiesced in the British decision on the grounds that the end of terror was a prerequisite to "an orderly evolution to independence" of South Arabia, and "precipitate British withdrawal from Aden area would result in [a] chaotic situation harmful to Western interests."<sup>23</sup> By this time, however, US officials had considered a pro-British independent South Arabia as almost a lost cause.<sup>24</sup>

Second, and more important, the US administration was less concerned about the future of Aden and South Arabia per se than the overall British readiness to shoulder responsibility for maintaining stability in the general area East of Suez. The British government took a position in the Defence White Paper of 1966 to retain its overall posture East of Suez as well as in NATO while curtailing some forces deployed overseas and cancelling procurement of some of the latest military equipment. Specifically, British officials made it clear that they were planning to redeploy part of the forces from Aden to its bases in such places as Bahrain and Sharjah in the Persian Gulf and that their commitment to the Gulf sheikhdoms as well as to Kuwait would be retained, though in somewhat reduced form. US officials were more appreciative of the British intention to maintain its overall posture than they were disappointed with specific decisions on Aden.<sup>25</sup>

Interestingly, the United States could have salvaged some Western influence in South Arabia had it responded positively to unofficial pleas from conservative leaders in Aden and the SAF to conclude some defense arrangement and/or to extend US aid after independence. US officials, however, consistently refused to establish such a relationship with any new state and only urged friendly South Arabians to look to the British as before.<sup>26</sup> In mid-1966, the US administration reaffirmed the existing policy toward South Arabia, agreeing "that it is in the US interest that the West retain a significant influence in South Arabia; also that dominant Communist

influence in the area be prevented, and that major regional disputes (such as a Saudi-UAR confrontation) over the area be avoided,” but “any attempt to pre-empt the area for the West and to ensure its political and economic stability would require a major commitment of resources, the justification for which has not been established.”<sup>27</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed these conclusions, pointing out that Aden was no longer essential militarily even though its continued availability might be valuable.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, the US administration kept its distance from developments in South Arabia and looked to the British to establish a sustainable, and as pro-Western as possible, government before their withdrawal.<sup>29</sup>

### III. DRIFT AND COLLAPSE

The British, however, could no longer manage the course of events in South Arabia, and their policy oscillated between continued reliance on the SAF and a trial opening to the nationalists. Throughout 1966, British policy focused on strengthening the SAF government, which consisted of pro-British elements from Aden and the hinterland. The British government tried to bolster the SAF by expanding military aid, justifying it on the grounds that “the humiliation of a disorderly withdrawal would weaken confidence in us in the Persian Gulf; and our failure to bring South Arabia to independence in an orderly manner would damage our prestige throughout the world.”<sup>30</sup> As the situation in South Arabia, especially in Aden, further deteriorated into 1967, the British objective came to be defined narrowly as maintaining the SAF government “at least up to the time of our final withdrawal” in order to eliminate “the risk of becoming involved in internal security operations after independence.”<sup>31</sup> Thus, in March, the Wilson government decided to advance the date of South Arabian independence from 1968 to November 1967 because the prospect of maintaining order was dimming, and tried to obtain the consent of the SAF government by offering to keep British naval forces in the vicinity for six months after independence to provide air defense against external threats. The adamant rejection by the SAF, however, forced them to reschedule independence again to January 1968.<sup>32</sup> US officials quietly accepted a series of British decisions, recognizing the growing British concern over the viability of the SAF.<sup>33</sup>

Thereafter, British policy shifted to backing the formation of a broadly-based government. Their effort was now focused on the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), headed by an ATUC leader Abdullah al-Asnaj and supported by Egypt. It was thought that the FLOSY,

while following a strongly nationalist line of demanding expulsion of Western influence, was likely to take a relatively moderate approach in comparison with its more radical rival, the NLF, which had taken a strongly anti-Egyptian position and parted completely with the FLOSY. The infighting between these nationalist forces, along with their assault on British personnel and the SAF government, had intensified.<sup>34</sup> US diplomats in close coordination with their British counterparts tried confidentially to persuade the FLOSY leadership to negotiate.<sup>35</sup> To their chagrin, however, the FLOSY rejected any negotiation either with the British or the United Nations, which had dispatched a special mission to help establish a South Arabian government that would include nationalist elements, unless it was recognized in advance as the sole representative of South Arabia.<sup>36</sup> The FLOSY publicly announced its position on April 23, which made UK-FLOSY talks almost impossible, and by default brought the NLF, which had been banned as a subversive organization, for the first time into the picture as part of a possible solution to the increasingly chaotic South Arabian situation.<sup>37</sup>

By the early summer, the situation in Aden had so deteriorated that terror and street fighting became daily events. The devastating defeat of the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli War in June (the Six-Day War) greatly aroused nationalist feeling against the West along with Israel. This made British military activities in and out of the Aden base, as well as normal business in Aden, almost impossible. In these circumstances, the British government in early July tilted again toward the SAF and decided to expand military aid, which now included heavy equipment such as bomber aircraft.<sup>38</sup> US officials, while depicting the British policy as “a gamble,” acquiesced to it in recognition that the possibility of co-opting nationalists had all but been dashed.<sup>39</sup>

Shortly thereafter, the British government tried a last-ditch effort to form a broadly-based government by expanding the supposedly strengthened SAF government. Under the strong influence of the last high commissioner in Aden, Humphrey Trevelyan, a seasoned diplomat who had witnessed the collapse of British presence in Egypt in 1956 as ambassador on the spot, the Supreme Council of the SAF chose in early July a new prime minister designate, Husayn ‘Ali Bayyumi, who was expected to be acceptable to conservative hinterland rulers, the armed forces (South Arabian Army: SAA), and the NLF, but not the FLOSY. The British were beginning to find partners for a broadly based government in the NLF, which had acquired a clear upper hand not only in the hinterland but also in Aden vis-à-vis the

FLOSY after the short-lived but disquieting nationalist uprising in the so-called Crater district of the city, triggered by a mutiny of elements of the SAA and the police.<sup>40</sup> However, the new government never took off. Leading figures declined to cooperate with the thinly veiled machinations of the British, and the FLOSY took a highly hostile stance. Though Bayyumi managed to present a list of government members, internal strife among the SAF leadership prevented the Supreme Council from approving it.<sup>41</sup> This episode marked the end not only of the British hope to form a broadly-based government but also of the SAF as a political entity. By late August, the SAF government, except for the SAA, ceased its functions and effectively disintegrated much more rapidly than Anglo-American officialdom had expected. Concurrently, in the hinterland, the sultans' rule crumbled, and the NLF seized power in many tiny principalities.<sup>42</sup>

Now the SAA leadership demanded that the British negotiate directly with both the NLF and the FLOSY. US officials, still determined not to assume a role "beyond that of interested observer," became concerned that the British might be driven to the impossible position of becoming a mediator of warring nationalist factions.<sup>43</sup> British officials, however, revised policy much more radically than their American counterparts had supposed. On September 5, Trevelyan issued a statement declaring that the SAF government had "ceased to function and no longer exercises control in the federation" and calling on "the nationalist forces" to commence discussions for forming a new government.<sup>44</sup> His aide confided to a US diplomat that behind his statement was a calculation that "orderly British withdrawal and formation [of a] viable South Arabian government can best be achieved with cooperation of groups which control terrorism."<sup>45</sup>

Policymakers in London soon found in the virtual disintegration of the SAF government an opportunity to extricate themselves from obligations they had somewhat reluctantly assumed. They also considered that formidable obstacles to negotiation with nationalist elements had been removed now that they were no longer bound by moral responsibility toward pro-Western regimes in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, which had insisted that a viable pro-Western regime be left behind after the British departure. They could also calculate that the external threat to South Arabia was reduced, given that Nasser was rapidly withdrawing Egyptian troops from Yemen after his devastating defeat in the Six-Day War. As a result, in late October, the Wilson government annulled its commitment of six-months' air defense along with heavy equipment that had been included in the military aid program to an independent South Arabian state.<sup>46</sup>

By now the British thought it most likely that the successor to their rule would be the NLF, which was about to establish a preponderant position among nationalist factions. The British found the NLF, the most left-wing faction in South Arabia, acceptable simply because it could best help orderly withdrawal of the British troops. At the same time, they officially retained a neutral position toward all nationalist factions, because the FLOSY, though weakened after losing substantial support from Egypt, remained influential enough to disrupt a British-NLF deal. Thus, the British waited nervously for two months to see the outcome of inconclusive NLF-FLOSY talks in Cairo that were sponsored by the Arab League. Finally, the declaration issued by the SAA leadership on November 6 stating that they recognized “the NLF as the only organization legally representing the people of South Arabia” and appealing to the NLF to enter into discussions with the British provided a long-awaited way out.<sup>47</sup> On November 14, Foreign Secretary George Brown declared in the House of Commons the decision to initiate negotiations with the NLF, and the British-NLF talks in Geneva on transferring sovereignty started at last on the 21st. The agreement was signed on the morning of the 29th, the day the last British soldier departed from Aden. On the next day, the establishment of the People’s Republic of South Yemen (PRSY) was proclaimed by the government led by the NLF leader Qahtan al-Sha’abi.<sup>48</sup>

Meanwhile, US officials were silently watching the British departure. The only exception was their diplomatic presentation to King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, who bitterly criticized the British policy in South Arabia, alleging that the British had colluded with the NLF at the expense of the SAF. US officials defended in general terms the British policy of negotiation with the NLF, arguing that “reality and not UK preferences must govern [the] last phase of disengagement.”<sup>49</sup>

Behind their equanimity was a sober observation and calculation regarding the intraregional balance of power. As early as May, when they shared with the British the objective of forming a broadly-based government, they considered that “our most important concern is not with respect to South Arabia itself but the implications of the transition for neighboring regimes friendly to us, notably Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Ethiopia.” Observing that a nationalist regime that might possibly emerge in South Arabia would “reflect the strong impulses of independence” that would resist any outside interference, they concluded that US interests would still be served “if the transition is relatively peaceful and takes place with a minimum of outside intervention” and that “to whom among internal elements the transfer is made” was a lesser concern.<sup>50</sup> In early November,



they chillily observed that what was taking place in southwest Arabia in essence was “both the Egyptians and the British are withdrawing militarily.” Though “what the independent regime might look like is still an enigma,” they predicted that “Arabism may be less a concern than the immediate problem of the creation of a unified nation.”<sup>51</sup> They found a South Arabia led by an anti-Western regime acceptable so long as it remained free from the dominant influence of the Soviet Union or Communist China, and the US diplomatic post in Aden, the only one in the southwest Arabia area and serving also as a listening post, could remain. What the United States should and could do was to extend diplomatic recognition as soon as deemed appropriate in order to offset its inability to offer economic and military assistance, which Communist countries were expected to be willing to do.<sup>52</sup>

In contrast, US officials responded very nervously to the slightest signs of the possibility of British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Rumors and speculation about an early British retreat from the Gulf were already spreading not only in London but also in the Middle East, partly because of the Wilson government’s earlier decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia by the mid-1970s. Many rulers of the Trucial States expressed strong concern about such possibilities, and King Faysal’s criticism of the British policy in South Arabia was at least partly derived from the same concern. US officials repeatedly confirmed to their British counterparts their “continuing belief that their [British] role in [the] Gulf remains crucial for maintenance [of] stability in [the] foreseeable future” and cheered the British “experienced note of caution against too facile comparison between situations in South Arabia and [the] Gulf States.”<sup>53</sup> The State Department became highly offended when it learned that the British ambassador to Saudi Arabia in reassuring King Faysal had told him that the British would stay in the Gulf “at least until 1970.”<sup>54</sup> The department instantly directed the embassy in London to “make low-key attempt [to] determine” British intentions. This did not become a diplomatic issue as the embassy soon reported back that the Foreign Office “assure[s] us [the] British intend [to] remain in [the] Gulf as long as need be: i.e. until adequate local security arrangements are made,” even though the Ministry of Defence envisioned that they would be out of the Gulf by the mid-1970s when they would withdraw also from Singapore and Malaysia.<sup>55</sup> Even in November, the British reiterated publicly as well as confidentially to US officials and leaders of Persian Gulf states that their commitment to the security of the Gulf would be unaffected by the departure from Aden. Accordingly, US officials could retain their assumption that “so long as the British remain, we



would expect general political stability in the Gulf.”<sup>56</sup>

### CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the Aden/South Arabian episode, the offshore-balancing strategy demarcated the outer limit of the behavior of the United States. The United States, while carefully avoiding its own involvement and calculating the intraregional balance of power, acquiesced in British policies in South Arabia. The Anglo-American relationship over South Arabia went basically well because both sides respected the division of labor that resulted from the mutual understanding of the late 1950s. And it was on the understanding that the British would continue to take the primary responsibility for maintaining the stability of the Persian Gulf that the US government accepted the British decision to leave Aden. Though US officials hoped to see an independent South Arabia politically oriented toward the West, they did not consider this objective so important as to justify allotting American resources either economically or politically.

Certainly, the increasingly precarious economic and financial conditions of the mid-1960s as well as the opinions of the US Congress and public that were becoming rapidly critical of expansive foreign policies set limits on the foreign policy options available to US policymakers. However, these factors did not specifically determine the options to be employed. The US-sponsored package in support of the pound sterling in the middle of the decade shows that the US administration was prepared to share the burden in the form of bolstering the United Kingdom itself rather than taking over its overseas commitments. Moreover, the basic character and contour of US policy toward South Arabia proved unchanged since the early 1960s when the Western economic problems had not seemed so serious and the United States had not yet dispatched substantial combat forces to Vietnam. While economic factors limited US options, it was the offshore-balancing strategy that determined the specific course the United States actually took in South Arabia. Somewhat surprisingly, the renewed British economic crisis of 1967, which proved much deeper than that of previous years and finally led to the devaluation of the pound sterling on November 18, had little impact on US policy toward South Arabia. Even in the critical weeks of November and after the independence of PRSY, US officials continued to express hope to their British counterparts that the British should “sustain an effective level [of] assistance to new state . . . in order [to] obviate full PRSY dependence on Communists for essential needs,” while refusing to share any of the

burden themselves.<sup>57</sup>

As it turned out, however, the days when US policymakers could count on the British to play a proxy role in the Middle East were numbered. In early January 1968, they were galvanized by the British decision to withdraw entirely from East of Suez by 1971. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President Johnson expressed “dismay” at “British withdrawal from world affairs.” At a meeting with Foreign Secretary Brown on January 11, Rusk went so far as to depict the British decision as “a catastrophic loss to human society” and advised him very succinctly, “Be Britain.” However, the British determination to make a complete withdrawal proved firm. Moreover, they were adamant on announcing explicitly the planned date of departure, reasoning that such a course would reduce “the risk of an Aden type situation.”<sup>58</sup>

It should be noted, however, that this did not mark the end of the US offshore-balancing strategy but rather the beginning of the same strategy that depended on Middle Eastern regional powers, instead of Britain, as proxies. A clue to such a new offshore-balancing strategy had already emerged in the harsh exchanges at the Rusk-Brown meeting. When Rusk told Brown that “the resulting gap would be contrary to free world interests” and that the “US could not pick up these responsibilities,” Brown rebutted saying that “there was no reason why it should be filled by HMG” and advised that regional powers along with the United States should “get together to discuss how to fill that gap.”<sup>59</sup> Soon thereafter, Anglo-American policymakers came to share a general outlook that the key to the security of the post-Britannic Gulf should rest on regional powers, especially Iran and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia. The American principle of burden shifting in the Middle East, nevertheless, proved so unwavering that the United States continued to place the primary responsibility for constructing a new political order in the Persian Gulf on the United Kingdom until the very last moment of the British presence there in 1971. Seen in this context, the consistent American noninvolvement in the developments in South Arabia, which lay between the Kuwait crisis of 1961 and the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf, provides the missing link to understanding the continuity of the US offshore-balancing strategy throughout the 1960s.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Spencer Mawby, *British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1955–67: Last Outpost of a Middle East Empire* (London: Routledge, 2005) is the only work that extensively uses declassified British documents to elucidate the development of the British policy toward

South Arabia, but it pays little attention to American behavior. Karl Pieragostini, *Britain, Aden and South Arabia: Abandoning Empire* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1991), chaps. 2–8, analyzes the development of British policies in detail but deals only with the period up to early 1966. An article by Yusuke Shibazaki, “Sekaiteki Eikyōryoku Iji no Kokoromi: Suez-itou karano Tettai to Igrisu no Chutou Seisaku” (The search for worldwide influences: Withdrawal from the East of Suez and British policy for the Middle East), in *Teikoku no Nagai Kage* (Long shadows of empire), ed. Yoichi Kibata and Harumi Goto (Kyoto: Minerva Shobou, 2010), 71–92, provides a concise overview of the development of British policy toward South Arabia. Although it does not use the primary British declassified documents used in more recent works, Glen Balfour-Paul, *The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap. 3, written by a former diplomat, remains a highly valuable account. Paul Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 4, is a detailed account focused on domestic dynamics. W. Taylor Fain, *American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 153–65, provides a short description of US policy toward South Arabia based on analysis of primary sources.

<sup>2</sup> The argument in this section is based on Toru Onozawa, *Maboroshi no Doumei: Reisen-shoki Amerika no Chutou Seisaku* (Illusory alliance: American regional policy for the Middle East in the early Cold War), 2 vols. (Nagoya: University of Nagoya Press, 2016). This article deals with the period immediately following those dealt with in the book and is partially intended to show the validity of its conclusion on US offshore-balancing strategy for the Middle East.

<sup>3</sup> Christopher Layne, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (Spring, 2002): 233–48.

<sup>4</sup> Memorandum by Arabian Department of Foreign Office (hereafter FO), “United Kingdom/United States Military Planning in the Middle East (especially Kuwait),” June 6, 1961, in FO371/156694/B1198/3, The National Archives, Kew, England (hereafter TNA). See also Onozawa, *Maboroshi no doumei*, 954–63, 1158–62.

<sup>5</sup> Phillips Talbot to Dean Rusk, “Consultation with the UK on the Kuwait Situation,” July 7, 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1961–1963, microfiche supplement to vols. 17, 18, 20, and 21, document no. 196. On details of the Kuwait crisis, see Onozawa, *Maboroshi no doumei*, 1162–84.

<sup>6</sup> Spencer Mawby, “Britain’s Last Imperial Frontier: The Aden Protectorates, 1952–59,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 29, no. 2 (2001): 75–100.

<sup>7</sup> Aden to Colonial Office (hereafter CO), no. 789, October 6, 1962; CO to Aden, no. 756, October 8, 1962, both in PREM11/3684, TNA. (Hereafter, “TNA” is omitted in citations of “PREM” and “CAB” documents held at TNA.)

<sup>8</sup> Memorandum for Prime Minister, “Constitutional Development in Aden (C.(61)68 and 70),” May 29, 1961, and Memorandum for Prime Minister, “Constitutional Development in Aden (C.P.C.(62)8),” February 15, 1962, both in PREM11/3684. The remaining parts of the protectorate, mostly in the eastern half, were reorganized into the Protectorate of South Arabia.

<sup>9</sup> Pieragostini, *Abandoning Empire*, chaps. 3 and 4.

<sup>10</sup> CC(62)66, CAB128/36/66, November 6, 1962; Simon C. Smith, “Revolution and Reaction: South Arabia in the Aftermath of the Yemeni Revolution,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 28, no. 3 (2000): 193–208. As for the Kennedy administration’s policy toward Egypt, see Douglas Little, “New Frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser, and Arab Nationalism,” *Journal of American History*, 75, no. 2 (September 1988): 501–27; Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Kennedy Administration and the Egyptian-Saudi Conflict in Yemen: Co-Opting

Arab Nationalism,” *Middle East Journal* 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 292–311.

<sup>11</sup> Memorandum of Conversation (hereafter Memcon), April 27, 1964, *FRUS, 1964–69*, 21: 130–35.

<sup>12</sup> Butler to Douglas-Home, PS/64/30, March 20, 1964, in PREM11/4678; Memcon, April 27, 1964, *FRUS, 1964–69*, 21: 130–35.

<sup>13</sup> Department of State (hereafter DOS) to Cairo, no. 2064, May 5, 1964, *FRUS, 1964–69*, 21: 136–38.

<sup>14</sup> London to DOS, A-2919, May 31, 1963, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, 18: 559–61; Memcon, January 30, 1964, *FRUS, 1964–1969*, 21: 118–25.

<sup>15</sup> C (63)3, CAB129/112/3, January 10, 1963; CC (63)11, CAB128/37/11, February 14, 1963; London to DOS, no. 1721, October 30, 1962, in “UK General 10/15/62–11/12/62” folder, National Security File, John F. Kennedy Library.

<sup>16</sup> CC (63)16, CAB128/37/16, March 14, 1963; C.C. (64)8, CAB128/39/8, November 12, 1964.

<sup>17</sup> DOS to USUN, no. 2581, April 1, 1964, *FRUS, 1964–1969*, 21: 621–22; Memorandum for the Record, April 16, 1964, *FRUS, 1964–1969*, 21: 626; CM (64)21, CAB128/38/35, April 9, 1964; CM (64)23, CAB128/38/37, April 16, 1964. The British government decided on the retaliatory attack rather hesitantly in order to address the strong grievance expressed by the SAF government. It informed Secretary of State Dean Rusk of its plan in advance. Rusk stopped short of endorsing but did not oppose it. FO to Washington, no. 4372, March 26, 1964; Washington to FO, no. 1188, March 28, 1964; Washington to FO, no. 1211, April 1, 1964, all in PREM11/4679.

<sup>18</sup> Francis J. Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 125–33; Jeremy Fielding, “Coping with Decline: US Policy toward the British Defense Reviews of 1966,” *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 633–56.

<sup>19</sup> C(66)33, CAB129/124/33, February 11, 1966; C(66)34, CAB129/124/34, February 11, 1966; CC(66)8, CAB128/41/8, February 14, 1966; Memcon, January 22, 1966, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 12: 514–15.

<sup>20</sup> London to DOS, no. 48, July 5, 1964, in DOS Central Files, in POL 19 ADEN, RG59, NARA (hereafter cited only “POL 19 ADEN”); London to DOS, no. 161, July 10, 1964, in POL 19 ADEN; Airgram from London, A-9, July 18, 1964, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>21</sup> Aden to DOS, no. 109, February 24, 1965, in POL 19 ADEN; Airgram from Aden, A-124, February 27, 1965, in POL 19 ADEN. Interestingly, American diplomats observed that the SAF leadership’s support for the British was weakening as they became concerned about the British Labour government’s tilt toward the voice of Aden and the ATUC.

<sup>22</sup> Airgrams from Aden, A-152, April 5, 1965, and A-180, May 17, 1965, both in POL 19 ADEN. See also Pieragostini, *Abandoning Empire*, 95–100.

<sup>23</sup> Aden to CO, no. 998, September 16, 1965; Memorandum for Prime Minister, “Aden,” September 23, 1965, both in PREM13/113; Circular Telegram from DOS, no. 509, September 28, 1965, *FRUS, 1964–1969*, 21: 148–49; Circular Telegram from DOS, no. 625, October 14, 1965, in POL 19 ADEN. Subsequently, the United States voted against resolutions submitted to the UN General Assembly as well as at lower committees deploring the British behavior in South Arabia and demanding immediate British withdrawal from Aden. Circular Airgram from DOS, CA-4185, October 15, 1965, *FRUS, 1964–1969*, 21: 149–53.

<sup>24</sup> Memorandum, “British Position in Aden and Persian Gulf,” September 2, 1965, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 146–48; Memorandum by CIA, November 5, 1965, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 156–61.

<sup>25</sup> Memcon, January 27, 1966, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 12: 516–28; Memcon, February 4, 1966,

*FRUS, 1964–1969*, 21: 162–65; Fielding, “Coping with Decline,” 650–51.

<sup>26</sup> Aden to DOS, no. 147, May 18, 1966, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 170–71; DOS to Aden, no. 22442, August 5, 1966, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 173–74. In February 1967, King Faysal of Saudi Arabia also expressed concern about post-Britannic South Arabia and urged “action to create stability by the US.” But the administration did not move. Stewart Udall to Dean Rusk, February 15, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>27</sup> IRG/NEA 66–35, October 14, 1966, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 181–83.

<sup>28</sup> Paper Prepared by JCS, August 9, 1966, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 175–77; JCS to McNamara, May 18, 1967, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 203–6.

<sup>29</sup> Memcon, October 19, 1966, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 183–85; London to DOS, no. 5986, January 27, 1967, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 191–93; DOS to Aden, no. 155272, March 15, 1967, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 197; Aden to DOS, no. 1168, March 14, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>30</sup> CC (66)26, CAB128/41/26, May 26, 1966.

<sup>31</sup> CC (67)13, CAB128/42/13, March 16, 1967.

<sup>32</sup> CC (67)13, CAB128/42/13, March 16, 1967; Circular Telegram from DOS, no. 160010, March 22, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; C(67)78, May 9, 1967, CAB129/129/28.

<sup>33</sup> William Handley to Under Secretary, “Your Appointment with Sir Michael Stewart, British Charge,” undated; Memcon, “Revised British Withdrawal Plans for South Arabia,” March 16, 1967; Aden to DOS, no. 1438, May 17, 1967, all in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>34</sup> Cairo to DOS, no. 4327, February 2, 1967; London to DOS, no. 7101, March 3, 1967, both in POL 19 ADEN. While the FLOSYS’s political base existed in Aden, the NLF, though originating in the hinterland, was also expanding its influence in Aden, especially among labor movements. Nasser tried in vain to unify these two groups in December 1965, and thereafter stood behind the FLOSYS because he found it more amenable than the NLF. Aden to DOS, no. 1267, April 5, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>35</sup> DOS to Taiz, no. 151922, March 9, no. 153487, March 11, and no. 153578, March 13, in POL 19 ADEN; DOS to London, no. 178848, April 20, 1967, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 201–2.

<sup>36</sup> Taiz to DOS, no. 1376, April 20, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; C(67)78, CAB129/129/28, May 9, 1967. In early April, the UN mission arrived but soon left Aden, having failed to establish contact with the FLOSYS. This failure effectively doomed the possibility that the UN mission could bring about a broadly based government, which both US and UK officials had looked forward to. Memcon, “UN Mission to Aden,” April 29, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>37</sup> Aden to DOS, no. 1342, April 23, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; London to DOS, no. 8915, April 28, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>38</sup> Aden to DOS, no. 1584, June 14, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; London to DOS, no. 10453, June 16, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; Aden to DOS, no. 1607, June 20, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; FO and CO to Certain British Missions, Guidance no. 171, July 4, PREM13/1297.

<sup>39</sup> Lucius Battle to Acting Secretary, “Independence Arrangements for South Arabia,” June 19, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>40</sup> Aden to FO, no. 855, June 27, 1967, in PREM13/1297; Memorandum for Prime Minister, “Aden,” June 28, 1967, in PREM13/1297; CC(67)50, CAB128/42/50, July 20, 1967; London to DOS, no. 10761, June 28, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; Aden to DOS, no. 29, July 6, and no. 36, July 8, in POL 19 ADEN. See also Mawby, *British Policy*, 164–69.

<sup>41</sup> Aden to DOS, no. 55, July 13; no. 73, July 19; and no. 93, July 26, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>42</sup> Aden to FO, no. 1233, August 21, 1967, in PREM13/1297; Aden to DOS, no. 226 and no. 227, August 28; no. 234, August 31, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; CC(67)54, CAB128/42/54, September 7, 1967.

<sup>43</sup> Aden to DOS, no. 234, August 31, 1967, POL 19 ADEN; DOS to London, no. 31801,

September 2, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>44</sup> FO and CO to Certain British Missions, Guidance no. 227, September 5, 1967, in PREM13/1297.

<sup>45</sup> Aden to DOS, no. 254, September 4, no. 259 and no. 261, September 5, 1967; London to DOS, no. 1636, September 4, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>46</sup> Memorandum for Prime Minister, “South Arabia,” October 26, 1967, in PREM13/1297; C(67)169, CAB129/133/29, October 26, 1967; CC(67)62, CAB128/42/62, October 30, 1967; FO to Aden, no. 1969, October 31, 1967, in PREM13/1297.

<sup>47</sup> Aden to FO, no. 1689–1691, November 6, 1967, in PREM13/1297; US Mission to NATO to DOS, no. 355, November 10, 1967, POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>48</sup> Aden to DOS, no. 567 and no. 568, November 11, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister, PM/67/104, November 13, 1967, in PREM13/1297; CC(67)68, CAB128/42/68, November 23, 1967; CC(67)69, CAB128/42/69, November 30, 1967.

<sup>49</sup> Jidda to DOS, no. 910, September 5; no. 976, September 10 and no. 1060, September 14, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; DOS to Jidda, no. 38541, September 16, and no. 43065, September 25, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>50</sup> Memorandum Prepared by DOS, “Future of South Arabia,” undated, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 211–15.

<sup>51</sup> Memorandum Prepared by DOS, “South Arabian Prospects,” November 8, 1967, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 237–41.

<sup>52</sup> Rusk to Johnson, December 4, 1967, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 249–50. As for the possibility of expansion of Soviet and/or Chinese influence, see Research Memorandum, “A New Look at South Arabia,” July 25, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>53</sup> Dhahran to DOS, no. 212, September 24, 1967; London to DOS, no. 2384, September 27, 1967; DOS to London, no. 47358, October 2, 1967; DOS to London, no. 55444, October 17, 1967, all in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>54</sup> Jidda to DOS, no. 1647, October 28, and no. 1674, October 31, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>55</sup> DOS to London, no. 61726, October 30, 1967; London to DOS, no. 3509, November 1, and no. 3752, November 9, 1967, all in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>56</sup> NIE30–1–67, “The Persian Gulf States,” May 18, 1967, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 206–8; Battle to Rusk, November 20, 1967, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 244–45; London to DOS, no. 4365, November 29, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.

<sup>57</sup> Memcon, November 1, 1967, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 232–33; DOS to London, no. 86853, December 19, 1967, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 255–56; Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power*, 166–71.

<sup>58</sup> All the quotations in this paragraph are from Memcon, January 11, 1968, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 12: 603–8; Johnson to Wilson, January 11, 1968, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 12: 608–9. As for the background of the attitude of US officials, see Battle to Rusk, January 9, 1968, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 21: 256–58.

<sup>59</sup> Memcon, January 11, 1968, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 12: 603–8.